CONCEPTS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF AIR INTELLIGENCE

Created: 12/1/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

TITLE: Conceptshilosophy Ot Air Intelli9ence

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AUTHOR: Lewis R. Long

VOLUME: 2 YEAR: 8 ^

. . .

STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A collection ol orllctos on tho historical, operational, doclrlnol, ond theoretical aspects ol Intelligence.

All tiaicmcnis of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

ihe authors They do not necessarily refleci official positions or views o( Ihe Central Inielligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in ihe contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government cndorscmeni ofan article's faciual statements and inierprctaiions.

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CONCEPTS fK

AIR DTTEXLIGENCE

ong

should like to set forth certain concepts for air intelligenceeel would vitalize an air Intelligence philosophy and could lead to an air intelligence policy and doctrine consistent with the dominant role that air power must play in the years toake no claim of originality In ail these concepts; noronsider that they alone wouldound airdoctrine. However, together with the vaUd concepts contained In the doctrinal manuals, theymprovide better guidance to the field than hasbeen available.

I should like to emphasize that all the concepts presented are meant to be applied within the framework of oneconcepthilosophy of airairis geared to air poweruclear age and that It has the same predominant characteristic* as has the air forcerange, speed, mobility, flexibility, and penetrative ability.

Because air forces have the capability of flying to any point on the globe and returning to any desired location, airmust provide bask information to guide such flights in peace or in war. Because air forcesynamic Impact on all form* of International relations, air intelligence must beto expose for the scrutiny of air commanders the entire structure of other nations and to advise and assist in theof air strategy and policies.

humues

In the established principles for the successful employment of air forces It Is considered that the air forces are an entity. Even so, air Intelligence must be considered Indivisible andat all levels of operation to employmentingle aggregate Instrument. Air Intelligence must be employed for the attainmentommon objective, whichIn essenceIs to contribute to the security of the nation. Air Intelligence provides the key to proper employment of the air forces Inthe Initiative tn many different conditions ofrelations, In biking advantage of different opportunities

ante

4BM

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or to war Air intelligence must also guide the air force inthe principle of surprise, in order to attain bothand psychological advantages through speed,originality, and concentration. For the present,must concentrate on indications of imminence of

hostilities, without neglecting informaUon on capabilities1

vulnerabilities of potential enemy countries. Thisof effort not only will contribute to the security of our forces but also will provide guidance for combat operations if war is forced upon us. Finally, air Intelligence must becoordinated through proper control. CONCEPT NUMBER ONE. Intelligence agencies are never more at uxir than in periods of nominal peace. The logicalof this concept is, of course, the fact that the success of the initial phases of war (and In this thermonuclear age these probably will also constitute the decisive phases) willon the quality of intelligence produced in peace. Most people can understand and pay lip service, at least, to theidea, but they balk completelyational consideration of the first one when it comes to providing tangible support needed by the intelligenceave never, inseen an Intelligence staff at any echelon that was not undermanned, overworked, and restricted In ita operationsack of real appreciation on the part of the command for the goals the intelligence section had set for itself to accomplish in the light of the command mission.

At all echelons intelligence staffs must have adequateof the best qualified personnel, marim^ equipment,and funds; maximum freedom of action; and coequal status with other major staff elements. It can be categorically stated that if the air force intelligence structure had all the support it could profitably employfully Justifyin peacetime, its resources would be ample for any type of war we might become involved in.

Let us now analyse each of the requirements (personnel,

terial support, freedom of action, and coequal status) in terms

of what other writers have bad to say, bearing in mind these :

three basic intelligence missions: to provide timely warninghe imminence of hostilities (whetherotal or limited war

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o provide detailed knawleagee eapaouWand

vulnerabilities of potential enemy nations and of friendlynations; and to provide the best possible intelligencethe intentions of foreign nations, particularly those thatpotential'

PERSONNEL. During wartime, all the services drew heavily on civilian professions for manning intelligence posts Law* yen, Insurance adjusters, Investigators, police enforcementscientific and technical personnel, and teachers were put into uniform; and, by and large, these people carried theworkload of tbe services. By and large, too, theircompared favorably with those of professionalpeople. There have been numerous attempts made to Identify the qualifications for intelligence personnel.ists ten major groups of traits which "the good spy is supposed to possess" in order to qualify for that particular aspect of Intelligence work. For the most part, these same traits could be usedtarting basis for selection of personnel for other intelligence tasks-First of all. his morale must be high and he must be genuinely interested In the Job ahead.

Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and

Third, he must beuick and practical thinker. He must have good Judgment and know how to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must bein some occupational skill.

Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet, tolerant and healthy.

Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other people, to workembeream, to understand the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the same foibles himself.

Sixth, be must know how to Inspire collaboration, to organise, administer and lead others. He must beto accept responsibility.

Iadiilas, War o/ ffffs (NT.arnalls,.

3d

Seventh, he must be discreet,assion^ 'Vflfek.

nymlty and know bow to keep his mouth shut arid. *

ecret

Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but

when bluffing andbecome necessary. Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring. Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything, to memorize details accurately. He must be able to report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate hisand relate them to the greater complex of things.

MATERIALhould like to stress the importance of allocating the maximum In equipment, facilities, and funds to intelligence work in time of peaceuotation from Sunhe Chinese military oracle, whose writings on the art of war. C. have influenced military thinking down to this day.

Hostile armies may face each other for years,for victory which is decidedingle day. This being so, to remain in Ignorance of the enemy'ssimply because one grudges the outlay of aounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height of inhumanity.

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve thingsthe reach of ordinary men. Is foreknowledge. In speaking of the cost of the British secret servicehole (both positive andeth noted: *

3 tbe Secret Services0 pounds;ounds; during the recentounds annually; andt ts worth many times this amount, for though the American, French and Russian (secret) services

Sua Tzu Wo, The Art of War (Translation by Lionel Dues,and noteshomas R. Phillips, Harrlaburg. Pa-,Service Publishing Co. WO.

"Ronald Beth, Spies at Work, London: Peter Own Limited MCMLTV,

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are now more extensive than at any time^in this .sW?-'

oxry, British secret

performanceomewhat diflerent order of magnitude for

British expenditures for intelligence. He said that4

budget was three million pounds and that this amount was the

highest in the entire history of the British Secret Service He

pointed out. however, that this figure is deceptive because It

represents only allotments from public funds and he adds:

"The bulk of Britain's mteUigence revenue comes from private

funds, such as dividends of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,

some of whose shares are held by thearago then gave an Indication of what US military services

are spending for mteUigence. In fiscalhe Army

askedor intelligence, and for fiscal

nclusive, the Armyotal0 onYet this represented less than one-half of one percent

of the total Army budget.1 Then, stressing his thesis that the

cold warWar ofarago pointed out relativefor Intelligence in the Continental Army and hi tbe

services today:

6eorge Washington spent approximately eleven percent of his entire military budget on mteUigence operations. The fact that today we spend less than one percent of our peacetimebudget on these same activities shows how little effort Is being made to solve the "friction" bymeans rather than brute force. From theave had with various Britishofficers, visits to JIB (Joint Intelligence Bureau) and

some of the intelligence officers of the Air ministry, and from

comparing the results of British intelligence with those of USAF

m certainly inclined to agree, at least partially,

with Seth's last statement for the quality of British intelligence

production is invariably very high, and the quantity compares

favorably with that produced by the much larger USAFstaffs. The British traditionally have been wlUing-

'feiafo. op..

'.

^I'sssWf

"

tiou of intelligence huormation, more, perhaps, than. " -

modern nations. They have not, In other words, weighedobtained by intelligence effortsompletelyas we "practical Americans" are inclined to do; theyone cannot package intelligence results on abasis. So for the past two hundred years theypreeminent in the field. This is not to say that they havemade serious mistakes; but, by and large, theirhave been remarkably sound. Moreover, theyperiods of nominal peace to extend and consolidateactivities, not only for the purpose ofthe next war but also (what is even more important)for the peace to follow.

FREEDOM OF ACTION. As backgroundiscussion of

the need for granting maximum freedom of action to air force

hould like to quote the following passage from

the Report of the Task Force on Intelligenceffect of Diplomacy on the Over-All Collection of

The task force has recognized the Incompatibility in method between the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active operations Incident to theof intelligence and the conduct of cold war. While all contribute to the end In view, conflictsthem must be resolved, usuallyigh level, and always in the national interest It must bethat diplomacy is not an end to itself; that while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of Intelligenceital element in the fight to preserve our national welfare andInstances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an attitude hasoften to the detriment of vigorous and timely action to the field.

