CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
1
MEMORANDUM PGR: Assistant to tbe Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
of the Lag In Operational andby Lt. Gen. M.
erbatim translation of an article entitledof the Lag in -Operational and Tacticaly Lt. Gen. M. Kochetkov which appearedpecial TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military
Thie article was acquiredoviet official who has provided reliable Information In the past.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
Enclosure
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cc: Military Assistant to tbe President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.ir Force
Director of Special Investigations Inspector General, U.ir Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
Director, Federsi;Biirea^
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Deputy Director for Intelligence
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DATE OF INFO: 0 APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE: Reliable Soviet'source (B) who has access to this type of document.
Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Elimination of the Lag In Operational and Technicalritten by Lieutenant General Mikhail A. Kochetkov, who has long been associated with the Chief Intelligence Directoratend8 was Chief of its Operations (Tranaborder) Directorate (see also Headquarters Comment
The article appeared in0 Second Editionpecial version of Voyennoya Myal (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. Tbe month of publication of0 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published In this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Cceimander.
Elimination of tbe Lag In
Operational and Tactical Intelligence-by
Lieutenant General M. Kochetkov
Vast changes in the nature of armed combat, caused by the appearance of weapons of nasi destruction and, especially, of missiles of varying designation, necessitate tbe development of new intelligence (razvedyvatelnaya) techniques and their introduction Into large units (soyedlneniye) and groupings (obedlnenlye) of tbe branches of tbe armed forces end arms ofe-exaoinatlon of the organizational structure of operational and tactical Intelligence from top to bottom, and the development of nev forms and methods of combat activity of operational and tactical intelligence in peacetime and wartime. Raturally, the solving of all these questions must take into account the natureuture war.
There is no need to prove the importance of operational and taotlcal Intelligence. Its Importance is adequately stated in the article of marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov n the first issue of theCollection of Articles of the ournal "Military Thought" (Voyennaya Kysl) It would be useful to refer to the statement of the Minister of Defenss, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. la. Mallnorskiy, made by hla at6 critique. He pointed out: "Under modern conditions intelligence takes on extraordinary significance; it has never been as important aa lt la now and will be in the near future. It is impossible to count on victory if one does not have reliable information about the enemy. If we talk about operationalts importance is simply enormous. To know the plans of the enemy, the concentration of his forces, means, and formations (gruppirovka) and react to themhis Is half the victory over the enemy."
It is known tbat the missile troops have moved up tose first place among tbe other branches of the armed forces. There are missile troops of strategic designation which are the means of the Supreme High Command (VGK), On the successful operations of the latter depend the seizure of the strategic initiative in the initial periodar and Its retention during the war until tbe enemy is completely destroyed.
The missile troops of the VGK are capable of solving tasks at great strategic depth for eliminatingar entire countries end other great strategic objectives, as well as destroying, in coordination with the ground forces, enemy targets in the theater of military operations (TVD) In the operational depth, beyond the range limits of the missile meansront.
The operations of other branches of the armed forces -antiaircraft (PVO) troops of the country, the ground forces, the air forces (WS) and the naval forcea, are dependent on Successful.', operations of the missile troops, which create conditions favorable for the operations of the others in the theater of military operations.
In examining the role and place of the branches of the armed forcesuture war, with the purpose of establlBhing their interrelationship and degree of independence, we come to the conclusion that even In peacetime the missile troops have to be provided with exhaustive, precise date* "on all objectives subject to destruction in the first ^counterblow of the missile troops against the aggressor, naturally the; mlBBllo troopV? must be targeted against these objectives in advance and betate of maximum readiness for an Instantaneous
In connection with this, we feel that, on behalf of the missile troops of tha VGK and fronts, an appropriate body composed of operatives (operator) and intelligence officers (rezvedchik) should be created in the General Staff. Its task must include the collation of intelligence data on strategic and operational objectives of the countries of the imperialist camp, and the determination, depending on tbe importance of these objectives and their influence on the courseay, of the order in which they will be subjected to nuclear strikes.
