1
mowing inrel/tgenc* orgon/xo/rom participated in tha preparation of Ihit
Ihe Central InreUjgorK* Aflenty aid necoaniio'ioni ot the Depa't-
jjt&Ct"'s'bte'NSA.
Director of Intelligence and Research; Department of Sfate Director. Defense Intelligence'AmMoiW Chief of Stat! lotrmy
Auhionl Chief of Novaloporlment of Iho Navy Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USA* Diroctor for Intelligence, Joint Staff Ihe Atomic Energy Commission Roprosentotrve lo tha US'B Director of the Nartooal Secvrny Agency
Abstoinings
The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, rhe mb(ect being outside
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
3
Likelihood and Consequencesroliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEAR
II. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR
CANDIDATES
A. The Status of the Eight
Communist China
Japan
Sweden
West
pecial
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
A. Communist
C. The French Program and We Problem of European15
IV. POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR NUCLEAR
POWERS TOWARD
A. The Soviet Attitude Toward
T""f'"-" 17
C. The French Attitude Toward Proliferation .. 17
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSION AGREEMENT.BAN. OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR
VI. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR
ANNEX A: ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING ANNUCLEAR28
LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCESROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons anddelivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.
CONCLUSIONS
the increasing availability of uranium, andand technicians, the developmentinimalweapons capability has come increasingly within thenonnuclearrogram for one or two low-yielda year would cost, through the first detonation,million andearcosts rise steeply for moreinimalbecome very large when advanced delivery systemsweapons are required. Political and militaryare likely to prove more important inpace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences inwealth and technical skill. Where the motivation isa country might attempt toack ofby importing materials, technology, andeven weapons themselves. )
believe that eight countries, in addition to France,physical and financial resources to develop ancapability (weapons and means of delivery) overdecade. However, we believe that only Communistactuallyeapons program. The Chinese may be
able toirst nuclear device byore likely date is4 or beyond. Approximately two yearsest the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon, j
frhus far the remainingJapan, Sweden, Canada, Italy, and Westlimited their nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will, however, almost certainly continue development of theirnuclear programs, someoint which would significantly reduce the time required to carryeapons program.
do not believe that the explosionirst device,the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability,major changes in Communist China's foreign policysense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy ofaggression, or even become willing to takemilitary risks. It would, however, increase Chineseand prestige and reinforce their efforts tohegemony through political pressures and the indirectof local "wars ofndia probably woulduclear weapons program on the basis ofuclear device, but is likely to continue itsprogramointrash weaponsbe developed relatively quickly, Japan also would feelsense of pressure, but would be more reluctantother countries toeapons capability. WeIsraelis would probablyuclear capability tothe Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. Thewould probably blame the West, particularly the US,Soviets would probably finds ways of exploiting
French force has as its primary purposeprestige and assisting France to assume leadershipEurope less dependent on the US andoice in theand control of Western nuclear power. While manyare in general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives,fear that the French program will stimulate furthererode the NATO concept, and perhaps most im-
portant, lead to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will limit themselves tonuclear programs over the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic, German interestational capability would rise.)
believe that the USSR desires to prevent thenuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove soLo produce major changes in its policy. The Soviets haveproved unwilling to conclude nondiffusion agreementsunacceptable terms. Even if the Soviets conclude thatwas movinguclear status, they wouldnot make radical changes in their policy, but employmixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional )
if the US, the UK, and the USSR could agree ona nondiffusion agreement, Communist China wouldrefuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherencedoubtful. Nevertheless, the very existence of such anwould inhibit other nonsignatories and reinforcewhere it alreadyomprehensiveban treaty would impose serious limitations on theof nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories butsubject to many of the same difficultiesondiffusion )
strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferationoccur over the nextears will almost certainly notpower relations nor do we believe it will producein the relations of states. The impact will bepolitical and psychological effects of the existence ofweapons, the greater unpredictability of relationsbetween alliance systems, and the possibility thatout of existing or future controversies could escalateserious confrontation involving the major powers.
