EP ibo
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
"The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the
Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armedy General of the Army P. Kurochkin
erbatim translation of an articleNature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It
of the Various Branches of the Armedy General of the Army P. Kurochkin which appearedpecial TOP SECRET Issue of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).
article was acquiredoviet official whoreliable information in the past.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
RICHARD HSLMS
Original: Tho Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
Assistant Chieftaff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.ir Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence end Research Department of State
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National Indications Center
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X*)
Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armedy General of the Army P. Kurochkin
CC'JNTRY SUBJECT
DATE OP INFO: 0 APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT ; Documentary
SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) vho has access to thie type of document.
Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of tbe Armedritten by General of the Army Pavel A. Kurochkin, Chief of the Militaryrunze.
The article appeared ln0 Second Editionpecial version of Vcycnnaya My si (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and Is issued irregularly. The month of publication of0 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before publlohed and some speeches which have been'"delivered prior to being published "In this form. It Is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.
and the Role and Place In It of the
Vaxloua Branches of the Armed Forcea by
General of tho Army P. Kurochkin
The concept ofpodal Collection of articles of the Journal Military Thought (Voyennayaor the purpose of presenting an opportunity to the leaders of the Armed Forcea to exchange ideaa freely and to discuaa the moat Important problems of modern (military) art la timely and unquestionably useful. This is confirmed, at .least, by the worthy and keen analysis of questions, and the decisivenesa, with which the first authors of the Collection are coming forward. iscussion that starts in this fashion is headed for sharp and fundamental disputes,ruitful denouement. .
In tbe articles found in the first Collection, many new positions on tbe nature of modern warfare are brought up, as well as methods and forma of conducting armed combat, and regarding the employment of the branches of the'-armed forces in lt. We shall dwell upon individual questions brought up by Colonel-Oeneral A. JJaaSllnvich in his article, and also On the articles of Lieutenant-Generaia I. Tolkonyuk and V. Baskakov that touch upon the same questions in many ways .1
Ia Soviet Military Artrisis?
Common to tbe articles of Generals Gaetilovlch, Tolkonyuk, end Baskakov is their position that thereiscrepancy between our military art and the new conditions of nuclear warfare; regarding this, they state that it is necessary toold reappraisal of our entire military doctrine, strategy,art, and tactics in particular. The authors of the
article apeak unequivocallyriels which they claim Soviet military science and military art aro undergoing.
ays General Gastllovlch, "are undoubtedly trying to squeeze missile-nuclear weapons Into the framework of the old, habitual position of our military doctrine, onlythe latter slightly,.and we forget that this doctrine was formulated on the basle of -he employment of means of armed combat that ore basically different from present-day means and cannot be compared with them" "The matter does not go 'beyond the adaptation of the old forma and methods to the new conditions, while It shouldatter of completely new categories in military affairs. Apparently the time has come to sacrifice, boldly, many of tbe positions on which the basic principles of operational art and tactics aren this way. General Tolkonyuk supports Oastilovlch. "Thislear contradiction of the theory of_operatlonal art and can berieia withouthus General Baakakov would summarize the matter.
These ore not Just words; the posing of tho question is sharp and, at first glance, basic. pon deeperone finds that the authors put things on the agenda that have been raised already and even partially eettled. In our opinion, thero le no_basis forundamcntal^re-asses.amc'nt of SovleT militaryrrisis ln military art. For our military doctrine has already beenwith the introduction of atomic weapons, end that which is viewedcrisis" in military art is nothing more than the natural expression of tbe contradictory and surging development of military affairs.
Indeed, of which attempts to squeeze missile-nuclear weapons into tha framework of the old positions of our military doctrine, of what "slight" modernization of this doctrins, are they talking about, when the very opportunity for tbeof Comrade Gastllovlch arose onlyesult of ths formulation of new doctrine, completely different from tho old one. It is paradoxical that Comrade Gastllovlch bases his Judgements on the re-examination of doctrine on the positions of tho new doctrine formulated in addresses and speeches of K.rushjjhcv, and in the speeches and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Mallnovskly,
and other government and military leaders.
