MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
"The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters
in the Initial Periody Admiral V. Kasatonov
1. Enclosederbatim translation of an article entitled. "The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Periodar" by Admiral V. Kasatonov which appearedpecial TOP SECRET iseue of the Soviet military Journal Voyenneya Mysl (Military Thought).
a. This article was acquiredoviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
H3
cc: Military Representative of the ProBldent
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff
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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army
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The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
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Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters In the Initial Periody Admiral V. Kasatonov
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OF CONTENT
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type of document.
ollowingerbatim translation of an article entitled "The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Periodritten by Admiral Vladimir A- Kasatonov, now Coeciander of the Black Sea Fleet and formerly Commander .of the Baltic Fleet.
The article appeared in0 Second Editionpecial version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. The month of publication of0 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, thla edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.
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The Use of Naval Forego In Closed Sen Theaters In the Initial Period of War
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Admiral V. Kasatonov
The qualitative leap in the development of the means of armed combat on the sea, which has occurred in en uaprecedentedly short period of tine, has placed before the art of navaleries of problems connected with the development of methods of operations ensuring the fullest realisation of the potentialities of new weapons for effective accomplishment of tbe missions of the fleets.
Li' recentonsiderable amount of work has been done in the Navy both ln the field of construction and tha development of forces and in training for the conduct of combat operations under new conditions. At the present time, the development of now weapons and the tempo of equipping the Navy, with them hasevel vhlch urgently demands that the main attention be given to methods of using these weapons. It Is becoming entirely obvious that even at the current stage the most important missions will be accomplished by strike forces of tbe Navy with missile and nuclear armament. We have ln mind, first of all, submarines armed with cruisend'ballistic missiles or long-range torpedoes with nuclear warheads, missile aviation,oastal missile units, and,ertain extent, missile surface ships and boataapable even under current conditions ofumber of combat missions ln sea theaters.
The high combat qualities of the strike forces create new potentialities for the Navyhole, make it possible to accomplish .missionsew way, and set up goals which were impossible to achieve not long ago. It is necessary to consider
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tho employment of these forces under concrete military-geographic conditions of this or that theater of military operations. It is veil known that the nlaslocis and Bethods for accomplishing thea vlll be considerably different for the fleets ln open sea theaters, such as the Northern and Pacific Fleets, and for tha fleets in closed sea theaters such as the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets. However, It must be kept in mind that at present the conception of "the closed sea theater" does not reflect completelythe nature of the conditions for operations of tbe forces of the fleet in it. The point Is that the activity of the fleets n the closed sea theaters is not at all limited by the closed seas such as tho Black Sea and tbe Baltic Sea, as it was several years ago, but must be carried outarge extent beyond tba llmlto of these seas to accomplish the aost important missions. The characteristics of the new weapons make it possible for the fleets to carry out such missions. However, for this It is necessary that part of the forces afloat, above all, submarines, be deployed beyond the limits of tbe closed seas even before the beginning of allitary operations, and that these forces be built up during the coursear through movements from other sea theaters or after the seizure of straits zones by tho ground forces. The operation of aviation beyond tbe limits of the closed seas is linked with tbe necessity, while flying over enemy territory, of overcoming the powerful counteroeaeures of the PVO system which has evolved. These circumstancesone of the most important features of closed sea theaters,--
Character 1st le of closed sea theaters is tbe presence of three large zones in which the conditions of conducting combat operations are substantially different. To such zones belong: the closed sea (for example, tbe Black Sea and the Baltiche zone of tbe straits with the adjacent narrows and Islands, and the more open and extensive sea (for example, theSea or the North Sea).
Among the most important missions of the Navy in closed sea theaters in the initial periodaf, it is possible to name two fundamental aisslons. One of these is tbe defense of one's own seacoast and the adjacent territory against attacks from the sea. The main element of this mission is
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combating enemy aircraft carrier large unltB (soyedineniye) operatingiven operational direction, vitb the goal of warding off tbe nuclear strikes of tbe aircraft carrier aviation forces again at the coastal and immediate rear area economic end administrative-political objectives of tbe country, the forces of tbe Navy, and the maritime fronts. Thus, in substance, this mission is similar to an analogous mission accomplished by fleets in open sea thsoters. However, in the conditions of operations of forces and the methods of their accompliehment, the mission in closed sea theaters haspeculiarities, as we shall show below.
The second fundamental mission is support (sodeystvlye) of the ground forces in attack and defense. Including support in the operation for seizing tbe straits tones, vith the aubsequsnt exit of submarine forces through the straits for operations in more open areas of the sea theater. To accomplish this mission
itlso necessary to combat aircraft carrier and miaalle vessel (rakctonosnoye) large units and prevent the entry of naval forces of the enemy through the straits into the closed
sea, or disrupt their combat activity in the straits zone and in
the area Just outside the straits.