possession of nuclear weapons may encourage apower to pursue policies which might resultocal
crisis, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainlytrong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood ofdetonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion in somemight even touchuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such anerious nuclear reactor accidentuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governmentsa weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. )
DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
t must also be kept In mindack of suitable test sites could presont difficult problems for some countries. An untested weapon would be of uncertain reliabilityountry were supplied with
Twenty-one year* after the beginning of the atomic age, the world has clearlyeriod in which the prerequisites tor developing atinimum nuclear weapons program are becoming Increasingly available to nonnuctear states. This condition has been createdide diffusion of basic knowledge and technical skilbi and by easier access lo the necessary materials. Natural uranium,carce and lightly controlled commodity, is now considerably easier lo obtain. The plutoniurn routeeapons program hasell marked trail, and one which in its earner stages Is scarcely distinguishableurely peaceful program. There are already moreundred reactors, moat of the small research variety, now operational or under construction In the nonnuclearrowing number of technicians, both native and Imported, are available to any country interesteduclear program.
Cost Is becomingarrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons as fissionable materials become more plentiful and the spread of In-formaUon lessens the likelihood of expensive mistakes. The costeapons program will vary considerably, depending upon the level of technical and economic development of the country Involved ami the size and type of weapons program desired. Regardless of expenditure, countries which do notubstantial technological base cannot produce nuclear weapons without considerable assistance from foreign sources. For countries possessing an adequate technologicalinimum program for producing one or two low-yield fission weapons per year wouldillion lo produce the first detonation,0ear thereafter
ountry attempts moreinimum program, the costs begin to rise steeply. For example, the initial costrogram leading to the productionission weapons per year Is probably0 million to achieve the detonationirst device, plusannua) operating expenses0 million. Tlie costsubstantial capability, including sophisticated delivery vehicles,weapons packages, and the production, can become astronomic. For example, the French have already5 billion on their nuclear program f
detailed designs of previously lusted weapons. It is unlikely, therefore, that any country would stockpile weapons of original design without first having conducted lusts, except under the most unusual andcircumstances. In any event, refinement of warheads forweapons systems would require testing. While undergroundcouldeasible solution in some instances, such testing would add costs. Involve considerable tune delays, and reduce diagnostic returns.
echnical and economic factors help establish limits to the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, but actual decisions will depend on political and military considerations as well. Indeed, nationalin political determination and strategic objectives are likely to prove more important In determining the pace and content of nuclear diffusion than differences in national wealth and technical skill.political and military considerations will weigh heavily in decisions as to the size and sophistication of weapons programs.ountry such as France may be satisfied only by the development of weapons systems which enable it to "share" in deterring the USSR, and which strengthen Its position in international councils.
country considering the acquisition of nuclear weaponsInto account its potential enemies and the kind of weaponsbelieves will be necessary to deter or deal with them. It mustit has strategic requirements, political pretensions, orwhich lt believes can only be served by the acquisitionweapons. More broadly, it must estimate the probablethe weapons program it can afford on its national prestige andwithin existing alliances. No matter how attractiveuclear program may appear, they must beountry might have whether nuclear weaponsa prudent form of defense expenditure and against otherconsiderations such as possible domestic resistance to aThe weight of arguments pro and con may change asand concomitant financial demands of the program becomeexperiencehe British experience with strategicas the political and strategic situation changes.
II. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CANDIDATES
believe that eight countries in addition to France and thenuclear powers have the physical and financial resourcesan operational nuclear capability (weapons and meanswithin the next decade.ists these eightthe probable time periods they would require to explodeecision to go ahead. Of these eight nations, weonly Communist China has actually embarkeduclear weap-
ons
Ruj far the remaining countries have limitednuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. alLhough we assume that they ore not ignoring possible military applications.
