CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS
. INTKL1.tr tTt'CL ESTIMATE NIC
STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OP SOVIET LONC RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
(SUPPLEMENTSNIE)
THE PROBLEM
To estimate current Soviet operational -strength in ICBM's and other ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges. or more, to identify present areas and methods of deployment, and to estimate the probable trends in strength and deployment over the next few years.
NIEI revises end updalea lhe estimates on this Subject which were made in: "Soviet Capabilities (or Long RangeOP
ete la Issuedso
that lhe reader can lully appreciate the quantity and quality of information on which It is based.
A brief nummary of this estimate,will be Included in the
forthcoming: "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities andowfor completion Inn that estimate, the treatment of ground launched missiles will be Incorporatedummnry of the entire Soviet long-range attack capability, Including bombers,missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. For our current estimates on these latter elements of the long rang* striking force, see, Anne. A; "Soviet Military Forces and4OP SECRET,.
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CONCLUSIONS
New information,uch firmer base for estimates on Soviet long range ballistic missiles, hasharp downwardin our estimate of present Soviet ICDM strength but stronglyour estimate of medium range missile strength.
We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the range of5 launchers from which missiles can be fired against the US, and that this force level will not increase markedly during the months immediately ahead.e also estimate that the USSR now hasperational launchers equipped. ballistic missiles. The bulk of these MRBM launchers are In western USSR, within range of NATO targets in Europe; others are in southern USSR and in the Soviet Far East. ICBM and MRBM launchers probably have sufficient missiles toeload capability and to fire additional missileseriod of some hours, assuming that the launching facilities are not damaged by accident or attack.
he low present and near-term ICBM force level probably results chieflyoviet decision to deploymall force of thefirst generation ICBMs, and to press the developmentmaller, second generation system. Under emergency conditions the existing force could be supplemented somewhat during the first halfut Soviet ICBM strength will probably not increase substantially until the newis ready for operational use, probably sometime in the latter halffter this point, we anticipate that the number of operationalwill begin to increase significantly. On this basis, we estimate that the force level inill5 operational ICBM launchers. 2/
r1 phec u. Coo.
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In addition. missiles now available, the USSR will probably. system ready (or operational use late this year or early next year. The USSR's combined strength in ihese missile categories will probablyperational launchers ineriod, and then level Off.
Soviet professions of greatly enhanced striking power thus derive primarilyassive capability to attack European and othertargets. Although Soviet propaganda has assiduously cultivated an image of great ICBM strength, the bulk of the USSR's present capability to attack the US is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles rather thanarge ICBM force. While thc present ICBM forcerave threatumber of US urban areas, it representsimited threat to US-based nuclear striking forces. 3/
y The Assistant Chief of Sl*lt. Intelligence, USAF. does not concur innd th-of paragraph S. See his footnote following the P
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PoaiUoa om 1CDX1 feece level.hief of Si.il,USAF:
eI.uneh.ra. Fourl1y
a. The ooi.tinuer.eeof th.ilon ICBM;
d. The USSK'e current egpeaalvo foreign policyvbalaAilal ICBM capability.
?1 B'neaayau.it. became aul.te.blo lo,
Ft'S, ' f Suff,SAF be-
llava. that nbout SO operationalna Ukely. even though the Soviet, may have elected loefopment of aecond generationbefore undertaking
3- Tb* AaalaUnl Chief of Staff, Iotolligeoce. USAF believe, thai the force now deployed oon-
erloue threat to US-baaed nuclear atriklng force*).