Although the foregoing comment was made in connectioniscussion of the Intelligence activities of the Depart-

' Intelligenceeport to the Congress, by the- .

on Organization of the Executive Branch of tbe Government, Jane 1BSS, pp.J. iBcrofllter referred to as Task Force Report,")

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tate( It Is every .bit as apphcable to air..

to tLeDcpariment of SUte because tbe air attache system, whichajor contributor of intelligence information,as an integral part of the State Department's Foreign Service,

It is altogether appropriate that, generally speaking,considerations take precedence over the collectionof theevertheless, within theof that principle (whichart of the principle ofcontrol over the militaryt should befrom the Implications of the Task Force findings thatconservative attitude toward opportunities forintelligence information should permeate not only theservice but also the military establishment

I shall not devote much attention to detailed suggestionsout intelligence operations. My concern is withof principles that would provide the type ofwhich competent people, using their innate Intelligencecan devise an Infinite number of ways in whichand produce air intelligenceways which must,be within the framework of US national objectivestimes.eel very strongly that wea page out of the British Secret Service book and putcollection effortsasis where they canown way, at least in part. This would be aand it would be impossible of achievementexisting regimentation that governs all businessin which the government is officiallySTATUS WITH OTHER MAJOR STAFFThere is, as faran discern, no rhyme norsubordinating intelligencetaff section tobiggest objection to the subordination of intelligence tolies in the fact that the operations officer isplaced ta the position where he frequently makesdecisions. The Intelligence officer Is supposedthe commanding officer as to what the enemy canwill attempt to do that would interfere with theof the command mission. The operationssupposed to advise the commanding officer as to

his own forces can and should do. The commanding officer is thenosition to weigh both bis own and the enemy's

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capablhUes^nd toound' COrribiand

comrrjand action. It is totally wrong for the operations officer

deprived of the full value (and probably full Information) of enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Zacharias, commenting on the fallacy of subordinating, told theCommittee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster that one of the organizational deficiencies which was afactor was:'

That the planning officers were allowed to take over the Intelligence function of evaluation. This resulted In Individualsull knowledge of the Japanese or their psychology detennlxiing what the Japanese might do. This practice applied not only inbut also at Pearl Harbor, where the erroneouswas reached by the planning officer that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. CONCEPT NUMBER TWO. Success achieved by intelligence in peace will determine the outcome of the war. General Kuter stated: *

In jet-atomic warfare there will be no room for gross errors of judgment. There will be no time, shouldstart, to correct mistakes in the types of forces that we have provided, the manner in which they have been organized and trained, or the way we fight. And the terrible penalty for failure could be quick anddefeat.

Many factors are involved in any satisfactoryBut one thing is sure. The question cannot be answered satisfactorily unless we have the properand unless the doctrine Is accepted. For years the US has believed that its greatest militarylay in its Industrial might The validity of this belief was demonstrated in Worldnd again In Korea. We can be sure that any Soviet attacks against this country wfll be planned to destroy not only our retaliatory force but also our industrial potential. Thus we can see that "no longer

* Kuter,t. Qen_ "No Room Fortr Farce Maga-

will the US or any other courdry be^aWe to build upa

tary forces and rely on Its'mdustrUl potential after the war has begun.""

Intelligence must be developed before war breaks out if it is to influence our preparations,oundation for our planning, and guide early phases of operations. It Is true that Mr. Allen Dulles, present Director of thechievedsuccess In the history of espionage with thenetwork he established In Germany, operating from Switzerland, during tbe war.

hrough this network Mr. Dulles managed toonspiracy within the high cornmand of the German armies In the south and to bring about the surrender of tbe very army on which Hitler wasfor the prolonging of the war from behind the legendary "Alpine redoubt."

However, the situation In Japanar different matter. Through shortsightedness and perhaps Ineptitude andthe US had failed to establish the groundwork for an effective espionage system In Japan, notwithstanding the fact that Zacharias and other authorities on Japan had been aware of the need and had advocated such prior planning. In view of the steadily deteriorating relations that existed between Japan and the US right up to tbe surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, this failure to develop. In advance oforkable system for systematic collection (in Japan) of Intelligenceduring the war that most intelligence personnel were sure was virtually Inevitable Is an extremely black mark against the US Intelligence agencies of that time. Moreover, this country made no serious effort to establish an Intelligence net within Japan during the war because it was felt that the effort was far too great In relation to Its possible value. Farago pointed out that itirtual. to setocal network in an enemy country under wartime. . a [Allen Dulles' success notwithstanding}

ry .

