CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEBCX
MSCiRAICDUM FOR TEE DIRZCTC3
SUBJECT: JgflcUOMtrategic Missile
1. It Gecns clear that the Soviet anticipate that tho UB nay oocn resort to uilLtary action against the niflsile bases In
Cuba, that they wish to avoid having to respond to this novo, and
ore therefore trying bard to bring about negctiationa which will forestall it. If the action io novurtheleae tai:en, ve believe that, while the Sovietc will feel the need to retslloto in sone wuy# they will try to avoid doirg so in awhich chnrply or suddenly raises the rinks of escalation.
e do cot exclude that there nay be seme coqprehensivo elenient in the Soviet reaction which could lead then to acta of retaliation without careful calculation of US responses. Thio
xcluded froa rxt erratic
downgrading and declassification
night be the core true if soviet cnounlties sustained in the attacks should be high. Id general, vo believe that the rinjnuc attack necessary to render the ndsslle Bites and aircraft inoperable vculd have the best chance of reducing the decent of irrotlcnolity in the soviet response.
soviet reactions to us mr strila*
3. they will probably ollcv tensions to subside andectiona to run their course in cuba before beginningretaliatory novas* ve believe thvy would notoltber in berlin or ogoinst other usit seens increasingly likely that the focal point oftion will be us bases on tbe periphery of tbe sovietthey are likely toevere politicalturkey or other us allies as veil as neutralaon the ussr, rather than take military ocasurea against
| to bear their own local power advantage,
then. in short, the soviet will ain ot ellcl noting us dilltory installations surrounding the ussr, where the soviets can bring
* h. In Berlin, they nay pick up once again tbair caopaign of Haltedo weaken the Western position. But they will probably proceed with caution, realizing tbat they havethe VS determination and willingness to confront the IBSR directly in any crisis Involving vital IS interecto.
5. There will of course be an extrexely sharp political reaction, with tba Soviets seeking the widest possible condecnB-tlon of tbe strike and ofolicyhole.
'y M Cur ciALGury estinate of the Cuban reaction io as followci
astro would probably wish to react strongly and the
Soviets would fled It extrenely difficult to restrain hie, even
f they wished to do so. He would use air defense forces at bis disposal against attacking aircraft. Ke would also be likely to use aircraft in Cuban hands and the full weight of tbe artillery with which he has ringed Guantanamo against the US Havel base.
b. If he survived tbe consequences of an attackuantanarjo, Castro would have sharply increased problens in / maintaining stability. Rifts within tho regies and between
tbe regtre and the people vould be videned. loso of cuban lives and property vould arouse cngor agelnot the tb,is would be offset by tbe lupressicu of soviet and castro lopoteuce. however, we believe tbat in tbe absences invasion tho chances oreuccessful uprioing.
c. tbe experience of hovlre buen let downthe soviet union would weaken castro's own cocfldenco andndermine his position. this jn turn wouldtbs popular ro action to the retire. soviet retaliation eeeAaA the U3 in other ports of the world irould have near- effect on cuban attitudes but would be less oeu^rj-ful to cubans than actionsouch their own island.
latin aixrlepn i'-no-rmon
7- the substantial support in latin america for tbe IB approach to tbe problem of the nleolle bases in cuba vo'ild bo likely to shrink considerably after an air strike, let the fact of soviet missile- bases in cuba bos made an irportict difference in tbs viewpoint of many latin americans toward tbe castro regime, end some governments have cemitted
theaselves to an extent thnt would coke It difficult for then to turn against tbe US. We expect that In the clrcunstanceo likely to develop scce La<;ln American Ooverccentc wouldS air strike butajorltyfcely to ev.pport tha US at least tacitly and to refrain front voting against the US In the VS,
Reaction .tofij Allieshs Weu>;rul1otr.
8. S air etrtko would of course give added Impetus to existing fciars of general woreny quarters of tbe free world. Coning on top ol* Soviet proepures to begin negotiations, it vceld bring forthchorus of ccouenaotion in cany quarters and would probably be exploited an the occasion for anti-US decenstrations in cany areas.
9- believe, however, that the adverse effects ofcove wouldroat extent be offset, end in nanysubetentiolly outweighed. This would result free eeeen-
tial sympathy for the US side in this controvcrey, by tbe evident widespread censure of respect and even relief nt evldencee of US detendnotion to prevail, ondtrong current ofarticularly enxcg free world officialsthat decicive action.
with all its ricks, is preferable to accepting defeat or stalenote In this crisis.
K-eV^-d With very few exceptions, the cost significant oapect of Afro-Asian neutraliet reaction so far has hscn the lack of nilitant opposition to the OS stood, and indeed, the evidence of sot* private syDpavhy in certain quarters. On tbe whole, j, however, while, an air strike would be strongly condenned, both officially and popularly, in nsny Af id -Asian States, it would not coneroat surprise to nost Afro-Asiaoe, and if j;id the job without bringing oa genera!ubstantial nunber would privately applaud, Hcnetheless, tha US should te braced for sone outbreaks of violence against Anerican personnel and property.
FCR TBE BOARD OF KfiTlOMAi