RFC 3447  PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryp
Network Working Group J. Jonsson Request for Comments: 3447 B. Kaliski Obsoletes: 2437 RSA Laboratories Category: Informational February 2003 PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1 Status of this Memo This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This memo represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.1 from RSA Laboratories' PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document is taken directly from the PKCS #1 v2.1 document, with certain corrections made during the publication process. Table of Contents 1. Introduction...............................................2 2. Notation...................................................3 3. Key types..................................................6 3.1 RSA public key..........................................6 3.2 RSA private key.........................................7 4. Data conversion primitives.................................8 4.1 I2OSP...................................................9 4.2 OS2IP...................................................9 5. Cryptographic primitives..................................10 5.1 Encryption and decryption primitives...................10 5.2 Signature and verification primitives..................12 6. Overview of schemes.......................................14 7. Encryption schemes........................................15 7.1 RSAESOAEP.............................................16 7.2 RSAESPKCS1v1_5.......................................23 8. Signature schemes with appendix...........................27 8.1 RSASSAPSS.............................................29 8.2 RSASSAPKCS1v1_5......................................32 9. Encoding methods for signatures with appendix.............35 9.1 EMSAPSS...............................................36 9.2 EMSAPKCS1v1_5........................................41 Appendix A. ASN.1 syntax...........................................44 A.1 RSA key representation.................................44 A.2 Scheme identification..................................46 Appendix B. Supporting techniques..................................52 B.1 Hash functions.........................................52 B.2 Mask generation functions..............................54 Appendix C. ASN.1 module...........................................56 Appendix D. Intellectual Property Considerations...................63 Appendix E. Revision history.......................................64 Appendix F. References.............................................65 Appendix G. About PKCS.............................................70 Appendix H. Corrections Made During RFC Publication Process........70 Security Considerations............................................70 Acknowledgements...................................................71 Authors' Addresses.................................................71 Full Copyright Statement...........................................72 1. Introduction This document provides recommendations for the implementation of publickey cryptography based on the RSA algorithm [42], covering the following aspects: * Cryptographic primitives * Encryption schemes * Signature schemes with appendix * ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying the schemes The recommendations are intended for general application within computer and communications systems, and as such include a fair amount of flexibility. It is expected that application standards based on these specifications may include additional constraints. The recommendations are intended to be compatible with the standard IEEE13632000 [26] and draft standards currently being developed by the ANSI X9F1 [1] and IEEE P1363 [27] working groups. This document supersedes PKCS #1 version 2.0 [35][44] but includes compatible techniques. The organization of this document is as follows: * Section 1 is an introduction. * Section 2 defines some notation used in this document. * Section 3 defines the RSA public and private key types. * Sections 4 and 5 define several primitives, or basic mathematical operations. Data conversion primitives are in Section 4, and cryptographic primitives (encryptiondecryption, signature verification) are in Section 5. * Sections 6, 7, and 8 deal with the encryption and signature schemes in this document. Section 6 gives an overview. Along with the methods found in PKCS #1 v1.5, Section 7 defines an OAEPbased [3] encryption scheme and Section 8 defines a PSSbased [4][5] signature scheme with appendix. * Section 9 defines the encoding methods for the signature schemes in Section 8. * Appendix A defines the ASN.1 syntax for the keys defined in Section 3 and the schemes in Sections 7 and 8. * Appendix B defines the hash functions and the mask generation function used in this document, including ASN.1 syntax for the techniques. * Appendix C gives an ASN.1 module. * Appendices D, E, F and G cover intellectual property issues, outline the revision history of PKCS #1, give references to other publications and standards, and provide general information about the PublicKey Cryptography Standards. 2. Notation c ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n1 C ciphertext, an octet string d RSA private exponent d_i additional factor r_i's CRT exponent, a positive integer such that e * d_i == 1 (mod (r_i1)), i = 3, ..., u dP p's CRT exponent, a positive integer such that e * dP == 1 (mod (p1)) dQ q's CRT exponent, a positive integer such that e * dQ == 1 (mod (q1)) e RSA public exponent EM encoded message, an octet string emBits (intended) length in bits of an encoded message EM emLen (intended) length in octets of an encoded message EM GCD(. , .) greatest common divisor of two nonnegative integers Hash hash function hLen output length in octets of hash function Hash k length in octets of the RSA modulus n K RSA private key L optional RSAESOAEP label, an octet string LCM(., ..., .) least common multiple of a list of nonnegative integers m message representative, an integer between 0 and n1 M message, an octet string mask MGF output, an octet string maskLen (intended) length of the octet string mask MGF mask generation function mgfSeed seed from which mask is generated, an octet string mLen length in octets of a message M n RSA modulus, n = r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_u , u >= 2 (n, e) RSA public key p, q first two prime factors of the RSA modulus n qInv CRT coefficient, a positive integer less than p such that q * qInv == 1 (mod p) r_i prime factors of the RSA modulus n, including r_1 = p, r_2 = q, and additional factors if any s signature representative, an integer between 0 and n1 S signature, an octet string sLen length in octets of the EMSAPSS salt t_i additional prime factor r_i's CRT coefficient, a positive integer less than r_i such that r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i1) * t_i == 1 (mod r_i) , i = 3, ... , u u number of prime factors of the RSA modulus, u >= 2 x a nonnegative integer X an octet string corresponding to x xLen (intended) length of the octet string X 0x indicator of hexadecimal representation of an octet or an octet string; "0x48" denotes the octet with hexadecimal value 48; "(0x)48 09 0e" denotes the string of three consecutive octets with hexadecimal value 48, 09, and 0e, respectively \lambda(n) LCM(r_11, r_21, ... , r_u1) \xor bitwise exclusiveor of two octet strings \ceil(.) ceiling function; \ceil(x) is the smallest integer larger than or equal to the real number x  concatenation operator == congruence symbol; a == b (mod n) means that the integer n divides the integer a  b Note. The CRT can be applied in a nonrecursive as well as a recursive way. In this document a recursive approach following Garner's algorithm [22] is used. See also Note 1 in Section 3.2. 3. Key types Two key types are employed in the primitives and schemes defined in this document: RSA public key and RSA private key. Together, an RSA public key and an RSA private key form an RSA key pair. This specification supports socalled "multiprime" RSA where the modulus may have more than two prime factors. The benefit of multi prime RSA is lower computational cost for the decryption and signature primitives, provided that the CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) is used. Better performance can be achieved on single processor platforms, but to a greater extent on multiprocessor platforms, where the modular exponentiations involved can be done in parallel. For a discussion on how multiprime affects the security of the RSA cryptosystem, the reader is referred to [49]. 3.1 RSA public key For the purposes of this document, an RSA public key consists of two components: n the RSA modulus, a positive integer e the RSA public exponent, a positive integer In a valid RSA public key, the RSA modulus n is a product of u distinct odd primes r_i, i = 1, 2, ..., u, where u >= 2, and the RSA public exponent e is an integer between 3 and n  1 satisfying GCD(e, \lambda(n)) = 1, where \lambda(n) = LCM(r_1  1, ..., r_u  1). By convention, the first two primes r_1 and r_2 may also be denoted p and q respectively. A recommended syntax for interchanging RSA public keys between implementations is given in Appendix A.1.1; an implementation's internal representation may differ. 3.2 RSA private key For the purposes of this document, an RSA private key may have either of two representations. 1. The first representation consists of the pair (n, d), where the components have the following meanings: n the RSA modulus, a positive integer d the RSA private exponent, a positive integer 2. The second representation consists of a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and a (possibly empty) sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u, one for each prime not in the quintuple, where the components have the following meanings: p the first factor, a positive integer q the second factor, a positive integer dP the first factor's CRT exponent, a positive integer dQ the second factor's CRT exponent, a positive integer qInv the (first) CRT coefficient, a positive integer r_i the ith factor, a positive integer d_i the ith factor's CRT exponent, a positive integer t_i the ith factor's CRT coefficient, a positive integer In a valid RSA private key with the first representation, the RSA modulus n is the same as in the corresponding RSA public key and is the product of u distinct odd primes r_i, i = 1, 2, ..., u, where u >= 2. The RSA private exponent d is a positive integer less than n satisfying e * d == 1 (mod \lambda(n)), where e is the corresponding RSA public exponent and \lambda(n) is defined as in Section 3.1. In a valid RSA private key with the second representation, the two factors p and q are the first two prime factors of the RSA modulus n (i.e., r_1 and r_2), the CRT exponents dP and dQ are positive integers less than p and q respectively satisfying e * dP == 1 (mod (p1)) e * dQ == 1 (mod (q1)) , and the CRT coefficient qInv is a positive integer less than p satisfying q * qInv == 1 (mod p). If u > 2, the representation will include one or more triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u. The factors r_i are the additional prime factors of the RSA modulus n. Each CRT exponent d_i (i = 3, ..., u) satisfies e * d_i == 1 (mod (r_i  1)). Each CRT coefficient t_i (i = 3, ..., u) is a positive integer less than r_i satisfying R_i * t_i == 1 (mod r_i) , where R_i = r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i1). A recommended syntax for interchanging RSA private keys between implementations, which includes components from both representations, is given in Appendix A.1.2; an implementation's internal representation may differ. Notes. 1. The definition of the CRT coefficients here and the formulas that use them in the primitives in Section 5 generally follow Garner's algorithm [22] (see also Algorithm 14.71 in [37]). However, for compatibility with the representations of RSA private keys in PKCS #1 v2.0 and previous versions, the roles of p and q are reversed compared to the rest of the primes. Thus, the first CRT coefficient, qInv, is defined as the inverse of q mod p, rather than as the inverse of R_1 mod r_2, i.e., of p mod q. 2. Quisquater and Couvreur [40] observed the benefit of applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to RSA operations. 4. Data conversion primitives Two data conversion primitives are employed in the schemes defined in this document: * I2OSP  IntegertoOctetString primitive * OS2IP  OctetStringtoInteger primitive For the purposes of this document, and consistent with ASN.1 syntax, an octet string is an ordered sequence of octets (eightbit bytes). The sequence is indexed from first (conventionally, leftmost) to last (rightmost). For purposes of conversion to and from integers, the first octet is considered the most significant in the following conversion primitives. 4.1 I2OSP I2OSP converts a nonnegative integer to an octet string of a specified length. I2OSP (x, xLen) Input: x nonnegative integer to be converted xLen intended length of the resulting octet string Output: X corresponding octet string of length xLen Error: "integer too large" Steps: 1. If x >= 256^xLen, output "integer too large" and stop. 2. Write the integer x in its unique xLendigit representation in base 256: x = x_(xLen1) 256^(xLen1) + x_(xLen2) 256^(xLen2) + ... + x_1 256 + x_0, where 0 <= x_i < 256 (note that one or more leading digits will be zero if x is less than 256^(xLen1)). 3. Let the octet X_i have the integer value x_(xLeni) for 1 <= i <= xLen. Output the octet string X = X_1 X_2 ... X_xLen. 4.2 OS2IP OS2IP converts an octet string to a nonnegative integer. OS2IP (X) Input: X octet string to be converted Output: x corresponding nonnegative integer Steps: 1. Let X_1 X_2 ... X_xLen be the octets of X from first to last, and let x_(xLeni) be the integer value of the octet X_i for 1 <= i <= xLen. 2. Let x = x_(xLen1) 256^(xLen1) + x_(xLen2) 256^(xLen2) + ... + x_1 256 + x_0. 3. Output x. 5. Cryptographic primitives Cryptographic primitives are basic mathematical operations on which cryptographic schemes can be built. They are intended for implementation in hardware or as software modules, and are not intended to provide security apart from a scheme. Four types of primitive are specified in this document, organized in pairs: encryption and decryption; and signature and verification. The specifications of the primitives assume that certain conditions are met by the inputs, in particular that RSA public and private keys are valid. 