TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROBLEM
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
1
5
OENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARINQ ON NUCLEAR
II. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CANDIDATES
A. Tlie Status of the EightChina
POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE POWERS TOWARD PROLIFERATION
Soviet Attitude Toward Proliferation
British Attitude Toward Proliferation .
French Attitude Toward Proliferation . ,,
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSION AGREEMENT,BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR
VI. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
ANNEX A ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING ANNUCLEAR CAPABILITY
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likelihood and consequencesroliferation of nuclear weapons systems
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons anddelivery systems over the next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.
CONCLUSIONS
the increasing availability of uranium, and nuclear and technicians, the developmentinimalweapons capability has come increasingly within the reach
of nonnuclearrogram for one or two low-yield fissionear would cost, through the first detonation,illion andear thereafter. However, costs rise steeply for moreinimal program and become very large when advanced delivery systems and compatible weapons are required. Political and militaryare likely to prove more important in determining the pace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences inwealth and technical skill. Where the motivation is strongountry might attempt toack of native resources by importing materials, technology, and technicians, or even weapons themselves. )
believe that eight countries, in addition to France,physical and financial resources to develop ancapability (weapons and means of delivery) overdecade. However, we believe that only Communistactuallyeapons program. The Chinese may be
able toirst nuclear device byut adate is4 or beyond. Approximately two yearstest the Chinese could probably produce their first crude
Thus far the remainingJapan, ten, Canada, Italy, and Westlimited their nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will, however, almost certainly continue development of theirnuclear programs, someoint which would significantly reduce the time required to carryeapons program
do not believe that the explosionirst device,the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability,major changes in Communist China's foreign policysense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy ofaggression, or even become willing to takemilitary risks. It would, however, increase Chineseand prestige and reinforce their efforts tohegemony through political pressures and the indirectof local "wars ofndia probably woulduclear weapons program on the basis ofuclear device, but is likely to continue itsprogramointrash weaponsbe developed relatively quickly. Japan also would feelsense of pressure, but would be more reluctantother countries toeapons capability. WeIsraelis would probablyuclear capability tothe Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. Thewould probably blame the West, particularly the US,Soviets would probably finds ways of exploiting
French force has as its primary purposeprestige and assisting France to assume leadershipEurope less dependent on the US andoice in theand control of Western nuclear power. While manyare in general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives,fear that the French program will stimulate furthererode the NATO concept, and perhaps most im-
portant, lead to German acquisition ol nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will limit themselves tonuclear programs over the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons In the defense of the Federal Republic. German interestational capability would rise. (Paras.
believe that the USSR desires to prevent thenuclear weapons, but that this desire will not prove soto produce major changes In its policy. The Soviets haveproved unwilling to conclude nondiflusion agreementsunacceptable terms. Even if the Soviets conclude thatwas movinguclear status, they wouldnot make radical changes in their policy, but employmixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional )
if the US, the UK. and the USSR could agree ona nondiflusion agreement. Communist China wouldrefuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherencedoubtful. Nevertheless, the very existence of such anwould inhibit other nonsignatories and reinforcewhere it alreadyomprehensiveban treaty would impose serious limitations on theof nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear signatories butsubject to many of the same difficultiesondiflusion )
strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferationoccur over the nextears will almost certainly notpower relations nor do we believe it will producein the relations of states. The impact will bepolitical and psychological effects of the existence ofweapons, the greater unpredictability of relationsbetween alliance systems, and the possibility thatout of existing or future controversies could escalateserious confrontation Involving the major powers. (Paras.
possession of nuclear weapons may encourage apower to pursue policies which might resultocal
crisis, but the possibility that such weapons could be used will almost certainlytrong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons programs increases, the likelihood ofdetonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion in somemight even touchuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such anerious nuclear reactor accidentuclear weapons detonation established as unintentional would almost certainly intensify domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other governmentsa weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. )
DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Twenty-one years after the beginning of the atomic age. the world has clearlyeriod to which the prerequisites for developing atinimum nuclear weapons program are becoming Increasingly available to nonnuclear states. This condition has been createdide difiusion of basic knowledge and technical skills and by easier access to the necessary materials. Natural uranium,carce and tightly controlled commodity, is now considerably easier to obtain. The plutonfum routeeapons program hasell marked trail, and one which in its earlier stages is scarcely distinguishableurely peaceful program. There are already moreundred reactors, most of the small research variety, now operational or under construction in the nonnuclearrowing number of technicians, both native and imported, are available to any country Interesteduclear program.