Tali body should have an accurately worked out card index enc*oapasslng all strategic and operational objectives in both the strategic and the operational depth. The cards for each objective should specify; its characteristics, precise geodetic andlocationhe size of the nuclear charge, the type of burst (ground,he nethod of delivering the nuclear charge to the target, the amount of time needed to deliver tbe strike after the command! is given, and other nev data on the listed objectives, and reports on nevly appeared objectives.
The first priority targets will be tbe individual, moat aggressive, and dangerous countries, large political, economic, and administrative centers, military-industrial objectives, and mainly the depots vith stockpiles of nuclear weapons, industry for the production of nuclear weapons delivery, air and naval bases, and the means of control and command of the missile troops and armed forces in the theaters of military operations.
Thus, it seems to us that onlyesultuccessful, velltlned strike by tbe missile troops of the VGK can one count on an entree to the large-scale operational employment of all the other branches of the armed forces.
In peacetime conditions, strategic intelligence provides the VGK vith the necessary Intelligence data on the above-mentioned objectives. It should be pointed out, however, that these objectives are on tho whole stationary, non-mobile, and, in placs -fore long time, vhlch affords the opportunity forxhaustive reconnaissance and study. Operational intelligence participates in these effortsimited extent, *
As soon as the first atomic strike is inflictedar is unleashed, the situation, above all for intelligence, willremendous change. Theforces of the enemy will start moving, their Large-scale movements will unfold, as well aa dispersal to the theaters of military operations, and ths nuclear-missile troops of the enemy, and other delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons, including aviation, aircraft carriers, and the misslie-carrying fleet, will start maneuvering in the theaters of combat operations.
Under these circumstances nev tasks vlll arise for intelligence, the significance of vhlch is bard to overestimate.
First of all. It will be necessary to clarify the results of our nuclear counterblow delivered by the missile troops, to continue Intelligence operations against the nuclear weapons preserved by the enemy, the means of control and command, nuclear industry, the nature of the formations of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations and their plans and Intentions. All new, ooblle objectives must be discovered quickly by intelligence operations, solow can be inflicted at once, and tbus keep the strategic initiative in our hands.
Inituation it la unlikely that ve can count on tho volume and timeliness of receipt of intelligence data as in ths peacetime network, and it is all the more unlikely that it will be possible to avoid multistages in the levying of those tasks on the appropriate organs of intelligence. The time element will acquire extraordinary significance.
It appears to us that tbe alssile troops of tbe VGK must now have their own.means of long-range intelligence (manned and unmanned reconnaissance planes, radlotechnlcal reconnaissance, and other means) in order to carry out independent reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance of objectives, and react to any changes ln the situation immediately.
Our armed forces, and mainly our missile troops, have first-class equipment, while operational and tactical intelligence and their technical equipment lag seriously. ertain gap between the means of destruction and the means of intelligenceeveloped.
Our Intelligence does not have dependable technical moans of detection of weapons of mass destruction. Reconnaissance planes are not yet able to find tbe launching pada of nuclear weapons and transmit the information acquired from aboard the aircraft directlyontrol point. Aerial photography and the processing of photographs are done extremely slowly and are late ln providing their results.
Tbe technical means of -pediotechnieal reconnaissance also lag in their development. We still do not have dependable ultra-shortwave (UKV) hand direction finders, communications intercept equipment is poorly developed, troop reconnaissance still does not have television equipment, thereew infrared
reconnaissance have Halted depth, of operation. In tbat they can be used only in the tactical zone, which excludes the possibility of reconnaissance of the atoaic scans of divisions and corps of the potential enemies.
The time has comehorough investigation of the technical equipment of operational and tactical Intelligence and to bring about the order needed. We consider that the serious fault vhlch led to the Lag in the technical equipment of operational and tactical intelligence is the absence of one central organ for operational and tactical intelligence in the General Staff vhlch vould occupy Itself vith questions of developing and providing technical equipment to intelligence units
The Chief Intelligence Directorate does not deal vith these matters at the present time, because it has been relieved of such work.
