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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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Likelihood and Consequencesroliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems
SobmJhW byDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concvfd in by the UNITED STATES rNTElLlGENCEverleaf3
AFFRtVED FllATE MY Mil
42:
The following intelligence orgoniioliont participated In the preparation of this ettimatei
The Control Intelligence Agency and tneof iho Deport-
ment ol State, Defenio. thee Navy, the Air Force, AEC. and NSA.
Concurring)
Doector of InfeffcgerKO andDeportment of S'o'e Director. Defenie Intelligence Agency
hief ofDeportment oty
Auiiioil Chief of Nerval Operoiion*oportmont of iho Navy
CWeF of Staff. IntelUgence. USA/'or Intelligence, Joint 5'off
The Atomic Energy Commiuion Repreientotivo to the USI6 Director of the National Security Agency
Abifainingi
Iho Aniitorrt Director. Federal Boroav ol Inveitigoilon. the (object being outiide
of hit lurtedichon.
material eontolnt Inlormotlon affecting Iho Notional Defenio of the Unitedwithin the meaning ol the,, the None-minion or revelation of which In any manner la on unautnorlied perion li prohibited.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROBLEM CONCLUSIONS DISCUSSION
I. OENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEAR
II. CAPAIlILtTIES AND INTENTIONS OF lhlil
A The Status of the Eight
lunlst China
Prograra and the Problem of European Nuclear
DLfTuMc-n
MAJOR NUCLEAR
IV. POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE POWERS TOWARD PROLIFERATION
Soviet Attitude Toward Proliferation
British Attitude Toward Proliferation
French Attitude Toward Proliferation
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THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSION AGREEMENT.BAN. OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR 17
BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
ANNEX A: ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING ANNUCLEAR CAPABILITY
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LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCESROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons anddelivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.
CONCLUSIONS
i
the Increasing availability of uranium, andand technicians, the developmentinimalweapons capability has come Increasingly within thenort nuclearrogram for one or two low-yielda year would cost, through the first detonation,million andearcosts rise steeply for moreinimalbecome very large when advanced delivery systemsweapons are required. Political and militaryare likely to prove more Important inpace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences Inwealth and technical skill. Where the motivation Isa country might attempt toack ofby Importing materials, technology, andeven weapons themselves. )
believe that eight countries, In addition to Prance,physical and financial resources to develop ancapability (weapons and means of delivery) overdecade. However, we believe that only Communistactuallyeapons program. The Chinese may be
Aflit MUASf MR Willi
able toirst nuclear device byore likely date is4 or beyond. Approximately two yearsestcouia probably produce their first crude fission weapon.
however, almost certainly continue development ot ihcirnuclear programs, someoint which would significantly reduce the time required to carryeapons program.
C. Wc do not believe that the explosionirst device, or even the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. It would, however, increase Chinese self-confidence and prestige and reinforce their efforts to achieve Asian hegemony through political pressures and the indirectof local "wars ofndia probably woulduclear weapons program on the basishinese detonationuclear device!
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The French force has as its primary purpose heightening French prestige and assisting France to assume leadershipuroi
peans are in general sympathy with de uauile's objectives, they also fear that the French program will stimulate further nuclear proliferation, erode the NATO concept, and perhaps most im-
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portant, lead to Oerman acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Oermans will limit themselves tonuclear programs over the next few years.
E. We believe that the USSR desires to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in its policy. The Soviets have thus far proved unwilling to conclude nondiffusion agreements save on unacceptable terms. Even If the Soviets conclude that West Germany was movinguclear status, they wouldnot make radical changes in their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional )
P. Even if the US, the UK, and the USSR could agree on termsondiffusion agreement, Communist China would almost
m Nevertheless, the very existence of such an agree-ment^vouWnhibit other nonsignatories and reinforce Internal opposition where it alreadyomprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would impose serious limitations on theof nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories but would be subject to many of the same difficultiesondiffusion )
a In strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the nextears will almost certainly not upset global power relations nor do we believe it will produce majcr realignments in the relations of states. The impact will be in the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, the greater unpredictability of relations within and between alliance systems, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalateerious confrontation Involving the major powers.)
H. The possession of nuclear weapons mayew nuclear power to pursue policies which might resultocal
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crisis, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainlytrong element of prudence Into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood ofdetonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion In tomemight even touchuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such anerious nuclear reactor accidentuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governmentsa weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed In the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal.