Cost Is becomingarrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons as fissionable materials become more plentiful and the spread oflessens the likelihood of expensive mistakes. The costeapons program will vary considerably, depending upon the level of technical and economic development of the country involved and the size and type of weapons program desired. Regardless of expenditure, countries which do notubstantial technological base cannot produce nuclear weapons without considerable assistance from foreign sources. For countries possessing an adequate technologicalinimum program for producing one or two low-yield fission weapons per year wouldillion to produce the first detonation,ear thereafter.
ountry attempts moreinimum program, the costs begin to rise steeply. For example, the initial costrogram leading to the productionission weapons per year is probablyillion to achieve the detonationirst device, plusannual operating expensesillion. The costsubstantial capability, including sophistic* led delivery vehicles,weapons packages, and the production, can become astronomic. For example, the French have already5 billion
t must also be kept in mindack of suitable test sites could present difficult problems for some countries. An untested weapon would be of uncertain reliabilityountry were supplied with
detailed designs of previously tested weapons, it Ls unlikely, therefore, that any country would stockpile weapons of original design without first having conducted tests, except under the most unusual andcircumstances. In any event, refinement of warheads (orweapons systems would require testing. While undergroundcouldeasible solution in some instances, such testing would add costs, involve considerable time delays, and reduce diagnostic returns.
echnical and economic factors help establish limits to the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, but actual decisions will depend on political and military considerations as well. Indeed, nationalIn political determination and strategic objectives are likely to prove more Important in determining the pace and content of nuclear diffusion than differences ln national wealth and technical skill.political and military considerations will weigh heavily in decisions as to the site and sophistication of weapons programs.ountry such as France may be satisfied only by the development of weapons systems which enable it to "share" in deterring the USSR, and which
ountry considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons must take Into account Its potential enemies and the kind of weapons systems it believes will be necessary to deter or deal with them. It must decide whether it has strategic requirements, political pretensions, or territorial ambitions which it believes can only be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. More broadly, it must estimate the probable impact of the weapons program it can afford on its national prestige and its influence within existing alliances. No matter how attractiveuclear program may appear, they must be balanced against whateverountry might have whether nuclear weaponsa prudent form of defense expenditure and against otherconsiderations such as possible domestic resistanceeapons program. The weight of arguments pro and con may change as the scope and concomitant financial demands of the program become clearer through experiencehe British experience with strategicnd as the political and strategic situation changes.
II. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CANDIDATES
e believe that eight countries In addition to France and the three major nuclear powers have the physical and financial resources to develop an operational nuclear capability (weapons and means of delivery) within the next decade.ists these eight countries and the probable time periods they would require touclear deviceecision to go ahead. Of these eight nations, we believe that only Communist China has actually embarkeduclear weap-
oris program.
I Thus far the remaining countries have limited
eir nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes, although we assume that they are not Ignoring possible military applications.
TABLE I
estimated time required for selected countries to produce andirst nuclear device "
Canada
Israel
Sweden
West.
India
-Italy
Japan
Communist China .
First Device
after decision after decision after decision after decision after decision after decision afterarly4
The estimates of time required are tor decisions made within the next year or so. If the decisions were to be made later than this, the time required might be shortened by Intervening developments.
A. The Status of the Eight Candidates Communist China
he Communist Chinese appear to haveery high priority to their nuclear weapons programumber of years and, despite serious difficulties occasioned by the cutoff of Soviet assistance and domestic economic problems, are likely to continue to press ahead. Our evidence with respect to Communist China's nuclear program is Insufficient, however, toonfident Judgment about the likeh dateirst nuclear explcelon.
pproximately two yearsest the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. To deliver this weapon, the Chinese would be forced to rely for the next few years onBULL) or on their twoet medium bomberse believe that the Chinese Communists will probably notissile system (medium range) until then order toignificant capability in the nuclear weapons field, the Chinese Communists willarger plutonium production capacity than we know to exist and facilities for the production of.