TABLE t
estimated time required for selected countries to produce andirst nuclear device'
Device l
Canada years after decision
Israel years after decision
years after decision
Westyears after decision
years after decision
years after decision
Japan years after decision
Communistas early4
A. The Status of the Eight Candidate! Communisf China
he Communist Chinese appear to haveery high priority to their nuclear weapons programumber of years and, despite serious difficulties occasioned by the cutoff of Soviet assistance and domestic economic problems, are likely to continue to press ahead. Our evidence with respect to Communist China's nuclear program Is Insufficient, however, toonfident judgment about the likely dateirst nuclear explosion.)'
neiievc tomall air-cooled reactor together with associated
facilities for chemical separation and metal fabrication. The reactor is estimated to be capable of producing enough plutonium for not more lhan two low-yield fission weajtons per year. Ii the reactor wentin earlyearliest possiblethe Chinese experl-
SE^ET
'The estimates of (Ime required lire for decisions made within the nextso. ir the decisions were to bo made later than this, the ume requiredshortened by intervening dcvuiupmcnjg,
ence no major problems In chemical separation or metal fabrication, theirst device could be tested using plutoniurn from this reactor alone would bef the reactor did not go critical2 or If the Chinese encounter the normal run of difficulties, the more likely date would be4 or beyond.'
pproximately two yearsest the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. To deliver this weapon, the Chinese would be forced to rely for the next few years onBULL) or on their two TU-Ifl jet medium bombersc believe that the Chinese Communists will probably notissile system (medium range) until the. In order toignificant capability in the nuclear weapons field, the Chinese Communists willarger plutoniurn production capacity than we know to exist and facilities for the production of.
SECRET
India
The psychological and political barriersuclear weapons program continue to be strong in India, and it is unlikely thatrogram will be authorized so long as Nehru remains in power. Its cost and India's reluctance to divert resources Irom present economic and military programs also constitute significant barriers.the border war has convinced most Indians that Communist Chinalear danger to India's security and prestige, and the threat of Chinese domination may affect the progress and direction of the Indian nuclear program.
There are clear Indications that India, which alreadyairly advanced nuclear research programlutoniurn separation plant under construction, is actively improving its overall capabilities in the nuclear field, possibly in anticipationuture decision to develop an operational nuclear capability may be required. Inlo two small research reactors, India0 MWtso-called Canada-India Reactoris capable of producing sufficient quantities of plutoniurn for about one or twoear. If present plans arc carried out, India will soonupply of uranium, withoutdequate to operate theWt reactor for the production of weapon-grade plutoniurn. Although this reactor isoperating with safeguarded heavy water supplied by the US, the Indianseavy water plant which will soon reach an output sufficient to service the CIR. By replacing the US-supplied heavy water, the CIR would not be subject to safeguards and could be operated for the production of weapon-grade plutoniurn should the Indians decide to do so. India couldosition of independence from present controls in about two years, after which it would take another two or three years for India to produce its first nuclear device. Byndia couldimited nuclear capability using aircraft.
.fapon
scientific and technical skills and its industrialat such an advanced state that, if the decision to go ahead werethe next year or so, Japan could probably develop an operationalcapability using aircrafthe deep-rooted reluctanceJapanese touclear weapons program, however,unlikely that Japan will Initiaterogram within the next
'The termrefers to the arrangements included in agreements between suppliers (US. UK, South Africa,nd recipients which require strict accountability and inspection by the supplier to ensure peaceful use of the material supplied.
SECRET
decade. Should the Japanese Socialist Party gain control of thewithin the period of this estimate. Japan would be even less likely to do so.
Sweden
weden lias thus far avoided making any clear-cut decisions with regarduclear weapons program, but basic nuclear research is of such high quality that the country is clearly nearlng the thresholdeapons5 MWt natural uranium fueled power reactor Is expected to reach full power byWt power reactor is scheduled lor completion. Theol weapon-grade materia! will require Ihc Swedes to build thelr owr. elicnii' al separation plant. '
Wt believeecision to go ahead made in the next "VParnr two, the Swedes couldirst device two or three years later. Moreover. If the Swedes decide to press ahead after the first detonation, wc believe Sweden couldeapon deliverable by aircraft byissile system carrying compatible fission warheads
present Social Democratic government, which is likelyln power for several more years at least, has indicated atimes that it was about toecision whether to undertakeof nuclear weapons, only to procrastinate at the lastthe trend toward nuclear proliferation continues and if itthai progress Is being modeest ban or broaderarrangements, the Swedish Government will be underinternal pressure to resolve the nuclear weaponsthe Swedes will actually go on to produce nuclear weaponsand will probably depend largely on the extent ofand its implication for Swedish neutrality
Canada
initialed its nuclear energy program during World Warcollaboration with the US and UK, and has long possessedeapons program except facilities for theplutoniurn and the required weapons design research. Canadato the US in the Free World production of uranium. Canadareactors ln operation now producing significantourth under construction. The3s expected to be in full operation hicould easily gouclear weapons program of somesophistication but has remained out by choice. The positionpolitical parties that Canada does not need and should not have its
^Sths^ET
own nuclear weapons program, reinforced by public sentiment andof cost, will continue toecision to proceed unlikely.