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DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEARwenty-one yexrt after the beginning or the atomic age. the work! has clearlyried In which the prerequisites for developing atinimum nuclear weapons program are becoming Increasingly available to nonnuclear states. This condition has been createdide diffusion of basic knowledge and technical skills and by easier access to the necessary materials Natural uranium,carce and tightly controlled commodity, is now considerably easier to obtain. The plutonlum routeeapuns program hasell marked trail, and one which In Its earlier stages Is scarcely distinguishableurely peaceful program. There are already moreundred reactors, most of the small research variety, now operational or under construction In the nonnuclearrowing number of technicians, both native and Imported, are available to any country Interesteduclear prograni.
Coat Is becomingarrier lo the acquisition of nuclear weapons as fissionable materials become more plentiful and the spread oflessens the likelihood of expensive mistakes. The costeapons program will varyepending upon the level of technical and economic development of the country involved and the aUt and type of weapons program desired. Regardless of expenditure, countries which do notubstantial technological base cannot produce nuclear weapons without considerable assistance from foreign sources. For countries possessing an adequate technologicalinimum program tor producing one or two low-yield fission weapons per year would costillion to produce the first detonation,ear thereafter.
ountry attempts moreinimum program, the costs begin to rise steeply. For example, the initial costrogram leading to the productionission weapons per year Is probablyillion to achieve the detonationirst device, plusannual operating expenses0 million. The cc*tsubstantial capability. Including sophisticated delivery vehicles,weapons packages, and tne production, can become
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detailed dealgna of previously tested weapons. It Is unlikely, therefore, that any country would stockpile weapons of original design without first having conducted teats, except under the moat unusual andcircumstances. In any event, refinement of warheada forweapons systems would require testing. While undergroundcouldeasible solution In some Instances, such testing would add coats, Involve conalderable time delays, and reduce diagnostic returna.
S. Technical and economic factors help establish limits to the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, but actual decisions will depend on political and military considerations as well. Indeed, nationalIn political determination and atrateglc objectives are likely to prove more Important In determining the pace and content of nuclear diffusion than differences In' national wealth and technical skill.political and military considerations will weigh heavily In decisions as lo the slse and sophistication of weapons programs.ountry such as France may be satisfied only by the development of weapons systems which enable It to "share" In deterring the^USSR, and which strengthen Its position In International councils '
country considering the acquisitionucicar weapons must lake Into account lis potential enemies and the kind of weapons systems It believes will be necessary to deter or deal with them. It must decide whether It has strategic requirements, political pretensions, or territorial ambitions which It believes can only be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. More broadly, It must estimate the probable Impact of the weapons program it can afford on Its national prestige and Its influence within existing alliances. No matter how attractiveuclear program may appear, they must be balanced against whateverountry might have whether nuclear weaponsa prudent form of defense expenditure and against otherconsiderations such as possible domestic resistanceeapons program. The weight of arguments pro and con may change as the scope and concomitant financial demands of the program become clearer through experiencehe British experience with strategicnd as the political and strategic situation changes.
II. CAPABILITIES ANO INTENTIONS Of POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CANDIDATES
e believe that eight countries In addition to France and the three major nuclear powers have the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) within the next decade.ists these eight countries and the probable time periods they would require touclear deviceecision to go ahead. Of these right nations, wc believe that only Communist China has actually embarkeduclear wrap-
It) till
S)
demonstrably peaceful purposes, although we awume that they are not Ignoring possible military applications.
Commu lift China
he Communist Chinese appear to haveery high priority to their nuclear weapons programumber of years and, despite serious difficulties occasioned by the cutoff ofet assistance and domestic economic problems, are likely to continue to press ahead. Our evidence with respect to Communist China's nuclear program is Insufficient, however, toonfident Judgment about the likely dateirst nuclear jxploston,
pproximately two yearsroduce their Oral crude fission weapon. To deliver Uds weapon, the Chinese would be forced to rely for the next few years onBULL) or on their two TU-lfl jet medium bomberse belle re that the Chinese Communists will probably rutissile system (medium range) until the. In order toignificant capability in the nuclear weapons field, the Chinese Communists willarger plutonlum production capacity than we know to exist and tenuities for the production of
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generalisations are poaalble concerning the countries Communlit Chinatime and
Imposed restraints stand Inome kind of nuclear weapons capability. These restraints Largely derive from one or more of the following: opposition either Internal or external,of cost, and the lack of strong positive motivation to proceed. We cannot exclude the possibility that events which we cannot nowwin remove these restraints upon some of the countries. Moreover, nuclear policies will continue to be affected by Intangibles difficult to assess, such as prestige, and subject to pressuresovernment might not be able to resist,ublic opinion which became arousedrospective enemy had acquired weapons.
