# RFC 8017 - PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                  K. Moriarty, Ed.
Request for Comments: 8017                               EMC Corporation
Obsoletes: 3447                                               B. Kaliski
Category: Informational                                         Verisign
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               J. Jonsson
Subset AB
A. Rusch
RSA
November 2016

PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2

Abstract

This document provides recommendations for the implementation of
public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm, covering
cryptographic primitives, encryption schemes, signature schemes with
appendix, and ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying
the schemes.

This document represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 from RSA
Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series.  By
publishing this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF.

This document also obsoletes RFC 3447.

Status of This Memo

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors.  All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
2.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
3.  Key Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
3.1.  RSA Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
3.2.  RSA Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
4.  Data Conversion Primitives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
4.1.  I2OSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
4.2.  OS2IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
5.  Cryptographic Primitives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
5.1.  Encryption and Decryption Primitives  . . . . . . . . . .  12
5.1.1.  RSAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
5.1.2.  RSADP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
5.2.  Signature and Verification Primitives . . . . . . . . . .  15
5.2.1.  RSASP1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
5.2.2.  RSAVP1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
6.  Overview of Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
7.  Encryption Schemes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
7.1.  RSAES-OAEP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
7.1.1.  Encryption Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
7.1.2.  Decryption Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
7.2.  RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
7.2.1.  Encryption Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
7.2.2.  Decryption Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
8.  Signature Scheme with Appendix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
8.1.  RSASSA-PSS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
8.1.1.  Signature Generation Operation  . . . . . . . . . . .  33
8.1.2.  Signature Verification Operation  . . . . . . . . . .  34
8.2.  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
8.2.1.  Signature Generation Operation  . . . . . . . . . . .  36
8.2.2.  Signature Verification Operation  . . . . . . . . . .  37
9.  Encoding Methods for Signatures with Appendix . . . . . . . .  39
9.1.  EMSA-PSS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
9.1.1.  Encoding Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
9.1.2.  Verification Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
9.2.  EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
A.1.  RSA Key Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
A.1.1.  RSA Public Key Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
A.1.2.  RSA Private Key Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
A.2.  Scheme Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
A.2.1.  RSAES-OAEP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
A.2.2.  RSAES-PKCS-v1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
A.2.3.  RSASSA-PSS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
A.2.4.  RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
Appendix B.  Supporting Techniques  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
B.1.  Hash Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
B.2.  Mask Generation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
B.2.1.  MGF1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
Appendix C.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
Appendix D.  Revision History of PKCS #1  . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
Appendix E.  About PKCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78

1.  Introduction

This document provides recommendations for the implementation of
public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm [RSA], covering
the following aspects:

o  Cryptographic primitives

o  Encryption schemes

o  Signature schemes with appendix

o  ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying the schemes

The recommendations are intended for general application within
computer and communications systems and as such include a fair amount
of flexibility.  It is expected that application standards based on
these specifications may include additional constraints.  The
recommendations are intended to be compatible with the standards IEEE
1363 [IEEE1363], IEEE 1363a [IEEE1363A], and ANSI X9.44 [ANSIX944].

This document supersedes PKCS #1 version 2.1 [RFC3447] but includes
compatible techniques.

The organization of this document is as follows:

o  Section 1 is an introduction.

o  Section 2 defines some notation used in this document.

o  Section 3 defines the RSA public and private key types.

o  Sections 4 and 5 define several primitives, or basic mathematical
operations.  Data conversion primitives are in Section 4, and
cryptographic primitives (encryption-decryption and signature-
verification) are in Section 5.

o  Sections 6, 7, and 8 deal with the encryption and signature
schemes in this document.  Section 6 gives an overview.  Along
with the methods found in PKCS #1 v1.5, Section 7 defines an
encryption scheme based on Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
(OAEP) [OAEP], and Section 8 defines a signature scheme with
appendix based on the Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS)
[RSARABIN] [PSS].

o  Section 9 defines the encoding methods for the signature schemes
in Section 8.

o  Appendix A defines the ASN.1 syntax for the keys defined in
Section 3 and the schemes in Sections 7 and 8.

o  Appendix B defines the hash functions and the mask generation
function (MGF) used in this document, including ASN.1 syntax for
the techniques.

o  Appendix C gives an ASN.1 module.

o  Appendices D and E outline the revision history of PKCS #1 and
provide general information about the Public-Key Cryptography
Standards.

This document represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 [PKCS1_22]
from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
series.

1.1.  Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Notation

The notation in this document includes:

c              ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and
n-1

C              ciphertext, an octet string

d              RSA private exponent

d_i            additional factor r_i's CRT exponent,
a positive integer such that

e * d_i == 1 (mod (r_i-1)), i = 3, ..., u

dP             p's CRT exponent, a positive integer such that

e * dP == 1 (mod (p-1))

dQ             q's CRT exponent, a positive integer such that

e * dQ == 1 (mod (q-1))

e              RSA public exponent

EM             encoded message, an octet string

emBits         (intended) length in bits of an encoded message EM

emLen          (intended) length in octets of an encoded message
EM

GCD(. , .)     greatest common divisor of two nonnegative integers

Hash           hash function

hLen           output length in octets of hash function Hash

k              length in octets of the RSA modulus n

K              RSA private key

L              optional RSAES-OAEP label, an octet string

LCM(., ..., .) least common multiple of a list of nonnegative
integers

m              message representative, an integer between 0 and
n-1

M              message, an octet string

mask           MGF output, an octet string

maskLen        (intended) length of the octet string mask

MGF            mask generation function

mgfSeed        seed from which mask is generated, an octet string

mLen           length in octets of a message M

n              RSA modulus, n = r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_u , u >= 2

(n, e)         RSA public key

p, q           first two prime factors of the RSA modulus n

qInv           CRT coefficient, a positive integer less than
p such that q * qInv == 1 (mod p)

r_i            prime factors of the RSA modulus n, including
r_1 = p, r_2 = q, and additional factors if any

s              signature representative, an integer between 0 and
n-1

S              signature, an octet string

sLen           length in octets of the EMSA-PSS salt

t_i            additional prime factor r_i's CRT coefficient, a
positive integer less than r_i such that

r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i-1) * t_i == 1 (mod r_i) ,

i = 3, ... , u

u              number of prime factors of the RSA modulus, u >= 2

x              a nonnegative integer

X              an octet string corresponding to x

xLen           (intended) length of the octet string X

0x             indicator of hexadecimal representation of an octet
or an octet string: "0x48" denotes the octet with
hexadecimal value 48; "(0x)48 09 0e" denotes the
string of three consecutive octets with hexadecimal
values 48, 09, and 0e, respectively

\lambda(n)     LCM(r_1-1, r_2-1, ... , r_u-1)

\xor           bit-wise exclusive-or of two octet strings

\ceil(.)       ceiling function; \ceil(x) is the smallest integer
larger than or equal to the real number x

||             concatenation operator

==             congruence symbol; a == b (mod n) means that the
integer n divides the integer a - b

Note: The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) can be applied in a non-
recursive as well as a recursive way.  In this document, a recursive
approach following Garner's algorithm [GARNER] is used.  See also
Note 1 in Section 3.2.

3.  Key Types

Two key types are employed in the primitives and schemes defined in
this document: RSA public key and RSA private key.  Together, an RSA
public key and an RSA private key form an RSA key pair.

This specification supports so-called "multi-prime" RSA where the
modulus may have more than two prime factors.  The benefit of multi-
prime RSA is lower computational cost for the decryption and
signature primitives, provided that the CRT is used.  Better
performance can be achieved on single processor platforms, but to a
greater extent on multiprocessor platforms, where the modular
exponentiations involved can be done in parallel.

For a discussion on how multi-prime affects the security of the RSA
cryptosystem, the reader is referred to [SILVERMAN].

3.1.  RSA Public Key

For the purposes of this document, an RSA public key consists of two
components:

n        the RSA modulus, a positive integer
e        the RSA public exponent, a positive integer

In a valid RSA public key, the RSA modulus n is a product of u
distinct odd primes r_i, i = 1, 2, ..., u, where u >= 2, and the RSA
public exponent e is an integer between 3 and n - 1 satisfying
GCD(e,\lambda(n)) = 1, where \lambda(n) = LCM(r_1 - 1, ..., r_u - 1).
By convention, the first two primes r_1 and r_2 may also be denoted p
and q, respectively.

A recommended syntax for interchanging RSA public keys between
implementations is given in Appendix A.1.1; an implementation's
internal representation may differ.

3.2.  RSA Private Key

For the purposes of this document, an RSA private key may have either
of two representations.

1.  The first representation consists of the pair (n, d), where the
components have the following meanings:

n       the RSA modulus, a positive integer
d       the RSA private exponent, a positive integer

2.  The second representation consists of a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ,
qInv) and a (possibly empty) sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i,
t_i), i = 3, ..., u, one for each prime not in the quintuple,
where the components have the following meanings:

p      the first factor, a positive integer
q      the second factor, a positive integer
dP     the first factor's CRT exponent, a positive integer
dQ     the second factor's CRT exponent, a positive integer
qInv   the (first) CRT coefficient, a positive integer
r_i    the i-th factor, a positive integer
d_i    the i-th factor's CRT exponent, a positive integer
t_i    the i-th factor's CRT coefficient, a positive integer

In a valid RSA private key with the first representation, the RSA
modulus n is the same as in the corresponding RSA public key and is
the product of u distinct odd primes r_i, i = 1, 2, ..., u, where u
>= 2.  The RSA private exponent d is a positive integer less than n
satisfying

e * d == 1 (mod \lambda(n)),

where e is the corresponding RSA public exponent and \lambda(n) is
defined as in Section 3.1.

In a valid RSA private key with the second representation, the two
factors p and q are the first two prime factors of the RSA modulus n
(i.e., r_1 and r_2); the CRT exponents dP and dQ are positive
integers less than p and q, respectively, satisfying

e * dP == 1 (mod (p-1))

e * dQ == 1 (mod (q-1)) ,

and the CRT coefficient qInv is a positive integer less than p
satisfying

q * qInv == 1 (mod p).

If u > 2, the representation will include one or more triplets (r_i,
d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u.  The factors r_i are the additional prime
factors of the RSA modulus n.  Each CRT exponent d_i (i = 3, ..., u)
satisfies

e * d_i == 1 (mod (r_i - 1)).

Each CRT coefficient t_i (i = 3, ..., u) is a positive integer less
than r_i satisfying

R_i * t_i == 1 (mod r_i) ,

where R_i = r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i-1).

A recommended syntax for interchanging RSA private keys between
implementations, which includes components from both representations,
is given in Appendix A.1.2; an implementation's internal
representation may differ.

Notes:

1.  The definition of the CRT coefficients here and the formulas that
use them in the primitives in Section 5 generally follow Garner's
algorithm [GARNER] (see also Algorithm 14.71 in [HANDBOOK]).
However, for compatibility with the representations of RSA
private keys in PKCS #1 v2.0 and previous versions, the roles of
p and q are reversed compared to the rest of the primes.  Thus,
the first CRT coefficient, qInv, is defined as the inverse of q
mod p, rather than as the inverse of R_1 mod r_2, i.e., of
p mod q.

2.  Quisquater and Couvreur [FASTDEC] observed the benefit of
applying the CRT to RSA operations.

4.  Data Conversion Primitives

Two data conversion primitives are employed in the schemes defined in
this document:

o  I2OSP - Integer-to-Octet-String primitive

o  OS2IP - Octet-String-to-Integer primitive

For the purposes of this document, and consistent with ASN.1 syntax,
an octet string is an ordered sequence of octets (eight-bit bytes).
The sequence is indexed from first (conventionally, leftmost) to last
(rightmost).  For purposes of conversion to and from integers, the
first octet is considered the most significant in the following
conversion primitives.

4.1.  I2OSP

I2OSP converts a nonnegative integer to an octet string of a
specified length.

I2OSP (x, xLen)

Input:

x        nonnegative integer to be converted

xLen     intended length of the resulting octet string

Output:

X corresponding octet string of length xLen

Error:  "integer too large"

Steps:

1.  If x >= 256^xLen, output "integer too large" and stop.

2.  Write the integer x in its unique xLen-digit representation in
base 256:

x = x_(xLen-1) 256^(xLen-1) + x_(xLen-2) 256^(xLen-2) + ...
+ x_1 256 + x_0,

where 0 <= x_i < 256 (note that one or more leading digits
will be zero if x is less than 256^(xLen-1)).