5.1 Encryption and decryption primitives An encryption primitive produces a ciphertext representative from a message representative under the control of a public key, and a decryption primitive recovers the message representative from the ciphertext representative under the control of the corresponding private key. One pair of encryption and decryption primitives is employed in the encryption schemes defined in this document and is specified here: RSAEP/RSADP. RSAEP and RSADP involve the same mathematical operation, with different keys as input. The primitives defined here are the same as IFEPRSA/IFDPRSA in IEEE Std 13632000 [26] (except that support for multiprime RSA has been added) and are compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5. The main mathematical operation in each primitive is exponentiation. 5.1.1 RSAEP RSAEP ((n, e), m) Input: (n, e) RSA public key m message representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Output: c ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Error: "message representative out of range" Assumption: RSA public key (n, e) is valid Steps: 1. If the message representative m is not between 0 and n  1, output "message representative out of range" and stop. 2. Let c = m^e mod n. 3. Output c. 5.1.2 RSADP RSADP (K, c) Input: K RSA private key, where K has one of the following forms:  a pair (n, d)  a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and a possibly empty sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u c ciphertext representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Output: m message representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Error: "ciphertext representative out of range" Assumption: RSA private key K is valid Steps: 1. If the ciphertext representative c is not between 0 and n  1, output "ciphertext representative out of range" and stop. 2. The message representative m is computed as follows. a. If the first form (n, d) of K is used, let m = c^d mod n. b. If the second form (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and (r_i, d_i, t_i) of K is used, proceed as follows: i. Let m_1 = c^dP mod p and m_2 = c^dQ mod q. ii. If u > 2, let m_i = c^(d_i) mod r_i, i = 3, ..., u. iii. Let h = (m_1  m_2) * qInv mod p. iv. Let m = m_2 + q * h. v. If u > 2, let R = r_1 and for i = 3 to u do 1. Let R = R * r_(i1). 2. Let h = (m_i  m) * t_i mod r_i. 3. Let m = m + R * h. 3. Output m. Note. Step 2.b can be rewritten as a single loop, provided that one reverses the order of p and q. For consistency with PKCS #1 v2.0, however, the first two primes p and q are treated separately from the additional primes. 5.2 Signature and verification primitives A signature primitive produces a signature representative from a message representative under the control of a private key, and a verification primitive recovers the message representative from the signature representative under the control of the corresponding public key. One pair of signature and verification primitives is employed in the signature schemes defined in this document and is specified here: RSASP1/RSAVP1. The primitives defined here are the same as IFSPRSA1/IFVPRSA1 in IEEE 13632000 [26] (except that support for multiprime RSA has been added) and are compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5. The main mathematical operation in each primitive is exponentiation, as in the encryption and decryption primitives of Section 5.1. RSASP1 and RSAVP1 are the same as RSADP and RSAEP except for the names of their input and output arguments; they are distinguished as they are intended for different purposes. 5.2.1 RSASP1 RSASP1 (K, m) Input: K RSA private key, where K has one of the following forms:  a pair (n, d)  a quintuple (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and a (possibly empty) sequence of triplets (r_i, d_i, t_i), i = 3, ..., u m message representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Output: s signature representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Error: "message representative out of range" Assumption: RSA private key K is valid Steps: 1. If the message representative m is not between 0 and n  1, output "message representative out of range" and stop. 2. The signature representative s is computed as follows. a. If the first form (n, d) of K is used, let s = m^d mod n. b. If the second form (p, q, dP, dQ, qInv) and (r_i, d_i, t_i) of K is used, proceed as follows: i. Let s_1 = m^dP mod p and s_2 = m^dQ mod q. ii. If u > 2, let s_i = m^(d_i) mod r_i, i = 3, ..., u. iii. Let h = (s_1  s_2) * qInv mod p. iv. Let s = s_2 + q * h. v. If u > 2, let R = r_1 and for i = 3 to u do 1. Let R = R * r_(i1). 2. Let h = (s_i  s) * t_i mod r_i. 3. Let s = s + R * h. 3. Output s. Note. Step 2.b can be rewritten as a single loop, provided that one reverses the order of p and q. For consistency with PKCS #1 v2.0, however, the first two primes p and q are treated separately from the additional primes. 5.2.2 RSAVP1 RSAVP1 ((n, e), s) Input: (n, e) RSA public key s signature representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Output: m message representative, an integer between 0 and n  1 Error: "signature representative out of range" Assumption: RSA public key (n, e) is valid Steps: 1. If the signature representative s is not between 0 and n  1, output "signature representative out of range" and stop. 2. Let m = s^e mod n. 3. Output m. 6. Overview of schemes A scheme combines cryptographic primitives and other techniques to achieve a particular security goal. Two types of scheme are specified in this document: encryption schemes and signature schemes with appendix. The schemes specified in this document are limited in scope in that their operations consist only of steps to process data with an RSA public or private key, and do not include steps for obtaining or validating the key. Thus, in addition to the scheme operations, an application will typically include key management operations by which parties may select RSA public and private keys for a scheme operation. The specific additional operations and other details are outside the scope of this document. As was the case for the cryptographic primitives (Section 5), the specifications of scheme operations assume that certain conditions are met by the inputs, in particular that RSA public and private keys are valid. The behavior of an implementation is thus unspecified when a key is invalid. The impact of such unspecified behavior depends on the application. Possible means of addressing key validation include explicit key validation by the application; key validation within the publickey infrastructure; and assignment of liability for operations performed with an invalid key to the party who generated the key. A generally good cryptographic practice is to employ a given RSA key pair in only one scheme. This avoids the risk that vulnerability in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be essential to maintain provable security. While RSAESPKCS1v1_5 (Section 7.2) and RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 (Section 8.2) have traditionally been employed together without any known bad interactions (indeed, this is the model introduced by PKCS #1 v1.5), such a combined use of an RSA key pair is not recommended for new applications. To illustrate the risks related to the employment of an RSA key pair in more than one scheme, suppose an RSA key pair is employed in both RSAESOAEP (Section 7.1) and RSAESPKCS1v1_5. Although RSAESOAEP by itself would resist attack, an opponent might be able to exploit a weakness in the implementation of RSAESPKCS1v1_5 to recover messages encrypted with either scheme. As another example, suppose an RSA key pair is employed in both RSASSAPSS (Section 8.1) and RSASSAPKCS1v1_5. Then the security proof for RSASSAPSS would no longer be sufficient since the proof does not account for the possibility that signatures might be generated with a second scheme. Similar considerations may apply if an RSA key pair is employed in one of the schemes defined here and in a variant defined elsewhere. 7. Encryption schemes For the purposes of this document, an encryption scheme consists of an encryption operation and a decryption operation, where the encryption operation produces a ciphertext from a message with a recipient's RSA public key, and the decryption operation recovers the message from the ciphertext with the recipient's corresponding RSA private key. An encryption scheme can be employed in a variety of applications. A typical application is a key establishment protocol, where the message contains key material to be delivered confidentially from one party to another. For instance, PKCS #7 [45] employs such a protocol to deliver a contentencryption key from a sender to a recipient; the encryption schemes defined here would be suitable keyencryption algorithms in that context. Two encryption schemes are specified in this document: RSAESOAEP and RSAESPKCS1v1_5. RSAESOAEP is recommended for new applications; RSAESPKCS1v1_5 is included only for compatibility with existing applications, and is not recommended for new applications. The encryption schemes given here follow a general model similar to that employed in IEEE Std 13632000 [26], combining encryption and decryption primitives with an encoding method for encryption. The encryption operations apply a message encoding operation to a message to produce an encoded message, which is then converted to an integer message representative. An encryption primitive is applied to the message representative to produce the ciphertext. Reversing this, the decryption operations apply a decryption primitive to the ciphertext to recover a message representative, which is then converted to an octet string encoded message. A message decoding operation is applied to the encoded message to recover the message and verify the correctness of the decryption. To avoid implementation weaknesses related to the way errors are handled within the decoding operation (see [6] and [36]), the encoding and decoding operations for RSAESOAEP and RSAESPKCS1v1_5 are embedded in the specifications of the respective encryption schemes rather than defined in separate specifications. Both encryption schemes are compatible with the corresponding schemes in PKCS #1 v2.0. 7.1 RSAESOAEP RSAESOAEP combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives (Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) with the EMEOAEP encoding method (step 1.b in Section 7.1.1 and step 3 in Section 7.1.2). EMEOAEP is based on Bellare and Rogaway's Optimal Asymmetric Encryption scheme [3]. (OAEP stands for "Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding."). It is compatible with the IFES scheme defined in IEEE Std 13632000 [26], where the encryption and decryption primitives are IFEPRSA and IFDPRSA and the message encoding method is EMEOAEP. RSAESOAEP can operate on messages of length up to k  2hLen  2 octets, where hLen is the length of the output from the underlying hash function and k is the length in octets of the recipient's RSA modulus. Assuming that computing eth roots modulo n is infeasible and the mask generation function in RSAESOAEP has appropriate properties, RSAESOAEP is semantically secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks. This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty of breaking RSAESOAEP can be directly related to the difficulty of inverting the RSA function, provided that the mask generation function is viewed as a black box or random oracle; see [21] and the note below for further discussion. Both the encryption and the decryption operations of RSAESOAEP take the value of a label L as input. In this version of PKCS #1, L is the empty string; other uses of the label are outside the scope of this document. See Appendix A.2.1 for the relevant ASN.1 syntax. RSAESOAEP is parameterized by the choice of hash function and mask generation function. This choice should be fixed for a given RSA key. Suggested hash and mask generation functions are given in Appendix B. Note. Recent results have helpfully clarified the security properties of the OAEP encoding method [3] (roughly the procedure described in step 1.b in Section 7.1.1). The background is as follows. In 1994, Bellare and Rogaway [3] introduced a security concept that they denoted plaintext awareness (PA94). They proved that if a deterministic publickey encryption primitive (e.g., RSAEP) is hard to invert without the private key, then the corresponding OAEPbased encryption scheme is plaintextaware (in the random oracle model), meaning roughly that an adversary cannot produce a valid ciphertext without actually "knowing" the underlying plaintext. Plaintext awareness of an encryption scheme is closely related to the resistance of the scheme against chosenciphertext attacks. In such attacks, an adversary is given the opportunity to send queries to an oracle simulating the decryption primitive. Using the results of these queries, the adversary attempts to decrypt a challenge ciphertext. However, there are two flavors of chosenciphertext attacks, and PA94 implies security against only one of them. The difference relies on what the adversary is allowed to do after she is given the challenge ciphertext. The indifferent attack scenario (denoted CCA1) does not admit any queries to the decryption oracle after the adversary is given the challenge ciphertext, whereas the adaptive scenario (denoted CCA2) does (except that the decryption oracle refuses to decrypt the challenge ciphertext once it is published). In 1998, Bellare and Rogaway, together with Desai and Pointcheval [2], came up with a new, stronger notion of plaintext awareness (PA98) that does imply security against CCA2. To summarize, there have been two potential sources for misconception: that PA94 and PA98 are equivalent concepts; or that CCA1 and CCA2 are equivalent concepts. Either assumption leads to the conclusion that the BellareRogaway paper implies security of OAEP against CCA2, which it does not. (Footnote: It might be fair to mention that PKCS #1 v2.0 cites [3] and claims that "a chosen ciphertext attack is ineffective against a plaintextaware