the countries which we have considered possible butare engaged in peaceful nuclear programs. Some havethe point where they will have all the facilities requireda nuclear weapons program in the eventecisionto do so, and the others will reach this position over theituation will arise in which there couldapidin the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons shouldits now operating cease to be effective.
i ! V
pecial Cose
proliferation of nuclear weapons would not necessarilyto countries which possess the skills, resources andproduce them Independently. Where the motivation isa country may attempt to acquire weapons by tappingand lnduatry of other countries or even by direct transfer.
III. IMPLICATIONS Of THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAM
A. Communist China
e do not believe that the explosionirst device, or even the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes In Communist China's foreign policy In the sense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. China's leaders would recognize that their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major states and could rwt do so In the foreseeable future. In particular, they would recognise that they remained unable either to remove or neutralize the US presence In Asia.
evertheless, the Chinese would feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery. They would probably feel that the US would be moreto Intervene on the Asian mainland and thus the tone of Chinese policy would probably become moreurther, their possession of nuclear weapons would reinforce their efforts to achieve Asianthrough political pressures and tbe Indirect support of local "wars ofuch tactics would probably acquire greatersince the Chinese feat wouldrofound impact on neighboring governments and peoples. It would alter the latter's sense of the relations of power, even If It made little Immediate change In the realities of power, andreater or lesser degree would probably result in Increased pressures to accommodate to Chinese demands.
ommunist China's success En tbe nuclear weapons field will give significant weight to the arguments of those Indians who are convinced that India at some point must have its own nuclear capability if It Is to avoid bending to Communist Chinese pressure or being forced Into excessive dependence on external support. It Is Indeed possible that these arguments could prevail and that India would embark oorogram. On balance, however, we do not believe India will make the decision for weapons development on the basis of theuclear
Chinese Inconsistent
Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that there la Insufficient evidence to warrantefinite statement about
statement is aome*hiit
appraisal of our Intentions and that the with
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he Japanese might feel an Increased sense of pressure after the Chinese aequlre nuclear weapons and opt for developing their nuclear programoint where they would be on the thresholdeapons capability. But they would be much more re*rti*ni, to cross that threshold than most other countries. The Japai ese have particularly strong psychological Inhibitions against the acquisition of nuclearand will thus probably continue to rely on the US for suppurt and protection. j
C. The French Program ond the Problem of European Nucleor Diffusion
The French nuclear weapons program Is very much anot President de Gaulle's foreign policy,ather effective one. He has been frank to admit that France cannot hope to achieve moreodest capability in comparison to that of the US or the USSR. The primary purpose of the French force is to heighten French prestige and status on the continent and thereby assist France tourope less dependent on the US andoice In the management and control of Western nuclear power. The Frenchwill appeal to those In Europe, at present relatively few, who have qualms about the firmness and the duration of the US commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe.
Thus far France's European Allies have avoided confronting de Oaulle on the question of the French nuclear program. Their reactionn ambivalent. While many Europeans are in general sympathy with de Gaulle's challenge to US dominance of the alliance, they are also fearful that the existence of en independent French nuclear force will increase the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, further erode the NATO concept, and, perhaps most important, provide the vehicle for German acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Theealise that if they are to have nuclear capabilities sufficient to constitute an important element In Soviet calculations, they need sophisticated weapons In some numbers. The cost and difficulty of developing and producing the appropriate weapons systems hasery great. Together with the expenditures necessary to stay Inace against obsolescence, these costs would be sufficient to dissuade the bulk of European, states from undertaking comparable programs, and they would realize that their Interests would not be servedere token capability. In this connection, the British decision not to develop
i Its own strategic missile system cannot but Impress other European countrieseapons program.
plant they might seek German technical assistance, which they probably consider of more Immediate benefit than financial assistance. Although German scientists have no experience In the gaseous diffusionthey could be of great value to the French In certain areas essential to the process. If the FTench program continues to encounter difficulties the French might find It worthwhile to go to the Germans for financial as well as technical assistance In exchange for some limited degree of German participation in the French program. An additional
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motive might be de Gaulle's interest InS-spot' jred (and. In his opinion, US-controlled) NATO collective deterrent system.