imposed restraints stand ln the way of their acquiring some kind of nuclear weapons capability. These restraints largely derive from one or more of the following: opposition either internal or external,of cost, and the lack of strong positive motivation to proceed. We cannot exclude the possibility that events which we cannot nowwill remove these restraints upon some of the countries. Moreover, nuclear policies will continue to be affected by intangibles difficult to assess, such as prestige, and subject to pressuresovernment might not be able toublic opinion which became arousedrospective enemy had acquired weapons.
the countries which we have considered possible butare engaged Ln peaceful nuclear programs. Some havethe point where they will have all the facilities requireda nuclear weapons program in the eventecisionto do so, and the others will reach this position over theituation will arise in which there couldapidin the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons shouldnow operating cease to be effective.
pecial Cos*
proliferation of nuclear weapons would not necessarilyto countries which possess the skills, resources andproduce them independently. Where the motivation isa country may attempt to acquire weapons by tapping theand industry of other countries or even by direct transfer. M
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
A. Communist China
We do not believe that the explosionirst device, or even the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. China's leaders would recognize that their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among the major states and could not do so in the foreseeable future. In particular, they would recognize that they remained unable either to remove or neutralize the US presence in Asia.
Nevertheless, the Chinese would feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery. They would probably feci that the US would be moreto intervene on the Asian mainland and thus the tone of Chinese policy would probably become moreurther, their possession of nuclear weapons would reinforce their efforts to achieve Asianthrough political pressures and the tadlrect support of local "wars ofuch tactics would probably acquire greatersince the Chinese feat wouldrofound Impact on neighboring governments and peoples. It would alter the latter's sense of the relations of power, even if it made little Immediate change in the realities of power, andreater or lesser degree would probably result in increased pressures to accommodate to Chin est- demands.
Communist China's success in the nuclear weapons field will give significant weight to the arguments of those Indians who are convinced that India at some point must have its own nuclear capability if It is to avoid bending to Communist Chinese pressure or being forced into excessive dependence on external support. It ls Indeed possible that these arguments could prevail and that India would embark onrogram. On balance, however, we do not believe India will make the decision for weapons development on the basis of theuclear device, especially if India Is obtaining military assistance
' The Acting Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of Slate, behoves that there Is insufficient evidence to warrantefinite statement about the Chinese appraisal of our Intentions and that the statement is somewhat inconsistent with
in modern defense weapons The Indians will probably continue what we believe to be their present program ol developing theirointrash weapons program could be brought to fruition relatively quickly.
he Japanese might feel an increased sense of pressure after the Chinese acquire nuclear weapons and opt for developing their nuclear programoint where they would be on the thresholdeapons capability. But they would be much more reluctant to cross that threshold than most other countries. The Japanese have particularly strong psychological inhibitions against the acquisition of nuclearand will thus probably continue lo rely on the US for support and protection.
C. The French Program and lhe Problem of European Nuclear Diffusion
The French nuclear weapons program is very much anof President de Gaulle's foreign policy,ather effective one. He has been frank to admit that France cannot hope to achieve moreodest capability In comparison to that of the US or the USSR The primary purpose of the French force Is to heighten French prestige and status on the continent and thereby assist France tourope less dependent on the US andoice ln the management and control of Western nuclear power. The FrenchwUl appeal to those In Europe, at present relatively few. who have qualms about the firmness and the duration of the US commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe
Thus far France's European Allies have avoided confronting de Gaulle on the question of the French nuclear program. Their reaction has been ambivalent. While many Europeans are in general sympathy with de Gaulle's challenge to US dominance of the alliance, they are also fearful that the existence of an independent French nuclear force will mcrease the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, further erode the NATO concept, and. perhaps most important, provide the vehicle for German acquisition of nuclear weapons
The French realise that if they are to have nuclear capabilities sufficient to constitute an important element in Soviet calculations, they need sophisticated weapons In some numbers. The cost and difficulty of developing and producing the appropriate weapons systems has proved very great. Together with the expenditures necessary to stay In the race against obsolescence, these costs would be sufficient to dissuade the bulk of European states from undertaking comparable programs, and they would realize that their interests would not be servedere token capability. In this connection, the British decision not to develop Its own strategic missile system cannot but impress other European countrieseapons program.