On behalfaritime front lt may be necessary to accomplish other missions, such as support of the ground forces in forcing the straits and in seizing islands of the straits zone, disruption of the sea transport of tbe enemy, protecting one's own transport, etc. Furthermore, under current conditions lt is possible to examine anew the problem of fire support for the maritime flank of the ground forces. Nov, of course, there can be no talk of the delivery of fire etrlkes against the flank of enemy ground forces by tube artillery of surface vessels. At the present time,ission is clearly unrealistic. Tbe problem is the employment of the mlsslls forces of the Navy for delivering strikes against enemy ground forces from distances of several hundred kilometers with nuclear varbeads. In spite of the feet tbat the/ activity of the Navy must be directed, first of ell, toward combat vith the naval forces of tbe enemy,umber of occasions, when it is required by the eltuatlon on land and permitted by tbe situation at aea, it la advisable
to bring In missile forces of tbe Navy, mainly submarines and coastal missile units, to delivor nuclear strikes against objectives on land for the benefit of ths troopsront. However these operations cay not be conducted to the detriment of the accomplishment by the Mavy of its basic tasks at sea,
A few vords about the operations of tbe Savy an theccur-leg-tlons lines of the enemy"" In our opinion, during the flrat lava of' the Initial periodar In closed sea theaters, this mission will not have Important Independent significance, since during that period the main forcea of the Navy must be directed toward the faateat possible destruction of the strike forcea of the enemyhe bearero of nuclear weapons. Tbe mlealon of disrupting military sea supply during the first daysar must be accompllahed only to the extent necessary as one of ths special missions for support of'the ground forces. During the subsequent period, tbe Importance of this mission may increase sharply In conjunction with the fact that after delivery of the first missile (airbornen tbe part of our enemies) strikes, replenishment and regrouping of forces vlll be required for the development of further military operations. It should be expected tbat by'.thisonvoy service In sea theaters of military operations villi have been organized by both sides. Tbe moat favorable conditions for combat against the sea communications lines will be created after the seizure of the straits zones by our troops, tbe exit of submarine forces out through the straits into the more sxtenslve areas of the sea theater, and tbe organization of basing for units of tbe strike -forces and tbe bulk of the support forces for seized enemy baass.
To determine correctly what forces of the Navy are needed in closed sea theaters for successful accomplishment of the missions enumerated above, one must consider tbe fact that the accomplishment of each of the missions Is linked vith definite geographic areasonsiderably greater degree than in open sea theaters. Thus, the mlssicn of destroying the aircraft carrier attack large unit (AUS) must be accomplished beyond the limits of the closed sea, since the possibility of aircraft carriers entering into..thatpart of the sea theater is practically out of theperations for disruption of tbe entry of the forces of the enemy fleet through the straits and disruption of their combat aotivlty in tbe straits zone must also be accomplished boyond the
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limlte of tbe closed uaa. umber of instances this vlll require the concentration of main efforts la tbe straits zone Itself. At tbe same time tbe mission of fire support for tbe maritime flank of tbe ground forcesumber of other missions-for supportront will be accomplished during the first days of war within the limits of tbe closed sea. Thus, in closed theaters it is necessary to have strike and support forcesomposition capable of accomplishing missions In all three basic zones of the sea theater.
Of all tbe arms of forces of the Havy, only submarines and aviation are capable of carrying out combat operations in the open partheater at the present time.
The main mission of these forces must be tbe destruction of enemy naval vessels already at sea; it Is advisable to entrust the destruction of enemy, naval veaaolo at their bases to the mlaalle troops of the Supreme High Commandhich can accomplish such mlssiona more effectively.
Speaking of the use of submarines. It should be pointed out that their penetration Into the above-mentioned areasea theater, their conduct of combat operations there, and also their materiel and technical support (replenishment of ammunition, fuel, and relief of personnel) is linked with the necessity ofthe antisubmarine defense developed by the enemy. At the same time, having penetrated into tbe area of combat operations, tbe submarine must carry out combat operations for aseriod of time as possible with mejciaua effectiveness. This requirement la met to the greatest degree by fast' submarines with atomic engines, armed with long-range torpedoes with nuclear warheads (with the condition that the depth of the sea permita atomic submarines to run at maximum diving depth as, for example, in the Mediterranean Sea).
Being able to stay at searactically unlimited period of time, atomic submarines can be in waiting areas sufficiently remote from the zones most densely saturated by the forces and facilities of anti-subsjarine defensewiftto deliver nuclear strikes against detected enemy naval vessels, and subsequently break away from pursuit by theforces. Beyond the limitslosed sea it is also advisable to use missile submarines (with the condition that they useissiles withowever, for this, the execution of special measures for tbe
organization of accurate target designation and subsequent replenishment of expended missiles vlll be required.
Besides the destruction of naval vessels, special submarined must carry out reconnaissancs of enemy naval vessel large units and convoys for the delivery of strikes against then by the forces of missile aviation and attack submarines. They must also combat enemy submarines, including missile-carrying submarines, tha possible use of which is highly probable even ln the immediate future.
To accomplish the mlssioni.of destroying highly maneuverable enemy formations in relatively extensive areasea theater. It is necessary to have at-the disposal of tbe fleet missile aviation capable of delivering strikes against enemy naval vessels with cruise missiles, both Independently and in coordination with submarines,istance of upilometers from their airfields. To carry out aerial reconnaissance for these forces, there must be long-range reconnaissance planes in tbe composition of the reconnaissance aviation of the navy.