encryption scheme such as RSAESOAEP" without specifying the kind of plaintext awareness or chosen ciphertext attack considered.) OAEP has never been proven secure against CCA2; in fact, Victor Shoup [48] has demonstrated that such a proof does not exist in the general case. Put briefly, Shoup showed that an adversary in the CCA2 scenario who knows how to partially invert the encryption primitive but does not know how to invert it completely may well be able to break the scheme. For example, one may imagine an attacker who is able to break RSAESOAEP if she knows how to recover all but the first 20 bytes of a random integer encrypted with RSAEP. Such an attacker does not need to be able to fully invert RSAEP, because she does not use the first 20 octets in her attack. Still, RSAESOAEP is secure against CCA2, which was proved by Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [21] shortly after the announcement of Shoup's result. Using clever lattice reduction techniques, they managed to show how to invert RSAEP completely given a sufficiently large part of the preimage. This observation, combined with a proof that OAEP is secure against CCA2 if the underlying encryption primitive is hard to partially invert, fills the gap between what Bellare and Rogaway proved about RSAESOAEP and what some may have believed that they proved. Somewhat paradoxically, we are hence saved by an ostensible weakness in RSAEP (i.e., the whole inverse can be deduced from parts of it). Unfortunately however, the security reduction is not efficient for concrete parameters. While the proof successfully relates an adversary Adv against the CCA2 security of RSAESOAEP to an algorithm Inv inverting RSA, the probability of success for Inv is only approximately \epsilon^2 / 2^18, where \epsilon is the probability of success for Adv. (Footnote: In [21] the probability of success for the inverter was \epsilon^2 / 4. The additional factor 1 / 2^16 is due to the eight fixed zero bits at the beginning of the encoded message EM, which are not present in the variant of OAEP considered in [21] (Inv must apply Adv twice to invert RSA, and each application corresponds to a factor 1 / 2^8).) In addition, the running time for Inv is approximately t^2, where t is the running time of the adversary. The consequence is that we cannot exclude the possibility that attacking RSAESOAEP is considerably easier than inverting RSA for concrete parameters. Still, the existence of a security proof provides some assurance that the RSAESOAEP construction is sounder than ad hoc constructions such as RSAESPKCS1v1_5. Hybrid encryption schemes based on the RSAKEM key encapsulation paradigm offer tight proofs of security directly applicable to concrete parameters; see [30] for discussion. Future versions of PKCS #1 may specify schemes based on this paradigm. 7.1.1 Encryption operation RSAESOAEPENCRYPT ((n, e), M, L) Options: Hash hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the hash function output) MGF mask generation function Input: (n, e) recipient's RSA public key (k denotes the length in octets of the RSA modulus n) M message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen, where mLen <= k  2hLen  2 L optional label to be associated with the message; the default value for L, if L is not provided, is the empty string Output: C ciphertext, an octet string of length k Errors: "message too long"; "label too long" Assumption: RSA public key (n, e) is valid Steps: 1. Length checking: a. If the length of L is greater than the input limitation for the hash function (2^61  1 octets for SHA1), output "label too long" and stop. b. If mLen > k  2hLen  2, output "message too long" and stop. 2. EMEOAEP encoding (see Figure 1 below): a. If the label L is not provided, let L be the empty string. Let lHash = Hash(L), an octet string of length hLen (see the note below). b. Generate an octet string PS consisting of k  mLen  2hLen  2 zero octets. The length of PS may be zero. c. Concatenate lHash, PS, a single octet with hexadecimal value 0x01, and the message M to form a data block DB of length k  hLen  1 octets as DB = lHash  PS  0x01  M. d. Generate a random octet string seed of length hLen. e. Let dbMask = MGF(seed, k  hLen  1). f. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask. g. Let seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen). h. Let maskedSeed = seed \xor seedMask. i. Concatenate a single octet with hexadecimal value 0x00, maskedSeed, and maskedDB to form an encoded message EM of length k octets as EM = 0x00  maskedSeed  maskedDB. 3. RSA encryption: a. Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2): m = OS2IP (EM). b. Apply the RSAEP encryption primitive (Section 5.1.1) to the RSA public key (n, e) and the message representative m to produce an integer ciphertext representative c: c = RSAEP ((n, e), m). c. Convert the ciphertext representative c to a ciphertext C of length k octets (see Section 4.1): C = I2OSP (c, k). 4. Output the ciphertext C. Note. If L is the empty string, the corresponding hash value lHash has the following hexadecimal representation for different choices of Hash: SHA1: (0x)da39a3ee 5e6b4b0d 3255bfef 95601890 afd80709 SHA256: (0x)e3b0c442 98fc1c14 9afbf4c8 996fb924 27ae41e4 649b934c a495991b 7852b855 SHA384: (0x)38b060a7 51ac9638 4cd9327e b1b1e36a 21fdb711 14be0743 4c0cc7bf 63f6e1da 274edebf e76f65fb d51ad2f1 4898b95b SHA512: (0x)cf83e135 7eefb8bd f1542850 d66d8007 d620e405 0b5715dc 83f4a921 d36ce9ce 47d0d13c 5d85f2b0 ff8318d2 877eec2f 63b931bd 47417a81 a538327a f927da3e __________________________________________________________________ ++++ DB =  lHash  PS  M  ++++  ++ V  seed > MGF > xor ++    ++ V  00 xor < MGF < ++      V V V ++++ EM = 00maskedSeed maskedDB  ++++ __________________________________________________________________ Figure 1: EMEOAEP encoding operation. lHash is the hash of the optional label L. Decoding operation follows reverse steps to recover M and verify lHash and PS. 7.1.2 Decryption operation RSAESOAEPDECRYPT (K, C, L) Options: Hash hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the hash function output) MGF mask generation function Input: K recipient's RSA private key (k denotes the length in octets of the RSA modulus n) C ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k, where k = 2hLen + 2 L optional label whose association with the message is to be verified; the default value for L, if L is not provided, is the empty string Output: M message, an octet string of length mLen, where mLen <= k  2hLen  2 Error: "decryption error" Steps: 1. Length checking: a. If the length of L is greater than the input limitation for the hash function (2^61  1 octets for SHA1), output "decryption error" and stop. b. If the length of the ciphertext C is not k octets, output "decryption error" and stop. c. If k < 2hLen + 2, output "decryption error" and stop. 2. RSA decryption: a. Convert the ciphertext C to an integer ciphertext representative c (see Section 4.2): c = OS2IP (C). b. Apply the RSADP decryption primitive (Section 5.1.2) to the RSA private key K and the ciphertext representative c to produce an integer message representative m: m = RSADP (K, c). If RSADP outputs "ciphertext representative out of range" (meaning that c >= n), output "decryption error" and stop. c. Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1): EM = I2OSP (m, k). 3. EMEOAEP decoding: a. If the label L is not provided, let L be the empty string. Let lHash = Hash(L), an octet string of length hLen (see the note in Section 7.1.1). b. Separate the encoded message EM into a single octet Y, an octet string maskedSeed of length hLen, and an octet string maskedDB of length k  hLen  1 as EM = Y  maskedSeed  maskedDB. c. Let seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen). d. Let seed = maskedSeed \xor seedMask. e. Let dbMask = MGF(seed, k  hLen  1). f. Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask. g. Separate DB into an octet string lHash' of length hLen, a (possibly empty) padding string PS consisting of octets with hexadecimal value 0x00, and a message M as DB = lHash'  PS  0x01  M. If there is no octet with hexadecimal value 0x01 to separate PS from M, if lHash does not equal lHash', or if Y is nonzero, output "decryption error" and stop. (See the note below.) 4. Output the message M. Note. Care must be taken to ensure that an opponent cannot distinguish the different error conditions in Step 3.g, whether by error message or timing, or, more generally, learn partial information about the encoded message EM. Otherwise an opponent may be able to obtain useful information about the decryption of the ciphertext C, leading to a chosenciphertext attack such as the one observed by Manger [36]. 7.2 RSAESPKCS1v1_5 RSAESPKCS1v1_5 combines the RSAEP and RSADP primitives (Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) with the EMEPKCS1v1_5 encoding method (step 1 in Section 7.2.1 and step 3 in Section 7.2.2). It is mathematically equivalent to the encryption scheme in PKCS #1 v1.5. RSAESPKCS1 v1_5 can operate on messages of length up to k  11 octets (k is the octet length of the RSA modulus), although care should be taken to avoid certain attacks on lowexponent RSA due to Coppersmith, Franklin, Patarin, and Reiter when long messages are encrypted (see the third bullet in the notes below and [10]; [14] contains an improved attack). As a general rule, the use of this scheme for encrypting an arbitrary message, as opposed to a randomly generated key, is not recommended. It is possible to generate valid RSAESPKCS1v1_5 ciphertexts without knowing the corresponding plaintexts, with a reasonable probability of success. This ability can be exploited in a chosen ciphertext attack as shown in [6]. Therefore, if RSAESPKCS1v1_5 is to be used, certain easily implemented countermeasures should be taken to thwart the attack found in [6]. Typical examples include the addition of structure to the data to be encoded, rigorous checking of PKCS #1 v1.5 conformance (and other redundancy) in decrypted messages, and the consolidation of error messages in a clientserver protocol based on PKCS #1 v1.5. These can all be effective countermeasures and do not involve changes to a PKCS #1 v1.5based protocol. See [7] for a further discussion of these and other countermeasures. It has recently been shown that the security of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol [17], which uses RSAESPKCS1v1_5 and certain countermeasures, can be related to a variant of the RSA problem; see [32] for discussion. Note. The following passages describe some security recommendations pertaining to the use of RSAESPKCS1v1_5. Recommendations from version 1.5 of this document are included as well as new recommendations motivated by cryptanalytic advances made in the intervening years. * It is recommended that the pseudorandom octets in step 2 in Section 7.2.1 be generated independently for each encryption process, especially if the same data is input to more than one encryption process. Haastad's results [24] are one motivation for this recommendation. * The padding string PS in step 2 in Section 7.2.1 is at least eight octets long, which is a security condition for publickey operations that makes it difficult for an attacker to recover data by trying all possible encryption blocks. * The pseudorandom octets can also help thwart an attack due to Coppersmith et al. [10] (see [14] for an improvement of the attack) when the size of the message to be encrypted is kept small. The attack works on lowexponent RSA when similar messages are encrypted with the same RSA public key. More specifically, in one flavor of the attack, when two inputs to RSAEP agree on a large fraction of bits (8/9) and lowexponent RSA (e = 3) is used to encrypt both of them, it may be possible to recover both inputs with the attack. Another flavor of the attack is successful in decrypting a single ciphertext when a large fraction (2/3) of the input to RSAEP is already known. For typical applications, the message to be encrypted is short (e.g., a 128bit symmetric key) so not enough information will be known or common between two messages to enable the attack. However, if a long message is encrypted, or if part of a message is known, then the attack may be a concern. In any case, the RSAESOAEP scheme overcomes the attack. 7.2.1 Encryption operation RSAESPKCS1V1_5ENCRYPT ((n, e), M) Input: (n, e) recipient's RSA public key (k denotes the length in octets of the modulus n) M message to be encrypted, an octet string of length mLen, where mLen <= k  11 Output: C ciphertext, an octet string of length k Error: "message too long" Steps: 1. Length checking: If mLen > k  11, output "message too long" and stop. 2. EMEPKCS1v1_5 encoding: a. Generate an octet string PS of length k  mLen  3 consisting of pseudorandomly generated nonzero octets. The length of PS will be at least eight octets. b. Concatenate PS, the message M, and other padding to form an encoded message EM of length k octets as EM = 0x00  0x02  PS  0x00  M. 3. RSA encryption: a. Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2): m = OS2IP (EM). b. Apply the RSAEP encryption primitive (Section 5.1.1) to the RSA public key (n, e) and the message representative m to produce an integer ciphertext representative c: c = RSAEP ((n, e), m). c. Convert the ciphertext representative c to a ciphertext C of length k octets (see Section 4.1): C = I2OSP (c, k). 4. Output the ciphertext C. 7.2.2 Decryption operation RSAESPKCS1V1_5DECRYPT (K, C) Input: K recipient's RSA private key C ciphertext to be decrypted, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n Output: M message, an octet string of length at most k  11 Error: "decryption error" Steps: 1. Length checking: If the length of the ciphertext C is not k octets (or if k < 11), output "decryption error" and stop. 2. RSA decryption: a. Convert the ciphertext C to an integer ciphertext representative c (see Section 4.2): c = OS2IP (C). b. Apply the RSADP decryption primitive (Section 5.1.2) to the RSA private key (n, d) and the ciphertext representative c to produce an integer message representative m: m = RSADP ((n, d), c). If RSADP outputs "ciphertext representative out of range" (meaning that c >= n), output "decryption error" and stop. c. Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1): EM = I2OSP (m, k). 