*UJr- Aaalataol Chief of Staff. Inlelllge&ce, USAP believea lhat the Soviet*o deploy firatil.a. aa aa iaUrim meagre until th.ecomehat the Soviet, -ould preferTcepC^ of anyo-lh of ibeirebil.ti..: oVe. th.
e. iceel-
er.ted. with Orel generationlearoa operationalnd. thetromsovUU BtSSLTuTZS^Xl tempo of thei, efforu. Th.aal Chief of SW. letelliaence. USAFle of urgency, plua. reatiaabUertenc* -HI ranh, in Iher or two.aaaMaWl deploymentore acceleratedlaatt indicated la Ibe
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DISCUSSION
6. The requirement to revise our estimates on Soviet long range ballistic missile forces stems from significant recent evidence[J
1 activities
at the Soviet ICBM and space vehicle test range has provided information on the new types of ballistic vehicles now being developed and on the pace and progress of the development programs.
Jthe first positiveof long range ballistic missile deployment complexes.^ xcellent guidance as to Soviet deployment methods, Q
^[useful evidence on the general status andof long range missile forces. Therefore, although significant gaps continue to exist and some of the available- information is still open to alternate interpretations, the present estimate stands on firmer ground than any previous estimate on this critical subject.
ICBM Development
he test-firing program from the Tyuratam ICBM and space launching rangehead has been much more intensivend has at
thc same time suffered many more failures, than in any other period in
its four year history. Thirty-nine launching operations were undertaken
between January andf these,nvolved either
first generation ICBMs or space vehicles using essentially the same
booster. All but one of theseere generally successful. The other
perations involved new vehicles not previously observed in range
activities. Of these, only about half resulted In generally successful
ora recant launching operation ooeptemberhich resulted Infailure, cannot yet beo type el >ehtcle.
firings which reached the vicinity of the instrumented impact areas. Of the last seven operations involving new vehicles, however, six have been generally successful. (See
One of the new vehicles (calledy US intelligence) isecond generation ICBM; the other (Category C) may be aICBM designpecial vehicle to test ICBM and spaceBoth are tandem staged, that Is, the upper stage Is ignited at altitude as in the case of Titan, rather than at launch as In the case of Atlas and the first generation Soviet ICBM. Our data are sufficient to show that both of the new vehicles are liquid propelled, but not towhether the propellents are storable or non-storable. Some aspectsof the upper stage of theehicle are similar to those of. missile, which was tested intensively at Kapustin Yar for some months preceding theperations at Tyuratam. The vehicles fired,istance. Into the Pacific onnd1 were probablyehicles. Some relationship seems to exist between die upper stages of theehicle and Venus probes. Despite this apparentwith space vehicles, itiring which immediately preceded Khrushchev's remark to McQoy last July,new ICBM" had been launched successfully. No further details are known about the configuration, propulsion, guidance, range, or payload of the new vehicles. 5/
1 tests confirm our previous estimate that the Soviets wouldew ICBM system, and we continue co believe that arequirement forystemissile which can be more readily handled and deployed than their original ICBM. This belief Is supportedeliable clandestine source who learned,0 orhat the Soviet leadership desired an ICBM using higher-energy fuel which
e have taken note of Soviet statementsegaton weapon. We do not believe lhat present Soviet capabilitiesissile warheadegaton yieldallistic ve* hide capable of deliveringarhead to intercontinental ranges. We will examine Ihis matter in fuller detail inly estimate.
would require leas bulk. In order to be flight tested fnesign workew missile was certainly underwayuclear tests appropriate to thc development of lighter warheads were conducted7he current nuclear testing program may serve further to prove the warhead design.