-Thomas K. Flnfctler. Power and Policy, New York: Hareourt. Brace.

- Farago, op.

. lea.

40

How can we account for the fact that, against all

he US didatisfactory espionage net Inafter war started but failed to do so in Japan, itsenemy? uggest that the reason lies, among

factors, in the accessibility of Germany before tbe outbreak of war. In other words, more Americans and individuals from Allied nations had contacts before the war in Germany than in Japan. Interestingly enough, the,Soviets failed to re-establish within Germany an adequate espionage net:

hen their original network, known as the Rote Kapelle or Red Orchestra, was smashed. They managed to create such networks only in countries of their wartime allies. Canada, the Unlled Kingdom, and the United States, and in neutral Switzerland,battleground of internationalhe Soviets did achieve remarkable success in Japanthe Sorge espionaget seems to me that thereirect correlation between the accessibilityotential enemy country just before the outbreak of hostilities and theof being able to establish (or re-establish) and maintain an espionage net in that country after war breaks out. What doe* this mean, as far as the US la concerned at the present time? If it is difficult to penetrate the Iron Curtain today, it will be even harder when war breaks out. Therefore, we must go all-out to penetrate it, and to establish many strong, diversified, and versatile nets as soon as possible. We cannot do this under the existing limitations of personnel, equipment, and funds. Yet maximum reliance roust be placed on the ability of mteUigence to decide by whom, when, where, and in what strength the US may be attacked The responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence (ACS/I.. USAF. is to develop this Information regarding ourto air attackthis in an air-nuclear age.

CONCEPT NUMBER THREE. Air intelligence must, on abasis, encompass all aspects of pouter tn foreign(political, economic, and psychosocial, as well asboth tn the present and tn the historical

Moreover, it must speak out on matters of national strategy.

-rw.p. in.

- "mi,.M.

w

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Hereir mtelllgegce (as well at army and naryhas eonflned Itself primarily to an erahiatkm of the military power of foreign nations. The National Security Council has directed the air force to interest Itself primarily in intelligence of foreign air forces and has assignedfor covering other aspects of national power to the other US Intelligence agencies.

It has long been an American tradition that the military establishment should remain free from the "taint ofesult, the military has shied away from any contact with political problems. This even reached the point before World War II where few of the regular military establishmenttheir constitutional right to vote In elections.

This fear of military domination in our national life stems, of course, from our Inherited distrust of all forms of tyranny and autocracy. Before the time that military power became inextricably tied to the other forms of national power, perhaps even as late as the First World War, this attitude may have had some validity In our national consciousness. However, Clause-wlU would not have subscribed to the complete separation of military thinking from the remainder of national life andHe pointed out that war Is merely an extension ofpolitical policy by otheritler demonstrated his conviction that war tsmopping-up process" by capitalizing on the gains made by his fifth column. Certainly the Marxists have from the beginning showed the world by word and deed that the line of demarcation between politics and military action is extremely nebulous.

It can and probably will be argued that air intelligence should "stick to Its knitting" and concentrate on ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces in thefashionhich the army is supposed to developon foreign ground forces; the navy, on foreign naval forces; the air lorce, on foreign air forces; and the Stateand CIA, on foreign political and economic strengths andowever, as It is air power that will have to carry the brunt of any Initial contacts with the enemy, as well as continuously to seek out and destroy all aspects of the enemy

-Karl von CUuaewUa, General, On War (TranilaUoo. Matttaashington.nfantry Journal. is

42

warmailng potential and will to fight, air mteUigence must hare tbe capability of advising the Chief of Staff, USAF, where and when to hit the enemy In order to hurt him most.

It seems Incontrovertible to me that we havelace In history where the military establishment, particularly the air force, must concern itself with political problems (as well as the economic and psychosocial problems)the traditional American feeling in the matter notwithstanding. General Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, agreed on this point, In responseuestion asked by the writer, foUowing his lecture to the Air War College. He stated, in effect, "Thererowing community of thought that theestablishment should get Into the fields of political and economic warfare, as weU as psychologicalirobviously, must be in tbe vanguard of this new approach.

