01
SI'KCIAI. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
probable communist reactions to certain seato undertakings in south vietnam
Military
Political i
Non-Communist attitude*
NOTE: This is the final version of the estimate and additional text wili noi be circulated.
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency -and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on Concurring were the Directorntelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department ofmy,ssistant Chief of Ndbal Operationsent of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff,SAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; ihe Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB ana the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
classification of title is confidential when used separately
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1
SUBJECT: : PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO
CERTAIN SEATO UNDERTAKINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable Communist reactions to the use of SEATO forces In South Vietnam to prevent Communist Incursions or Infiltration from North Vietnam.
ther National Estimates pertinent to this problem are, "Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeastatedj "Probable Reactions to Certain Courses of Action Concerningl;Prospects for North and SouthatedI; and, "Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Government ofl.
For the purpose of this estimate itssumed that in response to an appeal from the Government of VietnamEATO ground, naval, and air forces numbering0 are committed to patrol the GVN coast and to secure the GVN-Laotian border against incursions or infiltration from the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) In North Vietnam. The SEATO objective, which will be publiclyis to stop external Communist assistance to the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas, while avoiding direct engagement by these troops In the conflict within South Vietnam.
THE ESTIMATE
1. We believe that the CommunlBt Bloc would not commit North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forcesarge-scale military attack against South Vietnam or Laos In response to the assumed SEATO action. The DRV would probably seek to avoid having its regular units enterirect military on^af-cment with SEATO, and In particular US, forces. Hanoi,
Peiping, andould almost certainly be concerned over the increased risks for each of them of broadened hostilities involving QS forces. Moreover, they are generally confident that their current low risk tactics of local subversion and supporting "national liberation" struggles will continue to be successful In Southeast Asia.
2. Nevertheless, Peiping and Hanoi In particular would be highly concerned as to the Intentions of the SEATO forces, particularly during the initial deployment. The presence of SEATO forces so near Its border wouldource of constant unease to the DRV. Moreover, both Hanoi and Peiping would considerarticularly urgent matter to prevent any ln-vigoratlon or strengthening of SEATO which could result from
2/ The Communist guerrilla organizations in both Laos and South Vietnam (the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong) are under the control of the Communist Party of Northand look to Hanoi for guidance and support. We believe that Hanoi exercises considerable local tactical latitude In conducting the Communist struggle in both countries. When the struggle is elevated to thelevel, as is now the case with Laos, the major Bloc partners play an Increasingly Important leadership role. It is also likely that the USSR exercisesrestraint on DRV or Chinese Communist decisions which would risk the broadening of hostilities and raise the Issue of USSR or OS participation.
a successful SEATO operation. Both would seek by political means and by military means short of major overt attack, to frustrate the SEATO effort.
3- In the situation assumed, we believe that the DRV would seek at first to test the seriousness and effectiveness of the SEATO effort by subjecting the SEATO forces and their land lines of communication to harassment, ambush, andattack. The Communists could not be expected to recognize the announced intention of the SEATO forces to avoid involvement in the internal struggle in South Vietnam. They would probably estimate that by using their Viet Congin South Vietnam, by committing additional experienced guerrilla forces from North Vletnam^'to operations inlong familiar to them, and by exploiting the opportunities offered by the sizable Junk traffic in coastal waters, they
2/ 0 Vietnamese Communist troops,f them from south and central Vietnam, were evacuated to North Vietnam in the regroupment of forces following the Indochina War. The DRV has maintained relativelyarge part of thi3 pool of manpower experienced in guerrilla operations in South Vietnam, drawing upon It for cadres to reinforce the Viet Cong.