3.  Let the octet X_i have the integer value x_(xLen-i) for 1 <= i
<= xLen.  Output the octet string

X = X_1 X_2 ... X_xLen.

4.2.  OS2IP

OS2IP converts an octet string to a nonnegative integer.

OS2IP (X)

Input:  X octet string to be converted

Output:  x corresponding nonnegative integer

Steps:

1.  Let X_1 X_2 ... X_xLen be the octets of X from first to last,
and let x_(xLen-i) be the integer value of the octet X_i for 1
<= i <= xLen.

2.  Let x = x_(xLen-1) 256^(xLen-1) + x_(xLen-2) 256^(xLen-2) +
...  + x_1 256 + x_0.

3.  Output x.

5.  Cryptographic Primitives

Cryptographic primitives are basic mathematical operations on which
cryptographic schemes can be built.  They are intended for
implementation in hardware or as software modules and are not
intended to provide security apart from a scheme.

Four types of primitive are specified in this document, organized in
pairs: encryption and decryption; and signature and verification.

The specifications of the primitives assume that certain conditions
are met by the inputs, in particular that RSA public and private keys
are valid.

5.1.  Encryption and Decryption Primitives

An encryption primitive produces a ciphertext representative from a
message representative under the control of a public key, and a
decryption primitive recovers the message representative from the
ciphertext representative under the control of the corresponding
private key.

One pair of encryption and decryption primitives is employed in the
encryption schemes defined in this document and is specified here:
RSA Encryption Primitive (RSAEP) / RSA Decryption Primitive (RSADP).
RSAEP and RSADP involve the same mathematical operation, with
different keys as input.  The primitives defined here are the same as
Integer Factorization Encryption Primitive using RSA (IFEP-RSA) /
Integer Factorization Decryption Primitive using RSA (IFDP-RSA) in
IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363] (except that support for multi-prime RSA has
been added) and are compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5.

The main mathematical operation in each primitive is exponentiation.

5.1.1.  RSAEP

RSAEP ((n, e), m)

Input:

(n, e) RSA public key

m message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Output:  c ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Error:  "message representative out of range"

Assumption:  RSA public key (n, e) is valid

Steps:

1.  If the message representative m is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "message representative out of range" and stop.

2.  Let c = m^e mod n.

3.  Output c.

5.1.2.  RSADP

RSADP (K, c)

Input:

K RSA private key, where K has one of the following forms:

+  a pair (n, d)

+  a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and a possibly empty
sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u

c ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Output:  m message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Error:  "ciphertext representative out of range"

Assumption:  RSA private key K is valid

Steps:

1.  If the ciphertext representative c is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "ciphertext representative out of range" and stop.

2.  The message representative m is computed as follows.

a.  If the first form (n, d) of K is used, let m = c^d mod n.

b.  If the second form (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and (r_i, d_i,
t_i) of K is used, proceed as follows:

i.   Let m_1 = c^dP mod p and m_2 = c^dQ mod q.

ii.  If u > 2, let m_i = c^(d_i) mod r_i, i = 3, ..., u.

iii. Let h = (m_1 - m_2) * qInv mod p.

iv.  Let m = m_2 + q * h.

v.   If u > 2, let R = r_1 and for i = 3 to u do

1.  Let R = R * r_(i-1).

2.  Let h = (m_i - m) * t_i mod r_i.

3.  Let m = m + R * h.

3.  Output m.

Note: Step 2.b can be rewritten as a single loop, provided that one
reverses the order of p and q.  For consistency with PKCS #1 v2.0,
however, the first two primes p and q are treated separately from the
additional primes.

5.2.  Signature and Verification Primitives

A signature primitive produces a signature representative from a
message representative under the control of a private key, and a
verification primitive recovers the message representative from the
signature representative under the control of the corresponding
public key.  One pair of signature and verification primitives is
employed in the signature schemes defined in this document and is
specified here: RSA Signature Primitive, version 1 (RSASP1) / RSA
Verification Primitive, version 1 (RSAVP1).

The primitives defined here are the same as Integer Factorization
Signature Primitive using RSA, version 1 (IFSP-RSA1) / Integer
Factorization Verification Primitive using RSA, version 1 (IFVP-RSA1)
in IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363] (except that support for multi-prime RSA has
been added) and are compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5.

The main mathematical operation in each primitive is exponentiation,
as in the encryption and decryption primitives of Section 5.1.
RSASP1 and RSAVP1 are the same as RSADP and RSAEP except for the
names of their input and output arguments; they are distinguished as
they are intended for different purposes.

5.2.1.  RSASP1

RSASP1 (K, m)

Input:

K        RSA private key, where K has one of the following forms:
- a pair (n, d)
- a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and a (possibly empty)
sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u
m        message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Output:

s        signature representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Error:  "message representative out of range"

Assumption:  RSA private key K is valid

Steps:

1.  If the message representative m is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "message representative out of range" and stop.

2.  The signature representative s is computed as follows.

a.  If the first form (n, d) of K is used, let s = m^d mod n.

b.  If the second form (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and (r_i, d_i,
t_i) of K is used, proceed as follows:

1.  Let s_1 = m^dP mod p and s_2 = m^dQ mod q.

2.  If u > 2, let s_i = m^(d_i) mod r_i, i = 3, ..., u.

3.  Let h = (s_1 - s_2) * qInv mod p.

4.  Let s = s_2 + q * h.

5.  If u > 2, let R = r_1 and for i = 3 to u do

a.  Let R = R * r_(i-1).

b.  Let h = (s_i - s) * t_i mod r_i.

c.  Let s = s + R * h.

3.  Output s.

Note: Step 2.b can be rewritten as a single loop, provided that one
reverses the order of p and q.  For consistency with PKCS #1 v2.0,
however, the first two primes p and q are treated separately from the
additional primes.

5.2.2.  RSAVP1

RSAVP1 ((n, e), s)

Input:

(n, e) RSA public key

s signature representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Output:

m message representative, an integer between 0 and n - 1

Error:  "signature representative out of range"

Assumption:  RSA public key (n, e) is valid

Steps:

1.  If the signature representative s is not between 0 and n - 1,
output "signature representative out of range" and stop.

2.  Let m = s^e mod n.

3.  Output m.

6.  Overview of Schemes

A scheme combines cryptographic primitives and other techniques to
achieve a particular security goal.  Two types of scheme are
specified in this document: encryption schemes and signature schemes
with appendix.

The schemes specified in this document are limited in scope in that
their operations consist only of steps to process data with an RSA
public or private key, and they do not include steps for obtaining or
validating the key.  Thus, in addition to the scheme operations, an
application will typically include key management operations by which
parties may select RSA public and private keys for a scheme
operation.  The specific additional operations and other details are
outside the scope of this document.

As was the case for the cryptographic primitives (Section 5), the
specifications of scheme operations assume that certain conditions
are met by the inputs, in particular that RSA public and private keys
are valid.  The behavior of an implementation is thus unspecified
when a key is invalid.  The impact of such unspecified behavior
depends on the application.  Possible means of addressing key
validation include explicit key validation by the application; key
validation within the public-key infrastructure; and assignment of
liability for operations performed with an invalid key to the party
who generated the key.

A generally good cryptographic practice is to employ a given RSA key
pair in only one scheme.  This avoids the risk that vulnerability in
one scheme may compromise the security of the other and may be
essential to maintain provable security.  While RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5

(Section 7.2) and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (Section 8.2) have traditionally
been employed together without any known bad interactions (indeed,
this is the model introduced by PKCS #1 v1.5), such a combined use of
an RSA key pair is NOT RECOMMENDED for new applications.

To illustrate the risks related to the employment of an RSA key pair
in more than one scheme, suppose an RSA key pair is employed in both
RSAES-OAEP (Section 7.1) and RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.  Although RSAES-OAEP
by itself would resist attack, an opponent might be able to exploit a
weakness in the implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 to recover
messages encrypted with either scheme.  As another example, suppose
an RSA key pair is employed in both RSASSA-PSS (Section 8.1) and
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.  Then the security proof for RSASSA-PSS would no
longer be sufficient since the proof does not account for the
possibility that signatures might be generated with a second scheme.
Similar considerations may apply if an RSA key pair is employed in
one of the schemes defined here and in a variant defined elsewhere.

7.  Encryption Schemes

For the purposes of this document, an encryption scheme consists of
an encryption operation and a decryption operation, where the
encryption operation produces a ciphertext from a message with a
recipient's RSA public key, and the decryption operation recovers the
message from the ciphertext with the recipient's corresponding RSA
private key.

An encryption scheme can be employed in a variety of applications.  A
typical application is a key establishment protocol, where the
message contains key material to be delivered confidentially from one
party to another.  For instance, PKCS #7 [RFC2315] employs such a
protocol to deliver a content-encryption key from a sender to a
recipient; the encryption schemes defined here would be suitable key-
encryption algorithms in that context.

Two encryption schemes are specified in this document: RSAES-OAEP and
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.  RSAES-OAEP is REQUIRED to be supported for new
applications; RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 is included only for compatibility
with existing applications.

The encryption schemes given here follow a general model similar to
that employed in IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363], combining encryption and
decryption primitives with an encoding method for encryption.  The
encryption operations apply a message encoding operation to a message
to produce an encoded message, which is then converted to an integer
message representative.  An encryption primitive is applied to the
message representative to produce the ciphertext.  Reversing this,
the decryption operations apply a decryption primitive to the

ciphertext to recover a message representative, which is then
converted to an octet-string-encoded message.  A message decoding
operation is applied to the encoded message to recover the message
and verify the correctness of the decryption.

To avoid implementation weaknesses related to the way errors are
handled within the decoding operation (see [BLEICHENBACHER] and
[MANGER]), the encoding and decoding operations for RSAES-OAEP and
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 are embedded in the specifications of the respective
encryption schemes rather than defined in separate specifications.
Both encryption schemes are compatible with the corresponding schemes
in PKCS #1 v2.1.

7.1.  RSAES-OAEP

RSAES-OAEP combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives (Sections 5.1.1
and 5.1.2) with the EME-OAEP encoding method (Step 2 in
Section 7.1.1, and Step 3 in Section 7.1.2).  EME-OAEP is based on
Bellare and Rogaway's Optimal Asymmetric Encryption scheme [OAEP].
It is compatible with the Integer Factorization Encryption Scheme
(IFES) defined in IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363], where the encryption and
decryption primitives are IFEP-RSA and IFDP-RSA and the message
encoding method is EME-OAEP.  RSAES-OAEP can operate on messages of
length up to k - 2hLen -2 octets, where hLen is the length of the
output from the underlying hash function and k is the length in
octets of the recipient's RSA modulus.

Assuming that computing e-th roots modulo n is infeasible and the
mask generation function in RSAES-OAEP has appropriate properties,
RSAES-OAEP is semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks.  This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty
of breaking RSAES-OAEP can be directly related to the difficulty of
inverting the RSA function, provided that the mask generation
function is viewed as a black box or random oracle; see [FOPS] and
the note below for further discussion.

Both the encryption and the decryption operations of RSAES-OAEP take
the value of a label L as input.  In this version of PKCS #1, L is
the empty string; other uses of the label are outside the scope of
this document.  See Appendix A.2.1 for the relevant ASN.1 syntax.

RSAES-OAEP is parameterized by the choice of hash function and mask
generation function.  This choice should be fixed for a given RSA
key.  Suggested hash and mask generation functions are given in
Appendix B.

Note: Past results have helpfully clarified the security properties
of the OAEP encoding method [OAEP]  (roughly the procedure described
in Step 2 in Section 7.1.1).  The background is as follows.  In 1994,
Bellare and Rogaway [OAEP] introduced a security concept that they
denoted plaintext awareness (PA94).  They proved that if a
deterministic public-key encryption primitive (e.g., RSAEP) is hard
to invert without the private key, then the corresponding OAEP-based
encryption scheme is plaintext aware (in the random oracle model),
meaning roughly that an adversary cannot produce a valid ciphertext
without actually "knowing" the underlying plaintext.  Plaintext
awareness of an encryption scheme is closely related to the
resistance of the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks.  In such
attacks, an adversary is given the opportunity to send queries to an
oracle simulating the decryption primitive.  Using the results of
these queries, the adversary attempts to decrypt a challenge
ciphertext.