We believe that the French program has thus far had little direct effect on German attltudes'toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe the Germans will limit their nuclear development programs over the next few yaara to: projects which are demonstrably peaceful. For the time being, the principal Interest is In having nuclear weapons from whatever source immediately available for the defense of Qerman territory. While the Germans are extremely sensitive to any appearance of discrimination within NATO, their sensitivity apparently Is thus far not acute with respect to the nuclear restrictions Imposed on Germany by treaty. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, andthe US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of theRepublic, German interestational capability would rise.
Thus far the Germans have endorsed the Nassau proposalS-sponsored NATO multilateral nuclear force. We believe that once this force Is organized the Germans will expect It ultimately to developorce freeS veto. If this does not occur, the Germans might become Interestedurely European multilateral force or even in some sort of French-German arrangement. However, until such time as West Oermany l" prepared to loosen its close ties with the US, the attitude of the US with respect to German nuclear policy will continue to be of overriding Importance.
IV. POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD PROLIFERATION
A. The Soviet Attitude Toword Proliferotion
We believe that the USSR Is reluctant toiffusion of nuclear weapons. Within the Warsaw Pact, It Is under no significant pressure to make nuclear weapons available to Its European allies, and we believe that it will not In the foreseeable future. The Soviets have no military reasons for doing so, and such action would, in the Soviet view, riskn added Impulse to West German arguments and efforts to acquire an Independent nuclear capability.
In general, we believe that the Soviet desire to avoid proliferation win not prove so strong aa to produce major changes In their policy. The Soviets probably have doubts about the value of agreementsto prevent proliferation because of the obvious inability of the US and UK to head off the French program and their own inability to handle China. In any case, the USSR has thus far proved unwilling to reach agreement with the West against the transfer of nuclearand weapons technology, save on unacceptable terms. For example,
the Sovleta Insist that any such arrangement mustrovision which would exclude Germany from any multilateral nuclear force.
hile the Soviets probably appreciate that current US proposals for nuclear sharing within NATO are Intended to deny the Federalan Independent capability, they believe that the Ocrman role in NATO is tiund to grow. Thus they fear that present multilateral schemes will open tlie way to Germany'sajor voice In NATO nuclear decisions and perhaps to acquiring an Independent national capability. The Soviets areo concerned that, even If the multilateral force does not come about. Germany willuclear power through cooperation with France.
f the Soviets concluded that West Germany was moving toward the statusuclear power, they might feel compelled to take radical measures to head off this development. Such measures might involve, at one extreme, threatening toajor East-West crisis unless assurance was given that West Germany would be prevented fromcontrol of nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, they might offer concessions on reunification and disarmament In return for such assurances. On balance, however, we believe the Soviets will not make any radical changes In their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament.
he Sfifiih Attfruda Toward Proliferation
he British are also concerned about the spread of nuclearto nonnuclear .states which could use them Independently. The Macmlllan government haatrong Interest Inondiffusion agreementest ban treaty and has long been more hopeful than the US that compromise Is possible. If the Labor Party gains power we foresee no change of British policy on this score.abor government would be even more active In opposing proliferation.
C The French Attitude. Toward Proliferation
French attitude toward nuclear diffusion Is as yet difficultThey have, of course, refused to take part In test bandisarmament discussions Once Franceullyhowever, we expect that Its attitude on diffusion maymuch the same as that of the other nuclear powers.
