THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Created: 10/28/1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Information Ol0

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prepared for the executive committee of the national security council

further dissemination of information contained herein is NOT authorized.

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SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Surveillance ofctober and preliminary analysis of yesterday's coverage shows that the development of both IRBM andites in Cuba is continuing Its rapid pace. AllRBM launchers now appear to have reached fullreadiness. One nuclear storage facility is essentially complete, but none of the bunkers observed is yet bellevedto be in operation.

was brought down by

There are some indications thatost yesterday over Banes theystem.

Cuban military units remainigh state of alert and the Castro regime isaximum effort to whip up troop and public morale.

II. As0 EST, two or possibly three more Soviet sliips are heading for Cuba in addition to the two dry cargo ships and four tankers we have been watching. The tanker GROZNY should have reached tbe quarantine line early this morning. One Soviet transport aircraft which reached Brazil is there to pick up the body of the Soviet ambassador. scheduled for Cuba via North Africa and Brazil turned back at Morocco.

III. No significant redeployment of major Soviet ground, air or naval forces bas beon noted. The general posture of Soviet ground forces ln forward areas is one ofdefensive readiness. The overall total of Sovieton extended operations is somewhat greater than normal,lass submarine may be ln the area of thequarantine line.

In ^on-military developments, Khrushchev's bid forwithdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey looks like the first steperies of moves to demonstrate the USSR's readinessegotiated solution. Sovietcontinue to play down the possibility that the Cuban crisis could lead to general war.

hant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro' invitation to visit Cuba, and might go as early as Tuesday. There is thus far only fragmentary mixed reaction to the Pr ident's rejection of Khrushchev's Cuba-Turkey proposal.

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I. TBE SITUATION IN CUBA

Construction and other development activities at both IRBM and MRBM sites continueapid pace, according to photography ofctoberreliminary evaluation of photography ofctober.

Missile support equipment, Including aboutehicles, was moved into the vicinity of Guanajay IRBMetweenndctober. At the MRBM sites, the missile-launching complexes are being checked out rapidly, and automaticweapons and personnel trenches have been prepared during the last few days. Camouflage is being extended and Is becoming more effective, and dispersion of personnel and equipment also is evident.

AllRBM launchers now are estimated to be fully

Construction of probable nuclear storage facilities at both MRBM and IRBM sites was continuing onndctober. None of the bunkers observed is yet believed to be lnalthough one at Guanajay Sites essentially

Microwave relay towers have been noted at some of the MRBM and IRBM sites photographed onctober, and there are bigh frequency antennae at Sagua La Grandend 2. These indicate the development of command and control communications systems.

A missile propellant offloading and transshippingnow has been identifiedouble-fenced areailes west of Havana at Punta Gerardo, near Bahla Honda.

An American photographic reconnaissance aircraft crashed about noon Cuban time onctober in the Biuy.-Antllla area of northwestern Oriente Province.

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pianeTeax hat its wreckage and the body of tbe pilot bad been located.

Castro bad impliedublic announcement earlier onctober that foreign aircraft flying over Cuban territory would be attacked, and Havana radio claimed in mid-morning that anti-aircraft batteries "drove off unidentified war-planes flying over wide areas of eastern Cuba."

"The planned track ofook lt over or within the range of eightites at an estimated altitude0 feet. Assuming the mission flew the planned track,verflew sixites before tbe flight terminated in the vicinity of Banes on the north coast of Cuba. Anite ls located near Banes and ls believed to be operational. Thes estimated to* have aeffective altitude capability0 feet and limited capability0 feet. The loss ofas probably caused by intercept by anrom the Banes site, or pilot hypoxia, with the former appearing more likely on the basis of the available information."

the populace bad had no visible effect ln removing the "apathy and depression" which he had noted since the first

regime ln order to place the countryar footing.

Internal repercussions of the crisis include snags in communications and transportation, and both clandestine and press reports state that hospital treatment has been restricted to emergency cases. ational emergencywas set up onctober to draft workers to fill jobs wherever they were needed.