However, there are two flavors of chosen-ciphertext attacks, and PA94
implies security against only one of them.  The difference relies on
what the adversary is allowed to do after she is given the challenge
ciphertext.  The indifferent attack scenario (denoted CCA1) does not
admit any queries to the decryption oracle after the adversary is
given the challenge ciphertext, whereas the adaptive scenario
(denoted CCA2) does (except that the decryption oracle refuses to
decrypt the challenge ciphertext once it is published).  In 1998,
Bellare and Rogaway, together with Desai and Pointcheval [PA98], came
up with a new, stronger notion of plaintext awareness (PA98) that
does imply security against CCA2.

To summarize, there have been two potential sources for
misconception: that PA94 and PA98 are equivalent concepts, or that
CCA1 and CCA2 are equivalent concepts.  Either assumption leads to
the conclusion that the Bellare-Rogaway paper implies security of
OAEP against CCA2, which it does not.

(Footnote: It might be fair to mention that PKCS #1 v2.0 cites [OAEP]
and claims that "a chosen ciphertext attack is ineffective against a
plaintext-aware encryption scheme such as RSAES-OAEP" without
specifying the kind of plaintext awareness or chosen ciphertext
attack considered.)

OAEP has never been proven secure against CCA2; in fact, Victor Shoup
[SHOUP] has demonstrated that such a proof does not exist in the
general case.  Put briefly, Shoup showed that an adversary in the
CCA2 scenario who knows how to partially invert the encryption
primitive but does not know how to invert it completely may well be
able to break the scheme.  For example, one may imagine an attacker
who is able to break RSAES-OAEP if she knows how to recover all but

the first 20 bytes of a random integer encrypted with RSAEP.  Such an
attacker does not need to be able to fully invert RSAEP, because she
does not use the first 20 octets in her attack.

Still, RSAES-OAEP is secure against CCA2, which was proved by
Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [FOPS] shortly after the
announcement of Shoup's result.  Using clever lattice reduction
techniques, they managed to show how to invert RSAEP completely given
a sufficiently large part of the pre-image.  This observation,
combined with a proof that OAEP is secure against CCA2 if the
underlying encryption primitive is hard to partially invert, fills
the gap between what Bellare and Rogaway proved about RSAES-OAEP and
what some may have believed that they proved.  Somewhat
paradoxically, we are hence saved by an ostensible weakness in RSAEP
(i.e., the whole inverse can be deduced from parts of it).

Unfortunately, however, the security reduction is not efficient for
concrete parameters.  While the proof successfully relates an
adversary A against the CCA2 security of RSAES-OAEP to an algorithm I
inverting RSA, the probability of success for I is only approximately
\epsilon^2 / 2^18, where \epsilon is the probability of success for
A.

(Footnote: In [FOPS], the probability of success for the inverter was
\epsilon^2 / 4.  The additional factor 1 / 2^16 is due to the eight
fixed zero bits at the beginning of the encoded message EM, which are
not present in the variant of OAEP considered in [FOPS].  (A must be
applied twice to invert RSA, and each application corresponds to a
factor 1 / 2^8.))

In addition, the running time for I is approximately t^2, where t is
the running time of the adversary.  The consequence is that we cannot
exclude the possibility that attacking RSAES-OAEP is considerably
easier than inverting RSA for concrete parameters.  Still, the
existence of a security proof provides some assurance that the
RSAES-OAEP construction is sounder than ad hoc constructions such as
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.

Hybrid encryption schemes based on the RSA Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (RSA-KEM) paradigm offer tight proofs of security directly
applicable to concrete parameters; see [ISO18033] for discussion.
Future versions of PKCS #1 may specify schemes based on this
paradigm.

7.1.1.  Encryption Operation

RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT ((n, e), M, L)

Options:

Hash     hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of
the hash function output)
MGF      mask generation function

Input:

(n, e)   recipient's RSA public key (k denotes the length in
octets of the RSA modulus n)
M        message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen,
where mLen <= k - 2hLen - 2
L        optional label to be associated with the message; the
default value for L, if L is not provided, is the empty
string

Output:

C        ciphertext, an octet string of length k

Errors:  "message too long"; "label too long"

Assumption:  RSA public key (n, e) is valid

Steps:

1.  Length checking:

a.  If the length of L is greater than the input limitation
for the hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output
"label too long" and stop.

b.  If mLen > k - 2hLen - 2, output "message too long" and
stop.

2.  EME-OAEP encoding (see Figure 1 below):

a.  If the label L is not provided, let L be the empty string.
Let lHash = Hash(L), an octet string of length hLen (see
the note below).

b.  Generate a padding string PS consisting of k - mLen -
2hLen - 2 zero octets.  The length of PS may be zero.

c.  Concatenate lHash, PS, a single octet with hexadecimal
value 0x01, and the message M to form a data block DB of
length k - hLen - 1 octets as

DB = lHash || PS || 0x01 || M.

d.  Generate a random octet string seed of length hLen.

e.  Let dbMask = MGF(seed, k - hLen - 1).

f.  Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.

g.  Let seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen).

h.  Let maskedSeed = seed \xor seedMask.

i.  Concatenate a single octet with hexadecimal value 0x00,
maskedSeed, and maskedDB to form an encoded message EM of
length k octets as

EM = 0x00 || maskedSeed || maskedDB.

3.  RSA encryption:

a.  Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message
representative m (see Section 4.2):

m = OS2IP (EM).

b.  Apply the RSAEP encryption primitive (Section 5.1.1) to
the RSA public key (n, e) and the message representative m
to produce an integer ciphertext representative c:

c = RSAEP ((n, e), m).

c.  Convert the ciphertext representative c to a ciphertext C
of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

C = I2OSP (c, k).

4.  Output the ciphertext C.

_________________________________________________________________

+----------+------+--+-------+
DB = |  lHash   |  PS  |01|   M   |
+----------+------+--+-------+
|
+----------+              |
|   seed   |              |
+----------+              |
|                   |
|-------> MGF ---> xor
|                   |
+--+     V                   |
|00|    xor <----- MGF <-----|
+--+     |                   |
|      |                   |
V      V                   V
+--+----------+----------------------------+
EM =  |00|maskedSeed|          maskedDB          |
+--+----------+----------------------------+
_________________________________________________________________

Figure 1: EME-OAEP Encoding Operation

Notes:

-  lHash is the hash of the optional label L.

-  The decoding operation follows reverse steps to recover M and
verify lHash and PS.

-  If L is the empty string, the corresponding hash value lHash has
the following hexadecimal representation for different choices of
Hash:

SHA-1:   (0x)da39a3ee 5e6b4b0d 3255bfef 95601890 afd80709
SHA-256: (0x)e3b0c442 98fc1c14 9afbf4c8 996fb924 27ae41e4 649b934c
a495991b 7852b855
SHA-384: (0x)38b060a7 51ac9638 4cd9327e b1b1e36a 21fdb711 14be0743
4c0cc7bf 63f6e1da 274edebf e76f65fb d51ad2f1 4898b95b
SHA-512: (0x)cf83e135 7eefb8bd f1542850 d66d8007 d620e405 0b5715dc
83f4a921 d36ce9ce 47d0d13c 5d85f2b0 ff8318d2 877eec2f
63b931bd 47417a81 a538327a f927da3e

7.1.2.  Decryption Operation

RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT (K, C, L)

Options:

Hash     hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of
the hash function output)
MGF      mask generation function

Input:

K        recipient's RSA private key (k denotes the length in
octets of the RSA modulus n), where k >= 2hLen + 2
C        ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k
L        optional label whose association with the message is to
be verified; the default value for L, if L is not
provided, is the empty string

Output:

M        message, an octet string of length mLen, where
mLen <= k - 2hLen - 2

Error:  "decryption error"

Steps:

1.  Length checking:

a.  If the length of L is greater than the input limitation
for the hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output
"decryption error" and stop.

b.  If the length of the ciphertext C is not k octets, output
"decryption error" and stop.

c.  If k < 2hLen + 2, output "decryption error" and stop.

2.  RSA decryption:

a.  Convert the ciphertext C to an integer ciphertext
representative c (see Section 4.2):

c = OS2IP (C).

b.  Apply the RSADP decryption primitive (Section 5.1.2) to
the RSA private key K and the ciphertext representative c
to produce an integer message representative m:

m = RSADP (K, c).

If RSADP outputs "ciphertext representative out of range"
(meaning that c >= n), output "decryption error" and stop.

c.  Convert the message representative m to an encoded message
EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

EM = I2OSP (m, k).

3.  EME-OAEP decoding:

a.  If the label L is not provided, let L be the empty string.
Let lHash = Hash(L), an octet string of length hLen (see
the note in Section 7.1.1).

b.  Separate the encoded message EM into a single octet Y, an
octet string maskedSeed of length hLen, and an octet
string maskedDB of length k - hLen - 1 as

EM = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB.

c.  Let seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen).

d.  Let seed = maskedSeed \xor seedMask.

e.  Let dbMask = MGF(seed, k - hLen - 1).

f.  Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.

g.  Separate DB into an octet string lHash' of length hLen, a
(possibly empty) padding string PS consisting of octets
with hexadecimal value 0x00, and a message M as

DB = lHash' || PS || 0x01 || M.

If there is no octet with hexadecimal value 0x01 to
separate PS from M, if lHash does not equal lHash', or if
Y is nonzero, output "decryption error" and stop.  (See
the note below.)

4.  Output the message M.

Note: Care must be taken to ensure that an opponent cannot
distinguish the different error conditions in Step 3.g, whether by
error message or timing, and, more generally, that an opponent
cannot learn partial information about the encoded message EM.
Otherwise, an opponent may be able to obtain useful information
about the decryption of the ciphertext C, leading to a chosen-
ciphertext attack such as the one observed by Manger [MANGER].

7.2.  RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5

RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives (Sections
5.1.1 and 5.1.2) with the EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method (Step 2 in
Section 7.2.1, and Step 3 in Section 7.2.2).  It is mathematically
equivalent to the encryption scheme in PKCS #1 v1.5.
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 can operate on messages of length up to k - 11
octets (k is the octet length of the RSA modulus), although care
should be taken to avoid certain attacks on low-exponent RSA due to
Coppersmith, Franklin, Patarin, and Reiter when long messages are
encrypted (see the third bullet in the notes below and [LOWEXP];
[NEWATTACK] contains an improved attack).  As a general rule, the use
of this scheme for encrypting an arbitrary message, as opposed to a
randomly generated key, is NOT RECOMMENDED.

It is possible to generate valid RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 ciphertexts without
knowing the corresponding plaintexts, with a reasonable probability
of success.  This ability can be exploited in a chosen-ciphertext
attack as shown in [BLEICHENBACHER].  Therefore, if RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
is to be used, certain easily implemented countermeasures should be
taken to thwart the attack found in [BLEICHENBACHER].  Typical
examples include the addition of structure to the data to be encoded,
rigorous checking of PKCS #1 v1.5 conformance (and other redundancy)
in decrypted messages, and the consolidation of error messages in a
client-server protocol based on PKCS #1 v1.5.  These can all be
effective countermeasures and do not involve changes to a protocol
based on PKCS #1 v1.5.  See [BKS] for a further discussion of these
and other countermeasures.  It has recently been shown that the
security of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol [RFC5246], which uses
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and certain countermeasures, can be related to a
variant of the RSA problem; see [RSATLS] for discussion.

Note: The following passages describe some security recommendations
pertaining to the use of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.  Recommendations from PKCS
#1 v1.5 are included as well as new recommendations motivated by
cryptanalytic advances made in the intervening years.

o  It is RECOMMENDED that the pseudorandom octets in Step 2 in
Section 7.2.1 be generated independently for each encryption
process, especially if the same data is input to more than one
encryption process.  Haastad's results [HAASTAD] are one
motivation for this recommendation.

o  The padding string PS in Step 2 in Section 7.2.1 is at least eight
octets long, which is a security condition for public-key
operations that makes it difficult for an attacker to recover data
by trying all possible encryption blocks.

o  The pseudorandom octets can also help thwart an attack due to
Coppersmith et al.  [LOWEXP] (see [NEWATTACK] for an improvement
of the attack) when the size of the message to be encrypted is
kept small.  The attack works on low-exponent RSA when similar
messages are encrypted with the same RSA public key.  More
specifically, in one flavor of the attack, when two inputs to
RSAEP agree on a large fraction of bits (8/9) and low-exponent RSA
(e = 3) is used to encrypt both of them, it may be possible to
recover both inputs with the attack.  Another flavor of the attack
is successful in decrypting a single ciphertext when a large
fraction (2/3) of the input to RSAEP is already known.  For
typical applications, the message to be encrypted is short (e.g.,
a 128-bit symmetric key), so not enough information will be known
or common between two messages to enable the attack.  However, if
a long message is encrypted, or if part of a message is known,
then the attack may be a concern.  In any case, the RSAES-OAEP
scheme overcomes the attack.

