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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
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Likelihood and Consequences ofof Nuclear
Submitted by th* -DIRECTOR OF CENTRA! INTEUJGENCE
Concurred In by. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
The following intelligence organ'aaiions participated in the preparation '
The Central InielBgence Agency and tho intelligence organltotions of iKo Depart' merit* of Stole, Defeme, lhe Army, the'.Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA.
Concurring: .
irector of Intelligence ond Reieorch, Deportment of State . irector, Detente Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of theChief of Novol Operotlonteportmont of the NavyChief of Staff, (n'tlligenco, Director for InteHlgence,
The Atomic Energy Commtutan Representativeheirector Of the National Security Agency'
. ,u- V':
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau af Investigation, tire subject being outside
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
3
Likelihood and Consequencesroliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
1
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEAR
II. CAPABILITIES AND INTKNTIONS OF POTENTIAL
S)
I lliblflWaYrs IS)
POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR TOWARD PROLIFERATION
Soviet Attitude Toward Proliferation
British Attitude Toward Proliferation
French Attitude Toward Proliferation
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IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSIONEST BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR NUCLEAR
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BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
A: ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING ANNUCLEAR
LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCESROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons anddelivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.
CONCLUSIONS
the increasing availability of uranium, andand technicians, the developmentinimalweapons capability has come increasingly within thenonnuclearrogram for one or two low-yielda year would cost, through the first detonation,million andearcosts rise steeply for moreinimalbecome very large when advanced delivery systemsweapons are required. Political and militaryare likely to prove more Important inpace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences inwealth and technical skill. Where the motivation Isa country might attempt toack ofby importing materials, technology, andeven weapons themselves. )
believe that eight countries, in addition to France,physical and financial resources to develop ancapability (weapons and means of delivery) overdecade. However, we believe that only Communistactuallyeapons program. The Chinese may be
s
able toirst nuclear device byore likely date is4 or beyond. Approximately two yearseat the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon
ilItaly, and West Germany -have limitedprograms to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will.
however, almost certainly continue development of theirnuclear programs, someoint which would significantly reduce the time required to carryeapons program.
do not believe that the explosionirst device,the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability,major changes in Communist China's foreign policysense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy ofaggression, or even become willing to takemilitary risks. It would, however, increase Chineseand prestige and reinforce their efforts tohegemony through political pressures and the indirectof local "wars ofndia probably woulduclear weapons program on the basis ofuclear device, but ls likely to continue itsprogramointrash weaponsbe developed relatively quickly. Japan also would feelsense of pressure, but would be more reluctantother countries toeapons capability. WeIsraelis would probablyuclear capability tothe Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. Thewould probably blame the West, particularly the US,Soviets would probably finds ways of exploiting
French force has as its primary purposeprestige and assisting France to assume leadershipEurope less dependent on the US andoice in theand control of Western nuclear power. While manyare In general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives,fear that the French program will stimulate furthererode the NATO concept, and perhaps most im-
portant, lead to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will Umit themselves tonuclear programs over the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic, German interestational capability would rise)
B. We believe that the USSR desires to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in its policy. The Soviets have thus far proved unwilling to conclude nondiflusion agreements save on unacceptable terms. Even ir the Soviets conclude that West Germany was movinguclear status, they wouldnot make radical changes in their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional )
If the US. the UK, and the USSR could agree ona nondiflusion agreement. Communist China wouldrefuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherencedoubtful. Nevertheless, the very existence of such anwould Inhibit other nonslgnatories and reinforcewhere it alreadyomprehensiveban treaty would impose serious limitations on theof nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories butsubject to many of the same difficultiesondifTualon
strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferationoccur over the nextears will almost certainly notpower relations nor do we believe it will producein the relations of states. The impact will bepolitical and psychological effects of the existence ofweapons, the greater unpredictability of relationsbetween alliance systems, and the possibility thatout of existing or future controversies could escalateserious confrontation involving the major powers.
possession of nuclear weapons may encourage apower to pursue policies which might resultocal
crista, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainlytrong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood ofdetonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion In somemight even touchuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such anerious nuclear reactor accidentuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governmentsa weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. )
DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Twenty-one years after the beginning of the atomic age. the world has clearlyeriod in which the prerequisites for developing atinimum nuclear weapons program are becoming increasingly available to nonnuclear states. This condition has been createdide diffusion of basic knowledge and technical skills and by easier access to the necessary materials. Natural uranium,carce and tightly controlled commodity, Is now considerably easier to obtain. The plutonlum routeeapons program hasell marked trail, and one which In its earlier stages is scarcely distinguishableurely peaceful program There are already moreundred reactors, most of the small research variety, now operational or under construction in the nonnuclearrowing number of technicians, both native and imported, are available to any country Interesteduclear program.