Sovlot allltary-aclentific thought did,ertain period of tine, follcv the path of partial eodernization of the old doctrine, in order to lessen to aoae extent the Impact of nuclear weapons on the established foras and aetbods of eraed combat. But this evolved naturally from the objective conditions prevailing at the time, determining the possibilities of military-scientific thought. However, it should be stated tbat,ertain extent, everything that was done during this period helped to develop Soviet military science and military art, and laid the groundwork for going on to the next higher step of their development for the creationew military doctrine.
Tho. establishmentompletely'" ne_y. doctrine based on the employment of misBile-nuclear weapons In armed combatomparatively long and complicated process. The final formulation of this doctrine could be put on the agenda only after the creation of the actual materiel prerequisites, which determined not only the development of the axes of the use of missile-nuclear weapons, but alao the assurance of qualitative advances in its development, in tbe form of achieving unlimited range and accuracy in tbe destruction of targets, as well as tbe quantitative accuaulation of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering thee.
The stockpiling of nuclear -miss lie weapons in adequateaffected the characteristics, methods, and forms of modern armed combat profoundly. This was reflected in the new Soviet military doctrine and "the novelty of modern warfare and its dissimilarity.with past wars".
Led by the new military doctrine and corresponding directives of the Party, the Government, and the higher military command, Soviet military-scientific thought began to clarify and dof ine the laws and principles which have to be incorporated into tho basis of armed combat at its present stage, end to search for new methods and forms of this combat, taking' Into consideration tbe nature of tho political goals of the opposition's coalitions end the existing materiel base.
This process Is nothing moree-examination of the theoretical views that have accumulated regarding tbe conduct
ar and military action* of all diaenaione,and equipping of the armed forces. But thiea held and polntlesa repudiation of all previouslyof armed combat. In Lenin's philosophicaldialectical nature of repudiation is brought out asa bald repudiation,andomisand essential inepudiation, as acommunication,eature of development, vith thetbe (V. I. Lenin. Filosofsklye tetradi,
To speakrisis of military art in these circumstanceswillingly or unwillingly, signifies the downgrading ofuge amount of work already carried out in this direction, and closing one's eyes to the actual situation, in other words, misunderstanding the crux of the process vhlch is going on.
oubt, the completionew qualitative advance, and tbe elevation of Soviet military scienceew level of development which answers modern requirements, involve certain "growing pains". What is requiredeappraisal of the oldeclaive rejection of everything that is of no value, and the blazing of new trails. All this is connected with overcoming the occsslonally stiff resistance of various kinds of conservatives, who actually are inclined to substitute the renewal andof old experiences, above ell the experience of World War II,ecisive turn to new endeavors.
The problem before the leading representatives of Soviet military-scientific thought la to clarify the new allltary doctrine and mobilize all our forces to fulfill the programmed directives of the Party, tho Oovemment, and the Minister of Defense toew advance in the development of military science. This problem in within reason and,oubt, "ill be fulfilledery short time. During this struggle unprincipled conservatism will be defeated, as will harmful talk of many kinds about stagnation and crisis ln Soviet military science.
ne-Sided Approach to the Solution of the Question of tbe Nature anddem Armed Combat.
Tho basic thesis of the articles of Generals Gastllovlch, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov is the affirmation of the paramount
role of nuclear-misslie weapons in all aspects of the combat activity of the armed forces. General Gaetilovlch writes: "under modern conditions, groupings (obedlnenlye) of missile troops of tbe Supreme High Command (VGK) with their unlimited range of action end the tremendous force of their firepower have become the main and decisive branch of the armedhe efforts of all other branches of the armedave to be directed towards tbe most rapid and effective utilization of strikos by the oisslle groupings of tbe VOK. Besides, tbe basis for planning tbe actions of each branch of tbe forces
and not on the number of divisions, ships, aircraft,page 7) On pagee comes to the conclusion that In his "concept, the main, leading role belongs to the operations of tbe missile groupings, of the VGK, but not for the purposes that we usually visualize them now. This is not combat with the nuclear means of the enemy, nor the weakening of his economic potential, nor combat against the reserves, etc, but the complete destruction of the enemy with nuclear weapons of megaton rangeast territory, eliminating entire countries from the war."
