THE OUTLOOK IN EASTERN EUROPE
THE PROBLEM
To assess the prospects (or political and economic stability in Eastern Europe, especially in relation to the Berlin crisis.
SCOPE NOTE
This estimate is concerned primarily with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,and Bulgaria. East Germany has recently been examined in. "Stability of East Germanyerlinatednd is treated here only In passing. The special case of Albania was examined lnnd Control in the Communist, and will be discussed in the larger context of relations in the Sino-Soviet Bloc ln, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities andue
CONCLUSIONS
The Communist leaders in Easternhave made considerable progress In the past few years in the consolidation of internal political and economic stability. In none of these countries do the internal rivalries and policy differences which are endemic to Communist parties presentlyerious challenge to any of the Communist leaderships, nor do wethat internal party troubles during the next year or two will be so serious as to lead to major disruptions. Most of these countries continue to develop industryapid rate and tolowin living conditions. Inthe countryside haveeleterious effect on production, except In Poland, where agriculture remains predorninantly in private hands. In general, prospects for the next few years are for reasonable political stability and continued economic growth.
he peoples of Eastern Europe remain alienated from the regimes and opposed to communism, but as time goes on they are tending to adjust themselves torule and to acquiesce In its demands. The principal reason for this is theirhope of any radical change in their circumstances. We believe that
attempts to impose socialization Uiis trend will continue, aided to some ex-
tent by the slow Improvement In living standards, and that these peoples willcome to accept tbe permanence of Communist control For some time to come, however, this tendency will gain or lose in strength according to the success or failure of Soviet achievements in the East-West competition. )
The Soviets have found that theflexible policy they have followed towards Eastern Europe sinceas been less risky than appeared at first Most of the Satellite leaders, fearful of the confusions which mightwithin their own countries, have been disinclined to experiment or to.stray too 'for from the Soviet example in internal policy. Moscow has maintained effective control over Eastern Europe, not by daily orders and instructions, as before, but by willing imitation and automatic response by the Communist leaders.)
The chief potential dangers to Soviet control Ue in developments in Moscow, or in the Communist movementevival of serious factionalism in the Soviet Party, occasioned perhapsuccession struggle, would probably bring into play the inner-party rivalries which exist under the surface in the Satellites. Further afield, if the Chinese hold firm and the Albanians sustain their position, then the present tendencies within the world Communist movement toward greater diffusion of power and competing centers of authority will be accentuated. In the latter event, some of the EastParty leaders might in time be tempted to bargain with Moscow for greater autonomy in certain questions in return for their support against Peiping. In these circumstances, Moscow might also find it difficult to contain theinfluence exercised by Yugoslavia.)
An important Soviet objective in the Berlin question is to obtain Western recognition of the permanence ofrule in the Satellites. In this, the East European Party leaders fully support the Soviet effort. Those of Poland and Czechoslovakia have especially strong reasons for doing so. Ulbricht, is, of course, the most vigorous of the Satellite leaders in urging the Soviets to move rapidly and aggressively on the Berlin question, but we believe that Soviet tactics concerning Berlin are not influencedeither by the desires of the Satellite leaders or the attitudes of the East European populations.)
In the event that the Berlin crisisinto limited hostilities in East Germany, we believe that the peoples of Eastern Europe would not actin the initial stages. They would probably refrain, for the most part, from risky antiregime actions unless there was convincing evidence that the West was prepared to extend the conflictEastern Europe. Even then, most of them would probably confine themselves to passive resistance unless it appeared that Western military action was )
With respect to the Satellite armed forces, the top commanders are almost certainly reliable, as are many of theselected and Indoctrinated officers and noncommissioned officers. However, we believe that the effectiveness andof the Satellite forces, and even of their leadership, would depend heavily
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fupon the circumstances of the war. Most fof them would probably bee-Lfe mission within their own terri-jtories. In the event of populargainst the regimes or against Soviet ^domination, some of the Satellite forces would probably (as they did in Hungary) turn to the support of the people, though elite internal security units wouldremain reliable to the regimes. Thus, reliability of the Satellite forcesartime situation would largely depend on the speed and success of overall Bloc military operations.
DISCUSSION
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS Political Trends
The regimes ol Eastern Europe are in the hands of cautious, conservative men,of their populations, whose first care Is to consolidate their power. Since the upheavalshey have moved steadily to strengthen their political apparatuses and, under the slogan of "buildingo perfect their control over all segments of the population. With the notable exception of Poland, collectivization is nearly complete throughout the area. In statein Industrial management, and In other spheres the leaders have generally followed the Soviet line, seeking to Improve efficiency while further extending the leading role of the Communist Party. While failing ln many cases to achieve their objectives fully, they are steadily gaining ground.
