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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
3
Likelihood and Consequencesroliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems
Submtottd by fhe DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As Indicated overleaf3
T
following intelligent* oroomio'ioni partfcipatad In Ihm preparation of mis cthmofai
ThttnMllgonce Agency end Ihe Intelligence orfjanliaNomem ol Stale. Wm, the Army, the Nary, the AirK, aad NSA,
ConeurWngi
Director ol In'elligence oft (tci oared. Deperimonr of Sta'aDefeni*gency
Ativan! Chief of Staff lor Irieltlgenra, Dtpannww of Mis Amy
AMaloal ChM of Natalopotlm-nl of the Navy
Aualanl CWof of Staff, Intdligenca, USAf
Dintelor forJoint Staff
Ihe Atomic EnergybpraMntaftrt loS! B
Director ofNotfonol Ssciiry Agency
Abffainjng:
Th* AMMfom Kroctor, Podo/al Bu'sou of Inveiiiaotton, iHbg eaWeW of hh iwWkiion.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
3
Likelihood and Consequencesroliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems
S
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARINO ON NUCLEAR
JX CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OP POTENTIAL NUCLEAR
A. Tbe Status of tbe Eight
Communist
^ India
9
Japan
Sweden10
Canada10
Italy 11
West11
18
pecial12
OK THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS Communist13
and the Pioblem of aTilHpBtn16
AND ATTITUDES OP THE MAJOR NUCLEAR
POWERS TOWARD1ft
Soviet Attitude Toward1ft
British Attitude Toward17
French Attitude TowardIT
V. THE IMPLICATIONSONDIFFUSION AGREEMENT,BAN, OR NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR17
VI. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OP NUCLEAR. Ill
ANNEX A; ESTIMATED COSTS OP DEVELOPING ANNUCLEAR23
LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCESROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons anddelivery systems over tlie next decade; and to estimate the consequences thereof.
CONCLUSIONS
the Increasing availability of uranium, andand technicians, the developmentinimalweapons capability has come increasingly within thenonnuclearrogram for one or two low-yielda year would cost, through the first detonation,million andearcosts rise steeply for moreinimalbecome very large when advanced delivery systemsweapons are required. Political and militaryare likely to prove more Important lnpace and scope of nuclear diffusion than differences inwealth and technical skill. Where the motivation isa country might attempt toack ofby importing materials, technology, andeven weapons themselves. )
believe that eight countries, in addition to France,physical and financial resources to develop ancapability (weapons and means of delivery) overdecade. However, we believe that only Communistactuallyeapons program. The Chinese may be
able toirst nuclear device byore likely date Is4 or beyond. Approximately two yearsest the Chinese could probably produce their first crude fission weapon. /
Thus tor the remainingJapan,
Sweden, Canada, Italy, and Westlimited their nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes. They will, however, almost certainly continue development of theirnuclear programs, someoint which would significantly reduce the time required to carryeapons program.
do not believe that the explosionirst device,the acquisitionimited nuclear weapons capability,major changes in Communist China's foreign policysense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy ofaggression, or even become willing to takemilitary risks. It would, however, increase Chineseand prestige and reinforce their eflorts tohegemony through political pressures and the indirectof local "wars ofndia probably woulduclear weapons program on the basis ofuclear device, but Is likely to continue itaprogramointrash weaponsbe developed relatively quickly. Japan also would feelsense of pressure, but would be more reluctantother countries toeapons capability. WeIsraelis would probablyuclear capability tothe Arabs, but not to make war forthwith. Thewould probably blame the West, particularly the US,Soviets would probably finds ways of exploiting
French force has as its primary purposeprestige and assisting France to assume leadershipEurope less dependent on the US andoice in theand control of Western nuclear power. While manyare in general sympathy with de Gaulle's objectives,fear that the French program will stimulate furthererode the NATO concept, and perhaps most im-
portant, lead to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe, however, that the Germans will limit themselves tonuclear programs orer the next few years. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, and especially the US, might not use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic, German interestational capability would rise.)