Holy
has both the skills and the industrial and financialcarryinguclear weapons program. The Italians nowconstruction three large power reactors capable ofamounts of plutonium. The SENN and SEI-NIare designed to use only enriched fuel. Because this fuelonly under adequate safeguards, these reactors couldeapons program. On the other hand.uranium fueled reactor, could produce sufficienta weapons program if Italy imported the required uranium.radical change in national sentiment, however, it is highlyItaly will do more than continue with its present nonmilitaryThe swing to the left of the Italian electorate during theelections will almost certainly reinforce this decision for
West Germany
Although West Germany has the industrial potential, personnel, and technological skills to enter the nuclear weapons field, the obstacles to undertakingrogram are substantial. Treatyublic opposition, the absence of significant deposits of uranium ore within the country, the lack of testing space, and the current lack of large power reactorshemical separation plant, all represent major obstacles toeapons program. Furthermore, the West German Government almost certainly realizes that to embarkuclear weapons program would not only create serious internal political dissension and difficulties with Its Allies, butrave provocation to the USSR.
Nevertheless, West Germany has spent more on its nucleartlian any country other than the US, USSK, UK, and France. In the, the Federal and State governments spent5 million for various nuclear programs. Moreover, the German AEC has recently recommended that the Federal and State5 million for theouclear energy program which would Include several large power stations. Despite the size of these programs, however, there are no indications at the present time that West Germany has plans for developing annuclear weapons capability. Itseactors are small and
'Inhen the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the Brussels Treaty, the West Oerrnan Government made the following pledge:he Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in Its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons, or biological weapons."
used for research and training, with the production of plutoniumlimited to laboratory quantities.
Information is insufficient toonfident judgmentfuture developments. We believe that West Germany isthrough its broadly based nuclear program to increase itsand technical competence in fields related to nuclearand eventually toorld leader in the nucleara possible consequence ofrogram, West Germany maymajor world supplier of nuclear technicians and components.program would reduce the time required for the development ofnuclear capabilityecision were made to proceedweapons program. Moreover, if the program included largeand plutonium separation facilities it would soon bringto the threshold ofapability.
Gontrot
Certain generalizations are possible concerning the countries just discussed. Communistonly time and self-imposed restraints stand in the way or in *ir acquiring some kind of nuclear weapons capability- These restraints largely derive from one or more of the following: opposition either internal or external,of cost, and the lack of strong positive motivation to proceed. We cannot exclude the possibility that events which we cannot nowwill remove these restraints upon some of the countries. Moreover, nuclear policies will continue to be affected by intangibles difficult to assess, such as prestige, and subject to pressuresovernment might not be able toublic opinion which became arousedrospective enemy had acquired weapons.
AH the countries which we have considered possible but unlikely candidates are engaged in peaceful nuclear programs. Some havethe point where they will have all the facilities required touclear weapons program in the eventecision were made to do so, and the others will reach this position over the next few years.ituation will arise in which there couldapidin the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons should the restraints now operating cease to be effective.
peciol Cose
proliferation of nuclear weapons would not necessarilyto countries which possess the skills, resources andproduce them Independently. Where the motivation iaa country may attempt lo acquire weapons by tapping theand industry of other countries or even by direct transfer.for example, might fall Into this category. We have no evidence
that the UAR is presently engageduclear weapons program.tlie UAR is so deficient In most of the prerequisiteseapons program that it could not on its ownapability over at least the next decade. Nonetheless. UAR motivation is presently strong.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
A. Communist China
Wc do not believe that the explosionirst device, or even the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy ln the sense tliat the Chinese wouldeneral policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. China's leaders would recognize that their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major states and could not do so in the foreseeable future. In particular, they would recognize that they remained unable either to remove or neutralize the US presence In Asia.