I. Tolkonyuk states: "There is good reason to believe that often the will of the enemy to resist can be suppressed only by strikes of nuclear-missile weapono". We find this In General Baskakov's article: "Huclear weapons should be considered and employed as independent and decisive means for destroying the enemy". It should be noted that the statements of the first two authors refer largely to the general strategic aspect, and thetbe field of operational art. But this does not change the substance of the formulation of the question.
If've follow the concepts developed by the authors of tbe articles mentioned, and'doubtless agree that nuclear-misslie weapons should have the decisive role in assuring tbe possibility "df conqueringhortay, on the whole, or to achieve success In any operation, everything else seems relatively simple. It is only necessary to supply the missile troops with adequate means,he necessary nuclear-missile means to the ground forces and other branches of the armed forces, review certain aspects of our military strategy and operational art, and thus are created thee conditions for successful resolution of the course and outcome of all armed ccobat.
Guided by this premise. General Gastllovlchairly simple olan of actionariation of the concept for the European theater). In thisountering nuclear-missile strike is made against two or three NATO countries with the purpose of "total destruction of the enemy" and the elimination of these countries from the war. In order to utilize the results of this strike, the ground forces are put into operation; thirty to forty various ground forces division quickly "finish off" the remaining forceshe enemy in the border area, andapid rate they conquer tho zones that have to various degrees been destroyed and contaminated hy radiation produced by the massive strike of the strategic missiles, and occupy the country.
Besides, "if after the conquering of the territory of the countries that were subjected to the first massive nuclear strike, the enemy does not capitulate,imilar all-destroying blow may be repeated agalnBt the next country." The substance of tbe variations of actions proposed by the author amounts on tha one hand, to the complete destruction of the *Bnemyountry from the war, and on the other hand, to the conduct of operations of the ground forces in order to overrun the destroyed and contaminated zones, the suppression of any remaining resistance, and the occupation of the country.
In our opinion, the concept presented has many contradictory features. In the first place, the concepts "total destruction of the enemy" andountry from the war" mean tbe end of all resistance, and capitulation of tbe countries. But;once ,this, is so, what major operations by significant elements of the ground forces can we talk about under these conditions? Why throw'hirty to forty divisions with the purpose "mainly of conquering rapidly the zones that, im varying degrees, have been destroyed and contaminated by radiation"? One does not need muchlair for fantasy to imagine what these troops will encounterountry-that has been subjecteduclear-missile strike "for complete annihilation". Panic, chaos, masses of dead and mutilated persons, and the ruins of the destroyed cltios willeleterious influence on the troops. The same conditions vlll oblige the troops to undertake the Incredibly complicated tasks of establishing order, carrying outehabilitationosstanovltelnaya) work, organizing relocation, rendering medical assistance, and providing rations for large
masses of people. At the seen thee, the troops tr.er.seIves will be exposed to Irradiation and contagion and many compiles ted problems affecting thee can arise, which will not be so simple to solve. The questions of billeting, supply, medical and sanitation services, and others will become extremely complicated, and sometimes they will simply be Insoluble.
Having taken the concept proposed by the authorsasis, wo cannot avoid falling Into an insoluble argument concerning the place they assign to nuclear-mlsalle weapons, and the role of the ground forces and the other branches of the armed forces. This conception leads to the repudiation of any significant place for the, ground forces, and In fact abolishes all branches of the armed forces except missiles; lt abolishes strategy, operational art and tactics, end Joint actions by tbe branches of tbe armed forces and the arms of troops composing them which have been studied and established.
What are the reasons why the conception developed by Generals Gaetilovlch and Tolkonyuk Is groundless?
First of all, It Is impossible to combine the Incompatible. One cannot speak of the possibility of "total destruction of thef the possibility "of crushing his capability end wlLl tof the elimination of entire countriesar by nuclear-missile weapons alone, on the one hand, and tbe neceunlty and possibility of conducting on tbe territory of these countries large-scale end vigorous operations of the ground forcea on the other hand.
