NIE1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
NOTE: ThU eeBmaW auppUmanU.ha final verjlon oi tha eabmalo and additional tart will not b* olrouUtod.
Central Intelligence Agency
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizationshe preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force. The Joint Staff, AECandNSA.
Concurred In by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD ononcurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of thehe Assistant Chief of Naval Operalions (Intelligence),of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; tomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, thebeing outside of his jurisdiction.
AFPROKO FOR RELEASEsecret cw KisTORSCAL-REViEW PROGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUBJECT: : STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OP SOVIET
LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate current Soviet operational strength in ICBM'3 and other ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges. or more, and to estimate the probable trends in strength and deployment over the next few years.
THE ESTIMATE
New information,uch firmer base for estimates on Soviet long range ballistic missiles, hasharp downward revision in our estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength but strongly supports our eotlmate of medium range missile strength.
We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the rangeaunchers from which missllos can be
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fired against the DS, and that this force level will notmarkedly during thc months Immediately ahead.^ e also..estimate: that, theoperational launchers equippedallistic mlssilea. The bulk of these MRRM launchero are in western USSR, within range of NATO targets in Europe; others are in southern USSR and ln the Soviet Par East. ICBM and NRBH launchershave sufficient missiles toeload capability and to fire additional missileseriod of aome hours, assuming that the launching facilities are not damaged byor attack.
3. The low present and near-term ICBM force levelresults chieflyoviet decision to deploymall force of the cumbersome, first generation ICBMs, and to press the developmentmaller, second generation system. Under emergency conditions the existing force could besomewhat during the first halfut Soviet ICBM strength will probably not increase substantially until the new missile lo ready for operational use, probably sometime In the latter half After thla point, we anticipate that the
1/ The Assiotant Chief of Starr, Intelligence, DSAP, does not concur in this sentence. See hlB footnote on page
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number of operational launchers will begin to increase On this basis, we estimate that the force level inill5 operational ICBM launchers.5/
**. In addition. missiles nowthe USSR will probably. system ready for operational use late this year or early next year. The USSR's combined strength in these missile categories will probably0 operational launchers ineriod, and then level off.
5. Soviet; professions of greatly enhanced striking power thus derive primarilyassive capability to attack European and other peripheral targets. Although Soviethas assiduously cultivatod an image of great ICBM strength, the bulk of thc USSR's present capability to attack the US is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles rather thanarge ICBM force. While the present ICBM forcerave threatumber of US urban areas, lt representsimited threat to US-based nuclear striking forces 2/
2/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur innd the last sentence of5. See his footnote on page 4.
Tor Grc-njjfr
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n ICBM forcef the'Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF:
nlef or starf' Intelligence, USAP, believes that the Soviets had aboutperational ICBM* launchers innd that they will haven In his view, the early Performance record of the first generation ICBM Indicates the probability that, byubstantial numbers of these missiles had been deployed on operational launchers. Three considerations weigh heavily In this Judgment:
continuancenfgeneration ICBM; L ji wrings oi tne
feasibility of adapting the Tyura Tam pad for use with the first generation system; '
c- The USSR's current aggressiv* foreign policy
ubstantial ICBM capability.
2. In view of the time that has passed since the first generation system became suitable for operational deployment, months, the Assistant chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, believes that aboutperational launchers lns likely, even though the Soviets may have elected to await development of second generation missiles before undertaking large-scale deployment.
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, oej.ieves that the force now deployederious throat to US-based nuclear striking forces.
4. As to the future, the Assistant Chief of Staff,USAP, believes that the Soviets will continue togeneration missiles, as an interim measure until'themi*slles becorae available. He believes thatto acceptance of an inordi-
nate delay in the growth of their ICBM capabilities. Once the second generation system has become operational, which could be
t?rte belleves that deployment will bemissiles being withdrawn from operational
y the new missiles, it ls evident from
JSninP?0erS biat tht Sovlets feel obliged to increase the tempo of their efforts. The Assistant Chief of Staff,USAP, believes that this sense of urgency, plus the gains
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Original document.
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