E We believe that the USSR desires to prevent theuclear weapons, but that this desire win not prove so strong as to produce major changes In its policy The Soviets have thus far proved unwilling to conclude noridiffusion agreements save on unacceptable terms. Even if the Soviets conclude that West Germany was movinguclear status, they wouldnot make radical changes ln their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional (PoruS
if the US, the UK, and the USSR could agree ona nondiffusion agreement, Communist China wouldrefuse to sign, and French and Israeli adherencedouDtful. Nevertheless, the very existence of such anwould inhibit other nonsignatortes and reinforcewhere it alreadyomprehensiveban treaty would imposeutations on theof nuclear capabilities by rvonnuclear signatories butsubject to many of the same difficultiesvor.aifrusJon )
strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferationoccur over the nextears will almost certainly notpower relations nor do we believe it will producein the relations of states. The impact will bepolitical and psychological effects of the existence ofweapons, the greater unpredictability of relationsbetween alliance systems, and the possibility thatout of existing or future controversies could escalateserious confrontation Involving the major powers. (Paras.
H. The possession of nuclear weapons mayew nuclear power to pursue policies which might resultocal
crisis, but tho posalbiUty that such weapons could be used will almost certainlytrong element of prudence into the calculations of regional enemies. As the number of countries with nuclear weapons program* increases, the likelihood ofdetonation of weapons will also rise, particularly because safety measures are expensive and temptingly easy to dispense with. An unintentional nuclear explosion in somemight even touchuclear exchange, though we believe the major nuclear powers would react cautiously to such anerious nuclear reactor accidentuclear weapons detonation established as umntenttonal would almost certainly mtenslfy domestic opposition to the country's nuclear weapons program, and would cause other goTernmenUa weapons program to hesitate. If US nuclear forces were stationed in the area concerned, there might be considerable regional pressure for their withdrawal. S4)
DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON NUCLEARwenty-one years alter the beginning of the atomic age, the world lias clearlyeriod In which the prerequisites for developing atinimum nuclear weapons program are becoming Increasingly available to nonnuclear states. This condition has been createdide diffusion cf basic Knowledge and technical skills and by easier access to the necessary materials. Natural uranium,carce and tightly controlled commodity, is now considerably easier to obtain. The plutoniurn routeeapons program hasell marked trail, and one which In Its earlier stages ls scarcely distinguishableurely peaceful program. There are already moreundred reactors, most of the small research variety, now operational or under construction in the nonnuclearrowing number of technicians, both native and Imported, are available to any country Interesteduclear program.
Cost Is becomingarrier to the acquisition o< nuclear weapons as ftosJonoble materials become more plentiful and the spread oflessens the likelihood of expensive mistakes. The costeapons program wtl] vary considerably, depending upon the level of technical and economic development of the country in relied and the size and type of weapons program desired. Regardless of expenditure, countries which do notubstantial technological base cannot produce nuclear weapons without considerable assistance from foreign sources. For countries possessing an adequate technologicalinimum program for producing one or two low-yield fission weapons per year wouldillion to produce the first detonation,ear thereafter.
ountry attempts moreinimum program, the costs begin to rise steeply. For example, the Initial costrogram leading to the productionission weapons per year Is probablySTOO million to achieve the detonationirst device, plus sub-
annual operating
0 million. The costs of
stHi;tlHl capability, Including sophisticated delivery vehicles,weapons packages, and the production, can become astronomic. For example, the French have already5 billion
A It must also be kept In mindack of suitable test sites could present difficult problems for some countries. An untested weapon would be of uncertain reliabilityountry were supplied with
Sr^JJET
ailed designs ol previously tested weapons. II Is unlikely, therefore, ihst any country vould stockpile weapons ot anginal design without flrit Having conducted testa, except under the rood unusualn any event, refinement of warheada forweapona systems would require testing. While undergroundcouldeasible solution In some Instances, such testing would add costs, in voir, cceaaderibie Unw delays, and reduce diagnostic returns.
stSeoafliWrt
country considering the acquisition ot nuclear weaponsinto account Ita potential enemies and the land of weaponsbelieves will be necessary to deter or deal with then. It mustIt has strategic requirements, political pretensions, orwhich It believes can only be served by the acquisitionweapons, yore broadly, lt must estimate the probablethe weapons program it can afford on Its national prestige andwithin exl'Usg alliances. Ko matter how aUraetrveuclear pro--am may appear, they must beountry might have whether nuclear vreaponsa prudent form of letense expenditure and against otherconsiderations such as possible domestic resistance to aThe weight of arguments pro and eon may change asand concomitant financial demands of the program Decernsexperience (eg. the British experience with strategicas the pontics! and strategic situation changes.
If. CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF POTENT1AI NUCLEAR CANDIDATES
believe that eight countries tn addition to France and thenuclear powers have the physical and fm^rrffil immiusan operational nuclear capability (weapons and meanswithin the next decade.ist* these eightthe probable time periods they would require to explodeecision to go ahead. Of these eight nations, weonly Communist China has actually embarkeduclear weap-
tchnlcai and economic factors help establish limits to theof nuclear weapons, but actual decisions will dependand military considerations as well. Indeed. MtlonalIn political extermination and suateflc objectives are nicelymore Important tn deterrnining the pace and content ofthan differences In national wealth endskill.political and military considerations will weigh heavily Into the size and sophistication of weapons programs. Thus, aas France may be satisfied only by the development ofwhich enable tt to -share" to deterring tbe USSR, andptaetson Id International councils..
ons program.
'i Thus far the remaining countries have limited
Iheir nuclear programs to demonstrably peaceful purposes, although w* assume, thai they are not Ignoring possible military applications.
TABLE I
BTa-ATtootmoscuoeo countisu to Htcoixi aw
StST NUCLEAI DCVKf
ean after decision
ears after decision
ean after decision
WartTears after decision
ears after deeUlon
ears after decision
ears after decision
CommunistPossibly as early as IBM
"Tbe estimate* ot line required are lor decisions mad* within the nnlD the odalonsto be made later (ban tola, the tlirw requiredshorier-ed by intent nine dtvetopaaanje.
A. Tha Status of the Eloht Candidate* Communist China
he Communist Chinese appear lo haveery high priority to their nuclear weapons programumber of yearsespite serious difficulties occasioned by the cutoff of Soviet assistance and domestic economic problems, are likely to continue to press ahead. Our evidence with respect to Communist China's nuclear program ts Lniuffiflent, however, toonfident Judgment about the likely dateirst nuclear explosion
believe tomall air-cooled reactor together with for chemical separation and metal fabrication. The reactor Is estimated to be capable of producing enough Plutonium lor not more than two low-yield fission weapons per year. It tbe reactor wentIn earlyearliest possiblethe Chinese experl-
ersce no major problems in chemical separation or metal [abrtcaUon, theirst dcrtee could be tested using plutonlum from this reactor alone would be early IteH. If the reactor did not go critical2 or if the Chinese encounter theut c! difficulties, the more Uaetf date would be late IBM or beyond.*
pproximately two yearsest the Chinese could probably produce their Brst crude fission weapon To deliver this weapon, the Chlneae would ba forced to rely for the nett few years on someBOTX) or on iheir twoet medium bomberse believe that the Chinese Coram unlit* will probably notissile system (rnediura ranee) until the. In order toignificant capability in the nuclear weapons field, the Chinese Communuu willarger philonturaupecity than we snow to ex lot and isdUtles for the production at.
The psrchalogka) and political barriersuclsar weapons program continue to be strong In India, and It la unlikely thatrogram will be authorized so long aa Nehru remains In power. Its cost and India's reluctance to direr! reeouroei from present economic and military programs also constitute significant barriers.the border war has convinced roostthat Communist Chinalear danger to India's security and presUge. and the threat of Chinese domination may afreet the prograa* and direction of the Indian nuclear program
There art clear Indications that India, which alreadyairly advanced nuclear reawareh programlutoniurn separation plant under construction. Is actively Improving its overall capabilities In the nuclear Held, possibly in anticipationuture decision to develop an operational nuclear capability may be required. Into two small research reactora, India0 MWtso-called Canada-India lieactorIs capable of producing sufficient quanutles of plutoniurn for about one or twoear. If present plans are carried out, India will soonupply of uranium, withoutdequate to operate theWt reactor for the production of weapon-grade ptutonjum. Although Uds reactor htoperating with safeguarded heavy water supplkd by Use US, the Indianseavy water plant which will soon reach an output tswBcwTit to service the CIR By replacing the US-sucphed heavy waist, the CIR would not be subject to safeguards and could be operated for the production of weapon-grade plutoniurn ahould the Indians decide to do so. India couldosition of Independence from present controls ln about two years, after which ll would take another two or three years for India to produce its first nuclear device- Byndia couldimited nuclear capability using aircraft.
Jopon
apan's scientific and technical skills and Its industrial resources are at such an advanced state that, if the decision to go ahead were made in the nest year or so, Japan could probably develop an operationalcapability rising aircrafthe deep-rooted reluctance of tbe Japanese touclear weapons program, however, makes It unlikely that Japan will Initiaterogram within the next
term "safeguards" refers to the arrangements included tn agreements between, UK. Sooth Africa,nd recipient* wnich reqatn strict aeeoaoLability and Inspection by the supplier to ensure pcicerol us* of toe material supplied.