CONCEPT NUMBER FOUR. Intelligence must take aapproach. In speaking of the fact that data on the Soviet Bloc are Inadequate, the Task Force Report onActivities considered that security measures adopted by the Communists have been exceptionally effective, particularly in comparison with American security measures, which make It relatively simple for foreign nations to coUect vital secrets. The task force admonishes, however:

he Information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, Is potentially available Throughon the prime target we must exert every conceivable and practicable effort to get It. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policyillingness to accept certain calculatedand diplomatic risks, and fuU use of technological capabilities."

Opportunities to increase air Intelligence coverage of Soviet capabilities and intentions Include:

a. The increasing of our clandestine operations and efforts to infiltrate tbe iron and bamboo curtains from all peripheral countries, taking maximum advantage not only of border-

Samford,ajor General,for th*of, ^.

lectare to Army Waranuary

" Task Force Report, op.

COjAKeWcTfiff

crossing techniques on land and by air drop but also neutral shipping and US submarines, particularly in the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea coastal areas.

establishment of contacts with and provision ofto (in return for services rendered) agents fromgovernments in exile, such as those from the BalticEuropean Satellite nations; theutside China, as minority groups throughout Asia;religious organizations, business firms, andagencies throughout the Free World havingthe Soviet Bloc; all known visitors tosuch as trade union officials, scientists, airlinecrewmen, and others; and all defectors from ironcountries.

attempt to bribe, intimidate, subvert, orSoviet and Satellite diplomats, government officials,or visitors abroad to "double" for us upon theiror to defect and remain in the West

d The making of surreptitious photographic penetration flights with high capability aircraft at irregular intervals, to cover peripheral areas.

purchase of controlling interest In the mostfirms having dealings with the Soviet or Satellitein order to use these firms to collect intelligencespread favorable propaganda, subvert Soviet andand otherwise create situations behind tbe Ironcurtains that would be favorable to the West

employment of such outstanding historians asToynbee; political scientists, as Professor William Mand Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; geographers,udson; ethnologists, as Margaret Meade; andRussia and Communism as Dr. Marc Szeftel and Mr.The individuals named representew oflist of qualified consultants; the profoundknowledge of foreign peoples and areas in theirprofessions that Is possessed by people ofeflsprlng of Ideas of Inestimable value toIn addition to enriching the staff with peoplecaliber we should hire outstanding representatives Inand public relations fields (preferably thosem foreignho can assist the factual

04

in packaging the ideas we want lo use in our "War of;

with the Soviets, this struggle for the minds of xoenf '

CONCEPT NUMBER FIVE. Intelligence should be used asweapon, one capable of influencing the outcome

either the cold war or any hot war, peripheral as well as total. Although there are no apparent indications that the Soviet Union, during the next few years, intends to take action of the sort that would surely precipitate another world conflict, we must be always on the alert to the possibility that such amight arise through rniscalculation on their part The dangers are greatest in the peripheral areas, where Satellite peoples might get out of hand and take action "from which we cannot retreat without disaster; then the chances of keeping war limited are very remote."

The difficulty is not in tbe lack of desire to exercise such restraint, but In tbe fact that the things we stand to lose are of such great value that there is no chance of limiting phases of conflict To have mutual understanding and agreementenemies Is essential If conflict is to be localized. What does this mean to air intelligence? Simply this: we mustmteUigence on every facet of enemy life. To do this, air inteUigence should control or at least coordinate aU air force agencies that to any degree operate in enemy territory or attack behind enemy lines or perform other than strictly rnUitary operations In areas that may become the scene of battle or in areas where, in the cold war, the air forces encounterInfluences.

CONCEPT NUMBER SIX. Intelligence must be usedCommanders, policymakers, planners, andpersonnel at ail echelons must rely upon, then plan,not only upon intelligence but also upon mteUigencewithin practical limits of our own capabilityof such recommendations. We have longa principle of mteUigence the concept that it mustto the Interested command in time to be ofIn mteUigence circles there has not been,

seems to me, equal emphasis placed upon submission of

gence to the commander and his stair inorm and so convincingly expressed that it will receive the prompt attention

"Ibid.