To tbe extent that their powers and capabilities permit, the staffs of the branches of the armed forces and their intelligence departments (otdel) are dealing with these matters. Therefore, it is not surprising that thereack of unity of vlowsthe development and supply of Intelligence equipment that in many cases there is parallelism and duplication,^and that requirements of the General Staff and the Armed 'Forceahole for technical means of intelligence ore not token into account for appropriate orders to industry and planners. Bvery branch of the armed forces looks out for itself In tbe field of technical equipping of intelligence*
In order to close the gap between tbe means of destruction and tbe technical means of operational and taa$Hcal intelligence, it would be advisable to create an appropriate body in the structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate capable of coordinating and planning the development of technical intelligence means on behalf of all the armed forces, working In close cooperation with the Scientific-Technical Committee of the General Staff and the Operational Directorate.2
Thus, the Intelligence forces and means of large units must provide Intelligenceepth on the orderm, end groupings upm. In regardront. Intelligence mustepth of at least tvo front operations, so that at the end of the current operation, excluding any operational pauses, it vould be ready to report full Information about the enemy, his plans and Intentions, forecision on the follow-up operation.
Along vith the conduct of intelligence operations forthe large units and operational .groupings musteries of very important Intelligence tasks on behalf of the higher staff, operational groupings, and the General Staff; In return, the General Staff and the staffs of the higher groupings, using their intelligence means, aro obligated to service the lower intelligence organs and staffs.
Therefore, the next principle of organizational structure of operational and tactical Intelligence must be tbe centralization of operational and tactical intelligence of the branches and arms of the armed forces, and the subordination of intelligence organs of lower combined-arms ataffo to the higher ones, from the intelligence standpoint, withtho General Staff playing the dominant role. In turn the intelligence organs of combined-arms staffs consolidate in themselves the intelligence operations of tbe eras of the armed forces.
; The higher intelligence organs must direct, supervise, and assist their subordinates yith tbe organization and conduct of intelligence operations, vith tbe provision of intelligence equipment, vith selection of personnel, and with the combat training of intelligence units and BUbunlts, always maintaining tbe coebet preparedness of the latter.
It is necessary to examine the questions of organizational structure along two lines: the'structure of tbe Intelligence organs proper, fron the Center down to tbe regiment, end tbe structure of intelligence units, BUbunlts, large units, and groupings subordinate to these organs.
The following structure of operational and tactical Intelligence seems moat expedient to us.
In the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff there shouldirectorate of Operational Intelligence. This directorate should be assigned tbe following tasks:
the coordinating the intelligence operations of all branches and aros of troops;
--Planning and conducting intelligence activities of the intelligence departments of the branches and arms of troops on behalf of the large units and groupings of the branches and arms of troops and the General Staff (concentrating the intelligence efforts of the armed forcesheater of military operations in the main directions);
--Working out the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concerning the status of operational and tactical intelligence, and the direction of its development;
--Guiding the intelligence work of the intelligence directorates of the Staffs of military districts, especially the border districts, and the fleets, by all types and means of Intelligencehole, not separating the latter for subordination according to the various echelons of command (air, agent, naval, radiotechnical);3
--Working out, for design bureaus and scientific-research institutes, tbe tactcho losl data of the technical means of intelligence for all branches of the armed forces in order to eliminate duplication and'parallelism in the work, coordinating this work with the intelligence departments of the branches- of the armed forces;
-^Publishing bulletins about current questions of operational and tactical intelligence of tbe branches of tbe armed forces, and also manuals and Instructions on operational and tactical intelligence;
participation of the Directorate In working out large exercises and maneuvers carried out by the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the staffs of the branches Of the armed forces, in order to accumulate experience in intelligence, and to study and work out questions in its planning and conduct, collect intelligence data for use by the troops, and also to develop informational work in all elements of the intelligence organs;
--Participating in tests of appropriate intelligence end special equipment.
out experimental and denonetratlon exercises In intelligence;
in the instruction, posting, and training of intelligence personnel from divisions of all branches of the arced forces up to chiefs of intelligence directorates of military districtsnd other questions.