Nevertheless, the Chinese would feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery. They would probably feel tliat the US would be moreto intervene on the Asian mainland and thus the tone of Chinese policy would probably become moreurther, their possession of nuclear weapons would reinforce their efforts to achieve Asianthrough political pressures and the indirect support of local "wars ofuch tactics would probably acquire greatersince the Chinese feat wouldrofound impact on neighboring governments and peoples. It would alter the latter's sense of the relations of power, even if it made little immediate change in tlie realities of power, andreater or lesser degree would probably result in Increased pressures to accommodate to Chinese demands.
Communist China's success in the nuclear weapons field will give significant weight to the arguments of those Indians who are convinced that India at some point must have its own nuclear capability if it is lo avoid bending to Communist Chinese pressure or being forced into excessive dependence on external support. It is indeed possible that these arguments could prevail and that India would embark onrogram. On balance, however, we do not believe India will make the decision for weapons development on the basis of theuclear device, especially If India ls obtaining military assistance
.mil1"nimI tihlurlce to warrant-aaflfLJLUrifliillffof our intentions and that the statemenTT^^cTTWwhat
rrcimsislrrl with
SEo^ET
fn modern defense weapons. The Indians will probably continue what we believe to be their present program of developing theirointrash weapons program could be brought to fruition relatively quickly.
he Japanese might feel an increased sense of pressure after the Chinese acquire nuclear weapons and opt for developing their nuclear programoint where they would be on the thresholdeapons capability. But they would be much more reluctant to cross that threshold than most other countries. The Japanese have particularly strong psychological inhibitions against the acquisition of nuclearand will thus probably continue to rely on the US for support and protection.
sestet
C. The French Program and the Problem of European Nuclear Diffusion
The French nuclear weapons program is very much anof President de Gaulle's foreign policy,ather effective one. lie has been frank to admit that France cannot hope to achieve moreodest capability in comparison to that of the US or the USSR. The primary purpose of the French force is to heighten French prestige and status on the continent and thereby assist France tourope less dependent on the US andoice In the management and control of Western nuclear power. The Frenchwill appeal to those In Europe, at present relatively few. who have qualms about the firmness and the duration of the US commitment lo the nuclear defense of Europe.
Thus far Frances European Allies have avoided confronting de Gaulle on the question of the French nuclear program. Their reaction has been ambivalent. While ninny Europeans are in general sympathy with de Gaulle's challenge to US dominance of the alliance, they are also fearful that the existence or an independent French nuclear force will increase the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, further erode the NATO concept, and, perhaps most important, provide the vehicle for German acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The French realize that if they are to have nuclear capabilities sufficient to constitute an important clement in Soviet calculations, they need sophisticated weapons in some numbers. The cost and difficulty of developing and producing the appropriate weapons systems has proved very great. Together with the expenditures necessary to stay in the race against obsolescence, these costs would be sufficient to dissuade the bulk of European states from undertaking comparable programs, and they would realize that their interests would not be servedere token capability. In this connection, the British decision not to develop its own strategic missile system cannot but Impress other European countrieseapons program.
y ii tne French continue to encounter
technical difficulties In the. construction of tho Plerrelatte gaseousplant they might seek German technical assistance, which they probably consider of more immediate benefit than financial assistance. Although German scientists have no experience In the gaseous diffusion, they could be of great value to the French in certain areas essential to the process. If the French program continues to encounter difficulties the French might find it worthwhile to go to the Germans for financial as well as technical assistance In exchange for some limited degree of German participation in the French program. An additional
motive might- be de Gaulle's interest inS-sponsored (and, in his opinion, US-controlled) NATO collective deterrent system.