Cost is becomingarrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons as fissionable materials become more plentiful and the spread oflessens the likelihood of expensive mistakes. The costeapons program will vary considerably, depending upon the level of technical and economic development of the country involved and the sin and type of weapons program desired Regardless of expenditure, countries which do notubstantial techrolegtcal bass cannot produce nuclear weapons without considerable assistance from foreign sources. For countries possessing an adequate technologicalinimum program for producing one or two low-yleld fission weapons per year wouldillion to produce the first detonation,ear thereafter.
ountry attempts moreinimum program, the costs begin to rite steeply. For example, the Initial costrogram leading to the productionission weapons per year is probablyillion to achieve the detonationirst device, plusannual operating expenses0 million. The costsubstantial capability. Including sophisticated delivery vehicles,weapons packages, and the production. can become astronomic. For example, the Preach have already5 biUion
t must also be kept in mindack of suitable test sites could present difficult problems for some countries. An untested weapon would be of uncertain reliabilityountry were supplied with
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detailed designs of previously tested weapons. It is unlikely, therefore, that any country would stockpile weapons of original design without first having conducted tests, except under the most unusual andcircumstances. In any event, refinement of warheads forweapons systems would require testing. While undergroundcouldeasible solution In some instances, such testing would add cosU. involve considerable tune delays, and reduce diagnostic returns.
echnical and economic factors help establish limits to theof nuclear weapons, but actual decisions will dependand military considerations as well. Indeed, nationalin political determination and strategic objectives are likelymore important in determining the pace and content ofthan differences in national wealth and technical skill.political and military considerations will weigh heavily Into the slse and sophistication of weapons programs. Thus, ai>ait ias France may be satisfied only by the development of weapons
Isj^m, which enable it to "share" In deterring the USSR, and which. strengthen itw position in international councils.
A country considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons must take into account Its potential enemies and the kind of weapons systems it believes will be necessary to deter or deal with them. It must decide whether it has strategic requirements, political pretensions, or territorial ambitions which It believes can only be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. More broadly. It must estimate the probable Impact of the weapons program it can afford on its national prestige and Its Influence within existing alliances No matter how attractiveuclear program may appear, they must be balanced against whateverountry might have whether nuclear weaponsa prudent form of defense expenditure and against otherconsiderations such as possible domestic resistanceeapons program The weight of arguments pro and con may change ns the scope and concomitant financial demands of tlie program become clearer through experiencehe British experience with strategicnd as the political and strategic situation changes.
ii. capabilities and intentions of potential nuclear
CANDIDATES
e believe that eight countries In addition to France and the three major nuclear powers have the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) within the next decade.ists these eight countries and the probable time periods they would require touclear deviceecision to go ahead. Of these eight nations, we believe that only Communist China has actually embarkeduclear wcap-
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ESTIMATED TIME REQUftED FOR SEIECTED COUNTRIES TO PRODUCE ANDIRST NUCLEAR DEVICE "
Canada
Israel Sweden
West Germany
India
Italy
Japan
Communist China
Foistears afterears afterears afterears afterears afterears afterears after decision Possibly as early4
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The Status ofEight Candidates Communist China
he Communist Chineae appear to haveery high priority to their nuclear weapons programumber of years and. despite serious difficulties occasioned by the cutoff of Soviet assistance and domestic economic problem', are likely to continue to press ahead. Our evidence with respect to Communist China's nuclear program ls Insufficient, however, toonfident judgment about the likely dateirst nuclear ex pi aeon. " sssssssssssssissssssl
il. Approximately two yearsest the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. To deliver this weapon, the Chinese would be forced to rely for the next few years on somenti-quotedBULL) or on their twoet medium bombers (BADGER) We believe that the Chinese Communists will probably notissile system (medium range) until the. In order tognlflctmt capability In the nuclear weapons field, the Chinese Communists willarger plulonium production capacity than we know to exist and facilities for the production of.