Second, and most important, tbe solution of the problem oust be sought onlyhorough evaluation of the situation, which is possible only by taking the political factors into account along with the materiel factors. JEhe .content .of tbe .new Soviet military doctrine orients our military thought towards exactly this kind of approach to the solution of questions.
In fact, our new military doctrine ia based on the paramount role of nuclear-mlasile troops and provides for the carrying out of decisive nuclear-mlBBlle operations. Our nuclear-mlaalle troopB are capable of erasing from tho face of the earth any country or countries attacking ua or other Socialist stateB.
However, this basic premise stems only from the possibility ofestructive wan being unleashedrantic clique of imperialist lunatics who ore in power. In this case, we have to be ready to deliver the most destructive blows against the instigators of the war.
Herein ve cannot escape the fact that tbe bastion of those who Inspire this policy of playing with fire is beyond the confines of the European continent; so, in the event of tbe unleashingar, the main efforts of our Armed Forces, first and foremost of the chiefhe missile troops -will be directed primarily against the doclslve element of the enemy coalition. Here too, however, the question can only lie In the plan to defeat the enemy quickly and completely and eliminate his capability to continue active military operations. This is the basic and the most complicated task facing our missile troops. It has to be solved ln the shortest possible time, with maxiaua use of the effectiveness of nuclear-missile weapons.
The success of the outcome of this operation (operations) of the missile troops will dependeries of circumstances, above all, on the selection of the proper moment totrike on the most vitally important enemy conters, primarily on his centers of nuclear-missile weapon production, andlaunching bases. The result of the operation must be the ruination of the military and governmental machines of the aggressor. low of exactly this type can also cause other partners of the enemy coalition to give very careful thought to the advisability of entering the war. But an Indispensable condition of complete victory must be the readiness of the missile troops to carry out one or more operations against some of the countries of Europe and other continents. Ve have in mind tbe countries that will undertake to follow their senior partner into the war. The Intensity of the reaction must fluctuate, depending on the nature of tbe actions of tbe armed forces of one country or another.
In the determination of the degree of reaction it -is necessary to consider that nuclear-missile weapons must be usedecisive and purposeful way, but only within the limits of expediency. The forsaking of this requirement can leadituationar unleashed by aggressors will involve such
large human and material Losses on both sides that the consequences may be catastrophic for mankind.
Ih one case it may be necessary to conduct operationscomplete destruction of the means of retaliation, anddestroy the strategic nuclear weapons bases. Itthattrategic situation of this type it maytolace for the utilization of the otherthe armed forces of the Soviet Union, and of the forcescountries of the Socialist
We are also Inclined to think that, in some cases and in some directions, the primary role will belong to ground forces equipped with nuclear-misslie weapons. This can occur in tho unfolding of events when, after execution of the countering nuclear-miss He operation against the main bulwark of the imperialist bloc, or simultaneously withtrike is deliveredroup of objectives in the countries which allowed the use of their territory by their senior partner for the launching of the first blow. This strike will not have the purpose of "complete annihilation of the enemy" in the sense that General Gastilovich uses it. The strike is calculated to disorganize the governmental control and destroy the main strategic and operational nuclear weapons bases, as well as the main formations of enemy troops. In order to achieve the results desired of the operation, the ground forces will carry out Joint operations with the air forces and the navy for the complete destruction of the armed forces of the enemy and the achievement of the ultimate goals of the war. The ground forces, with their mobility and tremendous firepower, are aiming in decisivehe seizure of key positionsountry, possession of which will decide the outcome of the campaigniven theater.
The directions of troop actions are stipulated in the overall schemeampaign. In addition, an effort should be made to avoid troop operations in areas where the terrain is highlyby radioactivity arisingesult of -our-own -strategic nuclear-misaHe strikes. The troops should use their own nuclear-olsslle weapon capabilities to support thoir operations. The expenditure of these means should be strictly limited and aimed at the destruction of enemy formations capable of disrupting or slowing down the successful development of attack in decisive
directions.
When necessary for the assuranceorrelation of forces favorable to our troops, the forces and means of VGK missile large units (soyedlnenlye) may carry out strikes upon receipt of requests for fireront and an army.