We believe that the French program has thus far had little direct effect on German attitudes toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe the Germans will limit their nuclear development programs over tho next few years to projects which are demonstrably peaceful. For the time being, the principal interest is in having nuclear weapons from whatever source immediately available for the defense of German territory. While the Germans are extremely sensitive to any appearance of discrimination within NATO, their sensitivity apparently ls thus far not acute with respect to the nuclear restrictions imposed on Germany by treaty. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, andthe US. might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of theRepublic, German interestational capability would rise.
Thus far the Germans have endorsed the Nassau proposalS-sponsored NATO multilateral nuclear force. We believe that once this force is organized the Oermans will expect it ultimately to developorce freeS veto. If this does not occur, the Germans might become interestedurely European multilateral force or even in some sort of French-German arrangement. However, until such time as West Germany is prepared to loosen its close ties with the US, the attitude of the US with respect to German nuclear policy will continue to be of overriding importance.
IV. POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD PROLIFERATION
A. The Soviet Attitude Toward Proliferation
We believe that the USSR is reluctant toiffusion of nuclear weapons. Within the Warsaw Pact, it is under no significant pressure to make nuclear weapons available to its European allies, and we believe that it will not in tho foreseeable future. The Soviets have no military reasons for doing so, and such action would, in the Soviet view, riskan added impulse to West German arguments and efforts to acquire an independent nuclear capabUity.
In general, we believe that the Soviet desire to avoid proliferation will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in their policy. Tlie Soviets probably have doubts about the value of agreementsto prevent proliferation because of the obvious inability of the US and UK to head off the French program and their own inability to handle China. In any case, the USSR has thus far proved unwilling to reach agreement with the West against the transfer of nuclearand weapons technology, save on unacceptable terms. For example,
the Soviets insist that any such arrangement mustrovision which would exclude Germany from any multilateral nuclear force.
While the Soviets probably appreciate that current US proposals for nuclear sharing within NATO arc Intended to deny the Federalan independent capability, they believe that the German role in NATO is bound to grow. Thus they fear that present multilateral schemes will open the way to Germany'sajor voice in NATO nuclear decisions and perhaps to acquiring an independent national capability. The Soviets are probably also concerned that, even if the multilateral force does not come about, Germany willuclear power through cooperation with France.
If the Soviets concluded that West Germany was moving toward the statusuclear power, they might feel compelled to take radical measures to head off this development. Such measures might involve, at one extreme, threatening toajor East-West crisis unless assurance was given that West Germany would be prevented fromcontrol of nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, they might offer concessions on reunification and disarmament in return for such assurances. On balance, however, we believe tlie Soviets will not make any radical changes in their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament.
ft.vjjig Brilii.ll Alliiude lowqrd Proliferation
also concerned about the spread of nuclearto nonnuclcej'^taiefi-jyjMclijouid unt'Them independently.aban treaty and has longbeeTrme**Jjoj)efulcompromise is possible. If the Labor Partyforesee no change of British policy on this score. Indeed, awould be even more active in opposing proliferation.
C The French Attitude Toward Proliferation
French attitude toward nuclear diffusion is as yet difficultThey have, of course, refused to take part in test bandisarmament discussions. Once Franceullyhowever, wc expect that its attitude on diffusion maymuch the same as that of the other nuclear powers.
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSIONEST BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
road nondlfluslon agreement have includedthat the nuclear powers agree not to transfer weaponsnational control of nonnuclear powers or assist them in acquiring
weapons. Nonnuclear signatories would be required to agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons, acquire national control over them, or seek nuclear weapons assistance. If the US. UK, and the USSR could come together on the terms of such an agreement it would, of course, prevent Ihe acquisition of nuclear weapons by any nonnuclearCommunist China would, however, almost certainly refuse to sign. The French would certainly not sign unless they were considered one of the nuclear powers; even if this were done, we believe that French adherence would be doubtful.
Nevertheless, the very existenceucn an agreement wouldolitical and psychological Inhibition to the initiation of anweapons capability by other nonslgnatorics and would reinforceopposition where it already existed.
