SNIE 10-3-61-PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN SEATO UNDERTAKINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Created: 10/10/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN SEATO UNDERTAKINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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CENTBAjt IMTEltlOBHCE AOERCT

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SUBJECT 1 : CMWJN1ST REACTIONS TO

CERTAIN SEATJERTAXINOS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

To eatlaat* probable Communist reactlono to the uee of SEA TO force* in South Vietnam to prevent Comrjj.ilst lncuralonaInfiltration from Korth Vlttnam.2/

ther National Eatimate* pertinent to thle problem are, "Ukelihood of Major CoramunHt Military Intervention in Mainland Southeastated, "Probable Reaction* to Certain .Coureea of Action ConcerningliProapecte for North and Southatedlj and, "Bloc Support of the Cooaminist Effort Against th* Oovenoent of

THE ASSl/KPTIOH

forpurpose of this eetlsaate It la assumed that In responee to an appeal fro* th* Oovarnaent of VlttnanEATO ground, naval* and air forcta numbering0 arc oosnltted to patrol tha OVN ooaat and to aecurc the CVN-Laotlan border against Ineuralona or Infiltration froa the Corscsunlot Doaoeretic Republic of Yletnan (OAT) In North Tletruu. The sea TO objective, which will be publiclyia to atop external Coomunist asalatanc* to th* Viet

Cone Cocasunlst guerrillas, while avoiding direct engagement by theae troopa in the conflict within South Vietnam.

THE ESTIMATE

1. Ve believe that the Coenunlat Bloc would not eoenlt Horth Vletnaoeae or Chinese Coorzunist forcesarge-acal* salutary attack against South Vietnam or Laos In response to the aasuaedaction. Theould probably seek to avoid having Its regular units enterirect militaryt with seaTO, and in particular us, forces. Hanoi,

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Peiplng, andwould sJLssost certainly be concerned ever

the increased .rjekti for each of then of broadened hcetllltlen involvingorces, moreover, they are generally confident that their current lew risk teetles of local subversion anc.

Supporting "national liberation" Strugglesontinue to be successful In Southeast Asia.

2. nevertheless, pelping and Hanoi In particular would be highly concerned ss to the Intentions of the seato forces,uring the Initial deployment. The presence of seato forces so near Its border wouldource of constant unease to the WW. Moreover, both Hanoi and Pelping would considerarticularly urgent matter to prevent any in-vlgoratlon or etrerigtbenlng of seato which could result froa

2/ The CoBununlst guerrilla organltations In both Laos and South Vietnam (the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong) are under the control of the Coaaaunist Party of Horthand look to Hanoi for guidance and support. Ve believe that Hanoi exercises considerable local tactical latitude in conducting the Comrunlet struggle In both countriei. when the struggle is elevated to thelevel, as is now the ease with Laos, the major Bloc partners play anmportant leadership role. It Is also likely that the ussr exercisesrestraint on DRV or Chlness coraarunlst decisions which would risk the broadening of hostilities and raise tbe issus of ussr or OS participation.

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a successful SMTOVcoeration. Both vould aeek by political means and by military swans short or major overt attack, to frustrate tho SEATO effort.

3. In the situation assumed, we believe that the DRV would eeak at first to teat the serlouaness and effectiveness of the seato effort by subjecting the SEATO forces and their land lines of cceeaunlcation to harassment, ambuab, andattack. The Communists could not be expected to reoognlte the announced Intention of the 8SATO foreea to avoid involvement in the Internal atruggie In South Vietnam, They would probably estimate that by using their Viet Congin South Vietnam, by coesmlttlng additional experienced guerrilla forces from North Vletnasr^to operations inlong familiar to them, and by exploiting the opportunities offered by the sizable Junk traffic In coaatal watera, they

V 0 Vietnamese Ccdamtnlst troops, moat of them from south and central Vietnam, ware evacuated to North Vietnam in the regroupaent of foreea following the Indochina Var. The DRV haa maintained relativelyarge part of thla pool of manpower experienced in guerrilla operatlona in South Vietnam, drawing upon it for cadrea to reinforce th* Viet Cong.

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could harass the^SBATO land forces and Infiltrate th* SEA TO blockade. Tnercomniinlstii would expect worthwhile political and psychological reward* If their harassment and guerrilla operations against fEATO forces were successful, including lowered OVN moral* and Increased tensions au-ong soir* of the SEATO members. Hi lie seeking to test the SEATO forces, the DRV vould not relax It* Viet Cong campaign againit the OVN.