^CRET
decade- $hould the Japanese SociaUA Parly gain control ot thewithin the period of this estimate, Japan would be even less likely to do so.
Swsdei
weden has thus far avoided making any clear-cut decisions with regarduclear weapons program, bul basic nuclear research Is of such high quality that the country Is clearly nearing tne thresholdeapons5 HWt natural uranium fueled power reactor Is expected bo reach full power bySfi UWt power roector Is scheduled for completion byheof weapon-grade material will require the Swedes lo build their own chemical separation plant. [
_ [We believe thatecision to go ahead Is made in the next year or two, the (swedes couldirst device two or three years later. Moreover, if the Swedes decide to press ahead after the first detonaUon, we hellers Sweden couldeapon deliverable by sire rati byissile system carrying compatible fission warheads
he present Social Democratic government, which Is likely to remain tn power for several more years it least, hasumber of tiroes that It was about loecision whether to undertake the production of nuclear weapons, only to procrastinate it the last moment. If the tread toward nuclear proliferation continues and If It appears unlikely that progress Is being madeest ban or broaderarrangements, the Swedish Government will be underInternal pressure to resolve the nuclear weapons question. Whether the 8wooes will actually go on to produce nuclear weapons la uncertain and will probably depend largely on the extent of nuclear diffusion and lis implication for Swedish neutrality.
Conodo
anada Initiated Its nuclear energy program during World War II in collaboration with the US and UK. and has long pceaeeaed ill the prerequisiteseapons program except facilities for the separation of plutonlum ind the required weapons design researchs second to the US In the Free World production of uranium. Canada has three reactors In operation now producing significant quantities of plutonlumourth under construction. Thearge nuclear power3s expected to bell operationanada could easily gouclear weapons program of scene sUe and sophistication but has remained out by choice. The position of all political parties that Canada does not need and should not have ita
own nuclear weapons program, reinforced by public sentiment andot cost, will continue toecision to proceed unlikely.
fttri>
has both the skills and the industrial and financialcarryinguclear weapons program. The Italians nowconstruction three large power reactors capable ofamounts of pJutordum. The SEMH and SBLNIare designed to use only enriched fucL Because this fuelonly under adequate safeguards, these reactors couldeapons program. On the other hand.uranium fueled reactor, could produce suflVtenta weapons program If Italy Imported tho required uranium.radical change in national sentiment, however, it ls highlyItaly will do more than continue with Its present nonmllitaryThe swtag to the left of the Italian electorate during theelections will almost certainly reinforce this decision for
Wesf Germwy
Although West Germany has the industrial potential, personnel, and technological skills to enter the nuclear weapons field, the obstacles to undertakingrogram are substantial. Treatyublic opposition, the absence of significant deposits of uranium ore within the country, the lack of testing space, and the current lack of large power reactorshemical separation plant, all represent major obstacles toeapons program Furttwmore. the West German Government almost certainly realizes that to embarkuclear weapons program would not only create serious Internal political dissension and difficulties with Its Allies, butrave provocation to the USSR.
Nevertheless, West Germany has spent more on its nuclearthan any country other than the US. USSR, UK, and France, In the, the Federal and State governments spent5 million for various nuclear programs. Moreover, tbe German AEC has recently recommended that the Federal and State5 million for theouclear energy program which would include several large power stations. Despite the size of these programs, however, there are no Indications at the present time that West Germany has plans for developing annuclear weapons capability. Itseactors are small and
'Inhan the Federal Republic Of Germany seceded to the BrusieU Treaty, the West German Government made tbe flowinghe Federal Republic undertakes no; to man'Keetiire In IU territory any atomic weapons, enemies! weapons, or biological "eapen*"
used for research and training, with the production otaboratory quantities.
Informauon is insufficient toonfident Judgmentfuture developments. We believe that West Germany Isthrough Its broadly based nuclear program to increase Itsand technical competence In fields related to nuclearand eventually toorld leader In the nucleara possible etauKquence ofrogram, West Oerrnany maymajor world supplier of nuclear technicians and components.program would reduce the time required lor the development ofnuclear capabilityecision were made to proceedweapons program Moreover, if the program Included largeand plutonlum separation facilities lt would soon bringto the threshold ofapability
Generol
Certain generalizations are possible concerning the countries just discussed Ccenmunlstaside, only time and self-imposed restraints stand In the way of their acquiring scone kind of nuclear weapons capability. These restraints largely derive from one or more of the following: opposition either Internal or external,of cost, and the lack of strong positive motivation to proceed. We cannot exclude the possibility that events which we cannot nowwill remove these restraints upon some of the countries. Moreover, nuclear policies will continue to be affected by Intangibles difficult to assess, such as prestige, and subject to pressuresovernment might not be able to resist,ublic opinion which became arousedrospective enemy had acquired weapons.