All the parties in Eastern Europe aremeeting the main requirement for stabilityommunistamong the top handful of leaders. Personal rivalries and policy differences are endemic topolitics, but in none of the Satellites do these divisions appear to involve activeby one group of leaders to unseator efforts to recruit support forpolicies among the party membership or the population This unity Is partly due to the demonstration, in Hungary and Polandf the consequences of factionalism. It is also due, however, to the defeat of the "antlparty group" in the Sovietince that date, ambitious lieutenants ln the
Satellites have had little opportunity topowerful Soviet support against the local leadership; in consequence, one-man ruleln these countries. There has been no serious cliallenge to the established leadership In Eastern Europe over the past several years.
hrushchev's renewal atdof Ms attacks upon Stalin and the Stalinist past, and the reverberations of this attack throughout Eastern Europe probably are causing embarrassment and anxiety among the Satellite leaders. Some of the presentTJlbricht andcan plausibly be identifiedStalinist" line themselves, and must be somewhatat the implications ofdenunciation. Latent rivalriesthe various parties .might be encouraged, especially if the succession problem In any state should come to the fore. Nevertheless, we believe that the Eastern European regimes, having survived the upheavals6 and strengthened themselves thereafter, will be able to cope with the disturbing aspects ofolicy. Over the next year, or two, therefore, internal party troubles are not likely to be so serious as to lead to majorIn the Satellites.
The Economies
tability is also characteristic in thesphere, where most of the Satellites continue to develop industryapid rate, and lo achieve some improvement in living conditions. The emphasis onhich replaced0 concessions to consumers, produced
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In some countries, leading them to adopt more moderate development policies. Agriculture continues to be the principal trouble area. Rapid collectivization drives In recent years In Hungary, Czechoslovakia. Rumania, and East Germany, followed byto consolidate and develop existinghave led to mediocre results lnand have caused an unwantedof agricultural labor to urban areas. Poland, where agriculture remainsln private hands, has achieved theincrease in output.
ln the next year or two arcslightly lower, but still substantial,omewhat betterIn agriculture If new basic changesInstitutions are avoided, andImprovement In living conditions,Satellites will continue to lag farEurope. Except in EastAlbania, lt Is unlikely that economicbe basically revised In this period,lags In agriculture and Incause particular aspects of the plansunderfulfllled. East Germany,to lower1 targets and will5 goals unless It can obtainof new assistance from thefurther Albanian industrialIs threatened by the loss of tradefrom the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Trendsopular Attitudes
and large, the peoples ofremain alienated from theirthey regard as anttnatlonal. and areto communism, which appears toas an appealing Ideology but as ansystem serving the interests of thethe small class of its localan increasing sense ofthe prospects for change hasrecent yearsrend towardto the situation in which thefind themselves. Other factors whichthis trend have beenecreasing confidence inand what the East European peoplesas an International trend In favor of
Communist power. In general, thoughwith living conditions remains chronic, supplies of consumer goods are now larger and more varied thanhe regimes have grown sufficiently confident of their strength to launch unpopular policies, such as revisions of work norms anddrives, without encountering serious resistance from the populace. The recentaffecting Berlin have sharplythe restiveness of the population ln East Germany. Elsewhere, although there has clearly been some concern over the danger of war, there has been no discernible increase ln antiregime attitudes.
The Polish people, five years alterreturn to power, still enjoy significantly greater personal freedom than do the other East European populations. This margin has tended to diminish, however, as Gomulka has consolidated his position and begun to put Into practice his essentially orthodoxoutlook. Having gained theof Khrushchev, who holds him ln high esteem, Gomulka Is moving carefully but methodically In his long-term struggle with the Catholic Church He is also laying the foundations for the eventual socialization of agriculture. He has, however, made little or no headway toward reducing the thoroughly anti-Communist sentiments of theor in affecting its basic attachment to the Church. The Polish people nevertheless tend Increasingly. If resignedly, to join the regime in "helping" Poland. Over the next few years. Gomulka will make some progress in bringing Poland into closer conformity with Its neighbors.
We believe that the peoples of Eastern Europe will increasingly come to accept the permanence of Communist rule and tothemselves to its demands. The slow improvement In living standards which we foresee will further this development,nowhere arc economic gains likely to be so great as to generate active popularThe process of resignation andwill also be promoted or checked as the USSR appears to be prevailing or faltering in the East-West competition. Only if they
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a high chance o( bringingadical change in their status would theEuropeans be likely to risk overtto their regimes; otherwise, they willto regard themselves as victimsarger struggle In which they can exercise little influence.
II. RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLOC STATES Political Relationstups
Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe is marked by an awareness that, it Communist programs are to succeed, some allowance must be made for national sensibilities and local problems. The USSR continues to demand absolute adherence in matters of foreign policy and on questions of intrabloc discipline. Apart from this, however, Moscow seeks to maintain the essentials of Soviet control but at the same time to provide enough flexibility to enable national leaders to adapt general guide lines to local conditions, and so to workeasure of popular support.
This policy, which emerged after thewhich led to the near breakdown of Soviet authorityas proved to be less risky than lt first appeared. Most of the Satellite leaders are wary of experiments which might damage their control over their own countries. They also fear the confusions which might result If they got out of step with Moscow. Accordingly, they have been disinclined to test the limits of SovietIn Poland, Gomulka is an independent-minded man, but he ls In honest agreement on most matters with Khrushchev andpecial dispensation on Internal affairs. Even the present apostasy of the Albanian leaders is due, not to their desire to assert an unusual degree of independence, but to their fear that Khrushchev's rejection of Stalinist policies, and particularly his attitude towardthreatens their personal positions. Thus. whUe Soviet control of Eastern Europe at bottom still rests upon superior power. It Is effected primarily by willing imitation and automatic response rather than daily orders and instructions.
The chief potential dangers to Sovietlie outside Eastern Europe Itself. Of these, the greatest threat is the contingency of indecision or divided authority lneriod of serious factionalism In the Soviet Party, such as might occur during astruggle, would create great confusion among Communists ln the Satellites and would bring into play the Internal rivalries which, while presently under control, are never very far below the surface. In the process, Soviet control might be badly shaken, particularly If the crisis in Moscow were
The course of relations between the USSR and China ls another factor which mayar-reaching efleet upon the nature and degree of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. In the present state of open Sino-Soviet dispute, earlier indications of sympathy for Chinese radicalism among party elements in Bulgaria, East Germany, andhave disappeared. Nor ls the current example of Albania likely to attract anythe Eastern European leaders generally despise the Albanian Party, and what Is much more Important, they are aware that the USSR regards support for the front against Chinaatter of fundamental discipline.
Albania's defiance ofln an extremely acuteIs important, however, for the contribution which lt may make to the loosening of relations within the Communist movementhole. If the Chinese hold firm and the Albanians sustain their position, then the Inner politics ofcommunism willurther change away from monolithic unity and toward greater complexity and diversity. The overwhelming ideological pre-eminence of the USSR, which has been an importantof the power which it wields over other Communist parties, will be further diminished and competing centers of power and authority will tend to emerge. This process might eventually have an impact even upon the USSR's dominance over the Eastern European parties; some of them, for example, might find the opportunity to press their na-
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Interests upon Moscow in return for their support against Peiping and Tirana.
uccessful Communist state enjoying full Independence. Yugoslavia continues tootentially disturbing influence in Eastern Europe. The inconsistencies of Khrushchev's attitude toward Belgrade, and ln particular his attempts to cultivate Yugoslavia's support for his foreign policies without granting it the full credentialsrue socialist state,sow confusion In the other parties, particularly the Immediately neighboring ones. These unsettling effects can beso long as Soviet leadership Is firm and unchallenged elsewhere ln the Communist movement, but to the extent that Moscow's authority is weakened on other grounds, this containment will be less effective.
Economic Cooperation
ong period of relative Inactivity, the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) program of economic cooperation among the USSR and the European Satellites has acquired considerable momentum during the past threeerious effort Ls being made to coordinate some key aspects oflong-term plans, with the USSRthe predominanteginning has been made ln balancing area wide supplies and requirements for various commodities,national plans accordingly, andthe results in long-term bilateral trade agreements. Growing Inter-Satellitehas also taken the form of several Joint investment projects for the exploitation of mineral resources. Soviet credits to Eastern Europe diminished sharply7arge credit to East Germany was announced earlier this year. Czechoslovakia has begun toajor role in extending long-term aid to the other Satellites.
Despite this progress, however,falLi far short of the integration ofEuropeingle economic area.Is still primarily national In scope, and complementary specialization of production in particular has made little headway. Thecountries remain reluctant lo curb their own ambitions for broad industrialand to Increase their dependence upon other Bloc suppliers. Further, planning authorities are finding it difficult to derive clear economic criteria for specialization from the frequently artificial price structures of the CEMA members. Nevertheless, economicwill probably make continued gains over the next several years, particularly in the coordination of new Investments, wherenational Interests are less deeply
Military Arrangement)
The political relationships of the USSR and the Satellites described above arcIn the military field. The Warsaw Pactunified command" in Moscow beadedoviet marshal whose deputies are the Satellite defense ministers. Satellite forces are organized and trained generally In accordance with Soviet concepts; theirand equipment arc almost exclusively of Soviet type; for susUtuied operations they would be almost wholly dependent upon Soviet logistical support These armies are in fact Soviet creations, and al) vestiges of theirstructure and orientation are gone; their wartime missions are subordinated to Soviet planning, and their structure isto that of the Soviet armed forces.