Thus, we consider that the dominant role ln an operational-tactical plan will quite often belong to the ground forces, by dint of thoir being equipped with nuclear-missile weapons, and above all, to the highly mobile motorized rifle and tank large units.
In regard to the size of the Armed Forces, we considerarge part of tbe adult population, capable of activewill be mobilized and used as needed to guard and defend the entire territory of the country. Among the special organizations, the rescue-rehabilitation detachments will play an Important role.
Obviously, self-defense and guard units and large units, as wall as rescue-rehabilitation detachments, have to be created in accordance with territorial criteria and be prepared in advance to fulfill their tasks.
However, the size of the regular ground forces will undoubtedly bo large; ln other words,assive army It Is impossible to have rapid and definitive victoryuture war. It Is particularly necessary to consider tbe colossal losses that tha ground forces will suffer, which will require sizeable reserves trained for operations.
In connection with the great probability that under -certain conditions of the situation It will be necessary for tbe troops to fulfill the tasks of occupation, we consider it necessary to give special emphasis to the importance and responsibility of this function of the troops and to tho advisability of carrying out at least the most elementary training of the. troops in this sphere. In the past there have been serious difficulties in this regard. Now, under the conditions of tbe wide use of nuclear weapons, lt is necessary to surmount the serious complexities of the situation. The command of field troops is confronted with the necessity not
only of maintaining order among the troops themselves, hut also of Implementing measures for the organization and supervision of huge masses of peopletate of panic. It will be necessary to clear roads, to organize the evacuation of people from contaminated areas, and to provide huge masses of people with medical aid and food. To ignore these measures may lead to very drastic consequences.
Several Aspects of Operational Art
A new assessmentumber of questions of operational art by the authors of the special Collection is indicated, timely, and necessary. In the vanguard of these stands the solution of such questions as the place, role, and conduct of nuclear-missile operations in modern warfare, questions about the scale of modern front and army operations, regarding nev principles of planning offensive operations, regarding the principle of concentrating the main efforts to destroy the enemy's nuclear means and main troop formations, regarding the creation of rescue-rehabilitation troops, and the working out of operations within military districts. rofound elaboration of these questions, on the basis of mass employment of nuclear weapons, willesounding contribution to the development of Soviet military science.
In this connection, it must be.noted that the formulation of some of the questions, especially In the articles of Generals Gastilovlch end Baskakov, in our opinion, are faulty. This applies particularly to-the question of operational offense and operational defense, which we shall dwell upon.
The substance of the statements of Generals Gastilovlch and Baskakov on this question amounts to the following; nuclear weapons eliminate the boundaries between 'operational -offense and operational defense; in modern conditions offensive and defensive operations will be distinguished from one another mainly by the number of nuclear weapons allotted them (pages, in these operations the methods of troop operations will be identical (pages; defense, in the former meaning of the term, can only occuractical scale (pages Ik; the creation of defensive zones is impractical--any large unit executing defense in place will be destroyed by nuclear strikes by the enemy or will merely-, be bypassed by him; on an operational scale.
!
defense cannot bo stable.
Can we agree with such assertions? We feel that we cannot, primarily because these assertions do not conform with, and at times clearly contradict, Marxist dialectics in general, and the new conditions of conducting armed combat in particular.
In actuality, mass employment of nuclear weapons does change the nature of modern offensive and defensive operations radically. Large-scale maneuvering, aggressiveness, and decisiveness aro nowr inherent to both an offensiveefensive operation. Under modern conditions, an offensive operation will have more elements of defense and the defensive operation will have more elements of an offense. However, this has notnd will notefensive operation en offensive operation.
It does not follow that we turn our main attention to the similarity of offense and defense if we wont to understand the substance of this contradictory phenomenon, but to their differences to the study of the specific peculiarities of the opposing aspects, to the exposition and study of the major and minor aspects of thie contradiction, without which* it is impossible to develop the correct approach either to operational art or to tactics.
Obviously, we should not speak here of erasing the dividing line between operational offense and operational defense, but of the new nature of these conflicting aspects of armed combat, caused by the mass employment of nuclear weapons, and of the need to develop qualitatively new methods of conducting modern offensive and defensive operations. Talk of "erasing the dividing line" only leads us away from the solution of urgent problems of modern offenae and defense.