fusion plant they might seek German technical assistance, which they probably consider of more Immediate benefit than financial assistance. Although German scientists have no experience in the gaseous diffusion, they could be of great value to the French in certain areas essential to the process. If the French program continues to encounter difficulties the French might find it worthwhile lo go to the Oermans for financial as well as technical assistance in exchange for some limited degree of German participation in the French program An additional
motive might be de Gaulle's interest inS-sponsored (and, in his opinion. US-controlled) NATO collective deterrent system.
e believe that the French program has thus tar had Utile direct effect on German attitudes toward the acquisition of nuciear weapons We believe the Oermans will limit their nuclear development programs over the next few years to projects which are demonstrably peaceful For the time being, the principal interest is in having nuclear weapons from whatever source immediately available for the defense of German territory. While the Oermans are extremely sensitive to any appearance of discrimination within NATO, their sensitivity apparently is thus far not acute with respect to the nuclear restrictions imposed on Germany by treaty. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, andthe US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of theRepublic, German Interestational capability would rise.
far the Oermans have endorsed the Nassau proposal forNATO multilateral nuclear force. We believe thatforce is organized the Germans will expect It ultimately toa force freeS veto If this does not occur, the Germansinterestedurely European multilateral force or evensort of French-German arrangement. However, until suchWest Germany is prepared to loosen its close ties with the US,of the US with respect to German nuclear policy willbe of overriding importance.
IV. POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD PROLIFERATION
A. The Soviet Attitude Toward Proliferation
We believe that the USSR ls reluctant toiffusion of nuclear weapons. Within the Warsaw Pact, it ls under no significant pressure to make nuclear weapons available to Its European allies, and we believe that it will not in the foreseeable future. The Soviets have no military reasons for doing so, and such action would, in the Soviet view, riskan added impulse to West German arguments and efforts to acquire an independent nuclear capability.
In general, we believe that the Soviet desire to avoid proliferation will not prove so strong as to produce major changes in their policy. The Soviets probably have doubts about the value of agreementsto prevent proliferation because or the obvious inability of the US and UK to head off the French program and their own inability to handle China. In any case, the USSR has thus far proved unwilling to reach agreement with the West against the transfer of nuclearand weapons technology, save on unacceptable terms. For example.
the Soviets insist that any such arrangement mustrovision which would exclude Germany Irom any multilateral nuclear force.
While the Soviets probably appreciate that current US proposals for nuclear sharing within NATO are intended to deny the Federalan independent capability, they believe that the German role in NATO is bound to grow. Thus they fear that present multilateral schemes will open the way to Germany'sajor voice in NATO nuclear decisions and perhaps lo acquiring an independent national capability. The Soviets are probably also concerned that, even if the multilateral force does not come about, Germany willuclear power through cooperation with France.
If the Soviets concluded that West Germany was moving toward ;he statusuclear power, they might feel compelled lo take radical measures lo head off this development. Such measures might involve, at one extreme, threatening toajor East-West crisis unless assurance was given that West Germany would be prevented fromcontrol of nuclear weapons At the other extreme, they might offer concessions on reunification and disarmament in return for such assurances. On balance, however, we believe the Soviets will not make any radical changes in their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament.
he British Attitude Toward Proliferation
British are also concerned about the spread of nuclearto nonnuclear states which could use them independently. The
agreementest ban treaty and has long been more hopeful than the US that compromise ls possible. If the Labor Party gains power we foresee no change of British policy on this score.abor government would be even more active in opposing proliferation.
C. The French Attitude Toward Proliferation
French attitude toward nuclear diffusion is as yet difficultThey have, of course, refused to take part in test bandisarmament discussions. Once Franceullyhowever, we expect that its attitude on diffusion maymuch the same as that of the other nuclear powers.
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSIONEST BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
road nondiffusion agreement have includedthat the nuclear powers agree not to transfer weaponsnational control of nonnuclear powers or assist them in acquiring
SECRET
oubtful ]
weapons. Nonnuclear signatories would be required to agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons, acquire national control over them, or seek nuclear weapons assistance. If the US, UK. and the USSR could come together on the terms of such an agreement It would, of course, prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any nonnuclearCommunist China would, however, almost certainly refuse to sign. The French would certainly not sign unless they were considered one of the nuclear adherence would be doubtful. Nevertheless, theolitical and psychological inhibition to the initiation of anweapons capability by other nonsignatories and would reinforceopposition where it already existed.