nuclear weapon* capability. These restraints largely derive from one or more of the following: opposition cither internal or external,of cost, and the lack of strong positive motivation to proceed We cannot exclude the possibilityvents which we cannot nowwill remove these restraints upon some of the countries. Moreover, nuclear policies will continue to be affected by intangibles difficult to assess, such as prestige, and subject to pressuresovernment might not be able toublic opinion which became arousedrospective enemy had acquired weapons
ll the countries which we have considered possible but unlikely candidates are engaged in peaceful nuclear programs. Some havethe point where they will have all the facilities required touclear weaponshe eventecision were made to do so. and the others will reach this position over the next few yean.ituation will arise in which there couldapidIn the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons should the restraints now operating cease to be effective.
pecial Cow
he proliferation of nuclear weapons would not necessarilyto countries which possess the skills, resourcesbHlM5Vrio produce them independently. Where the motivation isa country may attempt to acquire weapons by tapping the man-
power and industry of other countries or even by direct transfer.
MPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
A. Communlit China
e do not believe that the explosionrit device, or even the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes In Communist China's roreign policy in the sense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. China's leaders would recognise that their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major stales and could not do so In the foreseeable future. In particular, they would recognise that they remained unable either to remove or neutralise the US presence In Asia.
evertheless, the Chinese would feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery. They would probably feel that the US would be moreto Intervene on the Asian mainland and thus the tone ot Chinese policy would probably become moreurther, their possession of nuclear weapons would reinforce their efforts to achieve Asianthrough political pressures and the Indirect support of local "wars ofuch tactics would probably acquire greatersince the Chinese feat wouldrofound Impact on neighboring governments and peoples. It would alter the latter'j sense of the relations of power, even If It made little immediate change in the realities of power, andreater or lesser degree would probably result In Increased pressures to accommodate to Chinese demands
ommunist China's success in the nuclear weapons field will give significant weight to tbe arguments of those Indians who are convinced that India at some point must have its own nuclear capability if It Isead bending to Communist Chinese pressure or being forced into excessive dependence on external support It is indeed possible that these arguments could prevail and that India would embark onrogram On balance, however, we do not believe India will make the decision for weapons development on Ihe basis of theuclear device, especially if India is obtaining military assistance
' The AcUng DUsclor of InteQlaenccResoajch. Department of Stale. beUere* lhat there It tne-iHtrlant tvMence to warrantefinite aUlemant about in- ChinMt appraisal of our Intentions and that iheU aomewhut tnconaUWDt with paragraph W
In modern defense weapons. The Induuuwitl probably continue what we belie re to be their present program of developing theirointrush weapons program could be brought to fruition relatively quickly.
he Japanese might feel an increased sense of pressure after the Chinese acquire nuclear weapons and opt for developing their nuclear programoint where they would be on the thresholdeapons capability But they would be much more reluctant to cross that threshold than most other countries. The Japanese have particularly strong psychological inhibitions against the acquisition of nuclearand will thus probably continue to rely on the US for support and protection.
C. The French Program and The Problemuropean Nuclear Diffusion
The French nuclear weapons program is very much anof President de Gaulle's foreign policy,ather effective one. He has been frank to admit that France cannot hope to achieve moreodest capability in comparison to that of the US or the USSR. The primary purpose of the French force is to heighten French prestige and status on the continent and thereby assist France tourope less dependent on the US andoice in the management and control of Western nuclear power. The Frenchwill appeal to those in Europe, at present relatively few. who have qualms about the firmness and the duration of the US commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe.
Thus far France's European Allies have avoided confronting de Qaulle on the question of the French nuclear program. Their reaction has been ambivalent. While many Europeans are In general sympathy with de Gaulle's challenge to US dominance of the alliance, they are also fearful that the existence of an Independent French nuclear force will increase the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, further erode the NATO concept, and, perhaps most important, provide the vehicle for German acqulsiUon of nuclear weapons.
The French realize that If they are to have nuclear capabilities sufficient to constitute an Important element In Soviet calculations, they need sophisticated weapons In some numbers. The cost and difficulty of developing and producing the appropriate weapons systems has proved very great. Together with the expenditures necessary to stay in the race against obsolescence, these coals would be sufficient to dissuade the bulk ot European states from undertaking comparable programs, and they would realise that their interests would not be servedere token capability. In this connection, the British decision not to develop its own strategic miasJle system cannot but Impress other European countrieseapons program.