It is likewise impossible to agree with the authors' declara^-tion that modern offensive and defensive operations will be distinguished from one another primarily by the number of nuclear weapons allotted them.
The forces and means of the sides, whatever their quantity and quality, cannot in themselves determine the specific peculiarities of one or another type of combat operation. It is one thing to have plenty of forces and means (including nuclearut
quite another to defend oneself and, on the other hand, to atart offensive actions when these forces and means are considerably less. An example of this la tbe battle at Kursk, where we had plenty of forces and means but were on the defensive, while on other fronts, where the forces and means were significantly less, we were taking the offensive.
The offense,ule, usually has comparatively greater forces and means than the defense. But who would say that In modern conditione it la impossible to attack and win withr even smaller forcesT! Nuclear weapons indeed create more favorable conditions for the triumph of this concept of military art. But if this is so, the quantity of forces and means in general, and of nuclear weapons in particular, cannot serveriterion of the type of operation, because it cannot determine the characteristic and specific traits of one or another type of -combat operation.
In our opinion, lt is not the quantity of nuclear weapons which is the factor determining the identifying features of operations, but the targets and the nature of the combat operations, and the methods and ways In which they are carried out, insofar as they alone allow us to see the specific' peculiarities of attack and defense, their substance. The authors ignored these factors and tookoundation the incidental and transient, which led them to Incorrect conclusions.
General Gastilovlch, alluding to the fact that part of the forces of an army or front may take tbe offensiveefensive operation, declares tbat defensive operationsront and on army will resemble an offensive operation in their operational methods. General Baskakov adheres to more or less the same opinion, asserting that "tbe difference between tbe conduct of an offenseefense..remains in the tactics alone".
It Is impossible to agree with such assertions. We elways had elements of offense In our defense, but we never considered the operational methods of troops on offense and defenseign of equality. This must not be done now, as this will lead unavoidably to the glossing over of the specific traits of offense and defense, andne-sided end superficial scrutiny
of the complex phenomena of armed combat, with all the consequences that arise therefrom.
Defenselearly defined goal--to disrupt or stop (hold up) the enemy offensive, inflict sizeable losses on him, and create favorable conditions for going over to the offensive. And if it does not succeed in withstanding the offensive, it does not achieve thiB goal. The question arises as to why weefense which is incapable of stalling an enemy offensive, inflicting losses upon him, and effecting favorable conditions for our troops to go over to the offensive!!
Consequently, the defense has to be stable if we wish to achieve the goals; nuclear weapons cannot alter this requirement. Itifferent matter that the stability of the defense under modern conditions need not be bound rigidly to holding whatever has become of the main line of resistance and the forward area. But thisuestion of the development of new methods forefensive battle and operation.
The fact that the enemy, having nuclear weapons, is able to destroy the defense, break through the defensive line, or bypass the troops that occupy it, does not mean that defensive lines or areas are not needed, or that the defense cannot be stable under modern conditions. To speak of defense without defensive lines or areas is like talking about an offensive without an attack, without forward progress. If we approach this from the standpoint of the possibilities of nuclear weapons, it will bo even easier for the offense to destroy or bypass enemy troops if they are ln assembly areas.
Obviously, we should speak of another thing: what defense should be like under modern conditions, what the characteristicsefensive line or area should be; how, where, and In what time periods defensive installations must be created, how to ensure the stability of the defense, how to safeguard personnel and combat equipment ln the defense, and what methods ofefensive battle and operation should be adopted in order to attain the goals of the defense.
In his article, "Mountain Warfare Then and. Engels, pointing out the validity of views on the impregnability of the so-called Swiss mountain redoubt, wrote: "Does this mean that
the defenseountainous country Is completely useless* Of course not. It means only that the defense must not be merely passive, but should draw on Its power end mobility, and operate offensively whenever an opportunity arises" (P. Sngels Selected Military Works,.