r

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and responsive command action that It warrants. Stressing the need for reducing the margin of error Inherent In any human undertaking. General White pointed out the need for educating our planners and our leaders. Ue said that poor command decisions and Inferior or urumaginative staff work would nullify the tremendous effort that has gone intoan extremely expensive air force. He added:

uperior employment of air weapons must be based on complete understanding of the nature of air warfare, tbe political and military context within which the air forces are operating,ound but imaginative understanding of targets andhere also has been entirely too little emphasis on thethat command plans and action should be based onThis has not always been the fault of intelligence. Nevertheless, too often in the air force, particularly, operational plans have been prepared with absolutely no regard for the Intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities and Intentions that these selfsame plans were designed to counter. Intaff officer at various echelons of command, there have been few instances in which command war plans,plans, or operations plans have actually been geared to the intelligence that gave rise to the necessity for such plans. More often than not, the Intelligence annex Is merely prepared at the same time as the basic plan and tbe other annexes and all are stapled together at one time. The proper procedure, and the one that we In Intelligence at USAFE (US Air Forces in Europe) were finally able to sell to the planners, should be this. The intelligence estimate of the situation is prepared first and given to the commander and to all his staff agencies in advance of the planning cycle. The basic plan and all the annexes (including the Intelligence annex) are then prepared simultaneously,iew to countering the threat indicated in the intelligence estimate.

I believe this failure to take the intelligence estimate into consideration at every stage in the planning cycle in theestablishment stems by and large from an American pre-

White, Thomas D_ Tbe Current Concept of American Militaryn Quarterly Review. Vol. VH,4 (AWCul am Handout,.

46

dilection for Ignoring In the poUcynmklng cycle availableregarding the capabilities and Intentions of actual or potential enemies.

It seems to me that the intelligence family must find some way not only to improve the quality of its product but also to stimulate an acceptance of that productillingness to act upon it. The process of making positive recommendations by intelligence for command actionelieve, materially improve this situation and would leadommand acceptancerinciple advanced by General Ridgway, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army. He stressed the fact that the present world situation makes it more important than ever to haveinformation upon which to base economical deployment and effective employment of army forces, as well as to avoid(obviously the same principle applies to all militaryeneral Ridgway stated: "Adequate intelligencethe fundamental basis for the calculation of risks, the formulation of plans, the development of materiel, theof resources, and the conduct of operation."CONCEPT NUMBER SEVEN. Intelligence must continuously estimate enemy intentions as weU as capabilities andOne of the biggest reasons that commanders at times have made their own estimates, rather than accept those of their mteUigence officers, is simply that the mteUigence officers have been unwilling to "go outimb" and estimate enemy intentions. Before thes the "method of intentions" was used by the US Army. Itethod used by the elder von Moltke. Shortly6 the American Army adopted the "method ofhich had been the method used by Napoleon.*1

Admittedly the "method of Intentions"ifficult one and, for the inexperienced intelligence officer, nonhablt formingthe probabUity of error is extremely high. Success for this method depends not only on an mtimate knowledge of the mentality of the opposing commanders as weU as the tactical doctrine of the enemy but also upon such intangible things as the physical and mental condition of the opponent, bis normal reactions, and reasoning processes. On the other hand, the

"Farago, op.. e.

' Command and General Blaff School, -Military. 7.

aarfffTTJErTrlAf*

"method of capablli ties" takes Into coriaideratlan ail lines of action open to the enemy. It does not discard any possible line until the enemy's dispositions are such that, even though he desired to adopt that line, he Is physically incapable of doing so. Thus It strives by elimination to reduce the possibility down to onethe only one line of action which the enemy can take. This Is the Ideal, as far as Intelligence is concerned, but It Is seldom reached.

CONCEPT NUMBER EIGHT Intelligence is no longer aof command, except at the higherll of the services (particularly the air force) have traditionally paid only lip service to the principle that Intelligenceunction of command. This has been amply demonstratedack of provision for suitable intelligence staffing between Worldnd Worldndemeaning of intelligenceMy reasons for believing that Intelligence should no longer beunction of command at all echelons are different from either of these.

In the first place if an all-out global war should occur, the U8 intelligence operations should be centrally controlled.the entire intelligence process cannot reasonably beout at all echelons; therefore, evenrolonged period of cold war, air mtelllgence operations must be, if not actually centrally controlled from Washington, at least concentratedmall number of locations where the complete Intelligence process is directed by one Individual. Unquestionably, in the past, commanders of squadrons, groups, wings, even airand air forces occasionally may havewinge of conscience because they have been unable to see their way clear to carry out all the Intelligence functions that manuals said they should, from collection through dissemination. These Individuals may nowigh of relief,iew It; for In the air force, their primary Intelligence function Is todown to the troops sir mtelllgence that has been received from higher echelons.

it may be arguedm hereby cutting the rug out from under thereviously expressedthat theofficer should not be subordinated to other staff officers but should report directly to the commanding officer. On the contrary, In these lower units, and even when his recognized

duties are in accord with his actualtill-feel that the mteUigence officer at every echelon of command should remain responsible only to the commanding officer or the chief of staff, and not to any other staff officer! He must maintain thisof other staff considerations in order best to present to his commander the most complete Intelligence picture and the most reasonable intelligence recommendations, even though he himself may not have developed either the mteUigenceof the situation or the recommendations based on it.