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plant they might seek German technical assistance, which they probably consider of more Immediate benefit than financial assistance. Although German scientists have no experience In the gaseous diffusionhey could be of great value to the French In certain areas essential to the process. If the French program continues to encounter difficulties the French might find it worthwhile to go to the Germans for financial as well as technical assistance in exchange for some limited degree of German participation In the French program. An additional
motive might be de Gaulle's interest inS-sponsored (and, In his opinion, US-controlled) NATO collective deterrent system.
We believe that the French program has thus far had Little direct effect on German attitudes toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe the Germans will limit their nuclear development programs over the next few years to projects which are demonstrably peaceful. For the time being, the principal interest Is In having nuclear weapons from whatever source Immediately available for the defense of German territory. While the Germans are extremely sensitive to any appearance of discrimination within NATO, their sensitivity apparently Is thus far not acute with respect to the nuclear restrictions imposed on Germany by treaty. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, andthe US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of theRepublic, German Interestational capability would rise.
Thus far the Germans have endorsed the Nassau proposalS-sponsored NATO multilateral nuclear force. We believe that once this force is organized the Germans will expect lt ultimately to developorce freeS veto. If this does not occur, the Germans might become interestedurely European multilateral force or even in some sort of French-German arrangement. However, until such time as West Germany is prepared to loosen Its close ties with the US, the attitude of the US with respect to German nuclear policy will continue to be of overriding importance.
IV. POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD PROLIFERATION
A. The Soviet Attitude Toword Ptolilefolion
We believe that the USSR is reluctant toiffusion of nuclear weapons. Within the Warsaw Fact, lt is under no significant pressure to make nuclear weapons available to its European allies, and we believe that lt will not in the foreseeable future. The Soviets have no military reasons for doing so, and such action would, in the Soviet view, riskan added impulse to West German arguments and efforts to acquire an independent nuclear capability.
In general, we believe that the Soviet desire to avoid proliferation will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in their policy. The Soviets probably have doubts about the value of agreementsto prevent proliferation because of the obvious Inability of the US and UK to head off the French program and their own inability to handle China. In any case, the USSR has thus far proved unwilling to reach agreement with the West against the transfer of nuclearand weapons technology, save on unacceptable terms. For example.
the Soviets LnslBt that any such arcanffemont mustrovision which would exclude Germany from any multilateral nuclear force
the Soviets probably appreciate that current USnuclear sharing within NATO are intended lo deny the Federalan Independent capability, they believe that the GermanNATO Is bound to grow. Thus they fear that present multilateral
schemes will open the way to Germany'sajor voice In NATO nuclear decisions and perhaps lo acquiring an independent national
capability. The Soviets are probably also concerned that, even If the
multilateral force does not come about, Germany willuclear
power through cooperation with France.
the Soviets concluded that West Germany was movingstatusuclear power, they might feel compelled to taketo head off this development. Such measures mightone extreme, threatening toajor East-West crisiswss given thst West Germany would be prevented fromcontrol of nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, theyconcessions on reunification and disarmament In return forOn balance, however, we believe the Soviets will notradical changes in their policy, but employixtureappeals, and proposals for regional disarmament.
British Attitude Toward Proliferation
British are also concerned about the spread of nuclearto nonnuclear stales which could use them independently.government hastrong interest in bothest ban treaty and has long been more hopefulUS that compromise ls possible. If tbe Labor Party gainsforesee no change of British policy on this score. Indeed, awould be even more active in opposing proliferation.
French Anituds Toward Proliferation
French attitude toward nuclear diffusion is as yet difficultThey have, of course, refused to take part Ln test bandisarmament discussions. Once Franceullyhowever, we expect that its attitude on diffusion maymuch the same as that of the other nuclear powers.
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSIONEST BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
road nondiffusion agreement have Includedthat the nuclear powers agree not to transfer weaponsnationsl control of nonnuclear powers or assist them In acquiring
weapons. Nonnuclear signatories would* be required to agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons, acquire national control over them, or seek nuclear weapons assistance- If the US. UK, and Uie USSR could come together on the terms of such an agreement It would, of course, prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any nonnuclear Communist China would, however, almost certainly refuse to sign. The French would certainly not sign unless they weren..on* of the nuclear powers; even If this were done, we believe that French
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El IIIIIwould be doubtful 1"
Nevertheless, the very existenceuch an agreement wouldolitical and psychological Inhibition lo the Initiation of anweapons capability by other notistgnatories and would reinforce inter-nal opposition where lt already existed.