A quite unique area for carrying out combat operations is the straits zone, within which the operation of submarines and surface veaaels is practically out of the question, and the operation of mlsBile aviation is hampered by the' smell dimensions and intricate configurations of the reaches and straits among the Islands. Ih slew of the large number of islands, tbe detection ofessels in the Btralta zone by any mesne of technical surveillance is considerably hampered. Hot long ago the only arm of forces of the Navy capable of carrying out combat operations in such areas wasorpedo and fighter aviation. Such operations were unavoidably coupled with large leasee, since straits sones are saturated to the greatest degree by the forces and facllltlea of antiaircraft defense.
The situation changed with the introduction of nuclear-missile vespons into the armament of the Navy. For strikes against points, of basing and clusters of vessels detected in anchorages, missiles from submarines and the launching installations of coastal missile units of the Navy can be used, independently and in coordination with units and large units of the operational (operativnaya) mlsBiles of tbe ground forces. Tho submarines can deliver strikes from firing positions locatedlosed sea at diatancee0ilometers, and the coastal missile units, from firing
positions on the seacoast.
Nuelear-alsslle means of destruction can also destroy formations of vessels during their passage of the straits. Since narrow straits are accurately deteroined lonee. It is possible to use missiles effectively against areas calculated inn any sectortrait. Using nuclear warheads of suitable force, it Is possible to achieve the required destruction of an enemy formation forcing tbe straitsimited number of missiles. At the same time one should takeinto account that for the destruction of small groups or individual small vesselseavily interrupted areaea theater, and also for the destruction of small targets at sea and on the coast, the use of nuclear-missile weapons will,umber of cases, prove to be inodvioable. Therefore, supporting the opinionumber of authors (for example, Colonel General A. Goetilovichi in the first issue of SpetBlnlnyysborniK' statey zhuraala "Voycnnayahat tha fighter-bomber should be considered the basic aircraft of front aviation, ve are convinced that Justlane is also essential to the Havy for combating veBaels and aviation of the antisubmarine defense in the Interests of ths aupport of the combat operatlone of submarines, the destruction of tbe facilities of coastal technical surveillance, end the execution of other alasions.
In the immediate future coastal missile units must become the main strike force of tbe fleets ln combating enemy naval vessels within the Units of the closed sea (and partially even ln the straits zone). These units,'armed with eruise missilesange of moreilometers, with inertlal guidance (avtonoonoye upravleclye) for firing against areas, andoning device (ustrcystvo aamonavedenlya) for destruction of vessels at sea, vlll be able to cover with their fire tha entire waters (akvatoriya)losed sea and make enemy combat activity and the operation of enemy naval vessels and transports within its limits practically out of the question. Tho limited dlmonslons of closed seas nake it poaslble to use to the fullest extent modern radio navigation and hydroacoustlc navigation systems of high accuracy to provids orisntational support to reconnaissance vessels and planes, which in turn makes lt possible to provide accurate target designation for coastal
missile units. Target assignation can also bo affectively provided by long-range coastal radar stations.
However, the high cotabat potentialities of coastal nlssile units do not eliminate tbe needormation of missile subnarines in the compositionleet operatinglosed sea theater. These submarines are needed both for delivering strikes against enemy vessels and objectives in tbe straits zone end for ths fire support of tbe maritime flank of the ground forces. In the near future submarines will be armed with cruise missilesoming device for tho final portion of their trajectory and will also be able to be used for the destruction of vessels at sea, particularly after these (missile submarines) have exited through tbe straits into tbe open partea theater.
Taking .these considerations Into account, it Is advisable to have in the compositionleetlosed sea theater, submarines armed, not with ballistic missiles, but vith cruise mlBslles, assuring the possibility of multipurpose use of tbe Bame submarines. To tho credit of cruise missiles there is one more olrcumatance of no small Importance, that with their launch from submarines the enemy does not have the opportunity ofix on tbe missiles ln flight to determine the trajectory and the point of launch, and consequently, the location of the With the use of ballistic nissllesask is accomplished fairly easily under modern conditions, particularly within the limitslosed sea with small dimensions. Having determined the locationissile submarine, the enemy vould bo able to direct his antisubmarine forces in pursuit of her.
In addition to missile submarines, lt is necessary to have in tbe composition of theumerically larger formation of torpedo submarines designated for tbe destruction of enemy vessels and transports at *ea, carrying out reconnaissance at tbe exits of the Straits and bases, .andtmber of other missions. One of the most Important missions of the torpedo submarines vlll be the prevention of secret infiltration Of enemy submarines through the straitslosed sea, and ths destruction of submarines detected within the limits of this sea.
Finally, surfaca missile vessels (particularly missile boats) mustefinite place in tbe composition of tbe strike forces of the Havy in closed sea theaters. In our view, the main mission of surface mlseile vessels vlll be combating surface vessels of the antisubmarine defense, carrying out combat operations against the sea communications lines of the enemy in order .to protect our own sea supply, and also combating enesy vessel forces In the ialand areas vhlle supporting the ground forces In seising the straits zone and in support of the exiting of submarines through the straits.
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The combat durability of surface missile vessels can beprimarily by providing them vith reliable antiaircraft defense, especially by arming these vessels vith antiaircraft misBiles and including special PVO vessels in the battle order of missile formations. The conditions of closed theaters make it possible to provide PVO for surface vesselsonsiderable extent by use of tbe forces and facilities of the maritime large units of tbe troops of the PVO of the Qountry.
