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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this paper: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Nauy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and ABC
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
oncurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; TheDefense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; Ihe Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commissionto the USIB. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
c
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
91
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE ASSUMPTIONS FOR PLANNING: SOVIET ICBM
THE PROBLEM
To provide coordinated Intelligence assumptions for planning, as to numbers of operational ICBM launching facilities in the USSR from the present Further, to provide assumptione regarding the general configurations of such launching facilities, with special attention to hardeningeans of protection.
FOREWORD
1. This paper is submitted in response to the specific requirement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an estimate on numbers of Soviet ICBM sitesith special attention
to hardened sites {see3. In recent NIE's we have pointed out that the inadequacy of our evidence, the rapidity of technological change and the other uncertainties surrounding both Soviet and US planning make lt impossible toetailed national estimate onubject for moreew years into the future. These coordinated Intelligence Assumptions for planning rest largely on Inference and deduction from general considerations, rather than on an evidential base. Because of the limited purpose of this paper, distribution of lt beyond the membership of the USIB will be limited to accord with the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. In order to support and clarify the assumptions about the numbers of Soviet ICBM sites, estimates and assumptions about the general configurations and operationalof the launching facilities are also included.
LIMI
BUTION
thk assumptions
launching facilities to
sufficient evidence is available on sovietnd deployment programs to justify an estimate, rather than only an assumption, of numbers of operational launchers toand toeneral description of the launching facilities. present types of launchers are fixed, and are grouped into large, soft, rail-served complexes. these complexes contain housing, maintenance, handling, and other facilitiesentral support area, as well as launchers designed to employ liquid fueled missiles. each complex probably has sufficient missiles toeload capability and to fire additional missileseriod of some hours. although they are protected from groundby deployment ln remote, densely wooded areas, and from aerial attack by surface-to-air missiles, existing complexes are highly vulnerable to overhead reconnaissance and to nuclear weapon effects.
the bulk of the force toill be deployed with road-Berved pairs of launchers, each pair havingbuildings for checking out and holding missiles in a
horizontal position. The launchersair areeet apart; the pairs are dispersed. from each other and. from the main support area of the complex. Complexes are believed to contain an average of eight launchers in four pairs.
3- Because of uncertainties as to detailedof the new ICBMs being tested and as to the pace and degree of success of therogram now under way, we cannot determine whenecond generation ICBM system will have been proved ready for operational For purposes of this paper, we assume that operational second generation missiles will be availableew completed launching complexes by On this basis, the numbers of operational ICBM launchersin the recently-completed, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missileatedan be summarized byas follows:
l 3
/ (First and Second Generation ICBMs)
levels of the Soviet ICBM force3 will be determined by the interactionwhat the Soviet leaders desire to do and whay theyto do. It ls not possible to estimate withthe years3 which decisions the Sovietsregarding ICBM deployment, and it ls at least asto estimate the likely rate of progress in theof their development program.
Policy Decisions
decisions in three crucial areas will bein establishing ICBM force goals ln the These are: (a) the strategic concepts toin the employment of Soviet long-rangeparticularly ICBMs; (b) the deployment conceptsadopted for the ICBM forceardening, dispersal.
1/ Includedew launchers at the Tyuratam test range, which we assume would be employed against the US in the event of war. This number may reachr so over the next few years.
2/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,the numbers of operational ICBM launchers for this period as follows:
nd (c) the role of an antl-ICBM system which will probably become operational during this period. AnSoviet technological breakthrough could affect these decisions, but such an eventuality cannot by its very nature be taken into account ln our assumptions.
6. Strategic Concepta. The Soviets would consider broad strategic concepts along the following general lines:
a. An ICBM capability designed to attack hardened US ICBMs in addition to the other fixed bases of the US nuclear force.
Calculations of theoretical ICBM forceto attack al] the hardened and unhardencd US ICBM sites programmed foreriod indicate that missiles numbering in the thousands would be necessary to supportission. We think it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets will undertakerogram because of the great uncertainties inherent intrategy, the physical difficulties of deployingorcehort period of time, and theexpenditure of resources it would require.
b. An ICBM capability designed to destroy soft and semlhardened fixed US strategic installations, including SAC bomber bases, ICBM sites, and communications and control facilities.