Although the flight-test failures in the first half1 probably set back the Soviet schedule for development of second generationit is clear from the test range activities thatrogram has been pursued with great vigor. The recent successes with theehicle, and the probable firing of such vehicles. after onlyonths of testing to Kamchatka, suggest that the initial difficulties with this system may now have been largely overcome. Moreover, it is probable that one or both the new vehicles have borrowed components or at least design techniques from proven systems, thereby aidingrogram. We believe that the program will continue to be pursued with vigor, andmaller, second generation ICBM will have been proven satisfactory for initial operational deployment in the latter half
Thus we believe that the first generation system will be the only Soviet ICBM system in operational use for the months immediately ahead and probably for about the next year. Despite its inordinate bulk and the other disadvantages Inherenton-storable liquid fueled system, the first generation system Is capable ofigh yield nuclearwith good accuracy and reliability against targets anywhere in the US.ummary of its estimated operational characteristics, seeest range launchings of first generation missiles (now called Category A) continued from January through July. ^
These latestirings were normal,^
Firingsours apart could
the training of operational crews for launching second salvos, but itbe determined whether these firings wereingle pad. Accuracy could not be determined, but reliability continued high. 6/
Utilization of Launching Pads
oviet ICBM capabilities at present depend in part, and in the near future will depend in considerable measure, upon whether or not the deployment, complexes now being discovered
jean be used to fire first generation missiles, or whether theybecome fully operationalecond generation missile becomes available. The first generation missile is obviously compatible with massive, fully rail-served launchers similar to those at Tyuratamnd B. But the launchers at confirmed field complexes, whosebegan only In9 or thereafter, resemble the simplified pair of pads at Tyuratam Area C, where missiles are transported to the pad by road and some of the support equipment is mounted on vans. (For artists', conceptions of the launchers at Tyuratamayout of the rangehead, see
rom our examination of1 test firing program, thedimensions of various items atnd C, and the requirements for handling and firing the first generation missile, we conclude that the simplifiedas designedew and smaller missile now being test fired. Although It is technically feasible for the Soviets to adapt the rail-based first generation missile to road served launchers of the type at Area C, it would be necessary to redesign much of the check-out, handling, erecting, and fueling equipment. This redesigned equipment would differ from both that atnd that designed for use with the
believe that the Soviets can ond will provide decoy protection, should they deem It necessary.'
new missile. Such action might have been taken as an interim measureong delay in the advene of the second generation system had been anticipated well in advance.
eployment
we have positively identified three ICBM complexes under construction. Two are near Yur'ya and Yoshkar-OIa,egion several hundred miles northeast of Moscow, and the third is near Vcrkhnyaya Salda in the Urals. The paired, road-served pads at these complexes closely resemble those at Tyuratam Area C. Near Kostroma, in the same general region but closer to Moscow,!:
^ we believe this isourthto thefarther
to the
was too limited either to confirm or rule out this location as an ICBM deployment complex. (The locations of presently known and suspected areas of ICBM deployment activities are shown in
IS. The new evidence confirms that the present Soviet deployment concept involves large, fixed complexes, with multiple pads and extensive support facilities. The identified deployment complexes are served by rail spurs which provide their major logistic support. The complexes are highly vulnerable to attack. For example, although the Yur'ya complex is quite large, the entire installation Is soft and each pair of pads is separated from its neighbor byn.Q
] For active defense against aircraft,urface-to-air missile sites are being Installed near the complexes.
t Yur'ya, the confirmed complex whose construction appears most advanced, eight launchers in four pairs were observed in various
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stages of construction inseeonsiderations of logistics and control, together with evidence from the MRBM program and other factors, lead us to believe that eight is the typical number of launchers for this type of complex.'/ Each pair of launchers has checkout and ready buildings which are probably capable ofissile for each pad; however, the extent of the support facilities strongly suggests that additional missiles are to be held theretoeload or standby capability. The designed salvo capability of the complex is apparently to be eight missiles. There would be atinutes delay between groups of four missiles If the system is radio-inertial (as is the first generation ICBM) and if one set of guidance facilities is provided for each pair ofecond salvo might be attempted after some hours, assuming the launching facilities were not damaged by accident or attack. Although we have no direct evidence on this matter, we believe it might be feasible toecond salvo2 hours."
n the basis of evidence dating back7 and otherinformation, we have estimated that Plesetsk is an ICBMrail-served launchers designed to employ the first generationinstallation at Plesetsk (see Figures even larger than theAlthough the presence of ICBM launchers has not beenare SAM sites, several very large support areas, andincluding what appears to be housing forois inadequate to establish
the number of launchers which may be at Plesetsk. We believe that the number may be as few as two, but four or more is also possible. An ICBM complex involving this much equipment, investment, and personnel would probablyeload of at least one missile per pad. Based on
he Assistant Chief of Slaff, Intelligence, USAF, believes lhal this typical number may be larger Oian eigbt. lie agrees. however, that If guidance facilities are provided for each pair of launchers,ue>iiC$ of launchingbe as described ir. lhe text.