An Internal Cuban broadcast was heard on theofctober in which the chiefilitia unit headquarters ln Las Villas Prlvince ordered that "close surveillance be maintained over militiamen and severebe taken with those who may demonstrate lack of loyalty towards the present regime."

II. SOVIET SHIPPING AND AIR TRAFFIC TO CUBA

Tbe four Soviet tankers and two Soviet dry cargo ships previously reported to be proceeding toward Cuba are still en route as0 EST and have been joined by two or por-haps three additional Soviot vessels. One of these, the LISICHANSK, cleared the Bosporus onctober0 tons of crude oil. The MICHURINSK passed through the Kiel Canal onctober en route to Cuba fron Leningrad with timberons of unknown cargo.

Another dry cargo vessel. the CHERNYAKHOVSK, may also have started for Cuba. She was observed movingesterly direction in the Baltic onctober and has been regularly engaged in the Cuban trade ln the past.

The East German passenger vessel VOELKERFREUNDSCIIAFTointiles from Havana harbor0 EST. The Polish dry cargo vessel BIALYSTOK probably will reach Cuba today; it wasautical miles east of Havana onctober. The Soviet tanker GROZNY probably reached the US quarantine line early this morning.

A Sovietransport scheduled to pick up the body of the Soviet Ambassador to Brazil was en route to Rio onctober. Anothercheduledrip from Moscow to Havana via Morocco, West Africa, and Brazil, turned back at Rabat for reasons as yet unknown.

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2 III. THS SITUATION IN THS BLOC A. MILITARY

We have noted the following Soviet militaryan assessment of their significance will be issued later this morning by the USIB Watch Committee.

No significant redeployment of major ground, air, or naval forces has been noted. Elements of most of thecommands are continuing what appears to be normal

One9 aircraft outbound from Berlin in tbecorridor on the afternoon ofctober was intercepted by two Soviet FIREBAR aircraft. Three passes were, USEUCOM, comments that this incident and other upgrading of air defense capability suggest that the Soviets may beof some sort of corridor harassment.

Ground: There is no evidence that ground forces of the western military districts of the USSR have moved or are preparing to move to the forward area. US attaches in Moscow, however, have been denied permission to visit the Belorussian, Kiev, and Carpathian Military Districts.

The general ground force posture in the forward area is that of precautionary defensive readiness.

ion missions report no large scale movements on the roads. There are no suggestionsommunistmove in the Berlin area.

Khrushchev'sctober letter to President Kennedy, vbicb was published Immediately, constitutes Moscow's first specific proposalegotiated settlement of tbe Cuban crisis. Bis call for reciprocal Soviet-USof offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey undersupervision and for mutual non-aggressioncovering these two countries was designed toU Thant to intensify his mediatory efforts and toother UN members to increase pressure on the USompromise settlement. Khrushchev expressed the belief that it is possible "to end the conflict quickly" and that his proposal provides the "basisettlement."

Moscow probably will make further proposals calculated to deter US military action against the missile sites or, failing this, to make such action as costly as possible in political terms. Thectober bid for an exchange ofregarding Turkey and Cuba probably representsmaximum position. The USSR's next step may be tothese demandsS guarantee not to attack Cuba and to respect Cuban sovereignty in exchangeoviet commitment to cease work on tbe missile sites and eventually to remove them under some form of international Inspection.

Soviet spokesmen continue to play down the possibilityeneral war and to emphasize the USSR's readiness to workeaceful solution. ASS correspondentestern journalist onctober that he did not anticipate that the Cuban crisis would lead to an armed conflict between the US and the USSR "because Cuba is not important enough to cause the Soviet Union to go toe expressed the belief that the USSR wouldtrong response to US actions, but refused to speculate what form Soviet reaction might take. oviet diplomat in Genevaestern colleague onctober that although he nad no idea what the USSR's reaction would be, he was "certain" the Kremlin would notar over Cuba.

alk with Ambassador Kohler onctober, Soviet Foreign Ministry press chief Kharlamov said the USSR had not published the text of President Kennedy's speechit was full of "crude anti-Soviet attacks." Hespecifically to the President's statement regarding the falsity of Soviet public and private assurances that the military equipment being sent to Cuba was exclusively

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defensive. Khariamov twice charged that the control of US policy had passed into the hands of thee said the Soviet Union could not be treated like Belgium orand warned that Soviet ships would be defended if necessary.