Calculations of theoretical requirements indicate thatCBM launchers, the Soviets could have high0 percent) of destroying US SAC bomber bases and other soft and semlhardenedinstallations programmed for this period. We have previously estimated that Soviet ICBM force goals would be established with the aim oforce of this general order of magnitude. It is posalble that the Soviets will continue with this conceptven though confrontedarge and rapidly growing number of hardened and submarine-launched US miaslles, on the basis that lt will remain militarily useful toapability to destroy those more vulnerable targets associated with US nuclear delivery capabilities. Also, while
retaining this concept, the Soviets mighturther increase of the ICBM force, ln order to permit attacks on some hardened US targets or to insureubstantial residual striking capabilityS attack.
c. An ICBM capability designed to attack major
US population and industrial centers.
We have estimated that the Soviets alreadyapability forumber of major US cities under ICBM attack. We have pointed to the large numbers of MRBMs the Soviets can bring to bear against Eurasian targets, thus making it possible, not only to attack military targets within range, but also, as Khrushchev has asserted, to hold Europe "hostage." oviet ICBM force geared primarily to this concept would notubstantial enlargement beyond3 level. Even under this concept, however, the Soviets would probably wish to add to their retaliatory capability by such
means aa Increasing the survivability of
their ICBM force and deploying some
specialized ICBMs designed to deliver war-
heads in0 MT range.
Deployment Concept. We have estimated that the ICBM force3 will be unhardened and vulnerable toobservation. The continued growth of OS strategicin the yearsarge part of which will be in hardened and submarine-launched missiles, will bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to increase the survivability of their own force. Soviet concern over US intelligence efforts, including their public charges that the US plans overhead reconnaissance, will add to this pressure. Some hardening or other protection for the bulk of the force would therefore be required. Moreover, the Soviets would almost certainly find it highly deBirable to deploy atmall number of hard0 pBi or more) ln order to support any of the strategic concepts described above.
In addition, the Soviets may be able later ln the period to deploy some number of icbmb with veryhis number is not likely to be large whether lt is to be used for military tasks orismainly to support deterrence and psychological
9- Role of the Ant1-ICBM. The Soviet assessment of the probable effectiveness of their AICBM and its future role in their balance of forces couldajorln determining force levels To the extent that the Soviets believe their AICBM defenses could cope with US missiles, this would tend to lower theirto build ICBMs foriven strategic objective. It is more likely, however, that the Soviets will not achieve high confidence in the effectiveness of their AICBM defense capability during this period. Considering the range ofstimate of IOC date. It is even possible that Soviet AICBM capabilities will have very little effect on the structure of their other forces during the period covered by these assumptions. Finally, US progress ln AICBM defense will at some point push Soviet ICBMupwards, but we believe that this is unlikely toignificant effect on Soviet programs
Development and Deployment Aspects
10. The actual structure of Soviet ICBM forces3 will depend, not only on the factors described above, but also on the Soviet capacity to deploy existing systems
and to develop and deploy ne* or modified systems during this period. Existing ICBM systems will continue to have utility throughout the period. They will remain well suited to attacking large, soft targets such as cities and air bases. Significant improvements in accuracy, and warhead yields on the orderT, could appear ln the next few years. Such improvements would increase the suitability of these weapons for attacking hardened command centera and some types of hardened ICBM sites.