In other words, in conditions when tbe offense becomes stronger than tbe defense, the problems of the latter must be BOlved, not by abolishing the defense, but by developing nev, more advanced methods of conducting lt. Nuclear armament gives us every opportunity for doing this. In tbe hands of the defense it increases the stability of the defense immeasurably. Of course this vllleal defense, not one backed by some sort tof thin defensive line of troops under cover, as General Baskakov recommends. It stands to reason that neither this line nor the defensive zone is capable of containing an enemy that is equipped with powerful nuclear weapons. Modern defensive battles and engageaente will take place In large areas, along the front and in depth, and often in separate directions. For this reason, operational defense must be deep, end capable of resisting tbe powerful, dispersed strikes of the offense. This con be achieved byystem of defensive areas echeloned in depth, and also by dispersed disposition of tbe reserves along the front and in depth.
The basis of modern defense will apparently consist of holding defensive areas firmly In conjunction with obstacles, operating offensively wherever tbe allghteat opportunity preaenta itself, and anticipating the enemy In the delivery of strikes. It is not difficult to imagine the gravity of the situation of the offense if the defease is able to atop it. mall number of nuclear strikes, against fairly dense, openly deployed combat arrays of the offense, can inflict such losses that the offenae will not be able to win even by large-scale nuclear strikes against the defense. This is sn important advantage of modern defense, the basis of which has toombination of holding firmly defensive areas which are separate, not clearly defined, but interrelated from the standpoint of firepower by decisive counterattacks from different directions by the reserves and tho defending troops, carried out right after the del ivory of nuclear atrikea.
Proceeding from this, ve consider lt possible to indicate the fundamental directions In vhlch. In our opinion, problems of modern defense must be solved.
1. Increase the firepower of the defense, tbe basis of which vlll be nuclear weapons and the firepower of antitank means; these means must permit the defense to win the battle of firepower against the offense and force the latter to give up the attack or delay It. The solution of this problem must follow the path of extensive shifts of trajectories of nuclear-missile weapons, as well es the path of creating in the defense, areas of rosistancs by fire, based on the utilization of systems of long-range control of antitank and rifle fire. The creation of areas of resistance by fire has very great significance in increasing the stability of the defense, as these areas are capable of resisting the nuclear strikes of the enemy much better than the conventional defensive areas can, and they can operate practically without limitations in an area that has been contaminated by radioactive materials.
2. Increasing the mobile capabilities of the defense and Its aggressiveness. In order to stop an enemy drive by building up troops quickly In the threatened areas, and to destroy him by nuclear strikes, and bold counterattacks and counterblows. The solution of this problem must take the path of creating powerful mobile reserves dispersed along the front and ln depth, and of developing new methods ofefensive battle and operation, as well aa the path of widespread use of portable obstacles, especially proximity-controlled minefields. ell thought-out system of quickly installed obstacles is capable of Inducing confusion In the offense end Inhibiting Its progressoint which is favorable for delivering nuclear strikes and-executing.
3. Increase the capabilities of the defense for protection against the nuolear blows of the offense by -meansystem of improving and developing new, high-efficiency engineer apparatus, of creating compact, portable designs of defensive Installations that can be assembled and dismantled, of providing apparatus with hinges for entrenchment, of developing explosive devices for making individual foxholes and of carrying out other measures, directed at the fulfillment of tasks of engineer support of anti-atomic protection (PAZ) for several hours of units and large units, as well as $he improvement of Individual means of anti-chemical protection and of the protective qualities of combat equipment, directed
toward the assurance of the feasibility of conducting defensive operations In an area contaminated by radioactive materials.
The solution of these problems willualitative advance in the organization and conductefensive battle andew stage in the creative development of modern defense.
* # e
We have touched uponew questions of strategy and operational art, the correct interpretation of which, in our opinion, has profoundly important meaning for the solution of all other questions of military art. Not claiming that our judgements are infallible, we hopeide exchange of opinions in the pages of the special Collection regarding these questions will help to find their best solutions.
Headquarters Comment: According to
Col. Gen. Anton I. Gastllovlch, who is on the faculty of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Anted Forces of the USSR, wrote an article in the first Issue of Spctsialr.yy Shornlk Statey Zhurnala "Voyennaya Myal" (Special Collection of the Journal Voyennayaonceivablyollectionnitiatedeginning with0 First Edition.
Original document.
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