SOVIET TACTICS IN GENEVA CONFERENCES

Created: 11/26/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY8

PART

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NOTES AND

SOVIET TACTICS IN GENEVA CONFERENCES

Soviet bloc delegates at both Geneva conferenceslast week ona record which they hope will place on the West the onus for any failure to reach There were no hints of any major changes in bloc In formal meetings and private conversations withdelegates, blocattempted to probe tho firmness of Western views onissues in both meetings.

Nuclear Test Cessation

In the talks on nuclear test cessation, the Sovietcontinued to direct his attack on what Moscow regards as the most vulnerable points in the Westernshort-term implicationear-by-year extensionestand the linkingest-cessation agreement to progress on other disarmament measures. In the meeting ofovember, Soviet delegate Tsarap-kin tried to test the firmness of this positionirect question to the American

Tsarapkin contendedink to other disarmamentwould render any cessation treaty "conditional, purposeless, and without prospects" and stated that his delegation wasto discuss only test Onovember he Insisted that the conference begin thedrafting of aagreement. He stronglyWestern requests forviewsontrol organ and reiterated the standardrefusal to discuss controls until the West agrees to acessation. Tsarapkin that the USSR has

reached the limits of its

Moscow appears confident that Its demand for an immediate agreement in principle on atest cessation contrasts favorably with the Westernwhich makes extensionear-by-year suspensionnot only onprogress in installing asystem, but also onon other disarmament

Surprise Attack

Soviet bloc moves in the talks last week on measures to prevent surprise attack were aimed at strengthening the bloc's case that the West is seeking to evade agreement onmeasures" by insisting on an abstract, technical approach to the problem. Bloc delegates charge that the West isonly In controls and the collection of Intelligencenot on specific They argue that the bloc approach Is more realisticIt deals with causes, not symptoms, of surprise attack.

rivate talk with the chief American delegate onovember, Soviet delegate Kuznetsov probed the American position that the talks should be confined to nonpolitical, technical problems. He said the USSR believes it isto agreeompleteat this time, in view of the mutual hostility andbut he claimed that Moscow hopesradual Introduction of measures which would reduce the danger of surprise attack.

Kuznetsov stated that the USSR is willing to accept ground

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observers and limited aerial photography, but only If tbese are accompanied by "practical measures." Hetep-by-step approach, with controls broadened as disarmamentare implemented. Henoted tbat the lack of agreement oo banning nuclear weapons sets Halts on measures for preventing surprise attack. This line reflects Moscow's earlier notes, which inslstod that surprise-attack talks would be useful only If they resulted in recommendations "inwith definite steps in the sphere of disarmament."

The chief American delegate believes tbat if the talks make no progress, Kuznetsov may soon abruptlyecess of the conference. Kuznetsov said onovember tbat the Western position during the week ofovember would determine whether any real progress in the next two weeks is possible. This statement suggests that Moscow may be preparing for an early breakoff.. Tbe Soviet note ofeptember stated that the talks should be concludec in four or five wee!

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