All the countries, which we have considered possible but unlikely candidates are engaged in peaceful nuclear programs Some havethe point where they will have all the facilities required touclear weapons program in the eventsesaeal were made to do so, and the others will reach this position over the next few years.ituation will arise In which there couldapidin the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons should the restraints now operating cease to be effective.
pecial Cos*
U. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would not nceeeaarlly ba restricted to countries which possess the skills, resources and know-how to produce them Independently Where the motivation is sufficientlyode try may attempt to acquire weapons by tapping theand Industry of other countries or even by direct transfer. Tha UAR, for example, might fall Into this category We have no evidence
lhat the OAR Is presently engageduclear weapons program.the UAR It ao deficient In most of the prerequisiteseapons program that it could not on its ownapability over at least the next decade Nonetheless, UAR motivation la ptesently st:ongL
III. WPtKATIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
A. Communist China
e do not believe that the explosionirst device, or even the acquisitionailed nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in Communist China's foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese wouldeneral policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. China's leaden would recognise that their limited capabilities had not altered the real power balance among tbe major states and could not do so in the foreseeable future In particular, they would recognize that they remained unable either to remove or neutralise the US presence In Asia.
In the nuclear weapons field will give
evertheless, the Chrnswe would fed very much stronger and thiswouki doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery. They would probably feel that the US would be morato Intervene on the Asian mainland and thus tbe tone of Chinese policy would probably become moreurther, their possession of nuclear weapons would reinforce their efforts lo achieve Asianthrough political pressures and the Indirect support of local "wart ofuch tactics would probably acquire greater ef-fectlvenesa. since the Chinese feat wouldrofound impact on neighboring governments and peoples. It would alter Use latter'i sense of the relations of power, even If It made little immediate change In the realities of power, andreater or leaser degree would probably result ln increased pressures to accommodate to Chinese deinands,
significant weight to the arguments of those Indians who are convinced that India at some point must hare Its own nuclear capability if it is to avoid bending to Communist Chinese pressure or being forced Into excessive Oependence on external support. It is indeed possible that these arguments could prevail and that India wouldonrogram. On balance, however, we do not believe India will make the decision for weapons development on the basis of theuclear device, especially if India is obtaining military assistance
that there Is insufficient evidence to warrantefinite statement about the Chinese appraisal of our MUnUdns and that the statement is somewhat Inconsistent with
In modern defense weapons. The Indiana will probably continue what we believe to be their present program of developing theirointrash weapons program could be brought to fruition relatively quickly.
ba iegavesese might feel an increased sense of pressure after the Chinese acquire nuclear weapons and opt for developing their nuclear programoint where they would be on the thresholdeapons capability. But they would be much more reluctant to cross that threshold than most other countries. The Japanese have particularly strong psychological inhibitions against the acquisition of nuclearand will thus probably continue to rely on the US for support and protection.
C. Th* French Prog ten ond the Problem of Europeon Nuclear Dtrtut>on
Tbe French nuclear weapons profrarn It very much anof President dt Gaulle's foreign policy,ather effective one. He has been frank to admit that France cannot hope to achieve morenodest capability In comparison to that of the US or tbe USSR. The primary purpooe of tne French force is to heighten French prestige and status on the continent and thereby assist France tourope lata dependent on the US andoice In tbe management and control ot Western nuclear power The Frenchwill appeal to those In Europe, at present relatively few, who hare qualms about the Annnees and tbe duration of the US commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe.
Thus far France's European Allies hare avoided confronting de Gaulle on the question of the French nuclear program. Their reaction has been ambivalent While many Europeans are ln general sympathy with de Gaulle's challenge to US dominance of the alliance, they are also fearful that the existence of on Independent French nuclear force will Increase the likelihood of further nuclear prollf tret tan, further erode the NATO concept, and, perhaps most important, provide tba vehicle for German acquisition of nuclear weapons
The French realise that if they are to bare nuclear capabilities sufficient to constitute on Important element in Soviet calculations, they need sophisticated weapons In some numbers. The coat and difficulty of developing and producing the appropriate weapons systems has proved very great. Together with the expenditures necessary to stay ln tbe race against obsolescence, these costs would be sufficient to dissuade the bulk of European states from undertaking comparable programs, and they would realise that their Interests would not be servedere token capability. In this connection, the British decision not to develop its own strategic missile system cannot but impress other European countrieseapons program.