3. EMEPKCS1v1_5 decoding: Separate the encoded message EM into an octet string PS consisting of nonzero octets and a message M as EM = 0x00  0x02  PS  0x00  M. If the first octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value 0x00, if the second octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value 0x02, if there is no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00 to separate PS from M, or if the length of PS is less than 8 octets, output "decryption error" and stop. (See the note below.) 4. Output M. Note. Care shall be taken to ensure that an opponent cannot distinguish the different error conditions in Step 3, whether by error message or timing. Otherwise an opponent may be able to obtain useful information about the decryption of the ciphertext C, leading to a strengthened version of Bleichenbacher's attack [6]; compare to Manger's attack [36]. 8. Signature schemes with appendix For the purposes of this document, a signature scheme with appendix consists of a signature generation operation and a signature verification operation, where the signature generation operation produces a signature from a message with a signer's RSA private key, and the signature verification operation verifies the signature on the message with the signer's corresponding RSA public key. To verify a signature constructed with this type of scheme it is necessary to have the message itself. In this way, signature schemes with appendix are distinguished from signature schemes with message recovery, which are not supported in this document. A signature scheme with appendix can be employed in a variety of applications. For instance, the signature schemes with appendix defined here would be suitable signature algorithms for X.509 certificates [28]. Related signature schemes could be employed in PKCS #7 [45], although for technical reasons the current version of PKCS #7 separates a hash function from a signature scheme, which is different than what is done here; see the note in Appendix A.2.3 for more discussion. Two signature schemes with appendix are specified in this document: RSASSAPSS and RSASSAPKCS1v1_5. Although no attacks are known against RSASSAPKCS1v1_5, in the interest of increased robustness, RSASSAPSS is recommended for eventual adoption in new applications. RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 is included for compatibility with existing applications, and while still appropriate for new applications, a gradual transition to RSASSAPSS is encouraged. The signature schemes with appendix given here follow a general model similar to that employed in IEEE Std 13632000 [26], combining signature and verification primitives with an encoding method for signatures. The signature generation operations apply a message encoding operation to a message to produce an encoded message, which is then converted to an integer message representative. A signature primitive is applied to the message representative to produce the signature. Reversing this, the signature verification operations apply a signature verification primitive to the signature to recover a message representative, which is then converted to an octet string encoded message. A verification operation is applied to the message and the encoded message to determine whether they are consistent. If the encoding method is deterministic (e.g., EMSAPKCS1v1_5), the verification operation may apply the message encoding operation to the message and compare the resulting encoded message to the previously derived encoded message. If there is a match, the signature is considered valid. If the method is randomized (e.g., EMSAPSS), the verification operation is typically more complicated. For example, the verification operation in EMSAPSS extracts the random salt and a hash output from the encoded message and checks whether the hash output, the salt, and the message are consistent; the hash output is a deterministic function in terms of the message and the salt. For both signature schemes with appendix defined in this document, the signature generation and signature verification operations are readily implemented as "singlepass" operations if the signature is placed after the message. See PKCS #7 [45] for an example format in the case of RSASSAPKCS1v1_5. 8.1 RSASSAPSS RSASSAPSS combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the EMSA PSS encoding method. It is compatible with the IFSSA scheme as amended in the IEEE P1363a draft [27], where the signature and verification primitives are IFSPRSA1 and IFVPRSA1 as defined in IEEE Std 13632000 [26] and the message encoding method is EMSA4. EMSA4 is slightly more general than EMSAPSS as it acts on bit strings rather than on octet strings. EMSAPSS is equivalent to EMSA4 restricted to the case that the operands as well as the hash and salt values are octet strings. The length of messages on which RSASSAPSS can operate is either unrestricted or constrained by a very large number, depending on the hash function underlying the EMSAPSS encoding method. Assuming that computing eth roots modulo n is infeasible and the hash and mask generation functions in EMSAPSS have appropriate properties, RSASSAPSS provides secure signatures. This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty of forging signatures can be directly related to the difficulty of inverting the RSA function, provided that the hash and mask generation functions are viewed as black boxes or random oracles. The bounds in the security proof are essentially "tight", meaning that the success probability and running time for the best forger against RSASSAPSS are very close to the corresponding parameters for the best RSA inversion algorithm; see [4][13][31] for further discussion. In contrast to the RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 signature scheme, a hash function identifier is not embedded in the EMSAPSS encoded message, so in theory it is possible for an adversary to substitute a different (and potentially weaker) hash function than the one selected by the signer. Therefore, it is recommended that the EMSA PSS mask generation function be based on the same hash function. In this manner the entire encoded message will be dependent on the hash function and it will be difficult for an opponent to substitute a different hash function than the one intended by the signer. This matching of hash functions is only for the purpose of preventing hash function substitution, and is not necessary if hash function substitution is addressed by other means (e.g., the verifier accepts only a designated hash function). See [34] for further discussion of these points. The provable security of RSASSAPSS does not rely on the hash function in the mask generation function being the same as the hash function applied to the message. RSASSAPSS is different from other RSAbased signature schemes in that it is probabilistic rather than deterministic, incorporating a randomly generated salt value. The salt value enhances the security of the scheme by affording a "tighter" security proof than deterministic alternatives such as Full Domain Hashing (FDH); see [4] for discussion. However, the randomness is not critical to security. In situations where random generation is not possible, a fixed value or a sequence number could be employed instead, with the resulting provable security similar to that of FDH [12]. 8.1.1 Signature generation operation RSASSAPSSSIGN (K, M) Input: K signer's RSA private key M message to be signed, an octet string Output: S signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n Errors: "message too long;" "encoding error" Steps: 1. EMSAPSS encoding: Apply the EMSAPSS encoding operation (Section 9.1.1) to the message M to produce an encoded message EM of length \ceil ((modBits  1)/8) octets such that the bit length of the integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section 4.2) is at most modBits  1, where modBits is the length in bits of the RSA modulus n: EM = EMSAPSSENCODE (M, modBits  1). Note that the octet length of EM will be one less than k if modBits  1 is divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise. If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "encoding error," output "encoding error" and stop. 2. RSA signature: a. Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2): m = OS2IP (EM). b. Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to the RSA private key K and the message representative m to produce an integer signature representative s: s = RSASP1 (K, m). c. Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of length k octets (see Section 4.1): S = I2OSP (s, k). 3. Output the signature S. 8.1.2 Signature verification operation RSASSAPSSVERIFY ((n, e), M, S) Input: (n, e) signer's RSA public key M message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string S signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n Output: "valid signature" or "invalid signature" Steps: 1. Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k octets, output "invalid signature" and stop. 2. RSA verification: a. Convert the signature S to an integer signature representative s (see Section 4.2): s = OS2IP (S). b. Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to the RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative s to produce an integer message representative m: m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s). If RSAVP1 output "signature representative out of range," output "invalid signature" and stop. c. Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM of length emLen = \ceil ((modBits  1)/8) octets, where modBits is the length in bits of the RSA modulus n (see Section 4.1): EM = I2OSP (m, emLen). Note that emLen will be one less than k if modBits  1 is divisible by 8 and equal to k otherwise. If I2OSP outputs "integer too large," output "invalid signature" and stop. 3. EMSAPSS verification: Apply the EMSAPSS verification operation (Section 9.1.2) to the message M and the encoded message EM to determine whether they are consistent: Result = EMSAPSSVERIFY (M, EM, modBits  1). 4. If Result = "consistent," output "valid signature." Otherwise, output "invalid signature." 8.2. RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding method. It is compatible with the IFSSA scheme defined in IEEE Std 13632000 [26], where the signature and verification primitives are IFSPRSA1 and IFVPRSA1 and the message encoding method is EMSAPKCS1v1_5 (which is not defined in IEEE Std 13632000, but is in the IEEE P1363a draft [27]). The length of messages on which RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 can operate is either unrestricted or constrained by a very large number, depending on the hash function underlying the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 method. Assuming that computing eth roots modulo n is infeasible and the hash function in EMSAPKCS1v1_5 has appropriate properties, RSASSA PKCS1v1_5 is conjectured to provide secure signatures. More precisely, forging signatures without knowing the RSA private key is conjectured to be computationally infeasible. Also, in the encoding method EMSAPKCS1v1_5, a hash function identifier is embedded in the encoding. Because of this feature, an adversary trying to find a message with the same signature as a previously signed message must find collisions of the particular hash function being used; attacking a different hash function than the one selected by the signer is not useful to the adversary. See [34] for further discussion. Note. As noted in PKCS #1 v1.5, the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding method has the property that the encoded message, converted to an integer message representative, is guaranteed to be large and at least somewhat "random". This prevents attacks of the kind proposed by Desmedt and Odlyzko [16] where multiplicative relationships between message representatives are developed by factoring the message representatives into a set of small values (e.g., a set of small primes). Coron, Naccache, and Stern [15] showed that a stronger form of this type of attack could be quite effective against some instances of the ISO/IEC 97962 signature scheme. They also analyzed the complexity of this type of attack against the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding method and concluded that an attack would be impractical, requiring more operations than a collision search on the underlying hash function (i.e., more than 2^80 operations). Coppersmith, Halevi, and Jutla [11] subsequently extended Coron et al.'s attack to break the ISO/IEC 97961 signature scheme with message recovery. The various attacks illustrate the importance of carefully constructing the input to the RSA signature primitive, particularly in a signature scheme with message recovery. Accordingly, the EMSAPKCSv1_5 encoding method explicitly includes a hash operation and is not intended for signature schemes with message recovery. Moreover, while no attack is known against the EMSAPKCSv1_5 encoding method, a gradual transition to EMSAPSS is recommended as a precaution against future developments. 8.2.1 Signature generation operation RSASSAPKCS1V1_5SIGN (K, M) Input: K signer's RSA private key M message to be signed, an octet string Output: S signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n Errors: "message too long"; "RSA modulus too short" Steps: 1. EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce an encoded message EM of length k octets: EM = EMSAPKCS1V1_5ENCODE (M, k). If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus too short" and stop. 2. RSA signature: a. Convert the encoded message EM to an integer message representative m (see Section 4.2): m = OS2IP (EM). b. Apply the RSASP1 signature primitive (Section 5.2.1) to the RSA private key K and the message representative m to produce an integer signature representative s: s = RSASP1 (K, m). c. Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of length k octets (see Section 4.1): S = I2OSP (s, k). 3. Output the signature S. 8.2.2 Signature verification operation RSASSAPKCS1V1_5VERIFY ((n, e), M, S) Input: (n, e) signer's RSA public key M message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string S signature to be verified, an octet string of length k, where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n Output: "valid signature" or "invalid signature" Errors: "message too long"; "RSA modulus too short" Steps: 1. Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k octets, output "invalid signature" and stop. 2. RSA verification: a. Convert the signature S to an integer signature representative s (see Section 4.2): s = OS2IP (S). b. Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive (Section 5.2.2) to the RSA public key (n, e) and the signature representative s to produce an integer message representative m: m = RSAVP1 ((n, e), s). If RSAVP1 outputs "signature representative out of range," output "invalid signature" and stop. c. Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM of length k octets (see Section 4.1): EM' = I2OSP (m, k). If I2OSP outputs "integer too large," output "invalid signature" and stop. 3. EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding: Apply the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding operation (Section 9.2) to the message M to produce a second encoded message EM' of length k octets: EM' = EMSAPKCS1V1_5ENCODE (M, k). If the encoding operation outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. If the encoding operation outputs "intended encoded message length too short," output "RSA modulus too short" and stop. 4. Compare the encoded message EM and the second encoded message EM'. If they are the same, output "valid signature"; otherwise, output "invalid signature." Note. Another way to implement the signature verification operation is to apply a "decoding" operation (not specified in this document) to the encoded message to recover the underlying hash value, and then to compare it to a newly computed hash value. This has the advantage that it requires less intermediate storage (two hash values rather than two encoded messages), but the disadvantage that it requires additional code. 9. Encoding methods for signatures with appendix Encoding methods consist of operations that map between octet string messages and octet string encoded messages, which are converted to and from integer message representatives in the schemes. The integer message representatives are processed via the primitives. The encoding methods thus provide the connection between the schemes, which process messages, and the primitives. An encoding method for signatures with appendix, for the purposes of this document, consists of an encoding operation and optionally a verification operation. An encoding operation maps a message M to an encoded message EM of a specified length. A verification operation determines whether a message M and an encoded message EM are consistent, i.e., whether the encoded message EM is a valid encoding of the message M. The encoding operation may introduce some randomness, so that different applications of the encoding operation to the same message will produce different encoded messages, which has benefits for provable security. For such an encoding method, both an encoding and a verification operation are needed unless the verifier can reproduce the randomness (e.g., by obtaining the salt value from the signer). For a deterministic encoding method only an encoding operation is needed. Two encoding methods for signatures with appendix are employed in the signature schemes and are specified here: EMSAPSS and EMSAPKCS1 v1_5. 9.1 EMSAPSS This encoding method is parameterized by the choice of hash function, mask generation function, and salt length. These options should be fixed for a given RSA key, except that the salt length can be variable (see [31] for discussion). Suggested hash and mask generation functions are given in Appendix B. The encoding method is based on Bellare and Rogaway's Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) [4][5]. It is randomized and has an encoding operation and a verification operation. Figure 2 illustrates the encoding operation. __________________________________________________________________ ++  M  ++  V Hash  V ++++ M' = Padding1 mHash  salt  ++++  +++ V DB = Padding2maskedseed Hash +++    V  ++ xor < MGF < bc   ++    V V V ++++ EM =  maskedDB maskedseedbc ++++ __________________________________________________________________ Figure 2: EMSAPSS encoding operation. Verification operation follows reverse steps to recover salt, then forward steps to recompute and compare H. Notes. 1. The encoding method defined here differs from the one in Bellare and Rogaway's submission to IEEE P1363a [5] in three respects: * It applies a hash function rather than a mask generation function to the message. Even though the mask generation function is based on a hash function, it seems more natural to apply a hash function directly. * The value that is hashed together with the salt value is the string (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  mHash rather than the message M itself. Here, mHash is the hash of M. Note that the hash function is the same in both steps. See Note 3 below for further discussion. (Also, the name "salt" is used instead of "seed", as it is more reflective of the value's role.) * The encoded message in EMSAPSS has nine fixed bits; the first bit is 0 and the last eight bits form a "trailer field", the octet 0xbc. In the original scheme, only the first bit is fixed. The rationale for the trailer field is for compatibility with the RabinWilliams IFSPRW signature primitive in IEEE Std 13632000 [26] and the corresponding primitive in the draft ISO/IEC 97962 [29]. 2. Assuming that the mask generation function is based on a hash function, it is recommended that the hash function be the same as the one that is applied to the message; see Section 8.1 for further discussion. 3. Without compromising the security proof for RSASSAPSS, one may perform steps 1 and 2 of EMSAPSSENCODE and EMSAPSSVERIFY (the application of the hash function to the message) outside the module that computes the rest of the signature operation, so that mHash rather than the message M itself is input to the module. In other words, the security proof for RSASSAPSS still holds even if an opponent can control the value of mHash. This is convenient if the module has limited I/O bandwidth, e.g., a smart card. Note that previous versions of PSS [4][5] did not have this property. Of course, it may be desirable for other security reasons to have the module process the full message. For instance, the module may need to "see" what it is signing if it does not trust the component that computes the hash value. 4. Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of RSASSAPSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1. Bellare and Rogaway [4] give a tight lower bound for the security of the original RSAPSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former case, while Coron [12] gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In [13] Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging from 0 to hLen; see [27] for discussion. See also [31], which adapts the security proofs in [4][13] to address the differences between the original and the present version of RSAPSS as listed in Note 1 above. 5. As noted in IEEE P1363a [27], the use of randomization in signature schemes  such as the salt value in EMSAPSS  may provide a "covert channel" for transmitting information other than the message being signed. For more on covert channels, see [50]. 9.1.1 Encoding operation EMSAPSSENCODE (M, emBits) Options: Hash hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the hash function output) MGF mask generation function sLen intended length in octets of the salt Input: M message to be encoded, an octet string emBits maximal bit length of the integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section 4.2), at least 8hLen + 8sLen + 9 Output: EM encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = \ceil (emBits/8) Errors: "encoding error"; "message too long" Steps: 1. If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the hash function (2^61  1 octets for SHA1), output "message too long" and stop. 2. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen. 3. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop. 4. Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0, then salt is the empty string. 5. Let M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  mHash  salt; M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight initial zero octets. 6. Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen. 7. Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen  sLen  hLen  2 zero octets. The length of PS may be 0. 8. Let DB = PS  0x01  salt; DB is an octet string of length emLen  hLen  1. 9. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen  hLen  1). 10. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask. 11. Set the leftmost 8emLen  emBits bits of the leftmost octet in maskedDB to zero. 12. Let EM = maskedDB  H  0xbc. 13. Output EM. 9.1.2 Verification operation EMSAPSSVERIFY (M, EM, emBits) Options: Hash hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the hash function output) MGF mask generation function sLen intended length in octets of the salt Input: M message to be verified, an octet string EM encoded message, an octet string of length emLen = \ceil (emBits/8) emBits maximal bit length of the integer OS2IP (EM) (see Section 4.2), at least 8hLen + 8sLen + 9 Output: "consistent" or "inconsistent" Steps: 1. If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the hash function (2^61  1 octets for SHA1), output "inconsistent" and stop. 2. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen. 3. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop. 4. If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value 0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop. 5. Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen  hLen  1 octets of EM, and let H be the next hLen octets. 6. If the leftmost 8emLen  emBits bits of the leftmost octet in maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and stop. 7. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen  hLen  1). 8. Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask. 9. Set the leftmost 8emLen  emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB to zero. 10. If the emLen  hLen  sLen  2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero or if the octet at position emLen  hLen  sLen  1 (the leftmost position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01, output "inconsistent" and stop. 11. Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB. 12. Let M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  mHash  salt ; M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight initial zero octets. 13. Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen. 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent." 9.2 EMSAPKCS1v1_5 This encoding method is deterministic and only has an encoding operation. EMSAPKCS1v1_5ENCODE (M, emLen) Option: Hash hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the hash function output) Input: M message to be encoded emLen intended length in octets of the encoded message, at least tLen + 11, where tLen is the octet length of the DER encoding T of a certain value computed during the encoding operation Output: EM encoded message, an octet string of length emLen Errors: "message too long"; "intended encoded message length too short" Steps: 1. Apply the hash function to the message M to produce a hash value H: H = Hash(M). If the hash function outputs "message too long," output "message too long" and stop. 2. Encode the algorithm ID for the hash function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo (see Appendix A.2.4) with the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), where the type DigestInfo has the syntax DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, digest OCTET STRING } The first field identifies the hash function and the second contains the hash value. Let T be the DER encoding of the DigestInfo value (see the notes below) and let tLen be the length in octets of T. 3. If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" and stop. 4. Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen  tLen  3 octets with hexadecimal value 0xff. The length of PS will be at least 8 octets. 5. Concatenate PS, the DER encoding T, and other padding to form the encoded message EM as EM = 0x00  0x01  PS  0x00  T. 6. Output EM. Notes. 