Side by side vith its strikeleet must have in its ccetposltion perfected forces of entlsubmarlne defense: vessels, antisubmarine aviation, fixed antisubmarine facilities, and also forces and facilities of antlmine defense, the basis.of vhlch are minesveepers. To provide timely data on low-flying aerial targets to tbe strike forcesleet and the troops of the PVO of the Country, it is necessary to have in the compositionleet radar patrol submarines and surface vessels. Because of tho aim of our enemies to use low altitudes to the maximum degree for the flights of their aviation, it ia impossible under current conditions to ensure timely end effective use of the forces and facilities of the PVO to repel an air attackufficient number of these vessels.
The conduct of aeridl reconnaissance in closed sea theaters is highly complicated because of tbe necessity of carryingllghts over enemy territoryowerful antiaircraft defense system organized in advance. Therefore, the presenceleetufficient number of modern reconnaissance aircraft for carrying out short-range and long-range reconnaissancerimary necessity.
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Finally, the fleet must have at its disposal potentialities for accomplishing yet another of its missions, we are talking about tactical naval landing operations (desent). In tbe course of .the execution of operations by the ground forcea for the purpose of seizing straits zones and also Individual islands and groupa of islands, it may be necessaryleet to debark small tactical landing forces in coordination with airborne and tank landing forces (desent). leet nay also be given theon of supporting troopsront in forcing the straits, using its means to carry out the ferrying of units of troops and combat materiel.
To fulfill theseleet will require from the Initiation of militaryertain amount of fast and email amphibious transport means. To avoid wasteful expenditurea on the composition of these means In peacetime, it Is advisable to have them under the authority of civil maritime organizations, rather thanleet, end to use them in the national economy for internal sea and river transport. The experience of oporating landing craft left over from World War II proved that theyuitable and economic means for short hauls, particularly when loading and unloading cargoeacoast not equipped with wharves.
Thus, the nature of the missions of the fleets and the military-geographic conditions of the closed sea theaters require, in general, the following forces within tho composition of these fleets:
missile, with cruise missiles; torpedo, with .nuclear and conventional torpedoes of different designation;
and also radar and hydroacouStlc patrol submarines;
econnaissance, and- antisubmarine;:'.
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coastal missile units, armed with cruise missiles with an inertlal (avtonomnaya) guidance ayatem and homing;
surface vessels (and boats): mlasile, antisubmarine, PVO, landing (only inadar patrol, and other special vessels.
It is quits obvious that for the support of the basic forces enumerated it is necessary to have an auxiliary fleetln size and purpose, including submarine tenders, supply ships, emergency rescue sbips, repair, ships, etc.
Now let us examine some problems pertaining to theof typical naval missions, using tbe forces and weapons mentioned.
Destruction of aircraft carrier attack large .units. The mission of destroying aircraft carrier attack large units in closed sea theaters is no less real than In open sea theaters. For example, in tho Mediterranean Sea, constantly being cedepleyed and maintained in high combat readiness,ig aircraft carrier large unit,. Sixth Fleet, having in its composition two heavy aircraft carriers. Cruisers, and destroyers. The Sixth Fleet, le the main strike formation of the naval forces of NATO in the southern direction which is actually ready to deliver strikes against coastal objectives and accomplish missions ln support of the ground forces. Tbe aircraft carriers and missile vessels of tbe aircraft carrier attack large unit (AUS) must be evaluated, as primary objectives, the destruction of which has independent operational consequences end, in addition, decisively affects the accomplishment of missionsleet In the support of.ithe ground forces. In general, the mission of destroying an aircraft carrier attack large unit requires the execution of an independent operationleet In coordination with long-range aviation, miasile troops, and forces of the neighboring front.
As we have already noted, the accomplishment of the mission of destroying an aircraft carrier attack large unit in closed sea theatersumber of intrinsic peculiarities. The military-geographic conditions make it possible not only to defend the aircraft carriers with tbe forces of the aircraft carrier attack large unit Itself, but also to use for this, ln full measure, the entire antiaircraft defense system of the member countries of NATO, as well as the system of antisubmarine defense created in advance, based on the equipment of tbe fixed facilities of the border and of tbe mobile forces. The heavily interrupted natureheater (tbe presence of Island and reef areas) facilitates tbe massing of enemy vessels and hampers
their detection. Alloaket it possible for the enemy, vlthout part lc alar risk, to concentrate aircraft carriers at considerably shorter distances from our seacoast and to deliver sudden strikes against considerably more distant (by -OGilometers) rear area objectives than in open sea theaters. This thesis Is borne out by the experience of tbe exercises of. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.
Thus, in closed sea theaters lt is necessary to consider tvo possible alternatives of aircraft carrier attack large unit opeations: first, vhen an aircraft carrier large unit Is concentrated before the initiation of combat operations in island areas which areistanceilometers (In certain cases perhaps even less) from our seacoast, and second, when an aircraft carrier attack large unit moves up from remote areasea theater to deliver aa attack at tbe operating radius of its aviation.
In the first case, tbe possibility oftrike against the aircraft carriers before they launch their aviation is unlikely. The main slsslonleet will be toounterstrike within the shortest possible period of time for the purpose of destroying the aircraft carriers and preventing repeated use of the aircraft carrier aviation.