I if IB* rTcncn continue to encounter technical difficulties in the construction of the Plerreiatte gaseousplant they might seek German technical assistance, which they probablyof more Immediate benefit than financial assistance. Al tho ugh German scientists bare no experience in the gaseous diffusion. they could be of great value to the French ta certain areas tatenUel to the proem If the French program continues to encounter difficulties the French might find It worthwhile to go to tbe Germans for financial as well as technical assistance in exchange for some limited degree of Oerman participation ta the French program An additional
5
might be de Gaulle's mtereet inS-sponsored (and, ia hli opinion, US-con trolled) NATO collective deterrent system.
e believe that the French Dragram has thus tar had Bttls direct effect on Oerrnan attitudes toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We believe the Oermans will Umtt their nuclear develocenem programs over the next tew years to projects which are demonstrably peaceful. Tor the time being, the principal Interest Is In having nuclear weapons from whatever source Immediately available for toe defense of Oerrnan territory, While the Oernians are extremely sensitive to any appearance of discrimination within NATO, their sensitivity apparently is thus far not acute with respect to the nuclear restrictions imposed on Qermany by treaty. If the Germans began to believe that their Allies, andthe US, might not use nuclear weapons In tbe defense of theRepublic, Oerrnan interestational capability would rise.
FT. Tnas far the Oernians have endorsed the Sassau proposalS-sponsored NATO multilateral nuclear force. We believe that once this force Is organised the Oermans will expect it ultimately lo developorce freeS veto. If this does not occur, the Ctermans might become Interestedurely European multilateral force or even In some sort ofrrangement However, until such time as West Germany Is prepared to loosen Its close ties with the US, the attitude of the US with respect lo Oerrnan nuclear policy will continue to be of overriding Importance
IV POLICIES AND ATTITUDES Of THE MAJOR NUCLEAt POWERS TOWARD PsrCUFWDON
A. The Soviet Altitude Toward Proliferation
a believe that the USSR Is reluctant toiffusion of nuclear weapons. Within the Warsaw Pact, It is under no significant pressure to make nuclear weapons available to its European allies, and we believe that It will not In the foreseeable future. The Soviets have no military reasons for doing so, and such action would, in the Soviet view, riskanpolse to West German arguments and efforts tondependent nuclear capability.
n general, we believe thai the Soviet desire to avoid proliferation win not prove so strong as to produce major changes In their poocy The Soviets probably have doubts about the value of agreementsto prevent proliferation because of the obvious Inability of Ihe US and UK to head off the French program and their own Inability to handle China. In any case, the USSR has thus far proved unwilling to reach agreement with the West against the transfer of nuclearand weapons technology, save on unacceptable terms. For exampVe,
the Soviets Insist thai any such srrsrisjeraent mostrovision which would exclude Oermany from soy multilateral nuclear fore*.
Whlw the Soviets probably appreciate thatroposals (or nuclear sharing within NATO are intended to deny the Fedeialan Independent capability, they believe that the Oerrnan role in NATO Is bound to grow. Thus they (ear that present multilateral schemes will open the way to Oermany'sajor voice In NATO nuclear decisions and perhaps to acquiring an independent national capability The Soviets are probably also concerned that, even if the multilateral force does not come shout, Germany willuclear power lb rough cooperation with Prance.
If the Soviets concluded that West Germany was moving; toward the statusuclear power, they might feel compelled to take radical measure* to head off this aeveloproent. Such measures might Involve, at one extreme, threatening toajor Bast-West crisis unlets assurance was given that West Germany would be prevented fromcontrol of nuclear steapoux. At the other extreme, tbey might offer concessions on reunification and disarmament In return for such assurances On balance, however, we believe the Soviets will not make any radical changes tn their policy, but employixture of threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament
Briton Armvekt Toward PreJlbttcmcn
British are also concerned about the spread of nuclearto nonnuclear states which could use them independently.government haatrong interest In bothest ban treaty and has long been more hopefulUS that coT.promise is possible. If the Labor Party gain*foresee no change of British policy on this score. Indeed, awould be even more active tn opposing proliferaUon.