1. For the six hash functions mentioned in Appendix B.1, the DER encoding T of the DigestInfo value is equal to the following: MD2: (0x)30 20 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 02 02 05 00 04 10  H. MD5: (0x)30 20 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 02 05 05 00 04 10  H. SHA1: (0x)30 21 30 09 06 05 2b 0e 03 02 1a 05 00 04 14  H. SHA256: (0x)30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20  H. SHA384: (0x)30 41 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 04 30  H. SHA512: (0x)30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 04 40  H. 2. In version 1.5 of this document, T was defined as the BER encoding, rather than the DER encoding, of the DigestInfo value. In particular, it is possible  at least in theory  that the verification operation defined in this document (as well as in version 2.0) rejects a signature that is valid with respect to the specification given in PKCS #1 v1.5. This occurs if other rules than DER are applied to DigestInfo (e.g., an indefinite length encoding of the underlying SEQUENCE type). While this is unlikely to be a concern in practice, a cautious implementer may choose to employ a verification operation based on a BER decoding operation as specified in PKCS #1 v1.5. In this manner, compatibility with any valid implementation based on PKCS #1 v1.5 is obtained. Such a verification operation should indicate whether the underlying BER encoding is a DER encoding and hence whether the signature is valid with respect to the specification given in this document. Appendix A. ASN.1 syntax A.1 RSA key representation This section defines ASN.1 object identifiers for RSA public and private keys, and defines the types RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey. The intended application of these definitions includes X.509 certificates, PKCS #8 [46], and PKCS #12 [47]. The object identifier rsaEncryption identifies RSA public and private keys as defined in Appendices A.1.1 and A.1.2. The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL. rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 1 } The definitions in this section have been extended to support multi prime RSA, but are backward compatible with previous versions. A.1.1 RSA public key syntax An RSA public key should be represented with the ASN.1 type RSAPublicKey: RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { modulus INTEGER,  n publicExponent INTEGER  e } The fields of type RSAPublicKey have the following meanings: * modulus is the RSA modulus n. * publicExponent is the RSA public exponent e. A.1.2 RSA private key syntax An RSA private key should be represented with the ASN.1 type RSAPrivateKey: RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { version Version, modulus INTEGER,  n publicExponent INTEGER,  e privateExponent INTEGER,  d prime1 INTEGER,  p prime2 INTEGER,  q exponent1 INTEGER,  d mod (p1) exponent2 INTEGER,  d mod (q1) coefficient INTEGER,  (inverse of q) mod p otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL } The fields of type RSAPrivateKey have the following meanings: * version is the version number, for compatibility with future revisions of this document. It shall be 0 for this version of the document, unless multiprime is used, in which case it shall be 1. Version ::= INTEGER { twoprime(0), multi(1) } (CONSTRAINED BY { version must be multi if otherPrimeInfos present }) * modulus is the RSA modulus n. * publicExponent is the RSA public exponent e. * privateExponent is the RSA private exponent d. * prime1 is the prime factor p of n. * prime2 is the prime factor q of n. * exponent1 is d mod (p  1). * exponent2 is d mod (q  1). * coefficient is the CRT coefficient q^(1) mod p. * otherPrimeInfos contains the information for the additional primes r_3, ..., r_u, in order. It shall be omitted if version is 0 and shall contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version is 1. OtherPrimeInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF OtherPrimeInfo OtherPrimeInfo ::= SEQUENCE { prime INTEGER,  ri exponent INTEGER,  di coefficient INTEGER  ti } The fields of type OtherPrimeInfo have the following meanings: * prime is a prime factor r_i of n, where i >= 3. * exponent is d_i = d mod (r_i  1). * coefficient is the CRT coefficient t_i = (r_1 * r_2 * ... * r_(i 1))^(1) mod r_i. Note. It is important to protect the RSA private key against both disclosure and modification. Techniques for such protection are outside the scope of this document. Methods for storing and distributing private keys and other cryptographic data are described in PKCS #12 and #15. A.2 Scheme identification This section defines object identifiers for the encryption and signature schemes. The schemes compatible with PKCS #1 v1.5 have the same definitions as in PKCS #1 v1.5. The intended application of these definitions includes X.509 certificates and PKCS #7. Here are type identifier definitions for the PKCS #1 OIDs: PKCS1Algorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID rsaEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID md2WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID md5WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha1WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha256WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha384WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha512WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID idRSAESOAEP PARAMETERS RSAESOAEPparams }  PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms  { OID idRSASSAPSS PARAMETERS RSASSAPSSparams } , ...  Allows for future expansion  } A.2.1 RSAESOAEP The object identifier idRSAESOAEP identifies the RSAESOAEP encryption scheme. idRSAESOAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 7 } The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type RSAESOAEPparams: RSAESOAEPparams ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1, maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1, pSourceAlgorithm [2] PSourceAlgorithm DEFAULT pSpecifiedEmpty } The fields of type RSAESOAEPparams have the following meanings: * hashAlgorithm identifies the hash function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms. For a discussion of supported hash functions, see Appendix B.1. HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms} } OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idsha1 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha256 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha384 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha512 PARAMETERS NULL }, ...  Allows for future expansion  } The default hash function is SHA1: sha1 HashAlgorithm ::= { algorithm idsha1, parameters SHA1Parameters : NULL } SHA1Parameters ::= NULL * maskGenAlgorithm identifies the mask generation function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1MGFAlgorithms, which for this version shall consist of idmgf1, identifying the MGF1 mask generation function (see Appendix B.2.1). The parameters field associated with idmgf1 shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms, identifying the hash function on which MGF1 is based. MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1MGFAlgorithms} } PKCS1MGFAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idmgf1 PARAMETERS HashAlgorithm }, ...  Allows for future expansion  } The default mask generation function is MGF1 with SHA1: mgf1SHA1 MaskGenAlgorithm ::= { algorithm idmgf1, parameters HashAlgorithm : sha1 } * pSourceAlgorithm identifies the source (and possibly the value) of the label L. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms, which for this version shall consist of idpSpecified, indicating that the label is specified explicitly. The parameters field associated with idpSpecified shall have a value of type OCTET STRING, containing the label. In previous versions of this specification, the term "encoding parameters" was used rather than "label", hence the name of the type below. PSourceAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms} } PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idpSpecified PARAMETERS EncodingParameters }, ...  Allows for future expansion  } idpSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 9 } EncodingParameters ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(0..MAX)) The default label is an empty string (so that lHash will contain the hash of the empty string): pSpecifiedEmpty PSourceAlgorithm ::= { algorithm idpSpecified, parameters EncodingParameters : emptyString } emptyString EncodingParameters ::= ''H If all of the default values of the fields in RSAESOAEPparams are used, then the algorithm identifier will have the following value: rSAESOAEPDefaultIdentifier RSAESAlgorithmIdentifier ::= { algorithm idRSAESOAEP, parameters RSAESOAEPparams : { hashAlgorithm sha1, maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA1, pSourceAlgorithm pSpecifiedEmpty } } RSAESAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1Algorithms} } A.2.2 RSAESPKCS1v1_5 The object identifier rsaEncryption (see Appendix A.1) identifies the RSAESPKCS1v1_5 encryption scheme. The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL. This is the same as in PKCS #1 v1.5. rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 1 } A.2.3 RSASSAPSS The object identifier idRSASSAPSS identifies the RSASSAPSS encryption scheme. idRSASSAPSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 10 } The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type RSASSAPSSparams: RSASSAPSSparams ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1, maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1, saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20, trailerField [3] TrailerField DEFAULT trailerFieldBC } The fields of type RSASSAPSSparams have the following meanings: * hashAlgorithm identifies the hash function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms (see Appendix A.2.1). The default hash function is SHA1. * maskGenAlgorithm identifies the mask generation function. It shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1MGFAlgorithms (see Appendix A.2.1). The default mask generation function is MGF1 with SHA1. For MGF1 (and more generally, for other mask generation functions based on a hash function), it is recommended that the underlying hash function be the same as the one identified by hashAlgorithm; see Note 2 in Section 9.1 for further comments. * saltLength is the octet length of the salt. It shall be an integer. For a given hashAlgorithm, the default value of saltLength is the octet length of the hash value. Unlike the other fields of type RSASSAPSSparams, saltLength does not need to be fixed for a given RSA key pair. * trailerField is the trailer field number, for compatibility with the draft IEEE P1363a [27]. It shall be 1 for this version of the document, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value 0xbc. Other trailer fields (including the trailer field HashID  0xcc in IEEE P1363a) are not supported in this document. TrailerField ::= INTEGER { trailerFieldBC(1) } If the default values of the hashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm, and trailerField fields of RSASSAPSSparams are used, then the algorithm identifier will have the following value: rSASSAPSSDefaultIdentifier RSASSAAlgorithmIdentifier ::= { algorithm idRSASSAPSS, parameters RSASSAPSSparams : { hashAlgorithm sha1, maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA1, saltLength 20, trailerField trailerFieldBC } } RSASSAAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1Algorithms} } Note. In some applications, the hash function underlying a signature scheme is identified separately from the rest of the operations in the signature scheme. For instance, in PKCS #7 [45], a hash function identifier is placed before the message and a "digest encryption" algorithm identifier (indicating the rest of the operations) is carried with the signature. In order for PKCS #7 to support the RSASSAPSS signature scheme, an object identifier would need to be defined for the operations in RSASSAPSS after the hash function (analogous to the RSAEncryption OID for the RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 scheme). S/MIME CMS [25] takes a different approach. Although a hash function identifier is placed before the message, an algorithm identifier for the full signature scheme may be carried with a CMS signature (this is done for DSA signatures). Following this convention, the idRSASSAPSS OID can be used to identify RSASSAPSS signatures in CMS. Since CMS is considered the successor to PKCS #7 and new developments such as the addition of support for RSASSAPSS will be pursued with respect to CMS rather than PKCS #7, an OID for the "rest of" RSASSAPSS is not defined in this version of PKCS #1. A.2.4 RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 The object identifier for RSASSAPKCS1v1_5 shall be one of the following. The choice of OID depends on the choice of hash algorithm: MD2, MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512. Note that if either MD2 or MD5 is used, then the OID is just as in PKCS #1 v1.5. For each OID, the parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL. The OID should be chosen in accordance with the following table: Hash algorithm OID  MD2 md2WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs1 2} MD5 md5WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs1 4} SHA1 sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs1 5} SHA256 sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs1 11} SHA384 sha384WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs1 12} SHA512 sha512WithRSAEncryption ::= {pkcs1 13} The EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding method includes an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo, where the type DigestInfo has the syntax DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithm, digest OCTET STRING } digestAlgorithm identifies the hash function and shall be an algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1v15DigestAlgorithms. For a discussion of supported hash functions, see Appendix B.1. DigestAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1v15DigestAlgorithms} } PKCS1v15DigestAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idmd2 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idmd5 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha1 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha256 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha384 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha512 PARAMETERS NULL } } Appendix B. Supporting techniques This section gives several examples of underlying functions supporting the encryption schemes in Section 7 and the encoding methods in Section 9. A range of techniques is given here to allow compatibility with existing applications as well as migration to new techniques. While these supporting techniques are appropriate for applications to implement, none of them is required to be implemented. It is expected that profiles for PKCS #1 v2.1 will be developed that specify particular supporting techniques. This section also gives object identifiers for the supporting techniques. B.1 Hash functions Hash functions are used in the operations contained in Sections 7 and 9. Hash functions are deterministic, meaning that the output is completely determined by the input. Hash functions take octet strings of variable length, and generate fixed length octet strings. The hash functions used in the operations contained in Sections 7 and 9 should generally be collisionresistant. This means that it is infeasible to find two distinct inputs to the hash function that produce the same output. A collisionresistant hash function also has the desirable property of being oneway; this means that given an output, it is infeasible to find an input whose hash is the specified output. In addition to the requirements, the hash function should yield a mask generation function (Appendix B.2) with pseudorandom output. Six hash functions are given as examples for the encoding methods in this document: MD2 [33], MD5 [41], SHA1 [38], and the proposed algorithms SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 [39]. For the RSAESOAEP encryption scheme and EMSAPSS encoding method, only SHA1 and SHA 256/384/512 are recommended. For the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 encoding method, SHA1 or SHA256/384/512 are recommended for new applications. MD2 and MD5 are recommended