At the major air force command levels there is no question In regard to major staff level standing for the intelligence officer as intelligence should continue to be for hisomplete function of command, in the traditional sense. At the lower echelons, intelligence would stillommandbut rather more in the "special staff" tradition than the "general staff" concept.

CONCEPT NUMBER NINE. Major headquarter! staffs should get out of the operational aspects of mteUigence to theextent possible and should confine their attention largely to policymaking and flash or spot estimating functions. This concept is closely related to some of the thinking indicated in the discussion of the preceding concept. Compared with the present tables of distribution, the mteUigence staff ofUSAF and the major subordinate commands would be relatively small. These staffs, however, would be comprised of highly qualified personnel, representing the maximumcapability in the air force. Their functions would be primarily pohcymaking, inspection, liaison, and estimating. They would be prepared to give flash estimates of indications of the Imminence of hostilities and spot estimates, as required by the commander and his staff. They would exercise staff supervision not only over the inteUigence activities of allunits of the command, but also over the coUection and production activities of the mteUigence centers belonging to the command; these centers would perform the operational aspects of the intelligence process for the entire command.

CONCEPT NUMBER TEN. Air Intelligence (to include coun-terintelUgence) must keep under continuous review and, to the maximum extent possible, must downgrade and publish its files concerning enemy capabilities, activities, and intentions.

Whatl am proposing Is nothing less than declassifyingcarefully selected Items of Intelligence andregarding Soviet activities and providing suchto the American publiclanned basis. Let thepeople get this Information, but from authoritative sources and not from newspaper columnists.

Probably the most violent opposition to this proposal will come from some of my fellow tatelllgence officers, becauseintelligence hasoral responsibility to protect its sources, and rightly so. Nevertheless, tatelllgence files are bulging with Information that represents such afrom so many sources that no one source could possibly be harmed by its disclosure. Let us substitute this type offor at least some of the detailed data on our ownestablishment that we now band out somthat the public reaction to this policy would, in general, be very favorable, and that In the long run, the story of air power and the capabilities of the air force to safeguard the security interests of the US can be made synonymous In the minds of the American people.

So let's stop giving aid and comfort to our potential enemies androgram designed to discomfort themlobal scaleby informing and arousing the American public and the rest of the free world with factual taMrw ledge of Sovietand intentions. For example, an article Ineader's Digest discussed the dUturbing story of the manner in which the Communists, who had Infiltrated the military services and governmental structure of Iran, werefrom talcing over the entire country by theesult of the investigation, it was disclosed that five hundred Iranian officers were implicated in the plot,numerous high-ranking Individuals in both the Army and the police departments."

This story, terrifying In its Implication for other countries,ubmit, haveuch stronger Impact on public awareness of the Communist threat to the world today had it been officially releasedovernment Intelligence agency, rather thanommercial writer. This Is the type of run-

" Joseph A. MazandJ and Edwin Mailer, The Hunch That Savedeaders Digest, September IBM, pp. 6fl-50

50

of-the-mill basic intelligence available to the services which should be released to the publk as soon and as fully as Isand. In any event, be!ore some sharp news reporter can capitalize It

CONCEPT ELEVEN. AU air mteUigence concepts must bedynamic, kept under constant review, and revised to meet changing world tltuatvms. It follows that air intelligence philosophy must be considered in Its broadest sense as asearch for principles. The doctrine and policiesfrom this process must be changed as new concepts are developed.

In this context. General Kuter provides another validfor developing an air intelligence policy, although he was applying It in the larger sense to the whole spectrum of air force thinking.rue air doctrine accepted and exploited is the keyound military policy. We have the doctrine, now we must exploit Itommone don't, as yet. have an air Intelligence policy or doctrine in writing, but If USAF will adopt that last admonition of General Kuter's as the basic att force intelligence policy, it will beatter of time until we have an air intelligence doctrineone on which tbe commands may then soundly base their ownpolicies.

Kuter, op-

Original document.

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