- if
could harass the SEATO land forces and Infiltrate the SEATO blockade. The Communists would expect worthwhile political and psychological rewards if their harassment and guerrilla operations against SEATO forces were successful, including lowered GVN morale and Increased tensions among some of the SEATO members. While seeking to test the SEATO forces, the DRV would not relax its Viet Cong campaign against the GVN.
k. it is expected that the SEATO action would cause the DRV to try to gain "compensation" In some manner, such as possibly declaringeneva Agreements, or certain articles of the Agreements, abrogated. It might also begin to receive Increasing military assistance from the Soviet Union and Communist China openly and In unconcealed violation of the Agreements, and to buildup an air force which would Include Jets. The Bloc would attempt to encourage andLaos and Cambodia to protest to the UN if any SEATO forces crossed the South Vietnam border.
5- If no agreement on Laos had been reached at Geneva prior to the assumed SEATO action, we believe that thewould take steps to hasten their takeover of Laos. They would Intensify their efforts to achieve politicaland they would step up military pressures against the
Laotian Army. Communist strength in south Laos wouldbe Increased by forces from North Vietnam to guard against an effort to partition Laos or an attack against the Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet airlift would probably eavier flow of military supply into south Laos, and the Communists would probably intensify their efforts toecure route for motor traffic into the south. On the other hand, if the SEATO action took place after the establishment of oalition government in Laos under Souvanna Phouma and the conclusion of an agreement at Geneva, the Communists would probably emphasize political rather than military measures to win control of the country. In either case, the scale of Communist infiltration of men and equipment from North to South Vietnam through Laos would probably not be significantly affected.
6. If the SEATO action appeared to be proving effective in reducing the present scale of Infiltration the Communists probably would increase their use of the mountain trail system through Cambodia. Thisonger and more difficult route but Its use could keep at least minimum support flowing to the Viet Cong. At the same time, in order to reduce the apparent success of the SEATO action, they could intensify small unit
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attacks, assassinations, and local terrorism In South Vietnam; they could also commit more DRV Irregular personnel for the harassment of the SEATO forces. It would probably be part of CommuniBt tactics to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces and accepting losses In South Vietnamong period of time.
the introduction or SEATO troops IntoCommunist China might increase its ground andin South China and strengthen its militaryTaiwan. It might also announce various typesassistance to the DRV "to meet the imperialistSouth Vietnam, possibly including the stationingCommunist air units in North Vietnam. Nevertheless,
we do not believe Peiping would consider assignment of SEATO forces to South Vietnam as an Immediate and direct threat to its own national security.
the same time, the Communist powersajor propaganda and politicalto label the SEATO action as aggression, asto the peace in the Par East, andisguisedto re-establish colonial rule over Indochina. Tothe fears of war in the Par East, Hanoi and Peiping
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would charge that the US, through SEATO, was preparing to attack the DRV and Communist China. The USSR would probably remind the world of Its defense commitments to both Peiping and Hanoi.
9- The reaction to the assumed SEATO action amongnon-Communist governments would vary widely. The Asian members of SEATO would find renewed confidence In the organization and the US, if the plan were to go well. If, on the other hand, the SEATO action were to become costly, prolonged, or to involve heavy casualties, the Asian members would soon become disenchanted and look to the US to doto lessen the burden and to solve the problem. Australia would probably go along with this action; New Zealand might also Join in. The UK would be likely to oppose the assumed SEATO action, and British reluctance to participate could be overcome only with great difficulty. Prance would also oppose the action and almost certainly would refuse to participate.
10. The neutralist governments in the area would be most concerned at the increased tension and danger of general hostilities. They would denounce the SEATO action and calleaceful solution. None of them, however, would be
without some secret sympathy for the SEATO action for they all have fears of Communist subversion and expansion. For example, Sihanouk has become increasingly fearful of and disillusioned with the DHV's subversive and guerrilla organizations in Laos and South Vietnam, both of whom have violated Cambodia's borders. He has no desire to see Laos or South Vietnam under Communist domination. Despite his genuine and justifiable fear of Communist China and North Vietnam, Sihanouk mightcovertly, with the SEATO action.
11. Moscow and Peiping would bring strong pressures against Japan. Although the Japanese Government would be under strong leftist Internal pressure, It would probably tolerate US logistic activities and would not officiallythe SEATO effort. Nationalist China would be elated with the SEATO action.
Original document.
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