In the secondhen an aircraft carrier attack large unit moves up from remote areas of the sea to the boundary of launch of its aviation, the mission is totrike against the aircraft carriers before tbe initial launching of the strike aviation. In spits of the fact that the conditions of closed sea theaters provide ample opportunity to employ refueling of aircraft carrier aviation in flight or at airfields on land, one oust conclude that the most advantageous alternative forithe enemy, ensuring the secrecy of operations, -is to launch hla planes from distances which allow them to fly to the objectivetrike without intermediate refueling.
The possible launching limit of aircraft carrier aviation for delivering attacks against probable objectives without intermediate refueling must be considered as tbe nearest boundary of that area In which it is necessary to concentrate
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tbe naln efforts to destroy the aircraft carrier attack large unit (to deliver the main strike). The far boundary of that area can be defined as the maximum distance at vhlch it is possible toassed strike by the most powerful forces against the aircraft carrier attack large unit. We support the opinion, expressed by many writers, that the most advantageous method of operations against an aircraft carrier attack large unit, considering its high mobility. Is the deliveryingle strike which is as powerful as possible, primarily with nuclear-missile weapons, within tbe shortest possible period of tie* efter; the detection of the aircraft carrier attack large unit by reconnaissance.
Since,ule, aircraft carrier attack large units in closed sea theaters operate as separate strike groupsgainst which attacks can be delivered either simultaneously, or in sequence over short intervals of tine, or, finally,onsiderabls gap in time and place, the goal of each strike must be the destruction of one aircraft carrier. Consequently, the goal of the operation can be achieved by the delivery of at least two strikes, ensuring the destruction of both aircraft carriers.
The mission of destroying aircraft carriers can be accomplished by tbe Joint efforts of missile aviation (the airf the Navy and long-range aviation) and submarines. The missile troops of the Supreme High Command (VGK) can be used mainly for the destruction of aircraft carriers and servicing orces at bases. The forcesront (missiles of tacticalesignation, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aviation) can be enlisted to support tbe combat operations of missile aviation and submarines.
For the conduct of combat operations against slrcraft carrier attack large units at sea during the first daysar, aviation will have the greatest use. Later on, ae nuclear torpedo or missile submarinesea theater, the role of submarine forces in the destruction of aircraft carrier attack large units will Increaseevel of equal importance with missile aviation. To destroy an aircraft carrier attack large unitowerful antiaircraft defense which is echeloned
In depth, it is necessary to deliver concentrated strikes by missile aviation forces using cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (snaryazheniye). Since the explosion of only one missileuclear warhead hitting the calculated point is sufficient to destroy any class of vessel, the expenditure of such missiles will be only one fifth or one Blxtb of theof missiles with conventional warheads.
Considering the vulnerability of cruise missilee-toartillery (ZA) and antiaircraft guided missile (ZURS) fire, it is advisable to employ salvo launching of missiles in delivering strikestrongly defended objective, in view of this, the Invulnerability to Jamming of cruise missiles has great importance, permitting the usearge number of them in each salvo. According to calculations, tbe destruction of one aircraft carrier operatingomponent of an aircraft carrier attack group (allowing for the opposition of tbe antiaircraft artillery of the vessels and four two-missile salvos of antiaircraft guided missiles) can be accomplished by one salvo of six airborne (aviatslonnaya) crulae missiles with nuclear"warheads launchedistanceilometers from the aircraft carrier attack group. trike by six-missile salvos from two directions simultaneously, the destruction of two large vessels (an aircraft carrierruiser) of an aircraft carrier attack group can be accomplished. In this case, of the twelve missiles launched in the two salvos, it is sufficient to have only six or seven missiles with nuclear warheads, and She other five or six missiles can have conventional warheads without causing substantial degradation of tbe results of the strike (the loss of delivery" aircraft en route is not allowed for here).
A somewhat different picture is presented with the use ofmissiles, which are vulnerable to Jamming. Tn thla case. In view of the impossibilityalvo launching of tbe required number of missiles from one direction, increasing tba density and reducing the depth of tbe combat formation of the delivery aircraft is achieved by organising it Into several parallel columnsnd also by launching two or more missiles on the beamuche) of one leading delivery aircraft. An indispensable condition for increasing the density of the strike is to attack from several directions. The experience of combat training confirms practically
the feasibility of launching; "Komet" missiles from severaloegrees apart. Calculations show that In an attack from three or more directions the probability of the "Komet" missiles reaching the target Increases toercent, as againstercent in an attack from one direction.
To deliver strikes beyond the limitslosed sea, misBilo* carrying aviation must overcome the antiaircraft defense while flying over enemy territory. Considering this, it is necessary to select flight routes over areas which are less saturated by the forces and facilities of the antiaircraft defense and to neutralise these forces and facilities in the zone of flight to the extent possible. However, considerable forces and facilities are required to neutralize the antiaircraft defense, so lt can only be fully accomplished by tbe joint effortsleetront. Along with tha use of front missiles and fighter-bomber aviation, the facilities of radio countermeasures (radioprotivcdeystviye) have primary Importance in overcoming the antiaircraft defense, particularly in neutralizing tbe system of radiotechnical surveillance of aircraft (vozdushnoye radlo-tekhnicheekoye nablyudeniye) and the control facilities of tbe enemy.