11. econd Important developmental factor, which might affect the number of Soviet ICBM launchers as well as their vulnerability, is the Soviet capacity to provide passivefor the force. This could involve hardeningsl oremlhardenlng (on the order ofr various schemes for concealment and dispersal. In our view, it Is highly unlikely that the soft complexes now operational or under construction can be substantially hardened. It ls possible that second generation ICBMs have storable fuel and all-lnertlal guidance, and it may be technically feasible for the USSR to deploy such missiles in fully hardened, silo-type facilitiesater date. However, we believe that deployment in 3ilos would require extensive redesign of the
horizontal handling and checkout facilities associated with Becond generation systems, and that the Soviets are unlikely to adopt this type of deployment for these relatively large systems. It is much more likely that full hardening willew system designed specifically for this type of deployment. Soviet development ofystem wouldnot result in any operational capability5
12. Second generation complexes which become operational3 couldodified concept, lessto US Intelligence collection or nuclear attack oremihard concept involving protection of missile handling and checkout facilities against overpressures on the orderut associated with soft launch pads, could be evolved for second generation ICBMs. This would be designed to provide protection except during the period required to prepare the launcher, move the missile to the pad, fuel it, and fire it. The period involved would probably be several hours. Another method would be greater dispersal than is now the practice, with launchers deployed singly rather than in pairs. We believe lt prudent to assume that virtually all second generation launchers activated4 and after will
R1EUTI OH
be protected by dispersal and possibly by use of theconcept as well. Soviet cities would almost certainly have priority for deployment of any AICBMut some ICBM launching facilities may be deployed close enough to auch cities to share this
13. We believe it reasonable to assume that, lnbut efficient program lastingeriodyears, the USSR could deploy secondlaunchers ln soft complexesate averagingand possibly as manyaunchers per year,in aboutof dispersala considerable* increase in the allocation ofas would the concurrent deploymentew,system. The adoption by the Sovietsardconcept may tend to lower the numbera forbecause of the increased time and effortdevelopment and construction.
2/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP,
believes lt reasonable to assume that the rate could be on the orderer year.
Various means of concealment and deception might be employed in conjunction with the methods of protection described above. Complete concealment against overhead observation is unlikely because of the difficulty oflarge-scale construction projectsonths' duration. However, US intelligence and targeting problems could be compounded by various forms of camouflage and deception.
we believe that the SovletB would not find It practical toarge, liquid-fueled ICBM system rail-mobile. It is unlikely that they will have developed andail or road-mobile, solid-fueled system
Assumed Numbers of Launchers
the basis of the foregoing considerations,possible to construct combinations of Soviet policyand technology which would result in highange within which we assume the ICBMwill fall. In both cases we assume that virtuallybecoming operational3 will be protected
by such means as greater dispersal and possibly semihardenlng, and that towards the end of theully hard system will enter operational service. Within the range assumed.
there would undoubtedly be some tradeoff between numbers of launchers and degree of protection provided by hardening, but we can provide no quantitative measure of this
a. High Side. An ICBM forceoperational
launchers7 can be assumed on the basisoviet decision toelatively large force, in order to avoid an extreme numerical inferiority ln ICBMs, to possess ancapability against soft and semihard US targets and possibly against some types of hard targets as well, and to buy numerical insuranceesidual second strike It wouldigorous construction program for launchers and an early and successful program to develop andew, fully-hardened system. The high side would be consistentoviet force structure in which the AICBM program would have little effect on the ICBM force level.
b. Low Side. An ICBM force oflaunchers7 can be assumed on the basis of a
H/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, calls attention to his footnote to the tablethe text.
Soviet decisionmaller number of operational launchers would comprise an adequate deterrent andcapability against OS cities as well as soft and semihard targets, and that protection and concealment of Soviet launchers wouldufficient Becond-strlke residual. It could result ln part from leas urgent or less successful developmentully-hardened system. The low side would be consldtent with an early beginning of the AICBM programeavy commitment of Soviet resources to lt, in which case the Soviet leaders might regard their AICBM capability asarge US numericalin ICBMs.
17- High and low assumptions respecting operational ICBM launchers are presented below by mid-years. The table does not specify very high-yield warheads, which are likely to be provided for some number of the larger ICBMs during the period, most of them on soft launchers. In considering the implications of the numbers shown in the table, lt should be kept in mind that more than one missile will probably be available for each of the soft and semlhardened launchers.
-
ASSUMED NUMBERS OP OPERATIONAL ICBM
High Side
3
MID- MID-7
launchers^/
posslb
TOTAL
few
400
525
650
Side
launchers3/
posslb semihardenedE/
few
First and second generation ICBMs. b/ Second generation ICBMs. c/ New, fully-hardened ICBMs.
%/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP,that the "High Side" approximates the most probable Soviet deployment program. Recalling hia estimate on deployment ln the period throughpagee would point out, however, that comparable differences prevail through Finally, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the number of new, fully-hardened launchers would be larger than Indicated in the "High Side."
Original document.
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