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, while also slowingof diffusion, would be subject to many of the same difficulties asagreement. Communist China would clearly rejectagreement. France would almost certainly not sign it at leasta time as it hadhermonuclear warhead formissiles.
i
comprehensivedevelopment of
a nuclear capability by nonnuclear signatories. If the agreement was limited to an atmospheric test ban, the developmentuclearprogram would be more difficult and expensive for the signatories. Underground testing, although more expensive and technically lessis one road,umpy one,eapons capability. Aside from technicaluclear test ban agreement,on-diffusion agreement, wouldtrong political and psychologicalto the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
creation of regional nonnuclear zones, such as the oneby Brazil for South America, couldignificanton the spread of nuclear weapons. There are many regionsworld where there would be wide public support forone. Prospects for agreement are brightest in thoseas South America and Sub-Sahara Africa, where there areaspiring nuclear powers and where the major powers have nolocate nuclear weapons systems.
VI. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
n strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the nextears will almost certainly not upset global powerNone of the prospective or potential nuclear powers will acquire capabilities which, if added to those of the US or the USSR, would significantly affect East-West military relationships, or bulk large militarily as an independent force. We do not believe China capable
ol acquiring moreelatively small operational capability in this
decade; {
The other potential nuclear powers would not, we believe, seek or be able to achieve more than small forces of local significance. Thus the impact of such proliferation as takes place will come from the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or futurecould escalateerious confrontation involving the major powers.
Speaking in the broadest of terms, we do not believe thatover the next decade will produce major realignments in the relations of states or lead to new combinations of allies and enemies. What nuclear proliferation will do is to intensify, as it already has, the strains within the major power groupings. The effort* of France and Communist China to develop their own weapons systemsirect challenge to the leaders of their respectiveUS and the USSR. France, already disposed to pursue Independent policies, is further encouraged to do so by its new status as an emerging nuclear power. China has similar aspirations which nuclear weapons would also encourage. Their pursuit of independent policies might encourage others to pursue policies inconsistent with those of their alliance leaders. At least for the foreseeable future, relations within and between alliance systems will probably be made more unpredictable by the addition of new nuclear powers.
The foregoing conclusions are based on our estimate that there will not be widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the nextears. We have estimated that an increasing number of nations will actively pursue nuclear energy programs right up to the thresholdeapons capability. Such programs could be justified domesticallyource of energy and astimulus to the development of technological skills and sophisticated industries.hreshold capability would facilitate the developmenteapons program if circumstances required. This is the road Sweden and India havetaken, and it may well be the path of others. Nationaland ambitions change, and with such changes could come new nuclear powers. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that some time within the nextountryrowing sense of national ambition such as Indonesia may decide to enter the nuclear weapons field. Finally, the development of broadly based peaceful programs by additional countries could lay the foundation for weapons programs beyond the nextears.
A new nuclear power may be emboldened by the possession of nuclear weaponsore vigorous pursuit of its objectives against enemy states, and the result may be an increase in the frequency of
local crises. However, we do not believe that in the case of most of the potential nuclear powers considered earlier, the acquisitionuclear arsenal would produce more aggressive International behavior. In any case, the psychological impact ofuclear power will in due course diminish, and countries with this new capability will probably experience the practical and difficult problem of translating lt into measurable political gains. Furthermore, the very presence of nuclear weapons, an entirely new element in the experience of regional enemies, will probablyew sense of prudence into the calculations of such rivals when one or another is considering the aggravationocal controversy.
Should local crises actually erupt into open conflict, it is more difficult to estimate the probable effect of nuclear weapons in the hands of one or more of the antagonists. It seems clear, however, that the situation would be potentially more dangerous than in the absence of such weapons, if only because of the additional uncertainties introduced by their presence. Thereendency for the US and the USSR to become involved in local crises in any event, but their involvement might in some cases be more likely if the possible use of nuclear weapons was at- stake. Although the involvement of the major powers inonflict would create the potential for escalation into general war, we believe that such an escalation is unlikely. The possession of nuclear weapons by local antagonists would almost certainly introduce elements of prudence into their own calculations and the pressure of world opinion for restraint would be of maximum effectiveness against the smaller powers. The involvement of the US and USSR could be expected to add to the forces of prudence and restraint, since it would almostbe in the US and Soviet Interest to see the hostilities broughtalt. Moreover, we do not believe that even in the event that one or the other of the local antagonists actuallyuclear weapon, the major powers would necessarily feel compelled to raise the crisis to the level of an East-West confrontation.