7.2.1.  Encryption Operation

RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT ((n, e), M)

Input:

(n, e)   recipient's RSA public key (k denotes the length in
octets of the modulus n)
M        message to be encrypted, an octet string of length
mLen, where mLen <= k - 11

Output:

C        ciphertext, an octet string of length k

Error:  "message too long"

Steps:

1.  Length checking: If mLen > k - 11, output "message too long"
and stop.

2.  EME-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding:

a.  Generate an octet string PS of length k - mLen - 3
consisting of pseudo-randomly generated nonzero octets.
The length of PS will be at least eight octets.

b.  Concatenate PS, the message M, and other padding to form
an encoded message EM of length k octets as

EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M.

3.  RSA encryption:

a.  Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message
representative m (see Section 4.2):

m = OS2IP (EM).

b.  Apply the RSAEP encryption primitive (Section 5.1.1) to
the RSA public key (n, e) and the message representative m
to produce an integer ciphertext representative c:

c = RSAEP ((n, e), m).

c.  Convert the ciphertext representative c to a ciphertext C
of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

C = I2OSP (c, k).

4.  Output the ciphertext C.

7.2.2.  Decryption Operation

RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT (K, C)

Input:

K        recipient's RSA private key
C        ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k,
where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Output:

M        message, an octet string of length at most k - 11

Error:  "decryption error"

Steps:

1.  Length checking: If the length of the ciphertext C is not k
octets (or if k < 11), output "decryption error" and stop.

2.  RSA decryption:

a.  Convert the ciphertext C to an integer ciphertext
representative c (see Section 4.2):

c = OS2IP (C).

b.  Apply the RSADP decryption primitive (Section 5.1.2) to
the RSA private key (n, d) and the ciphertext
representative c to produce an integer message
representative m:

m = RSADP ((n, d), c).

If RSADP outputs "ciphertext representative out of range"
(meaning that c >= n), output "decryption error" and stop.

c.  Convert the message representative m to an encoded message
EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

EM = I2OSP (m, k).

3.  EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding: Separate the encoded message EM into
an octet string PS consisting of nonzero octets and a message
M as

EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M.

If the first octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value 0x00,
if the second octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
0x02, if there is no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00 to
separate PS from M, or if the length of PS is less than 8
octets, output "decryption error" and stop.  (See the note
below.)

4.  Output M.

Note: Care shall be taken to ensure that an opponent cannot
distinguish the different error conditions in Step 3, whether by
error message or timing.  Otherwise, an opponent may be able to
obtain useful information about the decryption of the ciphertext
C, leading to a strengthened version of Bleichenbacher's attack
[BLEICHENBACHER]; compare to Manger's attack [MANGER].

8.  Signature Scheme with Appendix

For the purposes of this document, a signature scheme with appendix
consists of a signature generation operation and a signature
verification operation, where the signature generation operation
produces a signature from a message with a signer's RSA private key,
and the signature verification operation verifies the signature on
the message with the signer's corresponding RSA public key.  To
verify a signature constructed with this type of scheme, it is
necessary to have the message itself.  In this way, signature schemes
with appendix are distinguished from signature schemes with message
recovery, which are not supported in this document.

A signature scheme with appendix can be employed in a variety of
applications.  For instance, the signature schemes with appendix
defined here would be suitable signature algorithms for X.509
certificates [ISO9594].  Related signature schemes could be employed
in PKCS #7 [RFC2315], although for technical reasons the current
version of PKCS #7 separates a hash function from a signature scheme,
which is different than what is done here; see the note in
Appendix A.2.3 for more discussion.

Two signature schemes with appendix are specified in this document:
RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.  Although no attacks are known
against RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, in the interest of increased robustness,
RSASSA-PSS is REQUIRED in new applications.  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is
included only for compatibility with existing applications.

The signature schemes with appendix given here follow a general model
similar to that employed in IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363], combining signature
and verification primitives with an encoding method for signatures.
The signature generation operations apply a message encoding
operation to a message to produce an encoded message, which is then
converted to an integer message representative.  A signature
primitive is applied to the message representative to produce the
signature.  Reversing this, the signature verification operations
apply a signature verification primitive to the signature to recover
a message representative, which is then converted to an octet-string-
encoded message.  A verification operation is applied to the message
and the encoded message to determine whether they are consistent.

If the encoding method is deterministic (e.g., EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5), the
verification operation may apply the message encoding operation to
the message and compare the resulting encoded message to the
previously derived encoded message.  If there is a match, the
signature is considered valid.  If the method is randomized (e.g.,
EMSA-PSS), the verification operation is typically more complicated.
For example, the verification operation in EMSA-PSS extracts the
random salt and a hash output from the encoded message and checks
whether the hash output, the salt, and the message are consistent;
the hash output is a deterministic function in terms of the message
and the salt.  For both signature schemes with appendix defined in
this document, the signature generation and signature verification
operations are readily implemented as "single-pass" operations if the
signature is placed after the message.  See PKCS #7 [RFC2315] for an
example format in the case of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.

8.1.  RSASSA-PSS

RSASSA-PSS combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the
EMSA-PSS encoding method.  It is compatible with the Integer
Factorization Signature Scheme with Appendix (IFSSA) as amended in
IEEE 1363a [IEEE1363A], where the signature and verification
primitives are IFSP-RSA1 and IFVP-RSA1 as defined in IEEE 1363
[IEEE1363], and the message encoding method is EMSA4.  EMSA4 is
slightly more general than EMSA-PSS as it acts on bit strings rather
than on octet strings.  EMSA-PSS is equivalent to EMSA4 restricted to
the case that the operands as well as the hash and salt values are
octet strings.

The length of messages on which RSASSA-PSS can operate is either
unrestricted or constrained by a very large number, depending on the
hash function underlying the EMSA-PSS encoding method.

Assuming that computing e-th roots modulo n is infeasible and the
hash and mask generation functions in EMSA-PSS have appropriate
properties, RSASSA-PSS provides secure signatures.  This assurance is
provable in the sense that the difficulty of forging signatures can
be directly related to the difficulty of inverting the RSA function,
provided that the hash and mask generation functions are viewed as
black boxes or random oracles.  The bounds in the security proof are
essentially "tight", meaning that the success probability and running
time for the best forger against RSASSA-PSS are very close to the
corresponding parameters for the best RSA inversion algorithm; see
[RSARABIN] [PSSPROOF] [JONSSON] for further discussion.

In contrast to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme, a hash
function identifier is not embedded in the EMSA-PSS encoded message,
so in theory it is possible for an adversary to substitute a

different (and potentially weaker) hash function than the one
selected by the signer.  Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the
EMSA-PSS mask generation function be based on the same hash function.
In this manner, the entire encoded message will be dependent on the
hash function, and it will be difficult for an opponent to substitute
a different hash function than the one intended by the signer.  This
matching of hash functions is only for the purpose of preventing hash
function substitution and is not necessary if hash function
substitution is addressed by other means (e.g., the verifier accepts
only a designated hash function).  See [HASHID] for further
discussion of these points.  The provable security of RSASSA-PSS does
not rely on the hash function in the mask generation function being
the same as the hash function applied to the message.

RSASSA-PSS is different from other RSA-based signature schemes in
that it is probabilistic rather than deterministic, incorporating a
randomly generated salt value.  The salt value enhances the security
of the scheme by affording a "tighter" security proof than
deterministic alternatives such as Full Domain Hashing (FDH); see
[RSARABIN] for discussion.  However, the randomness is not critical
to security.  In situations where random generation is not possible,
a fixed value or a sequence number could be employed instead, with
the resulting provable security similar to that of FDH [FDH].

8.1.1.  Signature Generation Operation

RSASSA-PSS-SIGN (K, M)

Input:

K        signer's RSA private key
M        message to be signed, an octet string

Output:

S        signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the
length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Errors:  "message too long;" "encoding error"

Steps:

1.  EMSA-PSS encoding: Apply the EMSA-PSS encoding operation
(Section 9.1.1) to the message M to produce an encoded message
EM of length \ceil ((modBits - 1)/8) octets such that the bit
length of the integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section 4.2) is at most
modBits - 1, where modBits is the length in bits of the RSA
modulus n:

EM = EMSA-PSS-ENCODE (M, modBits - 1).

Note that the octet length of EM will be one less than k if
modBits - 1 is divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise.  If
the encoding operation outputs "message too long", output
"message too long" and stop.  If the encoding operation
outputs "encoding error", output "encoding error" and stop.

2.  RSA signature:

a.  Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message
representative m (see Section 4.2):

m = OS2IP (EM).

b.  Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to
the RSA private key K and the message representative m to
produce an integer signature representative s:

s = RSASP1 (K, m).

c.  Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of
length k octets (see Section 4.1):

S = I2OSP (s, k).

3.  Output the signature S.

8.1.2.  Signature Verification Operation

RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)

Input:

(n, e)  signer's RSA public key
M       message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string
S       signature to be verified, an octet string of length k,
where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Output:  "valid signature" or "invalid signature"

Steps:

1.  Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k
octets, output "invalid signature" and stop.

2.  RSA verification:

a.  Convert the signature S to an integer signature
representative s (see Section 4.2):

s = OS2IP (S).

b.  Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to
the RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative
s to produce an integer message representative m:

m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s).

If RSAVP1 output "signature representative out of range",
output "invalid signature" and stop.

c.  Convert the message representative m to an encoded message
EM of length emLen = \ceil ((modBits - 1)/8) octets, where
modBits is the length in bits of the RSA modulus n (see
Section 4.1):

EM = I2OSP (m, emLen).

Note that emLen will be one less than k if modBits - 1 is
divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise.  If I2OSP outputs
"integer too large", output "invalid signature" and stop.

3.  EMSA-PSS verification: Apply the EMSA-PSS verification
operation (Section 9.1.2) to the message M and the encoded
message EM to determine whether they are consistent:

Result = EMSA-PSS-VERIFY (M, EM, modBits - 1).

4.  If Result = "consistent", output "valid signature".
Otherwise, output "invalid signature".

8.2.  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5

RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the
EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method.  It is compatible with the IFSSA
scheme defined in IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363], where the signature and
verification primitives are IFSP-RSA1 and IFVP-RSA1, and the message
encoding method is EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (which is not defined in IEEE 1363
but is in IEEE 1363a [IEEE1363A]).

The length of messages on which RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 can operate is
either unrestricted or constrained by a very large number, depending
on the hash function underlying the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 method.

Assuming that computing e-th roots modulo n is infeasible and the
hash function in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 has appropriate properties,
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is conjectured to provide secure signatures.  More
precisely, forging signatures without knowing the RSA private key is
conjectured to be computationally infeasible.  Also, in the encoding
method EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5, a hash function identifier is embedded in the
encoding.  Because of this feature, an adversary trying to find a
message with the same signature as a previously signed message must
find collisions of the particular hash function being used; attacking
a different hash function than the one selected by the signer is not
useful to the adversary.  See [HASHID] for further discussion.

Note: As noted in PKCS #1 v1.5, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method
has the property that the encoded message, converted to an integer
message representative, is guaranteed to be large and at least
somewhat "random".  This prevents attacks of the kind proposed by
Desmedt and Odlyzko [CHOSEN] where multiplicative relationships
between message representatives are developed by factoring the
message representatives into a set of small values (e.g., a set of
small primes).  Coron, Naccache, and Stern [PADDING] showed that a
stronger form of this type of attack could be quite effective against
some instances of the ISO/IEC 9796-2 signature scheme.  They also
analyzed the complexity of this type of attack against the
EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method and concluded that an attack would be
impractical, requiring more operations than a collision search on the
underlying hash function (i.e., more than 2^80 operations).
Coppersmith, Halevi, and Jutla [FORGERY] subsequently extended Coron
et al.'s attack to break the ISO/IEC 9796-1 signature scheme with
message recovery.  The various attacks illustrate the importance of
carefully constructing the input to the RSA signature primitive,
particularly in a signature scheme with message recovery.
Accordingly, the EMSA-PKCS-v1_5 encoding method explicitly includes a
hash operation and is not intended for signature schemes with message
recovery.  Moreover, while no attack is known against the
EMSA-PKCS-v1_5 encoding method, a gradual transition to EMSA-PSS is
recommended as a precaution against future developments.