4. It la expected that th* SEA TO action vould cause tb* DRV to try to gain "compensation" In some manner, eueh aa possibly declaring* Oeneva Agreements, or certain artiolTB of th*brogated. It might alao begin to recelT* Increasingi*tanc* from the Soviet Onion and Coanuniat China openly and in unconecalad violation of th* Agreements, and to buildup an air force vhleh would include Jets. The Bloc could attempt to encourage andLaos and Cambodia to protest to the ON if any SEATO forces crossed th* South Vietnam border.

5- If no agreement on Lao* had been reached at Oenevao the aaaumed SEATO action, v* bell*ve that the Com-srunlet* vould take atepa to hasten their takeover of Laos. They vould intensify their effort* to achieve politicaland they vould atep up military pressures against th*

Laotian Amy. Cocawunlst strength In south Uoi wouldbt increased by force, froa Korti* Vietnam to guard against an effort to partition Laos or an attack against the Pathst Lao forest. Toe Soviet airlift would probablyeavier flow of sUlltary supply Into south Laos, aind the Cooawunlsts would probably Intensify their efforts toeoure route for motor traffic into ths south. On the other hand, if the SEA TO action took place aftsr the estsbllshraent of oalition government ln Laos under Souvanna phouns and the conclusion of an agreement at Geneva, tbe Ccosaunlats would probably eaphaslisefx, then sUlltary aveasurct to win control of tbe country. In either caae the eeale of Coonunlst Infiltration of nen end equipment froa North to South rietnaa through Laos would probably not be significantly arfeeted.

6. Zf the 5SATO action sppeared to be proving effective In reducing the preoent scslc of infiltration the Comarunlets probably would lnoresse thslr use of the mountain trail aystea through Caabodia. Thisonger and aore difficult route but Its use could keep st lesst aifiiarua support flowing to tht Viet Cong, it the tame time. In order to reduce the apparent success of the SEATO action, they could intensify small unit

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attacks, assassinations, and local tarrorlaa in South Vietnam) they couldonmilt nor* DRV Irregular penonnel for the harassment of the SEATO foreea. It would probably be part or Ccmmunlat taetlea to play upon poaaible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces and accepting losses in South Vietnamong period of time.

the Introduction of SEATO troops IntoCommunist China might Increase its ground andin South China and strengthen tta militaryTaiwan. It might also announce various typeaaaalstance to the DRV "to meet the imperlallatSouth Vietnam, possibly Including the stationingCommunist air units in North Vietnam. Nevertheless,

ws do not believe Yelping would consider assignment of SEATO forces to South Vietnam aa an lsamedlete and dlreot threat to its own national ssourlty.

the same tisae, the Conaunlst powsr*ajor propaganda and politicalto label the SEATO action aa aggression, aato th* peace in th* *ar East, andisguisedto re-establish colonial rule over Indochina. Tothe fears of war In the Par East, Hanoi and relplng

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would cha-ge thett the OS, through SEA TO, was preparing to attack the DRY and CoaBunist China. The USSR would probably remind the world of its defense commitments to both Pelping and Hanoi.

9. The reaction to the assumed SEATO action amongrron-Coowiunlat governments would vary widely. It Asian members of SEATO would find rinewed confidence in the organisation andf the plan were to go well. If, on the other hand, the SEATO action were to become coatly, prolonged, or to involve heavy casualties, the Asian members would soon become disenchanted and look to the OS to doto lessen the burden and to solve the problem. Australia would probably go along with this action; New Zealand might also Join ln. Ths OX would be likely to oppose the lasumed SEATO sctlon, and British reluctance to participate could be overcome only with great difficulty. Prance would also oppose the action and almost csrtslnly would refuse to participate.

The neutralist governments In the area would be most concerned at the Increased tension and denger of general hostilities, Tfcty would denounce the SEATO action and calleaceful solution. Hons of them, however, would be

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without loo* se-retor the SEATO action for they All have feare of. ccarinlst subversion and expansion. For example, Sihanouk has become Increasingly fearful of and disillusioned with the DRY'S subverslvs and guerrilla organizations in Laos and South Vietnam, both of whoa have violated Cambodia's borders. Be has no desire to see Laos or South Vietnam under Ccesaunlst domination. Despite his genuine and Justifiable fear of Cosvnuniat China and North Vietnam, Sihanouk might jvertly, with the SEATO aotion.

11. Moscow and Pslping would bring strong pressures against Japan. Although the Japanese Governmente under strong leftist Internal pressure. It would probably tolsratsoglstlo activities and would not officiallytbe SEATO effort. Nationalist China would bs slated with the SEATO aotion.

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