In addition to carrying out the supporting measures mentioned above. In order to overcome tbe enemy antiaircraft defense system (both the land antiaircraft defense system and the antiaircraft defense system of the aircraft carrier attack large unitt is necessary that all branches of aviation make maximum use of low flight altitudes, right down to" nedgehopping. We "believe tbat flight at minimum altitudes must be maintained by strike groups of aircraft both over the sea and ovef enemy territory, insofar as local terrain permits. Taking on altitude should be done only when tbe objective of the strike has been approached to 'within limits ensuring tbe possibility of launching and guiding (navedeniye) airborne cruise missiles.
Regardless of the limited number of submarines which can be counted on beyond the limitslosed sea during the first daysar, they must be used not only for strikes against enemy vessels but also for carrying out reconnaissance. From the beginning of combat operations, when reconnaissance information
will be particularly needed for the delivery ofediate ccunterstrlke against the enemy, submarines my- turn out to be tbe only reliable aeane of reconnaiasar.ee beyond the Haitilosed sea. At tbe saoc tine, after detecting an aircraft carrier attack large unit and reporting it, submarines must use every opportunity to deliver nuclear striked against the eneay aircraft carriers. Considering .this and the complexity of resupplying ammunition, the maximum possible number of torpedoes on submarines should have nuclear warheads (with the exceptionertain number of antisubmarine torpedoes and torpedoes for firing at antisubmarine vessels).
In addition to the submarines deployed on the approaches to narrows, it is advisable to deploy: the remaining submarines in small groups (two to three submarines each)ide front on the approaches to tbe probable combat maneuvering areas of tbe aircraft carriers. isposition of sub-aarines (PL) makes it possible to direct one to two groups of submarinesrigade of eubcarlnes against tbe eneay in practically any direction he aoves. Of cour8e, in this case,mall number of aubaarines sally forth to tbe attack, but the use of long-range torpedoes with nuclear charges compensatesertain extent for the small number of attacking submarines.
It is advisable to use atomic submarines armed with torpedoes only for strikes against large enemy vessels. It is advisable to assign to them waiting positions outside the Halts of the zone of probable movement of the aircraft carrier attack large unit, because tbe forces of the eneay antisubmarine defense (PLO) will carry out their aost intensive search for submarines in that zone. In delivering strikes, atoale'using -their great underwater,ilometers perpproach the aircraft carrier attack large unit (AUS) on the basis of reconnaissance information, with the design of delivering tbe strike from tbe bow angles (nosovoy kursovoy ugol) of the enemy. In this case submarines can launch nuclear torpedoes against the vessels of the aircraft carrier attack large unit from distances ofoilometers, without penetrating the curtains of distant and close vessel protection Of the aircraft carriers. On the other hand, when delivering
attacks freeubmarine oust approach toistanceilometers of the enemy vessels. Both for self-defense and In the Interest of combating enemy missile-carrying submarines, atomic submarines must destroy every enemy submarine detected, and to do this they must have reliable antisubmarine weapons and equipment for tbe detection of submarines.
The positions for missile submarines must be chosen with the design of carryinghift (manevr) of trajectories of tbe cruise missiles which will cover the largest number of probable directions of enemy movement. Considering the necessity of salvo firing, missile submarines are most advisably employed in groups, ensuring the launching of six to eight cruise missiles in one aalvo. According to calculations, in this case, in the deliverytrike against an aircraft carrier attack group (AUG) of typical composition, it can be guaranteed that one of the missilesuclear warhead will reach the target.
Tbe most crucial problem in organizingtrike la providing the missile auboarlnes with accurate data*on the location and factora of movement of the enemy fcr calculating an aiming point which ensures tbe lock-on (zaxhvat) of tbe enemy vessels by tbe booing system of the missile. With clear-cut organization of the control of submarines and aviation, this task can be accomplished by Aviation carryinghorough reconnaissance (dorazvedka) of the enemy. Also exerting great influence on the success of the firing is the 'accuracy with which the submarines determine their own position; this can be ensured by the use of radio navigation systems of high accuracy and by further Improvement of the navigational instruments on submarines.
As basic measures for the support of combat operations of submarines beyond the limitslosed sea, the following must be provided for: strikes by missiles against the coaatal centers of the antlaubmarlne defenae, destruction of aircraft carrier antisubmarine hunter-killer groups at aea by the forces of aviation, and measures for self-defense by the submarines.
Obwlously, in operations for the destruction of enemy forces at sea, the greatest effect can be achieved:'if there is
tactical coordination between submarines and aviation. However, considering tbe high mobility of aircraft carrier and missile vessel formations, as well as the complexity of achieving tactical coordination, delay in the delivery of strikes, for the purpose of assemblying all forces at assigned positions orpecific time, cannot be tolerated. The power of each strike group enables it to inflict defeat upon the enemy even when tha planned sequence is not observed.
What has been said does notenial of tbe necessity of coordination. Tbe point is only sthat under the conditions of the employment of miss lie-nuclear weapons, tbe most important thing is to anticipate tbe enemy. If the situationhe enemy operates in accordance with an alternative which was allowed for in planning, or close to It, then, undoubtedly, the best results will be obtained by combat operations carried out In the most expedient order. Specifically, the following sequence of strikes against an aircraft carrier attack large unit can be recommended as one of the advisable alternatives. First, missile submarinestrike, since these forces ensure the greatest surprisetrike because of the low flight altitudes of cruise missiles. After this, exploiting the weakening of the antiaircraft defense of the enemy large unitesult of the strike of the submarines, missile aviationtrike. Torpedo submarines attack last,hance to use their weapon most effectivelyisorganized enemy. articular case, the strikes of aviation and torpedo submarines may coincide in time. Inase, to ensure mutualviation must use only nuclear alrbursts and submarines must use only underwater bursts.