8.2.1.  Signature Generation Operation

RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN (K, M)

Input:

K        signer's RSA private key
M        message to be signed, an octet string

Output:

S        signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the
length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Errors:  "message too long"; "RSA modulus too short"

Steps:

1.  EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce an encoded
message EM of length k octets:

EM = EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE (M, k).

If the encoding operation outputs "message too long", output
"message too long" and stop.  If the encoding operation
outputs "intended encoded message length too short", output
"RSA modulus too short" and stop.

2.  RSA signature:

a.  Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message
representative m (see Section 4.2):

m = OS2IP (EM).

b.  Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to
the RSA private key K and the message representative m to
produce an integer signature representative s:

s = RSASP1 (K, m).

c.  Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of
length k octets (see Section 4.1):

S = I2OSP (s, k).

3.  Output the signature S.

8.2.2.  Signature Verification Operation

RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)

Input:

(n, e)  signer's RSA public key
M       message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string

S       signature to be verified, an octet string of length k,
where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n

Output  "valid signature" or "invalid signature"

Errors:  "message too long"; "RSA modulus too short"

Steps:

1.  Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k
octets, output "invalid signature" and stop.

2.  RSA verification:

a.  Convert the signature S to an integer signature
representative s (see Section 4.2):

s = OS2IP (S).

b.  Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to
the RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative
s to produce an integer message representative m:

m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s).

If RSAVP1 outputs "signature representative out of range",
output "invalid signature" and stop.

c.  Convert the message representative m to an encoded message
EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1):

EM = I2OSP (m, k).

If I2OSP outputs "integer too large", output "invalid
signature" and stop.

3.  EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding
operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce a second
encoded message EM' of length k octets:

EM' = EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE (M, k).

If the encoding operation outputs "message too long", output
"message too long" and stop.  If the encoding operation
outputs "intended encoded message length too short", output
"RSA modulus too short" and stop.

4.  Compare the encoded message EM and the second encoded message
EM'.  If they are the same, output "valid signature";
otherwise, output "invalid signature".

Note: Another way to implement the signature verification
operation is to apply a "decoding" operation (not specified in
this document) to the encoded message to recover the underlying
hash value, and then compare it to a newly computed hash value.
This has the advantage that it requires less intermediate storage
(two hash values rather than two encoded messages), but the
disadvantage that it requires additional code.

9.  Encoding Methods for Signatures with Appendix

Encoding methods consist of operations that map between octet string
messages and octet-string-encoded messages, which are converted to
and from integer message representatives in the schemes.  The integer
message representatives are processed via the primitives.  The
encoding methods thus provide the connection between the schemes,
which process messages, and the primitives.

An encoding method for signatures with appendix, for the purposes of
this document, consists of an encoding operation and optionally a
verification operation.  An encoding operation maps a message M to an
encoded message EM of a specified length.  A verification operation
determines whether a message M and an encoded message EM are
consistent, i.e., whether the encoded message EM is a valid encoding
of the message M.

The encoding operation may introduce some randomness, so that
different applications of the encoding operation to the same message
will produce different encoded messages, which has benefits for
provable security.  For such an encoding method, both an encoding and
a verification operation are needed unless the verifier can reproduce
the randomness (e.g., by obtaining the salt value from the signer).
For a deterministic encoding method, only an encoding operation is
needed.

Two encoding methods for signatures with appendix are employed in the
signature schemes and are specified here: EMSA-PSS and
EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5.

9.1.  EMSA-PSS

This encoding method is parameterized by the choice of hash function,
mask generation function, and salt length.  These options should be
fixed for a given RSA key, except that the salt length can be
variable (see [JONSSON] for discussion).  Suggested hash and mask
generation functions are given in Appendix B.  The encoding method is
based on Bellare and Rogaway's Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS)
[RSARABIN][PSS].  It is randomized and has an encoding operation and
a verification operation.

Figure 2 illustrates the encoding operation.

__________________________________________________________________

+-----------+
|     M     |
+-----------+
|
V
Hash
|
V
+--------+----------+----------+
M' = |Padding1|  mHash   |   salt   |
+--------+----------+----------+
|
+--------+----------+     V
DB =  |Padding2|   salt   |   Hash
+--------+----------+     |
|               |
V               |
xor <--- MGF <---|
|               |
|               |
V               V
+-------------------+----------+--+
EM =  |    maskedDB       |     H    |bc|
+-------------------+----------+--+
__________________________________________________________________

Figure 2: EMSA-PSS Encoding Operation

Note that the verification operation follows reverse steps to recover
salt and then forward steps to recompute and compare H.

Notes:

1.  The encoding method defined here differs from the one in Bellare
and Rogaway's submission to IEEE 1363a [PSS] in three respects:

*  It applies a hash function rather than a mask generation
function to the message.  Even though the mask generation
function is based on a hash function, it seems more natural to
apply a hash function directly.

*  The value that is hashed together with the salt value is the
string (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash rather than the
message M itself.  Here, mHash is the hash of M.  Note that
the hash function is the same in both steps.  See Note 3 below
for further discussion.  (Also, the name "salt" is used
instead of "seed", as it is more reflective of the value's
role.)

*  The encoded message in EMSA-PSS has nine fixed bits; the first
bit is 0 and the last eight bits form a "trailer field", the
octet 0xbc.  In the original scheme, only the first bit is
fixed.  The rationale for the trailer field is for
compatibility with the Integer Factorization Signature
Primitive using Rabin-Williams (IFSP-RW) in IEEE 1363
[IEEE1363] and the corresponding primitive in ISO/IEC
9796-2:2010 [ISO9796].

2.  Assuming that the mask generation function is based on a hash
function, it is RECOMMENDED that the hash function be the same as
the one that is applied to the message; see Section 8.1 for
further discussion.

3.  Without compromising the security proof for RSASSA-PSS, one may
perform Steps 1 and 2 of EMSA-PSS-ENCODE and EMSA-PSS-VERIFY (the
application of the hash function to the message) outside the
module that computes the rest of the signature operation, so that
mHash rather than the message M itself is input to the module.
In other words, the security proof for RSASSA-PSS still holds
even if an opponent can control the value of mHash.  This is
convenient if the module has limited I/O bandwidth, e.g., a smart
card.  Note that previous versions of PSS [RSARABIN][PSS] did not
have this property.  Of course, it may be desirable for other
security reasons to have the module process the full message.
For instance, the module may need to "see" what it is signing if
it does not trust the component that computes the hash value.

4.  Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output
of the hash function Hash) and 0.  In both cases, the security of
RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting
RSAVP1.  Bellare and Rogaway [RSARABIN] give a tight lower bound
for the security of the original RSA-PSS scheme, which
corresponds roughly to the former case, while Coron [FDH] gives a
lower bound for the related Full Domain Hashing scheme, which
corresponds roughly to the latter case.  In [PSSPROOF], Coron
provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging
from 0 to hLen; see [IEEE1363A] for discussion.  See also
[JONSSON], which adapts the security proofs in [RSARABIN]
[PSSPROOF] to address the differences between the original and
the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above.

5.  As noted in IEEE 1363a [IEEE1363A], the use of randomization in
signature schemes -- such as the salt value in EMSA-PSS -- may
provide a "covert channel" for transmitting information other
than the message being signed.  For more on covert channels, see
[SIMMONS].

9.1.1.  Encoding Operation

EMSA-PSS-ENCODE (M, emBits)

Options:

Hash     hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of
the hash function output)
MGF      mask generation function
sLen     intended length in octets of the salt

Input:

M        message to be encoded, an octet string
emBits   maximal bit length of the integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section
4.2), at least 8hLen + 8sLen + 9

Output:

EM       encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = \ceil
(emBits/8)

Errors:  "Encoding error"; "message too long"

Steps:

1.   If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for
the hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output
"message too long" and stop.

2.   Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.

3.   If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.

4.   Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen =
0, then salt is the empty string.

5.   Let

M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt;

M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
initial zero octets.

6.   Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.

7.   Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen
- 2 zero octets.  The length of PS may be 0.

8.   Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
emLen - hLen - 1.

9.   Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).

10.  Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.

11.  Set the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet
in maskedDB to zero.

12.  Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.

13.  Output EM.

9.1.2.  Verification Operation

EMSA-PSS-VERIFY (M, EM, emBits)

Options:

Hash     hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of
the hash function output)
MGF      mask generation function
sLen     intended length in octets of the salt

Input:

M        message to be verified, an octet string
EM       encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = \ceil
(emBits/8)
emBits   maximal bit length of the integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section
4.2), at least 8hLen + 8sLen + 9

Output:  "consistent" or "inconsistent"

Steps:

1.   If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for
the hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output
"inconsistent" and stop.

2.   Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.

3.   If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.

4.   If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.

5.   Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM,
and let H be the next hLen octets.

6.   If the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
stop.

7.   Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).

8.   Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.

9.   Set the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet
in DB to zero.

10.  If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not
zero or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the
leftmost position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal
value 0x01, output "inconsistent" and stop.

11.  Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.

12.  Let

M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt ;

M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
initial zero octets.

13.  Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.

14.  If H = H', output "consistent".  Otherwise, output
"inconsistent".

9.2.  EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5

This encoding method is deterministic and only has an encoding
operation.

EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE (M, emLen)

Option:

Hash     hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of
the hash function output)

Input:

M        message to be encoded
emLen    intended length in octets of the encoded message, at
least tLen + 11, where tLen is the octet length of the
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoding T of
a certain value computed during the encoding operation

Output:

EM       encoded message, an octet string of length emLen

Errors:  "message too long"; "intended encoded message length too
short"

Steps:

1.  Apply the hash function to the message M to produce a hash
value H:

H = Hash(M).

If the hash function outputs "message too long", output
"message too long" and stop.

2.  Encode the algorithm ID for the hash function and the hash
value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo (see
Appendix A.2.4) with the DER, where the type DigestInfo has
the syntax

DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
digest OCTET STRING
}

The first field identifies the hash function and the second
contains the hash value.  Let T be the DER encoding of the
DigestInfo value (see the notes below), and let tLen be the
length in octets of T.

3.  If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length
too short" and stop.

4.  Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - tLen - 3
octets with hexadecimal value 0xff.  The length of PS will be
at least 8 octets.

5.  Concatenate PS, the DER encoding T, and other padding to form
the encoded message EM as

EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T.

6.  Output EM.

Notes:

1.  For the nine hash functions mentioned in Appendix B.1, the DER
encoding T of the DigestInfo value is equal to the following:

MD2:     (0x)30 20 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 02 02 05 00 04
10 || H.
MD5:     (0x)30 20 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 02 05 05 00 04
10 || H.
SHA-1:   (0x)30 21 30 09 06 05 2b 0e 03 02 1a 05 00 04 14 || H.
SHA-224:  (0x)30 2d 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 04
05 00 04 1c || H.
SHA-256: (0x)30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00
04 20 || H.
SHA-384: (0x)30 41 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00
04 30 || H.
SHA-512: (0x)30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00
04 40 || H.
SHA-512/224:  (0x)30 2d 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 05
05 00 04 1c || H.
SHA-512/256:  (0x)30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 06
05 00 04 20 || H.

2.  In version 1.5 of this document, T was defined as the BER
encoding, rather than the DER encoding, of the DigestInfo value.
In particular, it is possible -- at least in theory -- that the
verification operation defined in this document (as well as in
version 2.0) rejects a signature that is valid with respect to
the specification given in PKCS #1 v1.5.  This occurs if other
rules than DER are applied to DigestInfo (e.g., an indefinite
length encoding of the underlying SEQUENCE type).  While this is
unlikely to be a concern in practice, a cautious implementor may
choose to employ a verification operation based on a BER decoding
operation as specified in PKCS #1 v1.5.  In this manner,
compatibility with any valid implementation based on PKCS #1 v1.5
is obtained.  Such a verification operation should indicate
whether the underlying BER encoding is a DER encoding and hence
whether the signature is valid with respect to the specification
given in this document.