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Tyuraram experience, we estimate the time toecond salvo at aboutours. 8/
new evidenceelter measure of the timing ofdeployment activities. Based on its size, the extent of Itsits present state of construction, the Yur'ya complex must havein the autumnoncurrent with or very shortly afterof construction at Tyuratam launch Area C. Yur'ya is probablythe earliest complexes of its type. Construction and Installationwill probably be completed some time earlycomplex at Yoshkar-Ola is many months behind Yur'ya; theless conclusive with respect to Kostroma and Verkhnyaya Salda, butbe seen is apparently in the early stages of construction. Fromtherefore, we have reasonably firm indications that atyears were used for the construction of even the simpler ICBMalthough this may be reduced to aboutonths as
Adequacy of Recent Intelligence Coverage
ur coveragedeployment areas in the USSR has been substantially augmented.
^Soviet missile test range installations^ ]are now known tolose resemblance to deployment sites In the field. On the basis of this activity, combined with other information and analysis, we now estimate that we have good intelligence coverage ofF
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Ut.nl Chiel of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, belie evidence of ICBM deployment at Plesetsk la indeterminate bul lhal, In th- il c
o^ilnat such deployment.
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^more thanercent
of those portions of the USSR within which ICBM deployment is most likely. 9/
20. Of the five confirmed or possible ICBM complexesQ
Yur'ya, Plesetsk, and Verkhnyaya Salda were previously
previously had not suspected Yoshkar-Ola or Kostroma. Q_
any previously suspected
areas did not contain ICBM complexes as of the summer
under active consideration as suspected locations of ICBM deployment activity (seeast experience indicates that some or all of the areas now under active consideration may prove to be negative, and conversely, that deployment activity may now be under way in other unsuspected areas,
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Probable ICBM Force
believe that our coverage of both test range activitiesdeployment areas is adequate to support the judgment thatthere areew ICBM complexes operational orWhile there are differences within the intelligenceto thc progress of the Soviet program to date and the precisethe current force, we estimate that the present Soviet ICBMin the rangeaunchers from which missiles can be firedUS. The low side of this range allows for the possibility that thenow fireoken ICBM salvoew launchers, locatedTyuratam rangehead and an operational complex, perhapshigh side, however, takes into account the limitations of ourallows for the existenceew other complexes equipped withmissiles, now operational but undetected.
Soviet system Is probablydesigriedtoetireeach launcher. The USSR may therefore be able to fire asome hours after the first, assuming that the launchingnot damaged by accident or atuck.
reasons for the small current capability are Importantestimate of the future Soviet buildup. Tlie first generationat an early stage of Soviet nuclear and missile technology,be powerful and reliable but was probably too cumbersome to bea large scale. One or more first generation sites may have beencancelled. |
jTha urgent development of at least one second generation system probably began innd an intensive firing program is nowconcurrent with the construction of simplified deployment complexes.
he Aaalatant Chief of Suit, inlnlllfcence, USAF. doei noi concur in lhe estimate of (COM force levels. For his position, see hla footnote following the Conclusion*.
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We therefore believe that in8 the Soviet leaders decided to deploymall force of first generation ICBMs while pressing toward second generation systems.