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omprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, while also slowing the pace of diffusion, would be subject to many of the same difficultiesondiffusion agreement. Communist China would clearly reject surh on agreement. France would almost certainly not sign It at least untilime as lt hadhermonuclear warhead for medlum-mnge missiles _H
reaty would impose serious limitations on the developmentuclear capability by nonnuclear signatories. If the agreement was limited to an atmospheric test ban. the developmentuclearprogram would be more difficult and expensive for the signatories. Underground testing, although more expensive and technically lessis one road,umpy one,eapons capability. Aside from technicaluclear test ban agreement,on-diffusion agreement, wouldtrong political and psychologicalto the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
he creation of regional nonnuclear zones, such as the oneby Braill for South America, couldignificant long-term effect on the spread of nuclear weapons. There arc many regions of the world where there would be wide public support for the creation ofone. Prospects for agreement are brightest in those areas, such as South America and Sub-Sahara Africa, where there are presently no aspiring nuclear powers and where the major powers have no desire to locate nuclear weapons systems.
VI. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
n strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the nextears will almost certainly not upset global powerNone of the prospective or potential nuclear powers will acquire capabilities which. If added to those of the US or the USSR, would significantly affect East-West military relationships, or bulk large militarily as an Independent force. We do not believe China capable
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able to achieve more Chan small forces of local slgruficance. Thus the impact of such proliferation as takes place will come from the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or futurecould escalateerious confrontation involving the major powers.
Speaking in the broadest of terms, wc do not believe thatover the next decade will produce major realignments in the relations of states or lead to new combinations of allies and enemies. What nuclear proliferation will do is to Intensify, as it already has. the strains within the major power groupings. The efforts of France and Communist China to develop their own weapons systemsirect challenge to the leaders of their respectiveUS and the USSR. France, already disposed to pursue Independent policies, is further encouraged to do so by its new status as an emerging nuclear power. China has similar aspirations which nuclear weapons would also encourage. Their pursuit of independent policies might encourage others to pursue policies Inconsistent with those of their alliance leaders. At least for the foreseeable future, relations within and between alliance systems will probably be made more unpredictable by the addition of new nuclear powers.
The foregoing conclusions are based on our estimate that there will not be widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the nextears. We have estimated that an increasing number of nations will actively pursue nuclear energy programs right up to the thresholdeapons capability. Such programs could be justified domesticallyource of energy and astimulus to the development of technological skills and sophisticated industries.hreshold capability would facilitate the developmenteapons program If circumstances required. This is the road Sweden and India havetaken, and it may well be the path of others. Nationaland ambitions change, and with such changes could come new nuclear powers. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that some time within the nextountryrowing sense of national ambition such as Indonesia may decide to enter the nuclear weapons field. Finally, the development of broadly based peaceful programs by additional countries could lay the foundation for weapons programs beyond the nextears
A new nuclear power may be emboldened by the possession of nuclear weaponsore vigorous pursuit of Its objectives against enemy states, and the result may be an increase In the frequency of
local crises. However, we do not believe that In tbe case of most of the potential nuclear powers considered earlier, the acquisitionuclear arsenal would produce more aggressive international behavior. In any case, the psychological Impact ofuclear power will ia due course diminish, and countries with this new capability will probably experience the practical and difficult problem of translating It into measurable political gains. Furthermore, the very presence of nuclear weapons, an entirely new element in the experience of regional enemies, will probablyew sense of prudence Into the calculations of such rivals when one or another is considering the aggravationocal controversy.
Should local crises actually erupt into open conflict, it is more difficult to estimate the probable effect of nuclear weapons in the hands of one or more of the antagonists- It seems clear, however, that the situation would be potentially more dangerous than in the absence of such weapons, If only because of the additional uncertainties Introduced by their presence. Thereendency for the US and the USSR to becomeocal crises in any event, but their involvement might in some cases be more likely if the possible use of nuclear weapons was at stake. Although the involvement of the major powers inonflict would create the potential for escalation into general war, we believe that such an escalation Is unlikely. The possession of nuclear weapons by local antagonists would almost certainly introduce elements of prudence into their own calculations and the pressure of world opinion for restraint would be of maximum effectiveness against the smaller powers. The Involvement of the US and USSR could be expected to add lo the forces of prudence and restraint, since It would almostbe In the US and Soviet Interest to see the hostilities broughtalt. Moreover, we do not believe that even In the event that one or the other of the local antagonists actuallyuclear weapon, the major powers would necessarily feel compelled to raise the crisis to the level of an East-West confrontation.