t'
It is known that operational Intelligence was not prepared at the beginning of tbe last war. Therefore, while ths war vas ineorchMU made for organizational forms and working methods, and not.onths after the start of tbe war, did operational intelligence acquire an acceptable organizational atructure in troop units and in the General Staff, in which was created the Reconnaissance Directorate.*
Under modern conditions we consider it iepracjical to create such an independent directorate, but lt Is quite necessary- in the structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (ORU) of the General Staff. It is unlikely that, in the next war, we shall have asonths) for working out the structure of operational intelligencehole, and in the General Staff in particular, and for tbe accumulation of experience in the combat activity of operational Intelligence. All this work should be carried out long before the war. The Leeocma of history must be token into consideration. he postwar period, when the reconnaissance corps washere'wasirectorate In the GRU of the General Staff and Itot of work, but than. Instead of developing It and Improving operational Intelligence, it began to lose its Importance and then ceased to exist. This deficiency should be eliminated quickly. This will notarge number of personnel.
It is advisable to enlarge somewhat the intelligenceof the branches of the armed forces. Thess departments must fully guide the operational and tactical intelligence of their branch of the armed forces and organize and carry out combat training of Intelligence subunits and units, ln accordance with the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and tbe Chief of the General Staff, with the coordination and guiding role in this
work performed by the OFU of tbe General. Staff.
Itecessary to restore to duty the chiefs of Intelligence of the arms of troops, providing thennailersons, and giving them the responsibility for carrying out the guidance of intelligence in their arm of troops.
It is necessary to examine the Intelligence directorates of military districts and fleets, and bring them Into line with modem requirements, taking Into account the fact that in the first operations'of tbe Initial periodar, the border military districts will have to operate with tbe forces and means on hand. Therefore, lt is advisable for tbe Intelligence organs, units, end sub-units of these military districts to be close to the wartime table of- organization and equipment even in peacetime.
It is advisable to strengthen the intelligence departments of -armies so that they can fulfill the tasks facing them. It is necessary" to do the same regarding the intelligence sections (otdelenlye) of divisions (large units).
It is absolutely necessary to raise the authority of intelligence and the chiefs of intelligence at all levels, in faot, not just paying the latter lip service as deputies to the chiefs of staff, and to relate them more closely to the chiefs of the operational sections, departments, and directorates, and demand that they perform creative snd active work. In regard to the structure of units and sob units of intelligence, supplying them with Intelligence equipment/.as well as the question of what means, units, and Bbhunits tbe-large units, and groupings of the ground forces should have at their disposal, we have at this time nothing to add to that which is stated in the article of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Chuykov. The implementation of his proposals willharp improvement of operational and tactical intelligence.
We have touched uponew of the important questions. Obviously, in the future It will be necessary to discuss these problems of operational and tactical intelligence more fully In the pages of this Collection.
Headquarters Comments:
According to other reliable sources, the GRU is charged with the collection of strategic intelligence {strateglcheskayao-called operational Intelligence (op'jrutrvr.aya razvgdka, information bearing on opposing armed forces in one theater ofnd so-called military intelligence (voyskovaya razvcdka, information supporting unit commanders in the furtherance of Immediate, localized combatpparently the term tactical intelligence (taktlcheskaya razvcdka) has supplanted the term military intelligence.
This is the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, concerned with military operations, and should not be confused with the how-defunct Operations Directorate of the GRU. Many of the functions proposed by Kochetkov for the "Operational Intelligence Directorate" (see pageirst paragraph) were formerly performed by the GRU Operations Directorate.
3* The responsibilities for both agent operations and radio-technical (communications and electronics intelligence) activities are known to have been held by the Intelligence Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (CSFO) as
U. This term (Razvedyyaltelnoye upravienlyc) can also be translated as Intelligence directorate, but from tbe context Reconnaissance Directorate appears more accurate. It is not clear how the GRU is able to distinguish between tbe two deslgnatlve concepts, intelligence and reconnaissance.
Original document.
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