freach Attitude Toward Proliferation
Prench attitude toward nuclear diffusion Is a* yet difficultThey have, of course, refused to take part in test bandisarmament discussions Once Franceullyhowever, we expect that It* attitude on diffusion maymuch the same as that of the other nuclear powera
V. TW IMPLICATIONSNttFftl$#ONEST IAN, OR NUCIEAR FREE ZONES FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
road condlffuslon agreement nave Includedthat the nuclear powers agree not to transfer weaponsnational control of nonnuclear powers or assist them In acquiring
onnuclear signatories would be required to agree notnuclear weaponi, acquire national control over them,nuclear weapon* agatVtante. If the US, UK, and the USSRtogether on the terrni of such an agreement It would, ofthe acquisition of nuclear weapons by any ncsinuclaarCoram unlet China would, however, almost certainly refuseThe French would certainty not sign unless they woeof the nuclear powers; even If this were done, we believe thatwould be doubtf uL
Nevertheless, tho very existence or Such an agreement wouldolitical and psychological Inhibition to the Initiation of anweapons capability by other nonslgnatorles and would reinforceopposition where It already axavted
A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, while also slowing the pace of diffusion, would be subject to many of the same difficultiesandlfiuslon agreement. Communist China would clearly reject such an agreement- France would almost certainly not sign It at least untilime as It hadhermonuclear warhead for medium-
range
omprehensive
teat ban Ueaty would Impose serious limitations on the developmentuclear capability by norm uclear signatories. If the agreement was limited lo an atmospheric test ban, the devekoprcentuclearprogram would be more difficult and expensive for the signatories. Underground testing, although mora expensive and technically leesis one road,umpyeapons capability Aside from technicaluclear test ban agreement.on-diffustou agreement, wouldtrong political and psychologicalrant to the acquisition of nuclear1
he creation of regional nonnuctear aones, such as the oneby Braiil for South America, couldignificant long-term effect on the spread of nuclear weapons There are many regions of the world where there would be wide public support for the creation ofone. Prospects for agreement are rxightast In those areas, such as South America and Sub-Sahara Afnra. where there are presently no aspiring nuclear powers and where the major powers have no desire to locat* nuclear weaponi systems.
VI. MOAD IMPlKAnONS Of NUOEAR PIKKlfWATION
4T. In ttrlctly military terms, tbe nuclear proliferation likely to occur over the nextears will almost certainly not upset global power re-laUonahlpt. None of tbe prospective or potential nuclear powers will acquire capablllltefl which, If added to those of the US or the USSR, would significantly affect East-West military relationships, or bulk large militarily at an Independent (orce. We do not believe China capable
of acquiring moreelaUwty amalT operational capability in this dtaadVI
Tbewould not, we believe, aeek of abte to achieve more than small forces of local significance. Thus ins impact of such proliferation as takes place vol cons* from the politicalchotoflcal effects of tbe existence of such new weapons, and the posstbr.Uy that hostilities arising out of existing or futurecould escalateerious confrontation involving the major powers.
in the broadest of terms, we do not believe thatover the next decade will produce major reallgnmenU inof states or lead to new combinations of allies andnuclear proliferation will do I* to Intensify, as it already has,within tht major power groupings. The efforts of PranceChina to develop their own weapons system* representchallenge to tbe leaders of their respective'-he USUSSR France, already disposed to pursue Independentfurther encouraged to do so by It* new status at an emergingChina has similar aspirations which nuclear weaponsencourage Their pursuit of Independent policies mightto pursue policies Inconsistent with those of their allianceleast for the foreseeable future, relations within and betweenwill probably be made more unpredictable by tht additionnuclear powers.
foregoing conclusions ar* bated on our estimate thatnot be widespread prollferaUor, of nuclear weapons over the nextWe have estimated lhat an increasing number of "stWupursue nuclear energy programs right up to the thresholdweapons capability. Such programs could be Justifieda source of energy and astimulus lo thetechnological skills and sophisticated Industries. Such awould facilitate Ihe developmenteapons programrequired. Thl* is the road Sweden and India havetaken, and it may well be ths path of others. Nationaland amblUons change, and with such changes couldnuclear powers, saoreover, we cannot exclude the possibilitytime within the nestountryrowing senseambition such as indoneale may decide to enter th*field. Finally, the development of broadly baaedby additional coun tne* could lay the foundation torbeyond the nextears
ew nuclear power may be emboldened by th* possession of nuclear weaponsore vigorous pursuit of its objectives against enemy states, and the result may be an Increase In the frequency of
localBosrever, we do not bellrca that In the case of most of the potenUsi non hai powers considered earlier, the scqsuMtlonruciear srsenaJ would produce more aggressive inieroaUomJ behaftor. In any case, the psycholof leal Impact ofuclear power wUt In due course diminish, and countries with this new capability will probably experience the practical and difficult problem of translating It Into measurable pollUeal gains. Furthermore, the very presence of nuclear weapons, an entirely new element in the experience of regional enemies, will probablyew sense of pt uoence Into the calculations ofali when one or another Is eouetdering the aggravationccal controversy.