Ambassador Kohler reported, however, that in general Khariamov seemed toenuine desire for The Soviet official said it was time for the two sides to sit down together and workolution.

The USSR hasrial balloon regarding another heads-of-government meeting in Vienna. Two Soviet embassy officials in Viennariend of Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky onctober with the suggestion thatAustria couldole in the Cuban crisis. They asked if Kreisky could do something to facilitate theof tensions, perhaps by offering Vienna as the siteummit meeting. Kreisky told the Soviet ambassador onctober tbat Austria would be glad to do what it can to facilitate negotiation. He suggested to the US Embassy that Khrushchev might find Hew York an undesirable siteeeting at the present time and recalled that the Soviet premier had enjoyed himself in Vienna during the1 meeting. It was evident that Kreisky wouldummit in Vienna, both for the sake of Austrian prestige andersonal boost in the forthcoming Austrian elections.

The first evidence of direct Soviet pressureS ally to dissociate itself from US policy on Cuba has comeeport on the Soviet ambassador's interview with Greek Foreign Minister Averoff onctober. Aftera Soviet memorandum on the Cuban situation, thewarned that by supporting the US in the crisis, Greece wasmost dangerous" position for its own Interests. He said that although the USSR would not allow the US to make another attempt to "subjugate" the Cuban people. It would notar and would workeaceful

Most of the bloc has not yet been heard to comment on the US rejection of Khrushchev'sctober proposals. Tho line that will be taken is indicated, however, by Radio Budapest, which describes the rejectionbitterto everybody." According to the Hungarians, the President was unresponsive to tbe "reasonable" Sovietbecause he is interested in maintaining tension,in connection with tbe US election campaign.

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Other East European commentary stresses theof tbe crisis. Radio Warsaw states that Khrushchev's proposal indicates the USSR Is willing to meet the United States "more than half way." East Germany's First Deputy Foreign Minister is quoted as saying that tbe Khrushchev's proposal demonstrates the USSR's "far-reaching preparedness for an understanding."

Some dimunltlon of public alarm in Poland, is indicated by the latest reports that scare buying hasanic buying in Bucharest, however, apparently continues. Some stores have been forced to close down, and tbe black market in food has reappeared.

In Yugoslavia, the official daily sounded tbe hope onctober that Khrushchev's acceptancehant's pleas for negotiations would bring the "perilous crisis streaming to its sensible end." If the situation does not Improve, however, Tito may meet with prominent neutralists,to unconfirmed reports from Belgrade. Nkrumah sent Tito and Nasir messages onctoberconcerted effort" to prevent any further deterioration of the

The Chinese Communists continue to strike the most militant notes in the bloc. According to the Peiping radio, US determination to "unleash direct military invasion against Cuba" becomes more apparent as additional events unfold each day. Tbe Chinese preferenceirm bloc posture in the Cuban crisis is again indicatedeople's Daily editorial ofctooer calling for mobilization of the people of the world to "smash US war provocations."

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IV. NON-BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

U Thant is thinking seriously of accepting Castro's invitation to visit Cuba. He may go to Cubaoping to take vlthubstantial group, mainly technicians vho could be used as expert observers atsites if they are allowed to inspect them. Castro said he would agreehant's proposal for aof missile site construction during negotiationsthe US halts "threats and aggressive actions,"the "naval

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa was expected toin New York onctober to talkhant,to establish the terms of referencehant's trip to Cuba.

Sweden's public reassertlon onctober of theof unlimited freedom of the seas in peacetime prompted Finland to do likewise the next day, fearing that delay might bring pressure from its "big neighbor." Swedishhave indicated the need for Stockholm to be formally "correct" because of the Baltic situation, but have made it obvious to US representatives that they expect the US to enforce the quarantine. The Swedish shipowners' association onctober recommended that Swedish ships submit tosearches under protest, reserving the right to claim damages. The master of the Coolangatta disregardedto this effect when he refused to stop onctober. Belgian shipowners reportedly decidedecret meeting that no Belgian ship will visit Cuba.

