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If
STUDIES Iff
INTELLIGENCE
A collection oi articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ot intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence arc those of
the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
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THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE. By Srmonnd Robert M.New York: F. A-t ihould not be necessary by now to come to the defense of that rather forlorn figure, the outsider who has the temerity to write on Intelligence.ecade of experience andbehind us and the work of our predecessors to draw upon, we should by now hare achieved breadth of view sufficient to appreciate the contribution that the amateur or tbescholartbe man who does not earn his living at intelligence workcan make to our discipline.ear, we have grown nearsighted from looking down our noses at those who Invade our field without benefit of classified data.
The word "professional" recently hasrominent place In our vocabulary. Itrowingeveloping tradition, an understanding that In Its broadest sense Intelligence is an intellectual discipline. Intelligence, however,rapplst-Uke profession. Those who enter It take vows of silence. All of us understand the peculiar needimitation upon our right to professional self-expression and freely accept It, but this barrier also can bring frustration and an unconscious rejection of the contribution made by amateurs who are not thus hampered. Perhaps the best works on intelligence are written by these same amateurs simply because our rules of the game do not permit theto compete.
"Trofessiouallsm" easilyefuge for theintelligence man. He falls back on his (he believes) superior knowledge of trader-raft and techniques or on his training; he Is proud that he Is really "witting." He manages
1 Simon Wolin la the brother of David J. Dallln. the author ofNow tn his sUUea. Wolin was educated in RussiananlvendUea.ime be was uaociate editor ofLeader, and later did research for OB lovemmentpresent time heree laaee .
'Robert M. Slusser attended the University or Chicago and theInsUtote St Columbia. Behort time ts Associate Director of the Rsasarcb Program on the USSR, an affiliate of the But European Wand. Ine_ which vu financed by the Fordffhiini is now employed at the Hoover library for War, Peace and BavotaOQQ. He baa edited Sorts* Meemtmtte Potterf-wi WaroDecUon of papers by former Soviet ofhclsls.
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forgetrofessional worth his salt must pausetoroad and detached view of his discipline.
It is precisely this detached view, unclouded by ourproblems, that the amateur or scholar sometimes can give
uk.
Every work on contemporary Intelligence and/or for security organizations, be it amateur or scholarly. Is vulnerable tocriticismat least on the narrow ground of scope and accuracy of data. With rare exceptions the outside writer is hobbled by limitations that are the converse of our own: he is denied access to information. Even when the outsider relies on the personal experiences of former members and victims of the service, as Wolin and Slusser have largely done, thewill often Judge his work to be superficial, out of date, or lacking In precision The professional who loses himself in the maze of daily problems and decisions will soon discover, however, that classified information Is his only remaining stock in trade! He has lost the ability to measure the broad sweep of his subject.
If he Is wise, the amateur does not compete with theon the latter's home ground. Instead, he escapesider field where he can more than hold hisand basic questions of philosophy and policy or the presentationervice In terms of its historical development.
elieve, is what Wolin and Slusser seek to do, at least in part, in their collection of essays on Soviet state security. The fact that their success is less than complete does notmy thesis. Their work Is significant. Indeed, to the extent that It Interprets the historical development and defines the philosophical bases of Soviet state security.
Wolin and Slusser have drawn together in one volumestudies on Soviet state security, earlier prepared byfrom its ranks and by Its victims for the now-defunctProgram on the USSR. Their historical survey ofsecurity organizations from the Cheka to the KGBand gives unity to these essays, which deal primarily with the Internal repressive and counterintelhgence roles of state security. External espionage activity receives only superficial and generalized treatment
Events in the Soviet orbit during6 and the discovery of new documentary material after the book went to press
tmy
presented serious problems of organize lion to the editors. They solved these difficulties, not entirely to the reader's satisfaction, by hurriedly tackingpostscript" and "addenda" In the form of notes. Constant reference must be made to this added material if the text Is to be brought Into any order.
The success of any collective work Is dependent, In the main, upon two things: the competence of the individual authors and the skill of the editor in distilling unity of purpose fromminds. For several reasons, WoUn and Slusser wereto achieve this editorial standard. Philip Moseley, adirector of the Research Program, earlier commented on the serious editorial problem that plagued the Program because former Soviet scholars often could not meet the criteria of American research. Many times the work of such men bad lo be torn apart and completely recast. Evidence at bandthat someesearch papers were used, wholly or in part, ir. preparingublished essays. It is unlikely that all these papers were originally written under the American editors' supervision. Their editorial work, which was probably donehe life of the Research Program when financial resources were low or nonexistent. Is not of the highest standard
* KoosUdUb Shtepa was educated In history andt Rui-eima anrverstue* before Um rerohrUon. Be fought with tbe White armies, then made his peace with th* Communists, and continued his academic career at the University of Kiev on hi hU am it tn IStt Shtepa east hla tot with the Oerman Invaders and waa later evacuated by them. Hla ecbobuly work bihas been disturbed byconflicts with Ukrainian re fusee* In Use vwt H> presently resides in the US. Dsm* the pen name W. Oodln, he collaborated with T. Beck en the volume, Suetimn furor, ant Out Ertraettem of Con/euicm OBSW York, MM).