These factors wouldloseof Soviet and Satellite forces InHowever, Bloc forces have so farno combined field exercises such as are now frequently held by NATO forces, although several combined tactical exercises,and communications exercises have taken place Involving Soviet forces with those ofcountry and observers from additional members. Inombinedpost exercise was conducted in East Germany, with the participation of sizable East German and Soviet forces, as well asfrom Poland and Czechoslovakia.
III. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BERLIN CRISIS
firmly entrenched theregimes may currently appearfrom the West, to the Soviets thisnot be secure until the Satellite regimes
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recognized as permanent. Thus the Soviet driveerman peace ity and an end to the occupation of West Berlin, while designed primarily to serve their objectives in Germany, is also intended to underline the finality of Communist rule in the Satellites. The USSR also believes that, if It can have its way on an issue which so heavily Involves Western prestige, the Eastern European peoples will conclude that thebalance of power has Irrevocably shifted in favor of the East and that any lingering hopes of liberation are illusory.
The party leaderships ln Eastern Europe fully support these aims. Poland, which fears German claims upon Its territory, and Czechoslovakia, which has expelled some three million ethnic Germans, are particularlyto have the status quo legalized; they also welcome the opportunity provided by thecrisis to deflect antiregime sentiment by whipping up the anti-German feelings of their populatlons. The Satellite leaders are,probably already concerned by the mass restlessness, manifested ln scare buying and boarding, which has been Induced in their countries by heightened tensions over Berlin. Since most of them have less at stake in the Berlin issue than Ulbricht, they are lessthan he in urging rapid and drastic action on the Berlin problem. Ulbricht constantly urges the Soviets to support his efforts to strengthen the German Democratic(GDR) and improve its position. For example, there is little doubt that, prior tougust, he pressed Moscow strongly toradical measures to end the increasingly painful flow of manpower and talent from East Germany. In general, however, wethat the Satellite leaders have littleupon Soviet calculations of risks and gains in the maneuvering over Berlin.
In making these calculations, one of the elements which the Soviets must consider is the probable behavior of the Satelliteand armed forces if the crisis should reach the point of limited war. They are aware of widespread anti-Russian sentiment throughout the East European area. They also understand that, while anti-Germancan easily be mobilized in some of these countries, the people make little distinction between East and West Germans. We believe, although there is little evidence, that the USSR also has reservations about theof Satellite forces, particularly against domestic uprisings. These factors probably areignificant restraint upon the USSR's Berlin tactics, especially since those tactics are calculated to avoid military conflict.
Our own view ls that, if limited hostilities occurred In East Germany, the peoples of Eastern Europe would not act precipitately In the initial stages, but would wait to see which way the struggle was going. Given theirof Western Inactivity during the East German uprising3 and the Hungarian rebellionhe overwhelming majority would almost certainly refrain from risky antiregime action unless the West gaveevidence that it was prepared tothe conflict over the entire Easternarea. Even then, most of the peoples would probably confine themselves to passive resistance unless it appeared that Western military action was succeeding.
With respect to the Satellite armed forces, the top commanders are almost certainlyas are many of the carefully selected and indoctrinated officers andofficers. However.-we believe that the effectiveness and reliability of the Satellite forces, and even of their leadership, wouldheavily upon the circumstances of the war. Most of them would probably bea defensive mission within their own territories. In the event of popular uprisings against the regimes or against Sovietsome of the Satellite forces would(as they did in Hungary) turn to theof the people, though elite internalunits would probably remain reliable to the regimes. Thus, reliability of the Satellite forcesartime situation would largelyon the speed and success of overall Bloc military operations.
Should the Berlin crisisonclusive outcome which represented clear andgains to the USSR, wc believe that the prevailing tendency toward popular accom-
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modation to the Satellite regimes would gain strength fairly rapidly. The key point in popular judgments would be the status of West Berlin; If the Soviets were able to force Western troops out of the city, or toime limit on their presence, moat Easternwould conclude that, shorteneral war. Soviet domination of their countries was assured for their lifetime. On the other hand, failure by the USSR to achieve significant gains in the issues of Berlin and Germany would hinder this process of acceptance and adjustmentettlement were reached which Involved an evident postponement of Soviet objectives, the cautious hopeshange which still survive ln Eastern Europe would be sustained and might even risealthough this outcome by Itself would by no means cause the peoples to undertake risky actions against their regimes.
Original document.
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