10.  Security Considerations

Security considerations are discussed throughout this memo.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

[GARNER]   Garner, H., "The Residue Number System", IRE Transactions
on Electronic Computers, Volume EC-8, Issue 2, pp.
140-147, DOI 10.1109/TEC.1959.5219515, June 1959.

[RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RSA]      Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A Method for
Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM, Volume 21,
Issue 2, pp. 120-126, DOI 10.1145/359340.359342, February
1978.

11.2.  Informative References

[ANSIX944] ANSI, "Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization
Cryptography", ANSI X9.44-2007, August 2007.

[BKS]      Bleichenbacher, D., Kaliski, B., and J. Staddon, "Recent
Results on PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard", RSA
Laboratories, Bulletin No. 7, June 1998.

[BLEICHENBACHER]
Bleichenbacher, D., "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against
Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1",
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 1462, pp. 1-12,
1998.

[CHOSEN]   Desmedt, Y. and A. Odlyzko, "A Chosen Text Attack on the
RSA Cryptosystem and Some Discrete Logarithm Schemes",
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 218, pp.
516-522, 1985.

[COCHRAN]  Cochran, M., "Notes on the Wang et al. 2^63 SHA-1
Differential Path", Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report
2007/474, August 2008, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/474>.

[FASTDEC]  Quisquater, J. and C. Couvreur, "Fast Decipherment
Algorithm for RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem", Electronic
Letters, Volume 18, Issue 21, pp. 905-907,
DOI 10.1049/el:19820617, October 1982.

[FDH]      Coron, J., "On the Exact Security of Full Domain Hash",
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 1880, pp.
229-235, 2000.

[FOPS]     Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T., Pointcheval, D., and J. Stern,
"RSA-OAEP is Secure under the RSA Assumption", Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Volume 2139, pp. 260-274,
August 2001.

[FORGERY]  Coppersmith, D., Halevi, S., and C. Jutla, "ISO 9796-1 and
the new forgery strategy", rump session of Crypto, August
1999.

[HAASTAD]  Haastad, J., "Solving Simultaneous Modular Equations of
Low Degree", SIAM Journal on Computing, Volume 17,
Issue 2, pp. 336-341, DOI 10.1137/0217019, April 1988.

[HANDBOOK] Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., and S. Vanstone, "Handbook
of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press, ISBN: 0849385237,
1996.

[HASHID]   Kaliski, B., "On Hash Function Firewalls in Signature
Schemes", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 2271,
pp. 1-16, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45760-7_1, February 2002.

[IEEE1363] IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography", IEEE Std 1363-2000,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2000.92292, August 2000,
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/891000/>.

[IEEE1363A]
IEEE, "Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography
- Amendment 1: Additional Techniques", IEEE Std 1363a-
2004, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2004.94612, September 2004,
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1335427/>.

[ISO18033] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology -- Security techniques --
Encryption algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers", ISO/
IEC 18033-2:2006, May 2006.

[ISO9594]  International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks", ISO/IEC 9594-8:2008, December 2008.

[ISO9796]  International Organization for Standardization,
"Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2:
Integer factorization based mechanisms",
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010, December 2010.

[JONSSON]  Jonsson, J., "Security Proofs for the RSA-PSS Signature
Scheme and Its Variants", Cryptology ePrint
Archive: Report 2001/053, March 2002,
<http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/053>.

[LOWEXP]   Coppersmith, D., Franklin, M., Patarin, J., and M. Reiter,
"Low-Exponent RSA with Related Messages", Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Volume 1070, pp. 1-9, 1996.

[MANGER]   Manger, J., "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in
PKCS #1 v2.0", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume
2139, pp. 230-238, DOI 10.1007/3-540-44647-8_14, 2001.

[MD4]      Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD4", Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Volume 1039, pp. 53-69,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-60865-6_43, 1996.

[MD4FIRST] Dobbertin, H., "The First Two Rounds of MD4 are Not One-
Way", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 1372, pp.
284-292, DOI 10.1007/3-540-69710-1_19, March 1998.

[MD4LAST]  den Boer, B. and A. Bosselaers, "An Attack on the Last Two
Rounds of MD4", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume
576, pp. 194-203, DOI 10.1007/3-540-46766-1_14, 1992.

[NEWATTACK]
Coron, J., Joye, M., Naccache, D., and P. Paillier, "New
Attacks on PKCS #1 v1.5 Encryption", Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Volume 1807, pp. 369-381,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-45539-6_25, May 2000.

[OAEP]     Bellare, M. and P. Rogaway, "Optimal Asymmetric Encryption
- How to Encrypt with RSA", Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Volume 950, pp. 92-111, November 1995.

[PA98]     Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., and P. Rogaway,
"Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key
Encryption Schemes", Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Volume 1462, pp. 26-45, DOI 10.1007/BFb0055718,
1998.

[PADDING]  Coron, J., Naccache, D., and J. Stern, "On the Security of
RSA Padding", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume
1666, pp. 1-18, DOI 10.1007/3-540-48405-1_1, December
1999.

[PKCS1_22] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard
Version 2.2", October 2012.

[PREFIX]   Stevens, M., Lenstra, A., and B. de Weger, "Chosen-prefix
collisions for MD5 and applications", International
Journal of Applied Cryptography, Volume 2, No. 4, pp.
322-359, July 2012.

[PSS]      Bellare, M. and P. Rogaway, "PSS: Provably Secure Encoding
Method for Digital Signatures", Submission to IEEE P1363a,
August 1998, <http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/
P1363a/contributions/pss-submission.pdf>.

[PSSPROOF] Coron, J., "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other
Signature Schemes", Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Volume 2332, pp. 272-287,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-46035-7_18, 2002.

[RFC1319]  Kaliski, B., "The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1319,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1319, April 1992,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1319>.

[RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.

[RFC2313]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5",
RFC 2313, DOI 10.17487/RFC2313, March 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2313>.

[RFC2315]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315>.

[RFC2437]  Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.0", RFC 2437,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2437, October 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2437>.

[RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.

[RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

[RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

[RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

[RFC6149]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD2 to Historic Status",
RFC 6149, DOI 10.17487/RFC6149, March 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6149>.

[RFC7292]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A.,
and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292>.

[RSARABIN] Bellare, M. and P. Rogaway, "The Exact Security of Digital
Signatures - How to Sign with RSA and Rabin", Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Volume 1070, pp. 399-416,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-68339-9_34, 1996.

[RSATLS]   Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "On the Security of RSA
Encryption in TLS", Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Volume 2442, pp. 127-142,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_9, 2002.

[SHA1CRYPT]
Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "Cryptanalysis on SHA-1",
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 2442, pp.
127-142, February 2005,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/
Wang_SHA1-New-Result.pdf>.

[SHOUP]    Shoup, V., "OAEP Reconsidered (Extended Abstract)",
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 2139, pp.
239-259, DOI 10.1007/3-540-44647-8_15, 2001.

[SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, August 2015,
<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4>.

[SILVERMAN]
Silverman, R., "A Cost-Based Security Analysis of
Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Lengths", RSA
Laboratories, Bulletin No. 13, 2000.

[SIMMONS]  Simmons, G., "Subliminal Communication is Easy Using the
DSA", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 765, pp.
218-232, DOI 10.1007/3-540-48285-7_18, 1994.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Syntax

A.1.  RSA Key Representation

This section defines ASN.1 object identifiers for RSA public and
private keys and defines the types RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey.
The intended application of these definitions includes X.509
certificates, PKCS #8 [RFC5958], and PKCS #12 [RFC7292].

The object identifier rsaEncryption identifies RSA public and private
keys as defined in Appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2.  The parameters field
has associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier
SHALL have a value of type NULL.

rsaEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }

The definitions in this section have been extended to support multi-
prime RSA, but they are backward compatible with previous versions.

A.1.1.  RSA Public Key Syntax

An RSA public key should be represented with the ASN.1 type
RSAPublicKey:

RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus           INTEGER,  -- n
publicExponent    INTEGER   -- e
}

The fields of type RSAPublicKey have the following meanings:

o  modulus is the RSA modulus n.

o  publicExponent is the RSA public exponent e.

A.1.2.  RSA Private Key Syntax

An RSA private key should be represented with the ASN.1 type
RSAPrivateKey:

RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
version           Version,
modulus           INTEGER,  -- n
publicExponent    INTEGER,  -- e
privateExponent   INTEGER,  -- d
prime1            INTEGER,  -- p
prime2            INTEGER,  -- q
exponent1         INTEGER,  -- d mod (p-1)
exponent2         INTEGER,  -- d mod (q-1)
coefficient       INTEGER,  -- (inverse of q) mod p
otherPrimeInfos   OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL
}

The fields of type RSAPrivateKey have the following meanings:

o  version is the version number, for compatibility with future
revisions of this document.  It SHALL be 0 for this version of the
document, unless multi-prime is used; in which case, it SHALL be
1.

Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) }
(CONSTRAINED BY
{-- version must be multi if otherPrimeInfos present --})

o  modulus is the RSA modulus n.

o  publicExponent is the RSA public exponent e.

o  privateExponent is the RSA private exponent d.

o  prime1 is the prime factor p of n.

o  prime2 is the prime factor q of n.

o  exponent1 is d mod (p - 1).

o  exponent2 is d mod (q - 1).

o  coefficient is the CRT coefficient q^(-1) mod p.

o  otherPrimeInfos contains the information for the additional primes
r_3, ..., r_u, in order.  It SHALL be omitted if version is 0 and
SHALL contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version
is 1.

OtherPrimeInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF OtherPrimeInfo

OtherPrimeInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
prime             INTEGER,  -- ri
exponent          INTEGER,  -- di
coefficient       INTEGER   -- ti
}

The fields of type OtherPrimeInfo have the following meanings:

o  prime is a prime factor r_i of n, where i >= 3.

o  exponent is d_i = d mod (r_i - 1).

o  coefficient is the CRT coefficient t_i = (r_1 * r_2 * ... *
r_(i-1))^(-1) mod r_i.

Note: It is important to protect the RSA private key against both
disclosure and modification.  Techniques for such protection are
outside the scope of this document.  Methods for storing and
distributing private keys and other cryptographic data are described
in PKCS #12 and #15.

A.2.  Scheme Identification

This section defines object identifiers for the encryption and
signature schemes.  The schemes compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5 have the
same definitions as in PKCS #1 v1.5.  The intended application of
these definitions includes X.509 certificates and PKCS #7.

Here are type identifier definitions for the PKCS #1 OIDs:

PKCS1Algorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID rsaEncryption                PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID md2WithRSAEncryption         PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID md5WithRSAEncryption         PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha1WithRSAEncryption        PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha224WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha256WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha384WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha512WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha512-224WithRSAEncryption  PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha512-256WithRSAEncryption  PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID id-RSAES-OAEP   PARAMETERS RSAES-OAEP-params } |
PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms                               |
{ OID id-RSASSA-PSS   PARAMETERS RSASSA-PSS-params },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

A.2.1.  RSAES-OAEP

The object identifier id-RSAES-OAEP identifies the RSAES-OAEP
encryption scheme.

id-RSAES-OAEP    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 }

The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type RSAES-OAEP-params:

RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm      [0] HashAlgorithm     DEFAULT sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm   [1] MaskGenAlgorithm  DEFAULT mgf1SHA1,
pSourceAlgorithm   [2] PSourceAlgorithm  DEFAULT pSpecifiedEmpty
}

The fields of type RSAES-OAEP-params have the following meanings:

o  hashAlgorithm identifies the hash function.  It SHALL be an
algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms.  For
a discussion of supported hash functions, see Appendix B.1.

HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms}
}

OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-sha1       PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha224     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha256     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha384     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-224 PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-256 PARAMETERS NULL },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

The default hash function is SHA-1:

sha1    HashAlgorithm ::= {
algorithm   id-sha1,
parameters  SHA1Parameters : NULL
}

SHA1Parameters ::= NULL

o  maskGenAlgorithm identifies the mask generation function.  It
SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set
PKCS1MGFAlgorithms, which for this version SHALL consist of
id-mgf1, identifying the MGF1 mask generation function (see
Appendix B.2.1).  The parameters field associated with id-mgf1
SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set
OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms, identifying the hash function on which
MGF1 is based.

MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1MGFAlgorithms} }

PKCS1MGFAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-mgf1 PARAMETERS HashAlgorithm },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

o  The default mask generation function is MGF1 with SHA-1:

mgf1SHA1    MaskGenAlgorithm ::= {
algorithm   id-mgf1,
parameters  HashAlgorithm : sha1
}

o  pSourceAlgorithm identifies the source (and possibly the value) of
the label L.  It SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set
PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms, which for this version SHALL consist of
id-pSpecified, indicating that the label is specified explicitly.
The parameters field associated with id-pSpecified SHALL have a
value of type OCTET STRING, containing the label.  In previous
versions of this specification, the term "encoding parameters" was
used rather than "label", hence the name of the type below.

PSourceAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms}
}

PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-pSpecified PARAMETERS EncodingParameters },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

id-pSpecified    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }

EncodingParameters ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(0..MAX))

o  The default label is an empty string (so that lHash will contain
the hash of the empty string):

pSpecifiedEmpty    PSourceAlgorithm ::= {
algorithm   id-pSpecified,
parameters  EncodingParameters : emptyString
}

emptyString    EncodingParameters ::= ''H

If all of the default values of the fields in RSAES-OAEP-params are
used, then the algorithm identifier will have the following value:

rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier    RSAES-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm   id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters  RSAES-OAEP-params : {
hashAlgorithm       sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm    mgf1SHA1,
pSourceAlgorithm    pSpecifiedEmpty
}
}

RSAES-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier  {
{PKCS1Algorithms}
}

A.2.2.  RSAES-PKCS-v1_5

The object identifier rsaEncryption (see Appendix A.1) identifies the
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption scheme.  The parameters field associated
with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a
value of type NULL.  This is the same as in PKCS #1 v1.5.

rsaEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }

A.2.3.  RSASSA-PSS

The object identifier id-RSASSA-PSS identifies the RSASSA-PSS
encryption scheme.

id-RSASSA-PSS    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }

The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type RSASSA-PSS-params:

RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm      [0] HashAlgorithm      DEFAULT sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm   [1] MaskGenAlgorithm   DEFAULT mgf1SHA1,
saltLength         [2] INTEGER            DEFAULT 20,
trailerField       [3] TrailerField       DEFAULT trailerFieldBC
}

The fields of type RSASSA-PSS-params have the following meanings:

o  hashAlgorithm identifies the hash function.  It SHALL be an
algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms (see
Appendix A.2.1).  The default hash function is SHA-1.

o  maskGenAlgorithm identifies the mask generation function.  It
SHALL be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1MGFAlgorithms
(see Appendix A.2.1).  The default mask generation function is
MGF1 with SHA-1.  For MGF1 (and more generally, for other mask
generation functions based on a hash function), it is RECOMMENDED
that the underlying hash function be the same as the one
identified by hashAlgorithm; see Note 2 in Section 9.1 for further
comments.

o  saltLength is the octet length of the salt.  It SHALL be an
integer.  For a given hashAlgorithm, the default value of
saltLength is the octet length of the hash value.  Unlike the
other fields of type RSASSA-PSS-params, saltLength does not need
to be fixed for a given RSA key pair.

o  trailerField is the trailer field number, for compatibility with
IEEE 1363a [IEEE1363A].  It SHALL be 1 for this version of the
document, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal
value 0xbc.  Other trailer fields (including the trailer field
HashID || 0xcc in IEEE 1363a) are not supported in this document.

TrailerField ::= INTEGER { trailerFieldBC(1) }

If the default values of the hashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm, and
trailerField fields of RSASSA-PSS-params are used, then the algorithm
identifier will have the following value:

rSASSA-PSS-Default-Identifier    RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm   id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters  RSASSA-PSS-params : {
hashAlgorithm       sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm    mgf1SHA1,
saltLength          20,
trailerField        trailerFieldBC
}
}

RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{PKCS1Algorithms}
}

Note: In some applications, the hash function underlying a signature
scheme is identified separately from the rest of the operations in
the signature scheme.  For instance, in PKCS #7 [RFC2315], a hash
function identifier is placed before the message and a "digest
encryption" algorithm identifier (indicating the rest of the
operations) is carried with the signature.  In order for PKCS #7 to
support the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme, an object identifier would
need to be defined for the operations in RSASSA-PSS after the hash
function (analogous to the RSAEncryption OID for the
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme).  S/MIME Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] takes a different approach.  Although a hash function
identifier is placed before the message, an algorithm identifier for
the full signature scheme may be carried with a CMS signature (this
is done for DSA signatures).  Following this convention, the
id-RSASSA-PSS OID can be used to identify RSASSA-PSS signatures in
CMS.  Since CMS is considered the successor to PKCS #7 and new
developments such as the addition of support for RSASSA-PSS will be
pursued with respect to CMS rather than PKCS #7, an OID for the "rest
of" RSASSA-PSS is not defined in this version of PKCS #1.

A.2.4.  RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5

The object identifier for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHALL be one of the
following.  The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash
algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
SHA-512/224, or SHA-512/256.  Note that if either MD2 or MD5 is used,
then the OID is just as in PKCS #1 v1.5.  For each OID, the
parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type NULL.  The OID should
be chosen in accordance with the following table:

Hash algorithm   OID
------------------------------------------------------------
MD2              md2WithRSAEncryption        ::= {pkcs-1 2}
MD5              md5WithRSAEncryption        ::= {pkcs-1 4}
SHA-1            sha1WithRSAEncryption       ::= {pkcs-1 5}
SHA-256          sha224WithRSAEncryption     ::= {pkcs-1 14}
SHA-256          sha256WithRSAEncryption     ::= {pkcs-1 11}
SHA-384          sha384WithRSAEncryption     ::= {pkcs-1 12}
SHA-512          sha512WithRSAEncryption     ::= {pkcs-1 13}
SHA-512/224      sha512-224WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs-1 15}
SHA-512/256      sha512-256WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs-1 16}

The EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method includes an ASN.1 value of type
DigestInfo, where the type DigestInfo has the syntax

DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithm,
digest OCTET STRING
}

digestAlgorithm identifies the hash function and SHALL be an
algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms.  For
a discussion of supported hash functions, see Appendix B.1.

DigestAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms}
}

PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-md2        PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-md5        PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha1       PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha224     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha256     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha384     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-224 PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-256 PARAMETERS NULL }
}

Appendix B.  Supporting Techniques

This section gives several examples of underlying functions
supporting the encryption schemes in Section 7 and the encoding
methods in Section 9.  A range of techniques is given here to allow
compatibility with existing applications as well as migration to new
techniques.  While these supporting techniques are appropriate for
applications to implement, none of them is required to be
implemented.  It is expected that profiles for PKCS #1 v2.2 will be
developed that specify particular supporting techniques.

This section also gives object identifiers for the supporting
techniques.

B.1.  Hash Functions

Hash functions are used in the operations contained in Sections 7 and
9.  Hash functions are deterministic, meaning that the output is
completely determined by the input.  Hash functions take octet
strings of variable length and generate fixed-length octet strings.
The hash functions used in the operations contained in Sections 7 and
9 should generally be collision-resistant.  This means that it is
infeasible to find two distinct inputs to the hash function that
produce the same output.  A collision-resistant hash function also
has the desirable property of being one-way; this means that given an
output, it is infeasible to find an input whose hash is the specified
output.  In addition to the requirements, the hash function should
yield a mask generation function (Appendix B.2) with pseudorandom
output.

Nine hash functions are given as examples for the encoding methods in
this document: MD2 [RFC1319] (which was retired by [RFC6149]), MD5
[RFC1321], SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
and SHA-512/256 [SHS].  For the RSAES-OAEP encryption scheme and
EMSA-PSS encoding method, only SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 are RECOMMENDED.  For the EMSA-
PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, and SHA-512/256 are RECOMMENDED for new applications.  MD2,
MD5, and SHA-1 are recommended only for compatibility with existing
applications based on PKCS #1 v1.5.

The object identifiers id-md2, id-md5, id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256,
id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512/224, and id-sha512/256 identify the
respective hash functions:

id-md2      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi (113549)
digestAlgorithm (2) 2
}

id-md5      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso (1) member-body (2) us (840) rsadsi (113549)
digestAlgorithm (2) 5
}

id-sha1    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithms(2) 26
}

id-sha224    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t (2) country (16) us (840) organization (1)
gov (101) csor (3) nistalgorithm (4) hashalgs (2) 4
}

id-sha256    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t (2) country (16) us (840) organization (1)
gov (101) csor (3) nistalgorithm (4) hashalgs (2) 1
}

id-sha384    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t (2) country (16) us (840) organization (1)
gov (101) csor (3) nistalgorithm (4) hashalgs (2) 2
}

id-sha512    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t (2) country (16) us (840) organization (1)
gov (101) csor (3) nistalgorithm (4) hashalgs (2) 3
}

id-sha512-224    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t (2) country (16) us (840) organization (1)
gov (101) csor (3) nistalgorithm (4) hashalgs (2) 5
}

id-sha512-256    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t (2) country (16) us (840) organization (1)
gov (101) csor (3) nistalgorithm (4) hashalgs (2) 6
}

The parameters field associated with these OIDs in a value of type
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL have a value of type NULL.

The parameters field associated with id-md2 and id-md5 in a value of
type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL.

The parameters field associated with id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256,
id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512/224, and id-sha512/256 should
generally be omitted, but if present, it shall have a value of type
NULL.

This is to align with the definitions originally promulgated by NIST.
For the SHA algorithms, implementations MUST accept
AlgorithmIdentifier values both without parameters and with NULL
parameters.

Exception: When formatting the DigestInfoValue in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
(see Section 9.2), the parameters field associated with id-sha1,
id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512/224, and
id-sha512/256 shall have a value of type NULL.  This is to maintain
compatibility with existing implementations and with the numeric
information values already published for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which are
also reflected in IEEE 1363a [IEEE1363A].

Note: Version 1.5 of PKCS #1 also allowed for the use of MD4 in
signature schemes.  The cryptanalysis of MD4 has progressed
significantly in the intervening years.  For example, Dobbertin [MD4]
demonstrated how to find collisions for MD4 and that the first two
rounds of MD4 are not one-way [MD4FIRST].  Because of these results
and others (e.g., [MD4LAST]), MD4 is NOT RECOMMENDED.

Further advances have been made in the cryptanalysis of MD2 and MD5,
especially after the findings of Stevens et al.  [PREFIX] on chosen-

prefix collisions on MD5.  MD2 and MD5 should be considered
cryptographically broken and removed from existing applications.
This version of the standard supports MD2 and MD5 just for backwards-
compatibility reasons.

There have also been advances in the cryptanalysis of SHA-1.
Particularly, the results of Wang et al.  [SHA1CRYPT] (which have
been independently verified by M.  Cochran in his analysis [COCHRAN])
on using a differential path to find collisions in SHA-1, which
conclude that the security strength of the SHA-1 hashing algorithm is
significantly reduced.  However, this reduction is not significant
enough to warrant the removal of SHA-1 from existing applications,
but its usage is only recommended for backwards-compatibility
reasons.

To address these concerns, only SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,
SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256 are RECOMMENDED for new applications.
As of today, the best (known) collision attacks against these hash
functions are generic attacks with complexity 2L/2, where L is the
bit length of the hash output.  For the signature schemes in this
document, a collision attack is easily translated into a signature
forgery.  Therefore, the value L / 2 should be at least equal to the
desired security level in bits of the signature scheme (a security
level of B bits means that the best attack has complexity 2B).  The
same rule of thumb can be applied to RSAES-OAEP; it is RECOMMENDED
that the bit length of the seed (which is equal to the bit length of
the hash output) be twice the desired security level in bits.

B.2.  Mask Generation Functions

A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input and outputs an octet string of
the desired length.  There may be restrictions on the length of the
input and output octet strings, but such bounds are generally very
large.  Mask generation functions are deterministic; the octet string
output is completely determined by the input octet string.  The
output of a mask generation function should be pseudorandom: Given
one part of the output but not the input, it should be infeasible to
predict another part of the output.  The provable security of
RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS relies on the random nature of the output
of the mask generation function, which in turn relies on the random
nature of the underlying hash.

One mask generation function is given here: MGF1, which is based on a
hash function.  MGF1 coincides with the mask generation functions
defined in IEEE 1363 [IEEE1363] and ANSI X9.44 [ANSIX944].  Future
versions of this document may define other mask generation functions.

B.2.1.  MGF1

MGF1 is a mask generation function based on a hash function.