only for compatibility with existing applications based on PKCS #1 v1.5. The object identifiers idmd2, idmd5, idsha1, idsha256, idsha384, and idsha512, identify the respective hash functions: idmd2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } idmd5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } idsha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identifiedorganization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } idsha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } idsha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } idsha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { jointisoitut(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } The parameters field associated with idmd2 and idmd5 in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type NULL. The parameters field associated with idsha1, idsha256, idsha384, and idsha512 should be omitted, but if present, shall have a value of type NULL. Note. Version 1.5 of PKCS #1 also allowed for the use of MD4 in signature schemes. The cryptanalysis of MD4 has progressed significantly in the intervening years. For example, Dobbertin [18] demonstrated how to find collisions for MD4 and that the first two rounds of MD4 are not oneway [20]. Because of these results and others (e.g., [8]), MD4 is no longer recommended. There have also been advances in the cryptanalysis of MD2 and MD5, although not enough to warrant removal from existing applications. Rogier and Chauvaud [43] demonstrated how to find collisions in a modified version of MD2. No one has demonstrated how to find collisions for the full MD5 algorithm, although partial results have been found (e.g., [9][19]). To address these concerns, SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512 are recommended for new applications. As of today, the best (known) collision attacks against these hash functions are generic attacks with complexity 2^(L/2), where L is the bit length of the hash output. For the signature schemes in this document, a collision attack is easily translated into a signature forgery. Therefore, the value L / 2 should be at least equal to the desired security level in bits of the signature scheme (a security level of B bits means that the best attack has complexity 2^B). The same rule of thumb can be applied to RSAESOAEP; it is recommended that the bit length of the seed (which is equal to the bit length of the hash output) be twice the desired security level in bits. B.2 Mask generation functions A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of the desired length. There may be restrictions on the length of the input and output octet strings, but such bounds are generally very large. Mask generation functions are deterministic; the octet string output is completely determined by the input octet string. The output of a mask generation function should be pseudorandom: Given one part of the output but not the input, it should be infeasible to predict another part of the output. The provable security of RSAES OAEP and RSASSAPSS relies on the random nature of the output of the mask generation function, which in turn relies on the random nature of the underlying hash. One mask generation function is given here: MGF1, which is based on a hash function. MGF1 coincides with the mask generation functions defined in IEEE Std 13632000 [26] and the draft ANSI X9.44 [1]. Future versions of this document may define other mask generation functions. B.2.1 MGF1 MGF1 is a Mask Generation Function based on a hash function. MGF1 (mgfSeed, maskLen) Options: Hash hash function (hLen denotes the length in octets of the hash function output) Input: mgfSeed seed from which mask is generated, an octet string maskLen intended length in octets of the mask, at most 2^32 hLen Output: mask mask, an octet string of length maskLen Error: "mask too long" Steps: 1. If maskLen > 2^32 hLen, output "mask too long" and stop. 2. Let T be the empty octet string. 3. For counter from 0 to \ceil (maskLen / hLen)  1, do the following: a. Convert counter to an octet string C of length 4 octets (see Section 4.1): C = I2OSP (counter, 4) . b. Concatenate the hash of the seed mgfSeed and C to the octet string T: T = T  Hash(mgfSeed  C) . 4. Output the leading maskLen octets of T as the octet string mask. The object identifier idmgf1 identifies the MGF1 mask generation function: idmgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 8 } The parameters field associated with this OID in a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier shall have a value of type hashAlgorithm, identifying the hash function on which MGF1 is based. Appendix C. ASN.1 module PKCS1 { iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs1(1) modules(0) pkcs1(1) }  $ Revision: 2.1r1 $  This module has been checked for conformance with the ASN.1  standard by the OSS ASN.1 Tools DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN  EXPORTS ALL  All types and values defined in this module are exported for use  in other ASN.1 modules. IMPORTS idsha256, idsha384, idsha512 FROM NISTSHA2 { jointisoitut(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) modules(0) sha2(1) };  ============================  Basic object identifiers  ============================  The DER encoding of this in hexadecimal is:  (0x)06 08  2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01  pkcs1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }   When rsaEncryption is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the  parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.  rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 1 }   When idRSAESOAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the  parameters MUST be present and MUST be RSAESOAEPparams.  idRSAESOAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 7 }   When idpSpecified is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the  parameters MUST be an OCTET STRING.  idpSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 9 }  When idRSASSAPSS is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the  parameters MUST be present and MUST be RSASSAPSSparams.  idRSASSAPSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 10 }   When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the  parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.  md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 2 } md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 4 } sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 5 } sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 11 } sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 12 } sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 13 }   This OID really belongs in a module with the secsig OIDs.  idsha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identifiedorganization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }   OIDs for MD2 and MD5, allowed only in EMSAPKCS1v1_5.  idmd2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } idmd5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) memberbody(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 }   When idmgf1 is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the parameters MUST  be present and MUST be a HashAlgorithm, for example sha1.  idmgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs1 8 }  ================  Useful types  ================ ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &Type OPTIONAL } WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARAMETERS &Type] }   Note: the parameter InfoObjectSet in the following definitions  allows a distinct information object set to be specified for sets  of algorithms such as:  DigestAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= {  { OID idmd2 PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID idmd5 PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID idsha1 PARAMETERS NULL }  }  AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER:InfoObjectSet } ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER.&id({InfoObjectSet}), parameters ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER.&Type({InfoObjectSet}{@.algorithm}) OPTIONAL }  ==============  Algorithms  ==============   Allowed EMEOAEP and EMSAPSS digest algorithms.  OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idsha1 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha256 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha384 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha512 PARAMETERS NULL }, ...  Allows for future expansion  }   Allowed EMSAPKCS1v1_5 digest algorithms.  PKCS1v15DigestAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idmd2 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idmd5 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha1 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha256 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha384 PARAMETERS NULL } { OID idsha512 PARAMETERS NULL } }  When idmd2 and idmd5 are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the  parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.  When idsha1, idsha256, idsha384 and idsha512 are used in an  AlgorithmIdentifier the parameters (which are optional) SHOULD  be omitted. However, an implementation MUST also accept  AlgorithmIdentifier values where the parameters are NULL. sha1 HashAlgorithm ::= { algorithm idsha1, parameters SHA1Parameters : NULL  included for compatibility  with existing implementations } HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {OAEPPSSDigestAlgorithms} } SHA1Parameters ::= NULL   Allowed mask generation function algorithms.  If the identifier is idmgf1, the parameters are a HashAlgorithm.  PKCS1MGFAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idmgf1 PARAMETERS HashAlgorithm }, ...  Allows for future expansion  }   Default AlgorithmIdentifier for idRSAESOAEP.maskGenAlgorithm and  idRSASSAPSS.maskGenAlgorithm.  mgf1SHA1 MaskGenAlgorithm ::= { algorithm idmgf1, parameters HashAlgorithm : sha1 } MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1MGFAlgorithms} }   Allowed algorithms for pSourceAlgorithm.  PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID idpSpecified PARAMETERS EncodingParameters }, ...  Allows for future expansion  } EncodingParameters ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(0..MAX))   This identifier means that the label L is an empty string, so the  digest of the empty string appears in the RSA block before  masking.  pSpecifiedEmpty PSourceAlgorithm ::= { algorithm idpSpecified, parameters EncodingParameters : emptyString } PSourceAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms} } emptyString EncodingParameters ::= ''H   Type identifier definitions for the PKCS #1 OIDs.  PKCS1Algorithms ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER ::= { { OID rsaEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID md2WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID md5WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha1WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha256WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha384WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID sha512WithRSAEncryption PARAMETERS NULL }  { OID idRSAESOAEP PARAMETERS RSAESOAEPparams }  PKCS1PSourceAlgorithms  { OID idRSASSAPSS PARAMETERS RSASSAPSSparams } , ...  Allows for future expansion  }  ===================  Main structures  =================== RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { modulus INTEGER,  n publicExponent INTEGER  e }   Representation of RSA private key with information for the CRT  algorithm.  RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { version Version, modulus INTEGER,  n publicExponent INTEGER,  e privateExponent INTEGER,  d prime1 INTEGER,  p prime2 INTEGER,  q exponent1 INTEGER,  d mod (p1) exponent2 INTEGER,  d mod (q1) coefficient INTEGER,  (inverse of q) mod p otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL } Version ::= INTEGER { twoprime(0), multi(1) } (CONSTRAINED BY {  version must be multi if otherPrimeInfos present  }) OtherPrimeInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF OtherPrimeInfo OtherPrimeInfo ::= SEQUENCE { prime INTEGER,  ri exponent INTEGER,  di coefficient INTEGER  ti }   AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters for idRSAESOAEP.  Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.  RSAESOAEPparams ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1, maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1, pSourceAlgorithm [2] PSourceAlgorithm DEFAULT pSpecifiedEmpty }   Identifier for default RSAESOAEP algorithm identifier.  The DER Encoding of this is in hexadecimal:  (0x)30 0D  06 09  2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07  30 00  Notice that the DER encoding of default values is "empty".  rSAESOAEPDefaultIdentifier RSAESAlgorithmIdentifier ::= { algorithm idRSAESOAEP, parameters RSAESOAEPparams : { hashAlgorithm sha1, maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA1, pSourceAlgorithm pSpecifiedEmpty } } RSAESAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1Algorithms} }   AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters for idRSASSAPSS.  Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.  RSASSAPSSparams ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1, maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1, saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20, trailerField [3] TrailerField DEFAULT trailerFieldBC } TrailerField ::= INTEGER { trailerFieldBC(1) }   Identifier for default RSASSAPSS algorithm identifier  The DER Encoding of this is in hexadecimal:  (0x)30 0D  06 09  2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A  30 00  Notice that the DER encoding of default values is "empty".  rSASSAPSSDefaultIdentifier RSASSAAlgorithmIdentifier ::= { algorithm idRSASSAPSS, parameters RSASSAPSSparams : { hashAlgorithm sha1, maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA1, saltLength 20, trailerField trailerFieldBC } } RSASSAAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1Algorithms} }   Syntax for the EMSAPKCS1v1_5 hash identifier.  DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithm, digest OCTET STRING } DigestAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { {PKCS1v15DigestAlgorithms} } END  PKCS1Definitions Appendix D. Intellectual Property Considerations The RSA publickey cryptosystem is described in U.S. Patent 4,405,829, which expired on September 20, 2000. RSA Security Inc. makes no other patent claims on the constructions described in this document, although specific underlying techniques may be covered. Multiprime RSA is described in U.S. Patent 5,848,159. The University of California has indicated that it has a patent pending on the PSS signature scheme [5]. It has also provided a letter to the IEEE P1363 working group stating that if the PSS signature scheme is included in an IEEE standard, "the University of California will, when that standard is adopted, FREELY license any conforming implementation of PSS as a technique for achieving a digital signature with appendix" [23]. The PSS signature scheme is specified in the IEEE P1363a draft [27], which was in ballot resolution when this document was published. License to copy this document is granted provided that it is identified as "RSA Security Inc. PublicKey Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material mentioning or referencing this document. RSA Security Inc. makes no other representations regarding intellectual property claims by other parties. Such determination is the responsibility of the user. Appendix E. Revision history Versions 1.0  1.3 Versions 1.0  1.3 were distributed to participants in RSA Data Security, Inc.'s PublicKey Cryptography Standards meetings in February and March 1991. Version 1.4 Version 1.4 was part of the June 3, 1991 initial public release of PKCS. Version 1.4 was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SECSIG9118. Version 1.5 Version 1.5 incorporated several editorial changes, including updates to the references and the addition of a revision history. The following substantive changes were made:  Section 10: "MD4 with RSA" signature and verification processes were added.  Section 11: md4WithRSAEncryption object identifier was added. Version 1.5 was republished as IETF RFC 2313. Version 2.0 Version 2.0 incorporated major editorial changes in terms of the document structure and introduced the RSAESOAEP encryption scheme. This version continued to support the encryption and signature processes in version 1.5, although the hash algorithm MD4 was no longer allowed due to cryptanalytic advances in the intervening years. Version 2.0 was republished as IETF RFC 2437 [35]. Version 2.1 Version 2.1 introduces multiprime RSA and the RSASSAPSS signature scheme with appendix along with several editorial improvements. This version continues to support the schemes in version 2.0. Appendix F: References [1] ANSI X9F1 Working Group. ANSI X9.44 Draft D2: Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. Working Draft, March 2002. [2] M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway. Relations Among Notions of Security for PublicKey Encryption Schemes. In H. Krawczyk, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto '98, volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 26  45. Springer Verlag, 1998. [3] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Optimal Asymmetric Encryption  How to Encrypt with RSA. In A. De Santis, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt '94, volume 950 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 92  111. Springer Verlag, 1995. [4] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. The Exact Security of Digital Signatures  How to Sign with RSA and Rabin. In U. Maurer, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt '96, volume 1070 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 399  416. Springer Verlag, 1996. [5] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. PSS: Provably Secure Encoding Method for Digital Signatures. Submission to IEEE P1363 working group, August 1998. Available from http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/. [6] D. Bleichenbacher. Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1. In H. Krawczyk, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto '98, volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1  12. Springer Verlag, 1998. [7] D. Bleichenbacher, B. Kaliski and J. Staddon. Recent Results on PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard. RSA Laboratories' Bulletin No. 7, June 1998. [8] B. den Boer and A. Bosselaers. An Attack on the Last Two Rounds of MD4. In J. Feigenbaum, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto '91, volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 194  203. Springer Verlag, 1992. [9] B. den Boer and A. Bosselaers. Collisions for the Compression Function of MD5. In T. Helleseth, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt '93, volume 765 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 293  304. Springer Verlag, 1994. [10] D. Coppersmith, M. Franklin, J. Patarin and M. Reiter. Low Exponent RSA with Related Messages. In U. Maurer, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt '96, volume 1070 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1  9. Springer Verlag, 1996. [11] D. Coppersmith, S. Halevi and C. Jutla. ISO 97961 and the New Forgery Strategy. Presented at the rump session of Crypto '99, August 1999. [12] J.S. Coron. On the Exact Security of Full Domain Hashing. In M. Bellare, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto 2000, volume 1880 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 229  235. Springer Verlag, 2000. [13] J.S. Coron. Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other Signature Schemes. In L. Knudsen, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272  287. Springer Verlag, 2002. [14] J.S. Coron, M. Joye, D. Naccache and P. Paillier. New Attacks on PKCS #1 v1.5 Encryption. In B. Preneel, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt 2000, volume 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 369  379. Springer Verlag, 2000. [15] J.S. Coron, D. Naccache and J. P. Stern. On the Security of RSA Padding. In M. Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto '99, volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1  18. Springer Verlag, 1999. [16] Y. Desmedt and A.M. Odlyzko. A Chosen Text Attack on the RSA Cryptosystem and Some Discrete Logarithm Schemes. In H.C. Williams, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto '85, volume 218 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 516  522. Springer Verlag, 1986. [17] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999. [18] H. Dobbertin. Cryptanalysis of MD4. In D. Gollmann, editor, Fast Software Encryption '96, volume 1039 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 55  72. Springer Verlag, 1996. [19] H. Dobbertin. Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress. Presented at the rump session of Eurocrypt '96, May 1996. [20] H. Dobbertin. The First Two Rounds of MD4 are Not OneWay. In S. Vaudenay, editor, Fast Software Encryption '98, volume 1372 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 284  292. Springer Verlag, 1998. [21] E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval and J. Stern. RSAOAEP is Secure under the RSA Assumption. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 260  274. Springer Verlag, 2001. [22] H. Garner. The Residue Number System. IRE Transactions on Electronic Computers, EC8 (6), pp. 140  147, June 1959. [23] M.L. Grell. Re: Encoding Methods PSS/PSSR. Letter to IEEE P1363 working group, University of California, June 15, 1999. Available from http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/P1363/patents.html. [24] J. Haastad. Solving Simultaneous Modular Equations of Low Degree. SIAM Journal of Computing, volume 17, pp. 336  341, 1988. [25] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3369, August 2002. Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002. [26] IEEE Std 13632000: Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography. IEEE, August 2000. [27] IEEE P1363 working group. IEEE P1363a D11: Draft Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography  Amendment 1: Additional Techniques. December 16, 2002. Available from http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/. [28] ISO/IEC 95948:1997: Information technology  Open Systems Interconnection  The Directory: Authentication Framework. 1997. [29] ISO/IEC FDIS 97962: Information Technology  Security Techniques  Digital Signature Schemes Giving Message Recovery  Part 2: Integer Factorization Based Mechanisms. Final Draft International Standard, December 2001. [30] ISO/IEC 180332: Information Technology  Security Techniques  Encryption Algorithms  Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers. V. Shoup, editor, Text for 2nd Working Draft, January 2002. [31] J. Jonsson. Security Proof for the RSAPSS Signature Scheme (extended abstract). Second Open NESSIE Workshop. September 2001. Full version available from http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/053/. [32] J. Jonsson and B. Kaliski. On the Security of RSA Encryption in TLS. In M. Yung, editor, Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO 2002, vol. 2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 127  142. Springer Verlag, 2002. [33] Kaliski, B., "The MD2 MessageDigest Algorithm", RFC 1319, April 1992. [34] B. Kaliski. On Hash Function Identification in Signature Schemes. In B. Preneel, editor, RSA Conference 2002, Cryptographers' Track, volume 2271 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1  16. Springer Verlag, 2002. [35] Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998. [36] J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 260  274. Springer Verlag, 2001. [37] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996. [38] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS Publication 1801: Secure Hash Standard. April 1994. [39] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Draft FIPS 1802: Secure Hash Standard. Draft, May 2001. Available from http://www.nist.gov/sha/. [40] J.J. Quisquater and C. Couvreur. Fast Decipherment Algorithm for RSA PublicKey Cryptosystem. Electronics Letters, 18 (21), pp. 905  907, October 1982. [41] Rivest, R., "The MD5 MessageDigest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April 1992. [42] R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman. A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and PublicKey Cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21 (2), pp. 120126, February 1978. [43] N. Rogier and P. Chauvaud. The Compression Function of MD2 is not Collision Free. Presented at Selected Areas of Cryptography '95. Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. May 1995. [44] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1 v2.0: RSA Encryption Standard. October 1998. [45] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #7 v1.5: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard. November 1993. (Republished as IETF RFC 2315.) [46] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #8 v1.2: PrivateKey Information Syntax Standard. November 1993. [47] RSA Laboratories. PKCS #12 v1.0: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard. June 1999. [48] V. Shoup. OAEP Reconsidered. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Crypto 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 239  259. Springer Verlag, 2001. [49] R. D. Silverman. A CostBased Security Analysis of Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Lengths. RSA Laboratories Bulletin No. 13, April 2000. Available from http://www.rsasecurity.com.rsalabs/bulletins/. [50] G. J. Simmons. Subliminal communication is easy using the DSA. In T. Helleseth, editor, Advances in Cryptology  Eurocrypt '93, volume 765 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 218 232. SpringerVerlag, 1993. Appendix G: About PKCS The PublicKey Cryptography Standards are specifications produced by RSA Laboratories in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of publickey cryptography. First published in 1991 as a result of meetings with a small group of early adopters of publickey technology, the PKCS documents have become widely referenced and implemented. Contributions from the PKCS series have become part of many formal and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 and IEEE P1363 documents, PKIX, SET, S/MIME, SSL/TLS, and WAP/WTLS. Further development of PKCS occurs through mailing list discussions and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are welcome. For more information, contact: PKCS Editor RSA Laboratories 174 Middlesex Turnpike Bedford, MA 01730 USA pkcseditor@rsasecurity.com http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs Appendix H: Corrections Made During RFC Publication Process The following corrections were made in converting the PKCS #1 v2.1 document to this RFC: * The requirement that the parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifier value for idsha1, idsha256, idsha384, and idsha512 be NULL was changed to a recommendation that the parameters be omitted (while still allowing the parameters to be NULL). This is to align with the definitions originally promulgated by NIST. Implementations MUST accept AlgorithmIdentifier values both without parameters and with NULL parameters. * The notes after RSADP and RSASP1 (Secs. 5.1.2 and 5.2.1) were corrected to refer to step 2.b rather than 2.a. * References [25], [27] and [32] were updated to reflect new publication data. These corrections will be reflected in future editions of PKCS #1 v2.1. Security Considerations Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. Acknowledgements This document is based on a contribution of RSA Laboratories, the research center of RSA Security Inc. Any substantial use of the text from this document must acknowledge RSA Security Inc. RSA Security Inc. requests that all material mentioning or referencing this document identify this as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #1 v2.1". Authors' Addresses Jakob Jonsson PhilippsUniversitaet Marburg Fachbereich Mathematik und Informatik Hans Meerwein Strasse, Lahnberge DE35032 Marburg Germany Phone: +49 6421 28 25672 EMail: jonsson@mathematik.unimarburg.de Burt Kaliski RSA Laboratories 174 Middlesex Turnpike Bedford, MA 01730 USA Phone: +1 781 515 7073 EMail: bkaliski@rsasecurity.com Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2003. All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 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