Wolln and Slusser themselves have written the mostessay. Their historical survey of Soviet state security is the finest short summary of this subject published in English. IU value is enhanced by extensive footnotes which are detailed comments rather than mere sourceere we can see the genesis of policies that came to full and bloody flower in the thirties: strict party control of state security, the growth of state security's right to arrest party members for opposition to dicta of the leaders, and the beginnings of Soviet espionage work abroad (In his essay, Konstantln Shtepa1 alsocertain early state security policiesifferent point of
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only
olin and Slusser touch on. although they do notStalin's own early experience in the Cheka. In the light of later developments, Stalin's personal participation In Cheka work ts significant This Introductory historical essay Is easily the best of the book. It Is required reading for all students of Soviet state security.
Konstantin Shtcpa has written on Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, first chief of the Cheka, and on Cheklsrn, theof organized terror. Possibly because most sourceare In Russian, the West has done little work on the personality and career of Dzerzhinskiy Like Stalin andDzerzhinskiy once Intended to enter the priesthood.he became an idealist of revolution, the "saint ofwhose influence on the state security apparatus Is still visible today.
Dzerzhinskiy was the greatest director of Soviet state security and tbe only true innovator among this motley crew. Hishave been dilettantesere executive officers (Yagoda andmbitious politiciansr bureaucrats of terror (Ignafyev andnderthe Cheka developed characteristics that came to full growth in successor organizations. Even before the Cheka was created, and Immediately upon the success of the OctoberDzerzhinskiy became commandant of Sroolny. the bead-quarters of the new regime In Petrograd. He thus personally assumed responsibility for the lives of tbeunction that later passed to the Cheka and Its successors. Early In the new regime, state security became Interested In internal party developments. It was Dzerzhinskiy who first proposed that party members must notify rtate security of opposition groups or tendencies within the party. When the collective heirs of Stalin strove to loosen state security's grip on the party they were simply trying to reverse anerzhinskry policy. Time will show Just how successful they were.
The doctrine known as Cheklsrn was first, formulated In Dzerzhlnakry's rime. Ititches' brew of prerevolutlonary Bolshevik theory, operational doctrine, and techniqueIn part from tbe tsaristhe traditional Russian view of secret police functions within theynical belief that the human being is the Soviet state's cheapest natural resource, and the Chekists' own knowledge that they form a
ftfft**if-*
special privileged caste. Cheklsm is the doctrine of an elite created toecular religion We court disaster If we fail to understand 1L
With one exception the other essays are lower In quality than the first two. All reflect the basic weakness of any volume on contemporary Soviet state securitythe lack of access to timely Information Early In his essay on the organization and function of state security. Ye. A.akes it clear that the exact structure at the time be wrote was not known to him. He attempts. In compensation, to describe the hybrid created by Beriya3 when be merged MGB and MVD. Much of Andreyerich's information was already out of date when be used it.
Little would be accomplishedlose review of Andreye-vich's errors. The nomenclature and numerical designations he assigns to MVD components3 cannot be trusted. He deprives tbe Foreign Intelligence Directorate of anyfor Satellite security/Intelligence services- (Andreyevtcb dees not discuss the adviser system in tbeisof legal and Illegal intelligence networks abroad Is confusing and. in fact, inaccurate. Andreyev!ch's essay,does show the Impact of the security machine on the average Soviet citizen.
Two essays on Soviet state security organizations since World War IIiscussion of state security after theofritten bynd G. S.ust be used with discretion. The first, which isto postwar organizational structure, contains numerous errors and distortions of fact.
It Is regrettableisproportionate amount of space Is given to the border guards and other armed forces of state
A. Andrerevleh is one of many atlases and pea names used by Yevgenly A. Karpovlch. an electrical engineer of Soviet origin.exile to alberta, be was released for military service and ultimately was sent to Germany to assist tn dismantling Industrial plant*. Be defected to the BrTUab tn carry
Vyachealae P. Artemyev. abas VaaUly Cbocaenso. formerly of the MKVD. was at one ttme employed as lecturer at the US Army school in Reeensberg. He Is the author of Correct! re Labor Camp* (InMunich, IBM).
COL O.urlutafcry served with Soviet frontier troops aotu
his
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security- Artemyev and Burlutakly describe the protection of Soviet frontiers in almost painful detail. Much of theirbears tbe stamp of truth,m not certain that either man is equipped to discuss the higher echelons of this directorate. Only incidental attention is paid to state security espionage activities abroad. Artemyev and Burlut skly, whose competence to handle thisuestion, havehort and inadequate essay on espionage in Western Europe, It contains errors of fact, interpretations, andThe authors, for example, deny the elementary fact that Moscow closely supervises all foreign residencies andTheir failure to consider in any detail the espionage role of Military Intelligence (KU) robs their paper of depth-
The best essayormer Soviet citizeniigor*yev*s1 paper on Investigative methods. Grigor"yev himself has felt the knout of state security. Although frankly based onin the thirties, this essay has much value for the present-day student Gngor'ycv inject* the flavor of Soviet life into his description of the recruitment and handling of secretthe preparation of cases against suspects; and the procedures of arrest. Interrogation, and extraction of
Perhap* because of the nature of their material, all essay* by former Soviet citizens, except Shtepa's paper on Dzerzhinskiy, are sparsely footnoted.
Students of Soviet security/espionage organs will welcome the editors' reading list. Although It Is poorly organized, this list is perhaps the best available compilation of source and secondary materials in Russian and the principal Western languages on Soviet state security. It Is an Indispensable tool for the specialist
The Soviet Secret Police. Is.ook of unevenessays range from the Indispensable to the superficial.poorly organized. It contains scene errors of fact andYet ftook that yon, the profeeaionalman, should
* It has not been rjosslble to identify A. Ortgor*yer.
Here you can find at time* something of that broadentioned earlier. So put aside for awhile your problems
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