In Berlin there are some indications Of Soviet and East German efforts to create unrest and anxiety over the Cuban situation. oviet Embassy officialerman journalist that the USSR is powerful ln Berlin and able to take the initiative. East German border guards have asked some Berlin-bound motorists their opinions of the Cubanpossibly recording the answers, and the West Berlin SED hashands off Cuba" propaganda campaign.

British Foreign Secretary Lord Home onctober called in Soviet Charge1 Loginov and told him that the dangers ln the Cuban situation come not from the US blockade, but from the buildup of Soviet missile bases. The War Office hasthe travel of bloc attache's to the London area.attache's have made numerous requests to visit air bases, especially those with USAF units.

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Ambassador Dowling in Bono reports that he isimpressed by the support and approval of thepolicy by the government and people in Germany, and ln Europe generally. He believes there bas been no comparable response to US leadership since the decision to intervene ln Korea, and he feels this Is all the more remarkable since there is no illusion about the risk

Swiss Foreign Minister Wahlen considers that Soviet retaliation is more likely in Turkey and Iran than inor Cuba.

There has not yet been any reaction in Western Europe to tho Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters pertaining to Cuban and Turkish missile bases. Khrushchev's offer was received in London diplomatic quarters with "intenseut was described by British officials as."

_ tnalysis of the Soviet motivations in

Cuba estimates that one strategic consideration maythe belief that the Cuban missiles, because theyless warning time than ICBMs, wouldew andthreat to the SAC bomber capability.

however, tbat since Moscow is unlikely to have cnosen^a" strategic showdown in an area where It Is militarily more vulnerable, there must have been political considerations as

fB_affBafaV,otes the USSR's desire to augment its bar-gaining^flpacTty in respect to Berlin, the elimination of foreign bases, and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Other objectives are to test the willingness of the US and its Allies to stand uponfrontation and hence the credibility of US commitments around the world.

President Ayub told the US Ambassador onctober that one reason Pakistan has not publicly supported the United States on Cuba is that official statements by US allies outside the American hemisphere would merelyispute which Bhould be handled expeditiously by the OASocalized basis. Ayub stated his belief that resolute hardnes- backed by real power is the only posture tbat is successful in dealing with the USSR.

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Venezuela plans to offer two destroyers and oneto tbe OAS forces jointlyolombian offer of naval vessels. Colombia decided to limit its offer to naval forces when the War minister threatened to resign if land forces were sent offime of serious internal security problems. Venezuela also has had difficultyCastro-supported guerrillas and other belligerent groups.

Venezuela onctober became the first Latincountry to order full-scale mobilization of its armed forces. President Betancourt,eading advocate of action against Castro, wants to "put an end once and for all" to what he called Cuba's threat to Venezuelan security.

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President Goulart,5 October reply to President Kennedy's letter, adamantly reconfirmed Brazil's opposition to military measures against Cuba other than the quarantine. Heear that OAS decisions have been losingand that these decisions have been taken by amajority and with unjustifiable haste." Goulart showed very little concern over the threat to the hemisphere of the missiles in Cuba. He pointed out that "defense of the principle of self-determination of peoples, in its broadest sense, hasrucial point of tbe foreign policy ofnd he then stated that any form of Intervention in an American state inspired by alleged incompatibility of its political regime is deeply displeasing to the conscience of the Brazilian people.

Onctober Bolivia also declared its adherence to the principles of "non-intervention and self-determination" in the Cuban case, but endorsed tbe OAS vote calling for the use of force if necessary to maintain the "blockade."

President Goulart told tbe US Ambassador in Rio onctober that he had ordered leaders of the stevedores' union not to strike against handling American ships because Brazil supports the quarantine. This strike was reportedly ordered by the Communist Party. Accordingroadcast from Rio the dockers decided to suspend the boycott because the government bad shown disapproval. President Goulart also toldor Gordon that he had informed the Soviet Charge" that the Soviet aircraft which may land at Recife on Its way to Havana would be inspected by the Brazilian Air Force and any cargo removed.

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