MGF1 (mgfSeed, maskLen)

Options:

Hash     hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of
the hash function output)

Input:

mgfSeed  seed from which mask is generated, an octet string
maskLen  intended length in octets of the mask, at most 2^32 hLen

Output:

mask     mask, an octet string of length maskLen

Error: "mask too long"

Steps:

1.  If maskLen > 2^32 hLen, output "mask too long" and stop.

2.  Let T be the empty octet string.

3.  For counter from 0 to \ceil (maskLen / hLen) - 1, do the
following:

A.  Convert counter to an octet string C of length 4 octets (see
Section 4.1):

C = I2OSP (counter, 4) .

B.  Concatenate the hash of the seed mgfSeed and C to the octet
string T:

T = T || Hash(mgfSeed || C) .

4.  Output the leading maskLen octets of T as the octet string mask.

The object identifier id-mgf1 identifies the MGF1 mask generation
function:

id-mgf1    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }

The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type hashAlgorithm,
identifying the hash function on which MGF1 is based.

Appendix C.  ASN.1 Module

-- PKCS #1 v2.2 ASN.1 Module
-- Revised October 27, 2012

-- This module has been checked for conformance with the
-- ASN.1 standard by the OSS ASN.1 Tools

PKCS-1 {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)
modules(0) pkcs-1(1)
}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

-- EXPORTS ALL
-- All types and values defined in this module are exported for use
-- in other ASN.1 modules.

IMPORTS

id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512-224,
id-sha512-256
FROM NIST-SHA2 {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
};

-- ============================
--   Basic object identifiers
-- ============================

-- The DER encoding of this in hexadecimal is:
-- (0x)06 08
--        2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
--
pkcs-1    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1
}

--
-- When rsaEncryption is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier,

-- the parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
--
rsaEncryption    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }

--
-- When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
-- parameters MUST be present and MUST be RSAES-OAEP-params.
--
id-RSAES-OAEP    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 }

--
-- When id-pSpecified is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
-- parameters MUST be an OCTET STRING.
--
id-pSpecified    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }

--
-- When id-RSASSA-PSS is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
-- parameters MUST be present and MUST be RSASSA-PSS-params.
--
id-RSASSA-PSS    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }

--
-- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- the parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
--
md2WithRSAEncryption         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 }
md5WithRSAEncryption         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 }
sha1WithRSAEncryption        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 5 }
sha224WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 14 }
sha256WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
sha384WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
sha512WithRSAEncryption      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
sha512-224WithRSAEncryption  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 15 }
sha512-256WithRSAEncryption  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 16 }

--
-- This OID really belongs in a module with the secsig OIDs.
--
id-sha1    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2)
26
}

--
-- OIDs for MD2 and MD5, allowed only in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
--
id-md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {

iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2
}

id-md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5
}

--
-- When id-mgf1 is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters
-- MUST be present and MUST be a HashAlgorithm, for example, sha1.
--
id-mgf1    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }

-- ================
--   Useful types
-- ================

ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= CLASS {
&id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER  UNIQUE,
&Type  OPTIONAL
}
WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARAMETERS &Type] }

-- Note: the parameter InfoObjectSet in the following definitions
-- allows a distinct information object set to be specified for sets
-- of algorithms such as:
-- DigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
--     { OID id-md2  PARAMETERS NULL }|
--     { OID id-md5  PARAMETERS NULL }|
--     { OID id-sha1 PARAMETERS NULL }
-- }
--

AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER:InfoObjectSet } ::=
SEQUENCE {
algorithm
ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&id({InfoObjectSet}),
parameters
ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER.&Type({InfoObjectSet}{@.algorithm})
OPTIONAL
}

-- ==============
--   Algorithms
-- ==============

--
-- Allowed EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS digest algorithms.

--
OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-sha1       PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha224     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha256     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha384     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-224 PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-256 PARAMETERS NULL },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

--
-- Allowed EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digest algorithms.
--
PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-md2        PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-md5        PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha1       PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha224     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha256     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha384     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512     PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-224 PARAMETERS NULL }|
{ OID id-sha512-256 PARAMETERS NULL }
}

-- When id-md2 and id-md5 are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
-- parameters field shall have a value of type NULL.

-- When id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512,
-- id-sha512-224, and id-sha512-256 are used in an
-- AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters (which are optional) SHOULD be
-- omitted, but if present, they SHALL have a value of type NULL.
-- However, implementations MUST accept AlgorithmIdentifier values
-- both without parameters and with NULL parameters.

-- Exception: When formatting the DigestInfoValue in EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
-- (see Section 9.2), the parameters field associated with id-sha1,
-- id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512, id-sha512-224, and
-- id-sha512-256 SHALL have a value of type NULL.  This is to
-- maintain compatibility with existing implementations and with the
-- numeric information values already published for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5,
-- which are also reflected in IEEE 1363a.

sha1    HashAlgorithm ::= {
algorithm   id-sha1,
parameters  SHA1Parameters : NULL

}

HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {OAEP-PSSDigestAlgorithms} }

SHA1Parameters ::= NULL

--
-- Allowed mask generation function algorithms.
-- If the identifier is id-mgf1, the parameters are a HashAlgorithm.
--
PKCS1MGFAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-mgf1 PARAMETERS HashAlgorithm },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

--
-- Default AlgorithmIdentifier for id-RSAES-OAEP.maskGenAlgorithm and
-- id-RSASSA-PSS.maskGenAlgorithm.
--
mgf1SHA1    MaskGenAlgorithm ::= {
algorithm   id-mgf1,
parameters  HashAlgorithm : sha1
}

MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1MGFAlgorithms} }

--
-- Allowed algorithms for pSourceAlgorithm.
--
PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID id-pSpecified PARAMETERS EncodingParameters },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

EncodingParameters ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(0..MAX))

--
-- This identifier means that the label L is an empty string, so the
-- digest of the empty string appears in the RSA block before
-- masking.
--

pSpecifiedEmpty    PSourceAlgorithm ::= {
algorithm   id-pSpecified,
parameters  EncodingParameters : emptyString
}

PSourceAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms} }

emptyString    EncodingParameters ::= ''H

--
-- Type identifier definitions for the PKCS #1 OIDs.
--
PKCS1Algorithms    ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= {
{ OID rsaEncryption                PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID md2WithRSAEncryption         PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID md5WithRSAEncryption         PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha1WithRSAEncryption        PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha224WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha256WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha384WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha512WithRSAEncryption      PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha512-224WithRSAEncryption  PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID sha512-256WithRSAEncryption  PARAMETERS NULL } |
{ OID id-RSAES-OAEP   PARAMETERS RSAES-OAEP-params } |
PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms                               |
{ OID id-RSASSA-PSS   PARAMETERS RSASSA-PSS-params },
...  -- Allows for future expansion --
}

-- ===================
--   Main structures
-- ===================

RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus           INTEGER,  -- n
publicExponent    INTEGER   -- e
}

--
-- Representation of RSA private key with information for the CRT
-- algorithm.
--
RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
version           Version,
modulus           INTEGER,  -- n
publicExponent    INTEGER,  -- e
privateExponent   INTEGER,  -- d
prime1            INTEGER,  -- p
prime2            INTEGER,  -- q
exponent1         INTEGER,  -- d mod (p-1)
exponent2         INTEGER,  -- d mod (q-1)
coefficient       INTEGER,  -- (inverse of q) mod p
otherPrimeInfos   OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL
}

Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) }
(CONSTRAINED BY
{-- version MUST
be multi if otherPrimeInfos present --})

OtherPrimeInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF OtherPrimeInfo

OtherPrimeInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
prime             INTEGER,  -- ri
exponent          INTEGER,  -- di
coefficient       INTEGER   -- ti
}

--
-- AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters for id-RSAES-OAEP.
-- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.
--
RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm      [0] HashAlgorithm     DEFAULT sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm   [1] MaskGenAlgorithm  DEFAULT mgf1SHA1,
pSourceAlgorithm   [2] PSourceAlgorithm  DEFAULT pSpecifiedEmpty
}

--
-- Identifier for default RSAES-OAEP algorithm identifier.
-- The DER encoding of this is in hexadecimal:
-- (0x)30 0D
--        06 09
--           2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07
--        30 00
-- Notice that the DER encoding of default values is "empty".
--

rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier    RSAES-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm   id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters  RSAES-OAEP-params : {
hashAlgorithm       sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm    mgf1SHA1,
pSourceAlgorithm    pSpecifiedEmpty
}
}

RSAES-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{PKCS1Algorithms}
}

--

-- AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters for id-RSASSA-PSS.
-- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.
--
RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm      [0] HashAlgorithm      DEFAULT sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm   [1] MaskGenAlgorithm   DEFAULT mgf1SHA1,
saltLength         [2] INTEGER            DEFAULT 20,
trailerField       [3] TrailerField       DEFAULT trailerFieldBC
}

TrailerField ::= INTEGER { trailerFieldBC(1) }

--
-- Identifier for default RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifier
-- The DER encoding of this is in hexadecimal:
-- (0x)30 0D
--        06 09
--           2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A
--        30 00
-- Notice that the DER encoding of default values is "empty".
--
rSASSA-PSS-Default-Identifier    RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm   id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters  RSASSA-PSS-params : {
hashAlgorithm       sha1,
maskGenAlgorithm    mgf1SHA1,
saltLength          20,
trailerField        trailerFieldBC
}
}

RSASSA-AlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{PKCS1Algorithms}
}

--
-- Syntax for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 hash identifier.
--
DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithm,
digest OCTET STRING
}

DigestAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {
{PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms}
}

END

Appendix D.  Revision History of PKCS #1

Versions 1.0 - 1.5:

Versions 1.0 - 1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data
Security, Inc.'s Public-Key Cryptography Standards meetings in
February and March 1991.

Version 1.4 was part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of
PKCS.  Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI Implementors'
Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-18.

Version 1.5 incorporated several editorial changes, including
updates to the references and the addition of a revision history.
The following substantive changes were made:

*  Section 10: "MD4 with RSA" signature and verification processes
were added.

*  Section 11: md4WithRSAEncryption object identifier was added.

Version 1.5 was republished as [RFC2313] (which was later
obsoleted by [RFC2437]).

Version 2.0:

Version 2.0 incorporated major editorial changes in terms of the
document structure and introduced the RSAES-OAEP encryption
scheme.  This version continued to support the encryption and
signature processes in version 1.5, although the hash algorithm
MD4 was no longer allowed due to cryptanalytic advances in the
intervening years.  Version 2.0 was republished as [RFC2437]
(which was later obsoleted by [RFC3447]).

Version 2.1:

Version 2.1 introduced multi-prime RSA and the RSASSA-PSS
signature scheme with appendix along with several editorial
improvements.  This version continued to support the schemes in
version 2.0.  Version 2.1 was republished as [RFC3447].

Version 2.2:

Version 2.2 updates the list of allowed hashing algorithms to
align them with FIPS 180-4 [SHS], therefore adding SHA-224,
SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256.  The following substantive changes
were made:

*  Object identifiers for sha224WithRSAEncryption,
sha512-224WithRSAEncryption, and sha512-256WithRSAEncryption
were added.

*  This version continues to support the schemes in version 2.1.

Appendix E.  About PKCS

The Public-Key Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by
RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers
worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-
key cryptography.  First published in 1991 as a result of meetings
with a small group of early adopters of public-key technology, the
PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented.
Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal
and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 and IEEE P1363 documents,
PKIX, Secure Electronic Transaction (SET), S/MIME, SSL/TLS, and
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) / WAP Transport Layer Security
(WTLS).

Further development of most PKCS documents occurs through the IETF.
Suggestions for improvement are welcome.

Acknowledgements

This document is based on a contribution of RSA Laboratories, the
research center of RSA Security Inc.

Authors' Addresses

Kathleen M. Moriarty (editor)
EMC Corporation
176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA  01748
United States of America

Email: kathleen.moriarty@emc.com

Burt Kaliski
Verisign
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA  20190
United States of America

Email: bkaliski@verisign.com
URI:   http://verisignlabs.com

Jakob Jonsson
Subset AB
Munkbrogtan 4
Stockholm  SE-11127
Sweden

Phone: +46 8 428 687 43
Email: jakob.jonsson@subset.se

Andreas Rusch
RSA
345 Queen Street
Brisbane, QLD  4000
Australia

Email: andreas.rusch@rsa.com