The net effect of this Soviet decision, together with whatever slippage Is occurring In the development of second generation systems, has been toow plateau of ICBM strength. Under emergency conditions the existing force could be supplemented during the first half2 by putting some second generation ICBMs on launcher at one or two completed complexes before the weapon system has been thoroughly tested. However, the Soviets could not have very muchin the reliability, accuracy and effectiveness oforce. In any event, operational ICBM strength will probably not increaseuntil the new missile has been proved satisfactory for operational use, probably some time in the latter halflternatively, the possibility cannot be excluded that second generation ICBMs could be proved satisfactory for operational use somewhat earlierossibly as soon as the first simplified complex is completed. After this point, we anticipate that the number of operational launchers will begin to increase significantly.
We continue to believe, for the many reasons adduced in, that the Soviet leaders haveorce of several hundred operational ICBM launchers, to be acquired as soon as practicable over the nexl few years. in addition to the complexes known to be under construction, it is probably that work is under way on other undiscovered complexes and that the construction of still others is scheduled to begin soon. Taking account of this probability, together with our present intelligence coverage and our information on site activation lead-time, we estimate that the force level inill5 operational ICBM launchers. The high side of this range allows for eight complexes of eight launchers each under construction at the present time, with four more scheduled to begin by the end of the year; it would
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require siie activation time to decrease to aboutonths by the end of the year; it buildsresent force level of aboutperational launchers. The low side of theange would be achieved if six complexes were now under construction, two more were begun by the end of the year, and thc present force level were only aboutaunchers.
s noted in, Soviet force goals for the period6 will be increasingly affected by developments in US and Soviet military technology, including the multiplication of hardened US missile sites, the possible advent of more advanced Soviet missiles which can better be protected, and by developments in both antimissile defenses and space weapons. The international political situation will also affect Soviet force goals, and thereood chance that the Soviet leaders themselves have not yet comeefinite decision. We have not been able as yet to review, in the light of the new evidence, these and other considerations pertaining to the probable future pace of the Soviet ICBM program. Therefore we are unable toumerical estimate beyondonsidering the problems involved in site activation, however, we believeater possiblyaunchers per year beginning in3 would be feasible. To accomplishchedule, the USSR would have to layajor program of site construction within the next year, which we believe would be detected
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3
Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
he large-scale deployment
. ballistic missiles in western USSR.Q
^approximatelyixed sitesotal ofads suitable for launching these MRBMs have been firmly identifiedide
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belt siretching from the Baltic to the southern Ukraine.^
^we are virtually certain thataboutdditionalTaking account
of indicators pointing to still other locations
estimate with high confidence that fn the western belt alone there are now aboutitesotal ofaunch pads, completed or under construction. (For known and estimated site locations in this area, see
new information does not establish whether individualfully operational, nor does It reveal which type of missile each Is Q
"^approximately three-quarters of theappeared to be complete or nearly so, some were underand the evidence on others is ambiguous. Construction hasbeen completed at someof support equipment and missiles could probably berelatively quickly thereafter, perhapseriod ofThree basic site configurations have been observed, all ofa strong resemblance to launch areas at the Kapustin(seeny of the three types could. missiles, whose size and truck-mountedare virtually identical. The sites could not employ ICBMs,type might be intended for. IRBM which has beenat Kapustin Yar.
the basis of the new evidenceealth of otherdevelopment, production, training and deployment, we estimate thatwestern belt alone the USSR now hasperationalequipped. ballistic missiles, together withsupporting equipment and trained personnel. Frommissiles could be directed against NATO targets fromTurkey. On less firm but consistent evidence, aboutdditional
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launchers arc believed to be operational in other areas: in the Trans-caucasus and Turkestan, from which they could attack Middle Eastern targets from Suez to Pakistan; and in the southern portion of the Soviet Far East within range of Japan, Korea, and Okinawa.
"Jthe presence of some sites in Turkestan and in the Soviet Far East, north of Vladivostok.
this basis, we estimate that the USSR nowotal ofoperational launchers equipped with medium range ballisticthe bulk of them within range of NATO targets in Europe. Thisthe same numerical estimate as given in, butnow made with greater assurance.