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, while also slowingof diffusion, would be subject to many of the same difficulties asagreement. Communist China would clearly rejectagreement. France would almost certainly not sign It at leasta time as it hadhermonuclear warhead formissiles H
of
a nuclear capability by nonnuclear signatories. If the agreement was limited to an atmospheric test ban, the developmentuclearprogram would be more difficult and expensive for the signatories. Underground testing, although more expensive and technically lessIs one road,umpy one,eapons capability. Aside from technicaluclear test ban agreement,on-diffusion agreement, wouldtrong political and psychologicalto the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
creation of regional nonnuclear zones, such as the oneby Brazil for South America, couldignificanton the spread of nuclear weapons. There are many regionsworld where there would be wide public support forone. Prospects for agreement are brightest in thoseas South America and Sub-Sahara Africa, where there areaspiring nuclear powers and where the major powers have nolocate nuclear weapons systems
VI. BROAD IMPIICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely tothe nextears will almost certainly not upset global powerNone ol the prospective or potential nuclear powerscapabilities which, if added to those of the US or thesignificantly affect East-West military relationships, or bulkas an independent force. We do not believe China capable
able to achieve more than small forces of local significance. Thus the impact of such proliferation as takes place will come from the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or futurecould escalateerious confrontation involving the major powers.
Speaking In the broadest ol terms, we do not believe thatover the next decade will produce major realignments in the relations of states or lead to new combinations of allies and enemies. What nuclear proliferation will do is to intensify, as it already has. the strains within the major power groupings. The efforts of France and Communist China to develop their own weapons systemsirect challenge to the leaders of their respectiveUS and the USSR. France, already disposed to pursue independent policies, is further encouraged to do so by its new status as an emerging nuclear power. China has similar aspirations which nuclear weapons would also encourage. Their pursuit of independent policies might encourage others to pursue policies Inconsistent with those of their alliance leaders. At least for the foreseeable future, relations within and between alliance systems will probably be made more unpredictable by the addition of new nuclear powers.
The foregoing conclusions are based on our estimate that there will not be widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the nextears. We have estimated that an increasing number of nations will actively pursue nuclear energy programs right up to the thresholdeapons capability. Such programs could be justified domesticallyource of energy and astimulus to the development of technological skills and sophisticated industries.hreshold capability would facilitate the developmenteapons program if circumstances required. This is the road Sweden and India havetaken, and it may well be the path of others. Nationaland ambitions change, and with such changes could come new nuclear powers. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that some time within the nextountryrowing sense of national ambition such as Indonesia may decide to enter the nuclear weapons field. Finally, the development of broadly based peaceful programs by additional countries could lay the foundation for weapons programs beyond the nextears.
A new nuclear power may be emboldened by the possession of nuclear weaponsore vigorous pursuit of its objectives against enemy states, and the result may be an increase in the frequency of
local crises. However, we do not believe that in the case of most of the potential nuclear powers considered earlier, the acquisitionuclear arsenal would produce more aggressive international behavior. In any case, the psychological impact ofuclear power will in due course diminish, and countries with this new capability will probably experience the practical and difficult problem of translating it into measurable political gains. Furthermore, the very presence of nuclear weapons, an entirely new element in the experience of regional enemies, will probablyew sense of prudence into the calculations of such rivals when one or another is considering the aggravationocal controversy.
Should local crises actually erupt into open conflict, it ls more difficult to estimate the probable effect of nuclear weapons in the hands of one or more of the antagonists. It seems clear, however, that the situation would be potentially more dangerous than in the absence of such weapons, If only because of the additional uncertainties introduced by their presence. Thereendency for the US and the USSH to become involved in local crises in any event, but their involvementome cases be more likely if the possible use of nuclear weapons was at stake Although the involvement of the major powers Inonflict would create the potential for escalation into general war. we believe that such an escalation is unlikely. The possession of nuclear weapons by local antagonists would almost certainly Introduce elements of prudence into their own calculations and the pressure of world opinion for restraint would be of maximum effectiveness against the smaller powers. The involvement of the US and USSR could be expected to add to the forces of prudence and restraint, since It would almostbe in the US and Soviet interest to see the hostilities broughtalt Moreover, we do not believe that even in the event that one or the other of the local antagonists actuallyuclear weapon, the major powers would necessarily feel compelled to raise the crisis to the level of an East-West confrontation.