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSIONEST BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONE5 FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
road nondiffusion agreement have Includedthat the nuclear powers agree not to transfer weaponsnational control of nonnuclear powers or assist them In acquiring
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Nonnuclear signatories would be required to agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons, acquire national control over them, or seek nuclear weapons assistance. If the US. UK. and the USSR could come together on the terms of such an agreement It would, of course, prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any nonnuclearCommunist China would, however, almost certainly refuse to sign. The French would certainly not sign unless they were considered one of the nuclear powers; evenjf this mere done, we believe that adherence would be doubtful. Nevertheless, the veryolitical and psychological Inhibition to the Initiation of anweapons capability by other nonsigiutories and would reinforceopposition where It already existed.
omprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, while also slowing the pace of diffusion, would be subject to many of the same difficultiesondifluslon agreement. Communist China would clearly reject such an agreement. France would almost certainly not sign It at least untilime as lt_hadhermonuclear warhead for medium-range missiles.
iy woum impose wnuuim Ihe developmentuclear capability by nonnuclear signatories. If the agreement was limited to an atmospheric test ban, the developmentuclearprogram would be more difficult and expensive for the signatories. Underground testing, although more expensive and technically lessIs one road,umpy one.eapons capability. Aside from technicaluclear its; ban agreement,on-dlffuslon agreement, wouldtrong political and psychologicalto the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
be creation of regional nonnuclear zones, such as the oneby Brazil for South America, couldignificant long-term effect on the spread of nuclear weapons. There are many regions of the world where there would be wide public support for the creation ofone. Prospects for agreement are brightest in those areas, such as South America and Sub-Sahara Africa, where there are presently no aspiring nuclear powers and where the major powers have no desire to locate nuclear weapons systems.
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BROAD IMPLICATIONS Of NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
n strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the nextears will almost certainly not upset global powerNone of the prospective or potential nuclear powers will acquire capabilities which, If added to those of the US or the USSR, would significantly affect East-West military relationships, or bulk large militarily as an Independent force. We do not believe China capable
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potential nuclear powers wouia noi, we able to achieve more than small forces of local significance. Thus the impact of such proliferation as takes place will come from the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or futurecould escalateerious confrontation involving the major powers.
peaking in the broadest of terms, we do not believe thatover the next decade will produce major realignments in the relations of states or lead to new comblnaUons of allies and enemies. What nuclear proliferation will do Is to intensify, as It already has. the strains within the major power groupings. The efforts of France and Communist China to develop their own weapons systemsirect challenge to the leaders of their respectiveUS and the USSR. France, already disposed to pursue Independent policies, Is further encouraged to do so by Its new status as an emerging nuclear power. China has similar aspirations which nuclear weapons would also encourage. Their pursuit of Independent policies might encourage others to pursue policies Inconsistent with those of their alliance leaders. At least for the foreseeable future, relations within and between alliance systems will probably be made more unpredictable by the addition of new nuclear powers
he forcfoing conclusions are based on our estimate that there will not be widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the nextears. We have estimated that an Increasing number of nations will actively pursue nuclear energy programs right up to the threshold of acapability. Such programs could be justlflec domesticallyource of energy and astimulus to the development of technological skills and sophisticated Industries.hreshold capability would facilitate, the developmenteapons program if circumstances required.
could come
new nuclear powers. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that some time within the nextountryrowing sense of national ambition such as Indonesia may decide to enter the nuclear wvapons field. Finally, the development of broadly based peaceful prrgrams by additional countries could lay the foundation for weapons programs beyond the nextean.
ew nuclear power may be emboldened by the possession of nuclear weaponsore vigorous pursuit of Its objectives against enemy states, and the result may be an Increase In the frequency of
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local crises. However, we do not believe that In the case of most of the potential nuclear powers considered earlier, the acquisitionuclear arsenal would produce more aggressive international behavior. In any case, the psychological Impact ofuclear power will In due course diminish, and countries with this new capability will probably experience the practical and difficult problem of translating It into measurable political gains. Furthermore, the very presence of nuclear weapons, an entirely new element In the experience of regional enemies, wlUew sense of prudence into the calculations of such rivals when one or another Is considering the aggravationocal controversy.
Should local crises actually erupt Into open cocilct, it Is more dlfflcult to estimate the probable effect of nuclear weapons In the hands of one or morehe antagonists. It seems clear, however, that the situation would be potentially more dangerous than In the absence of such weapons. If only because of the additional uncertaii.tles introduced by their presence. Thereendency for the US and the USSR to become Involved In local crises in any event, but their Involvement might In some cases be more likely If the possible use of nuclear weapons was at stake. Although the Involvement of the major powers Inonflict iwould createotential for escalation Into general war, we believe that such an escalation Is unlikely. The possession of nuclear weapons by local antagonists would almost certainly Introduce elements of prudence Into their own calculations and the pressure of world opinion for restraint would be of maximum effectiveness against the smaller powers. The Involvement of the US and USSR could be expected to add to the forces of prudence and restraint, since It would almostbe In the US and Soviet Interest to see the hostilities broughtalt. Moreover, wc do not believe that even In the event that one or the other of the local antagonists actuallyuclear weapon, the major powers would necessarily feel compelled to raise the crisis to the level of an East-West confrontation.