As the number of countries with nuclear weapons increases, the risk of unintentional or unauthorized detonation of such weapons will also rise, and for more than purely statistical reasons. Elaborate safety measures such as those developed by the US are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with, evenountry with considerable financial and technological resources. The accidental detonationuclear weapon in any part of the world could have far reaching consequences. Unless the circumstances were very quickly explained, understood and believed, the reaction of peoples and perhaps govem>-ments would probably be confused, even panic stricken. If thewas In the territory of one of the major powershrough the accidental firing from another countryissileuclearhere Is some slight chanceuclear exchange would
be touched off immediately. The odds are. of course, strongly against such an escalation; the major powers recognize that the diffusion of nuclear weapons will increase the chances ot an accidental detonation and would probably react cautiously to any such incident.
In the caseerious reactor accident, or an accidental weapons detonation on the sob of the owner, the consequences would depend on the attendant circumstances. In general, the impactuclear accident on world opinion, particularly if life and property were lost, and considerable contamination occurred, would almost certainly serve to restrain most governmentseapons program. More specifically, if the accident came as the resultountry's efforts toational weapons capability and occurredopulated area, domestic opposition might become strong enough to causeof the program. There would also be strong public pressure within the area where tbe accident occurred to remove all nuclear wen pons systems, regardless of origin. Forrench nuclear accident might not only affect the future or the French program by arousing domestic resistance but also provide an emotional Issue which would be exploited by those who want US nuclear weapons withdrawn from Europe.
The spread or nuclear weapons also raises the possibility that the actionsuclear power other than the US and USSR couldeneral war. Wo believe, however,eliberate nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or the US by one or these powers is extremely unbkely. Nonetheless, even the possibility is enough toew element or uncertainty into both alliance systems and into East-West relations.
ANNEX A
ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
MINIMUM PROGRAM
Weapons
program for the production of one to two low-yieldweapons per year, to be delivered by existing aircraft {bomberscommercialould cost on the order0 millionmillion. This totalillionillion for theand operation of basic researchillion tofor the acquisition of materials and the productionillionillion for weapons research, development,Additional outlaysillionillion perbe required for the annual operation of this program.
Vehicles
actual costs of delivery systems, aircraft or missiles,upon the sophistication desired and whether or not thesedeveloped indigenously or procured from an external source.requirement were only to obtain fromelivery vehicletorude weapon, the incremental costsrelativelysmaller for an aircraft system than forsystem. The costs of developing andeliveryof course, be large.
MODERATE PROGRAM: THE FRENCH EXAMPLE
A. Nuclear Program
the basis of official French figures, we estimate that,rance bad spent5 billion on its nuclearexpenditures for peaceful purposes. ]
SE5RET
B. Delivery Capabilities
or the next few years, the French Intend to use the Mirage IV light jet bomber for the delivery of nuclear weapons pendinguclear powered submarine ballistic missileoken delivery capability with the Mirage IV will probably exist by the end of this year, but the projected force ofill not be operational before the endhe French have announced that they will achieve an initial operational capability with nuclear submarines We believe this may be somewhat optimistic, f
systems will add appreciably to the costs of theweapons program Thus, the force ofirageotal equivalent to some one-half billion US dollars,billion for the basic aircraft and the balance formodifications, and such possibilities as an air-to-surfacethree nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines nowcost on the order5 billion toillion, exclusive ofa modest surface-to-surface intermediate range ballisticillion0 million, also exclusive of warheads."
C. General
costs of these programs are to be met in part bytotal military spending and in part by reductions inDefense Minister Messmer notedecent article thatin military expenditures of one billion new francs (NF)is expected0 even though military expenditures area constant share of gross national product. Earlier in thecited the present military share of GNPercentfactor cost).
'These estimated costs arc for developing and producing the delivery systems und do not include costs for opcraUon and maintenance.
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