Contrary to our previous view that MRBMs were deployed in mobile units, we now know that even though their support equipment is truck-mounted, most if not all MRBM units employ fixed sites. Like the ICBM complexes, these are soft, screened from ground observation by their placement in wooded areas, and protected against air attack by surface-to-air missile sites in the vicinity. The systems are probably designed so that all ready missilesite can be salvoedew minutes of each other. Two additional missiles are probably available for eachecond salvo could probably be launchedours after the first. There is some evidence that after one or two salvos the units arc to move from their fixed sites to reserve positions. Their mobility could thus be used for their Immediate protection, or they could move to new launch points to support field forces in subsequent phasesar.
Thc Soviet planners apparentlyarger total requirement for MRBMs and IRBMs than we had supposed. While the rate ofactivity in the western belt is probably tapering offigorous three-year program, some sites of all three basic types are still under construction. There will therefore be at least some increase in force levels in the coming months. The magnitude of the buildup thereafter will depend largely on the degree to which. system is deployed,
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and whether or noi it will supplement or replace medium range missiles.
iih the adveni of. IRBM, probably in1 orhe Soviets will acquire new ballistic missile capabilities against such areas as Spain, North Africa, and Taiwan. To this extent at least, they probably wish to supplement their present strength. They may also wish to deploy IRBMs or MRBMs to more northerly areas within range of targets ln Greenland and Alaska. Moreover, evidence fromsources indicates that thc Soviet field forces are exerting pressure to acquire missiles of these ranges. In general, however, we believe that the future MRBM/IRBM program will emphasize changes in the mix among the existing systems, and later the introduction of secondsystems, rather than sheer numerical expansion. Taking theseInto account, we estimate that the USSR willMRBM and IRBM launchers sometime Ineriod, and that the force level will be relatively stable thereafter.
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FIGURES
Soviet ICBM Test Range Activities, Tyuratam,aunching Operations
Estimated Current Performance Characteristics, Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missiles.
Tyuratam Missile Test Center (Status in.
Concept of Tyuratam Launch Area A.
Concept of Tyuratam Launch Area C.
ICBM Deployment Complex, Yur'ya, USSR (Status In
Suspected ICBM Deployment Complex, Plesetsk, USSR (Status in
Typical Fixed MRBM Launch Site.
Known and Suspected Areas of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile
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FIGURC 1
ESTIMATEO CURRENT PER FORMANCE CHAKaCTEKISTICS SOVIET LOHCllillC MISSILE!
ICBM'
Onaroilonel Rang*
lieu
l
Ml
b*ft*>
or
aga
Star.
i (lb>)
let!
SS-6
]
0
Bit.
75*
a-
tit Fllgki
e lion TlmaCendlHon 1
kit
hit
Ml
TimeCondition II
"In
mm
win
ThMCondition III
mln
lain
Ceaeblllir1
hn
hri
Notibtlnnal.
Foreaiie too ranee and oaiheed weightwe for heavy notecone (lop fisuie)noeeccme {bottom 9 '
J The lower limit of this rang* approximate* the percentage ffhteh might be maintained ready in continuous peaeollmo operations for an indefinite period. The upper limit might be achieved II the hoview prepared their force for an nltnelpecific time designated well in advance. maximum rendineae.
1 The upper limit would be more likely to be achieved if the Sovlata had provided Dm (or peaking their force- on launcher prior to an attackpecific lime.
* CoadiUoa I: Crewa on routine standby, electrical eoaipmeat cold,notII: Crewa oa alert, electrical-.up, mtsallesled.
Condition III: Crewa on alert, electrical equipmentup. mtasilea fueled and lopped. Thia eondlllon probably can not be maintained for more than an hour or so.
From same pad, nnd dependent upon condition of aleii.
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BESTCOPT AMFUJif
Original document.
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