As the number of countries with nuclear weapons Increases, the risk of unintentional or unauthorized detonation of such weapons will also rise, and for more than purely statistical reasons. Elaborate safety measures such as those developed by the US are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with, evenountry with considerable financial and technological resources. The accidental detonationuclear weapon In any part of the world could have far reaching consequences. Unless the circumstances were very quickly explained, understood and believed, the reaction of peoples and perhapswould probably be confused, even panic stricken. If thewas In the territory of one of the major powershrough the accidental firing from another countryissileuclearhere Is some slight chanceuclear exchange would
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be touched offThe odds are. of couisc, strongly against such an escalation; the major powers recognise that the diffusion of nuclear weapons will ucrease the chances of an accidental detonation and would probably react cautiously tn any such Incident
In the caseerious reactor accident, or an accidental weapons detonation on the soil of the owner, the consequences would depend on the attendant circumstonces. In general, the impactuclear accident on world opinion, particularly If life and property were lost, and considerable contamination occurred, would almost certainly serve to restrain most governmentseapons program. More specifically, if the accident came as the resultountry's efforts toational weapons capability and occurredopulated area, domestic opposition might become strong enough to causeof the program. There would also be strong public pressure within the area where the accident occurred to remove all nuclear weapons systems, regardless of origin. Forrench nuclear accident might not only affect the future of the French program by arousing domestic resistance but also provide an emotional issue which would be exploited by those who want US nuclear weapons withdrawn from Europe.
The spread of nuclear weapons also raises the possibility that the actionsuclear power other than the US and USSR couldeneral war. We believe, however,eliberate nuclear attack on the Soriet Union or the US by one of these powers Is extremely unlikely. Nonetheless, even the possibility Is enough toew aliment of uncertainty Into both alliance systems and Into East-West relations.
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ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
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MINIMUM
A. Nuclear Weapons
:rogram for the production of one to two low-yield all-plutonlum fission weapons per year, to be delivered by existing aircraft (bombers or modified commercialould cost on the order0 million0 million. This tealillionillion for theand operation of basic researchillionillion ior the acquisition of materials and the production of plutonlum;illionillion for weapons research, development, and fabrication. Adci'jonal outlaysillionillion per year would be requited for the annual operation of this program.
nry VOtdm
actual costs of delivery systems, aircraft or missiles,upon the sophistication desired and whether or not thesedeveloped Indigenously or procured from an external source.requirement were only to obtain fromelivery vehicletorude weapon, the Incremental costsrelativelysmaller for an aircraft system than forsystem. The costs of developing andeliveryof course, be large.
MODERATE PROGRAM, THE FRENCH EXAMPLE
A Nuclear Program
the basis of official French figures, we estimate that, by the
B. Delivery Capabilities
or the next few years, tha French Intend to use the Mirage IV light jet bomber for the delivery of nuclear weapons pendinguclear poweied submarine ballistic missileoken delivery capability with the Mirage IV will probably exist by the end of this year, but the projected force ofill not be operational before the endhe French have announced that they will achlevj. an initial operational capability with nuclear submarines by
systems will add appreciably to the costs of theweapons program. Thus, the force ofirageotal equivalent to some one-half billion US dollars,billion for the basic aircraft and the balance formodifications, and such possibilities as an air-to-surfacethree nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines nowcost on the order5 billion toillion, exclusive ofa modest surface-to-surface Intermediate range ballisticillion0 million, also exclusive of
C. General
costs ofgrams are to be met In part bytotal military spending and in part by reductions InDefense Minister Messmer notedecent article thatIn military expenditures of one billion new francs (NF)is expected0 even though military expenditures area constant share of gross national product. Earlier In thecited the present military share of GNPercentfactor cost).
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estimated costs are for developing and producing the delivery syatettl ROVED FORdo not Include costs for ope1
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