It Is quite obvious that success in combatting, an aircraft carrier attack large unit depends entirely on reconnaissance, especially aerial.
For the fulfilment of the missions of aerial reconnaissance, it is necessary. In our opinion, to enlist simultaneously considerable groups of aircraft, which must,arrow sector and at low altitudes, surmount the zone least saturated with the forces and facilities of antiaircraft defenses and then disperse ln accordance with their assigned reconnaissance routes. For the detection of an aircraft carrier large unit, not only the forces
of naval reconnaissance must be used, but also the reconnaissance of tbe oiaslle troops of tbe Supreme High Coaoand and of Long-range aviation.
Support of the ground forceaaritime area. Without examining all of tbe above-mentioned missions which might be accomplished on behalfaritime front, we shell dwell briefly only on the fundamentala of accomplishing the task of disrupting the entry of enemy naval forces through the stralta.
As is well known, the operational altuetion in closed seas dependsonsiderable degree on the possibility of the entry of enemy naval force* from outside. In view of this, fleets in closed theatera have always had the mission of interdicting or disrupting the entry of forces of en enemy fleet through the straits. The importance of this mission rests in the fact that its accomplishment supports to"the greatest degree the success of the operations of the ground forces in maritime areas, and creates favorable conditions for the opeations of tbe forcesleet in fulfilling other missions in the cloaed seas.
Tbe essence of the mission under examination ia defined by the requirement that the enemy formation be destroyed before Its passage through the straits, and tbat individual groups penetrating through the straits be destroyed in tbe area adjacent to theefore the accociplisbment of their niaslona. Depending on the general situation and the conpoeition of the enemy forces, this mission con be considered ss ooe'ibf the Individual missions of support of tho ground forces, and be accomplished in the courao of dally operational activities, or it can be consideredundamental mission of support and be accomplished by carrying out an offensive operation for the destruction of the forces of the enemy fleet.
We believe that,umber of instances, it will be Impossible to differentiate sharply the miaslon Of disrupting the entry of enemy naval forces through the straits snd the mission of destroying his forces In the straits zone and beyond Its Halts, since it will not always be possible to determine what the enemy will elect to do, to send his forces through the straits or to operate them on behalf of his ground forces located outside the closed sea. Obviously, there will be Instances when one will
occur and instances where the other will occur. Therefore, the conduct of an offensive operation for the destruction Of the enemy forces, andefensive operation, is in order. This fits the conditions of the initial periodar, during which, as is known, in addition to pursuing the lamed late goals of this or that operation, one must always pursue the goal of seizing the initiative, whichecisive Influence on tbe entire course of combat operations during that period.
In the final analysis, in determining the conditions foriven operation during the initial periodar, we do not see the necessity for detecting without fail concrete indications of tbe intentions of the eneay to send his forces through the straits. Moreover, lt Is not always possible to do this sufficiently ahead of time. It seems to us that the operation under examination should be carried out from the very start of combat operations and should have the characterountorstrike for the purpose of destroying tbe main enemy strike (or landing) formations, detected even before tbe start of combat operations. In this case, irrespective of the intentions of tbe eneay for the use of his forces, tbe goal of the operation'is attained by their destruction.
In general, to achieve tbe goal of tbe operation,of the following particular tasks must be provided for:
tba destruction or weakening of an enemy formation detected at its basesj
tbe destruction of tbe main eneay forces at sea, including in the straits zone;
the destruction of units of forces which have penetrated through tha straits in the area adjacent to the strait's.
In setting forth the particular tasks inequence, we do not mean that it is required to fulfill all of themirlthout fail. The point is that they must be considered during the planning of tbe operation. It is not difficult to imagine various alternative situations ln which it will be unnecessary to accomplish this or that particular task.
Speaking of the destruction of enemy vessels at their bases, we have In mind those bases and points of basing vhlch are located within tbe limits of tbe straits zone or in tbe area just outside tbe straits. In accomplishing this mission In closed sea theaters, the main role belongs to large units of ballistic missiles of operational designation of the ground forces, missile submarines, and coastal missile unite of'the Navy. Bach of these arms of forces can deliver strikes against vessels at their bases either Independently or in coordination with each other. By this, not only are the enemy vessels at the bases destroyed, but also the naval bono or point of baelng itself is either destroyed or put out of operationong time.
Tne use of ballistic alsslleaumber of advantages because they are less subject to dispersion (rasseivanlye) in comparison with cruise missiles and ere Invulnerable to the forces and facilities of the enemy antiaircraft defense. in fulfilling tbe mission by Joint efforts lt Is expedient to plan the delivery of the first strike by ballistic missiles, pursuing the goal of not only delivering destruction to the enemy vessels and the installationease, but also of neutralizing tho forces and facilities of the enemy antiaircraft defense, thus decreasing significantly tbe counteraction to tbe subsequent employment of cruise missiles from submarines and coastal launchers.