As the number of countries with nuclear weapons increases, the risk of unintentional or unauthorized detonation of such weapons will also rise, and for more man purely statistical reasons. Elaborate safety measures such as those developed by the US are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with, evenountry with considerable financial and technological resources. The accidental detonationuclear weapon in any part of the world could have far reaching consequences. Unless the circumstances were very quickly explained, understood and believed, the reaction of peoples and perhapswould probably be confused, even panic stricken. If thewas In the territory of one of the major powershrough the accidental firing from another countryissileuclearhere Is some slight chanceuclear exchange would
be touched off unmedlately. The odds are, of course, strongly against such an escalation; the major powers recognize that the diffusion of nuclear weapons will increase the chances of an accidental detonation and would probably react cautiously to any such incident.
In the caseerious reactor accident, or an accidental weapons detonation on the soil of the owner, the consequences would depend on the attendant circumstances. In general, the Impactuclear accident on world opinion, particularly if life and property were lost, and considerable contamination occurred, would almost certainly serve to restrain most governmentseapons program. More speciflcaHy, If the accident came as the resultountry's efforts toational weapons capability and occurredopulated area, domestic opposition might become strong enough to causeof the program. There would also be strong public pressure within the area where the accident occurred to remove all nuclear weapons systems, regardless of origin. Forrench nuclear accident might not only affect the future of the French program by arousing domestic resistance but also provide an emotional issue which would be exploited by those who want US nuclear weapons withdrawn from Europe.
The spread of nuclear weapons also raises the possibility that the actionsuclear power other than the US and USSR couldeneral war. We believe, however,eliberate nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or the US by one of these powers Is extremely unlikely. Nonetheless, even the possibility is enough toew element of uncertainty Into both alliance systems and into East-West relations.
ANNEX A
ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
MINIMUM PROGRAM
Weapon*
program for the production of one to two law-yieldweapons per year, to be delivered by existing aircraft (bomberscommercialould cost on tbe order0 millionrrullion. This totalillionillion for theand operation of baste researchillion
for the acquisition of materials and the production of plutonlum:illionillion for weapons research, development, and fabrication. Additional outlaysillionillion per year would be required for the annual operation of this program.
Vehicles
actual coots of delivery systems, aircraft or missiles,upon the sophistication desired and whether or not thesedeveloped indigenously or procured from an external source.requirement were only to obtain fromelivery vehicletorude weapon, the incremental costsrelativelysmaller for an aircraft system than forsystem. The costs of developing andeliveryof course, be large.
MODERATE PROGRAM: THE FRENCH EXAMPLE
A. Nuclear Progrom
SJC*ct'
B. Delivery Copabilities
S. For the next few years, the French intend to use the Mirage IV light Jet bomber for the delivery or nuclear weapons pendinguclear powered submarine ballistic missileoken delivery capability with the Mirage IV will probably exist by the end of this year, but the prolected force ofill not be operational before the end6 The French have announced that they will achieve an initial operational capability with nuclear submarines
elivery systems will add appreciably to the costs of the French nuclear weapons program. Thus, the force ofirage IV's might wellotal equivalent to some one-half billion US dollars. Including one-quarter billion for the basic aircraft and the balance forankers, modifications, and such possibilities as an air-to-surface missile. The three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines now programmed will cost on the order5 billion toillion, exclusive of warheads,odest surface-to-surface intermediate range ballisticillion0 million, also exclusive of warheads."
C. General
Tho* esUtoated com are forandeliver? systems and do not include cosu for opcrauon and maintenance.
he costs of these programs are to be met in part by increases in total military spending and in part by reductions in conventional forces. Defense Minister Messmer notedecent article that an increase in military expenditures of one billion new francs (NF) per year is expected0 even though military expenditures are limitedonstant share of gross national product. Earlier In the article he cited the present military share of ONPercent (presumably at factor cost).
Original document.
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