As the number of countries with nuclear weapons Increases, the risk of unintentional or unauthorized detonation of such weapons will also rise, and for more than purely statistical reasons. Elaborate safety measures such as those developed by the US are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with, evenountry with considerable financial and technological resources. The accidental detonationuclear weapon In any part of the world could have far reaching consequences. Unless the circumstances were very quickly explained, understood and believed, the reaction of peoples and perhapswould probably be confused, even panic stricken. If thewas In ihe territory of one of the major powershrough the accidental ruing from another countryissileuclearhere is some slight chanceuclear exchange would
30
be touched off Immediately. Ttip oddS are, ot course, strongly agnlnst such an escalstion; the major powers recognise that Lhe diffusion of nuclear weapons will Increase the chances of an accidental detonation and would probably react cautiously to any such Incident
n the caseerious reactor accident, or an accidental weapons detonation on the soil of the owner, the consequences would depend on the attendant circumstancet. In general, the impactuclear accident on world opinion, particularly if life and property were lost, and considerable contamination occurred, would almost certainly serve to restrain most governmentseapons program. More 8pecLflcally, If the accident came as the resultountry's efforts toational weapons capability and occurredopulated area, domestic opposition might become strong enough to causeof the program. There would also be strong public pressure within the area where the accident occurred to remove all nuclear weapons systems, regardless of origin. Forrench nuclear accident might not only affect the future of the French program by arousing domestic resistance but also provide an emotional issue which would be exploited by those who want TJS nuclear weapons withdrawn from Europe.
be spread of nuclear weapons also raises the possibility that the actionsuclear power other than the US and USSR couldeneral war. We believe, however,eliberate nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or the US by one of these powers is extremely unlikely. Nonetheless, even thenough toew element of uncertainty into both alliance systems and into East-West relations.
ANNEX A
ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
I. HYPOTHETICAL MINIMUM PROGRAM
A. Nuclear Weeper t
pro cram (or the production of one to two low-yield allweapon* per year, to be delivered by existing(bombentcommercialould cost on the order0 millionmillion. Thia total Includesmillionillion for theand operation of basic researchillion tofor the acquisition of materials and the productionillionillion for weapons research, development,Additional outlaysillionillion perbe required for the annual operation of this program.
ehrcls,
actual costs of delivery systems, aircraft or missiles,upon the sophistication desired and whether or not thesedeveloped Indlgrnousry or procured from an external source.requirement were only to obtain fromelivery vehicletorude weapon, tne incremental costsrelativelysmaller for an aircraft system than forsystem. The coats of developing andeliveryof course, be large.
ODERATE PROGRAM: THE FRENCH EXAMPIE A. Nuclear Program
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or the next few years, the French Intend to use the Mirage IV light jet bomber for the delivery of nuclear weapons pendinguclear powered submarine ballistic missileoken delivery capability with the Mirage IV will probably exist by the end of this year, but the projected force ofill not be operational before the end The French have announced that they will
elivery systems will add appreciably to the costs of the French nuclear weapons program. Thus, the force ofirage lvs might wellotal equivalent to some one-half billion US dollars, including one-quarter billion for the basic aircraft and the balance forankers, modifications, and such possibilities as an alr-tc-surface missile. The three nuclearballistic missile submarines now programmed will cost on the order5 billion to S2 billion, exclusive of warheads,odest surface-to-surface intermediate range ballisticillion0 million, also exclusive of warheads."
C. General
he costs of these programs are to be met in psrt by Increases In total military spending and in part by reductions in conventional forces. Defense Minister Messmer notedecent article that an increase in military expenditures of one billion new francs (NF) per year is expected0 even though military expenditures are limitedonstant share of gross national product Earlier In the article he cited the present military share of GNPercent {presumably at factor cost).
estimated costs are tor developing and producing tbs delivery system* and do not Include costs for operation and maintenance.
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