In using cruise aissllee, lt is necessary to allow for the fact that because of their low flight altitudes their use for strikes against objectives remote from the seacoest is limited by the nature of the local topography. Specifically, the altitude of the terrain in tbe zone of flight of cruise missiles must noteters above sea level. In'this respect, coastal missile units of the Navy are more limited in the selection of possible directions and dletancas -of fire than submarines, which can select tbe most advantageous direction of fire by changing the launching position. On the other hand, submarines are inferior to coastal nlsslle units in accuracy of fire, since the error In determination of the location of the submarine is added to the dispersion of tho missiles. In closed seas, vltb tbe existing means of supporting the navigation of submarines, this error in location may amount to one to four kilometers. Considering
these circumstances, lt Is necessary to use ballistic missiles for the destruction of objectives more remote froa tbe coast, and cruise missiles for the destruction of coastal objectives.
In planning combat operations for the destruction of vessels at sea, lt is necessary to distinguish between two cases. If the vessels are effecting movement in long and narrow straits, then cruise end ballistic missiles can be .used successfully for the destruction of the vessels. If the enemy vessels are located outside the straits and have freedom of maneuver, then it is not advlsablo to use either cruise or ballistic mlssllos with inertlal (avtonomnoye) guidance, since during the time of preparing ths missiles for?.lAtnchlng, tbe vessels can change the factors of their movement sharply, and by the moment of the strike be beyond the limits of the radius of destruction. In this case, the vessels can be destroyed by naval attack aviation, using missiles and nuclear bombs.
The delivery of Joint missile strikes against enemy vessels forcing -the straits requires very careful organization, especially the organization of reliable reconaissance, and timely preparation and precise direction of fire. Tbe organization of missile strikes in the straits zone must provide for determination of tbe limits for detection of the enemy (vith conslderstion of the readiness of the missiles for launching) and for designation of the positions and time for delivering the strikes. During successive strikes, to avoid mutual Interference (pooekh) during the flight of the missiles, esch strike group oust beleg pointsime ofoment of firing (vzryv) tbe missiles. The time of launch for tbe missiles Is calculated on tbe bests of the assigned time periodstrike, with allowance for their flight timethe target.
Considering the substantial-differences in the nature of-the preparation and methods of fire of forces participatingtrike, it is impossible during the coursetrike to shift tbe aiming points and introduce some sort of adjustments requiring changes in the initial data for firing. This leads unavoidablytrike. Thus, .the calculated areatrike, positions, and aiming points, and consequently all of the initial data for firing, remain unchanged. ule, tbe conditions of straits make it possible to control tbe forces precisely, changing only the time of the strikes ln accordance vith tbe
speed of movement of the enemy. These conditions also determine the paramount role of reconnaissance, as the successtrike depends primarily on the trustworthiness and accuracy of its information.
Shifting the areatrike is possible and necessary only in case the enemy breaks off forcing the straits end puts into bis bases (into his roadsteads). It is to be supposed that in this case there will be sufficient time for shifting fire, especially if the probable holding points of tho enemy are taken into account In advance and specified to the commanders of large units and units as alternate strike objectives.
Successful operations of our forces beyond the limitslosed sea do not exclude the possibilityenetration through; the straits by individual enemy groups, for the destruction ofpecial formation of forces must be deployed in advance. In the composition of this formation, coastal missile units of the Havy can be effectively used; they would' deliver the first strikes against the enemy formation while it is still in the straits, and then destroy the enemy vessels which have penetrated into tbe area adjacent to tbe straits. An important advantage of coastal missile unitshe ability of the duty BUb-units (dezhurnoyo'-ip-odrazdeler.iye) to deliver strikes against an enemy appearing unexpectedly in shorter periods of time than can any other naval forces. For carrying out combat operations for tbe destruction of enemy forces which have penetrated through the straits, other naval forces must also be enlisted, especiallyubmarines and surface missile vessels. Of primary Importance for the successful accomplishment of the mission by submarines is their deployment In advance In the area adjacent to the straits, ensuring their timely maneuver for the Interception of tbe enemy suddenly sallying forth from the straits.
It should be noted that tbe conditionslosed theater, primarily the feasibility of carrying out overlapping reconnaissance by various forces, and also tbe possibility for ample utilization of coastal facilities of surveillance, facilitate the organization and practical accomplishment of coordination of all forces, and make it possible to deliver strikes against the enemy in the most advantageous sequence.
Such are Bone of the elements of tho accomplishment of the mission of disrupting the entry through the straits of the naval forces of the enemy. The Growing operational-tactical potential of the forces, based on the power of missile-nuclear weapons, cakes it possible to accomplishission, not by blockading the straits from the side of the closed pert of the theater, but by destroying the eneay forces st their bases and at sea beycnd the Halts of the closed part of the theater.
In ths present article, methods of using naval forces ln closed sea theaters in the initial period of war have been examined only in general outline and incconfprmlty with tbe situation in these theaters at the present time, with consideration of the prospects for tbe next few years. In conclusion, lt should be noted that the special complexity of tola situation, caused by tbe Halted dimensions of tbe closed sea theaters and the presence in the immediate proximity of bases for aggression prepared in advance on the territories of the member countries of NATO, urgently requires all possible automatlEatlon of the control of naval forces, above all, the automatization of the collection and processing of information.
1. Headquarters Comment: Colonel General Anton losipovich Gaatilovich Is on the faculty of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
Original document.
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