hould local crises actually erupt Into open conflict, lt Is more difficult to estimate the probable effect of nuclear weapons In the hands of one or more of the anUgccitrU. It seems clear, however, that the situation wo old be potentially mare dangerous than in the absence of such weapons, if only because of the sortltlnrial uncertain Un Introduced by their prssence. Thereendency for the US Bud tbe USSR to become Involved In local crises tn any event, but their involvement might In some cases be more likely If the possible use of nuclear weapons was at stake. Although the Involvement of the major powers Inonflict would create the potential for tacaiaUon Into general war, we believe that such an cecalaUoa Is unlikely. Tbe possession of nuclear steepens by local antagonist* would almost certainly introduce elements of prudence into their own calculations and the pressure of svorld opinion for restraint would be of maximum effectiveness against the smaller powers. The Involvement of tbe US and USSR could be expected to add to the forces of prudence and restraint, since It would almostbe In the US and Soviet interest to see the hostilities broughtait. Moreover, we do not believe that even tn the event that one or th* Other of the local anUgonists actuallyuclear weapon, the major powers would nires tartly feel compelled to rakw the crisis to the level of an East-West confrontation.
* the number of countries with nuclear weapons Increases, the riskintentional or unauthorised detonation of such weapons will also rise, and for mors than purely statistical reasons Elaborate safety measures such as those developed by the US are opera!re and temptingly easy to dispense with, evenountry with ftasxaoerabie financial and technological resources. The accidental detonationuclear weapon in any part of the world could have far reachingnless th* circumstances were very quickly explained, understood and believed, the reaction of peoples and perhapswould probably be corf used, even panic stricken. If thewas In th* territory of one of th* major powershrough the accidents! firing from another countryissileuclearhere is some slight chanceuclear exchange would
be touched off Immediately The cdds ere, oftrongly against such an escalation; the major powers recognise that the diffusion ot nuclear weapons will Increase the chances ol an accidental detonation and woukl probably react cauUously to any such incident
In the caseerious reactor accident, or an accidental weapons detonation on the soil of the owner, tbe consequence* ssould depend on th* attendant circumstances. In general, the Impartuclear accident on world opinion, particularly If Ufe and property were sect, and considerable contamination occurred, would almost certainly serve to restrain most governmentseapons program. More specifically. If th* accident came as the resultountry's efforts toational weapons capability and occurredopulated area, domestic opposition might become strong enough to cause abandon-ment of the program. There would also be strong public pressure within the area where the accident occurred to remove all nuclear weapons systems, regardless of origin Forrench nuclear accident might not only affect the future of the French program by arousing domestic resistance but also provide an emotional Issue which would be exploited by those who want US nuclear weapons withdrawn from Eurcpe-
The spread of nuclear weapons also nalte* the possibility that tbe actionsuclear power other than the US and USSR couldeneral war. We believe, however,ell berate nuclear attack on the Soviet Union or the US by one of these powers Is extremely urilikely. Nonetheless, even the possibility Is enough toew element of uncertainly into both alliance systems and Into East-West relations.
ANNEX A
COSTS OF DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
I. HYPOTHETICAL MINIMUM PtOQRAM
Wsopoei'
-rogram for the production of one to two low-yield aJ-plntonlum
I byircraft (bomberso the order0 millionillion for tee con-to JSC
i for tbe acquisitionlUkmillion for weapons reaeexch. derelopment. and fabrication. AddlUonal outlay-illionillion per year would be required for the annual operation of this program.
Vehicles
he actual costs of delivery systems, aircraft or missiles, would depend upon the sophistication desired and whether or not these systems were developed indigenously or procured from an external source. If the requirement were only to obtain fromelivery Tthicle large enough torude weapon, the Incremental costs would be relativelysmaller for an aircraft system thanissile system. The coeU of developing andelivery system would, of course, be large.
OOCRaTE PROGtAMi THE PWeCH EXAMPLE
a. Nuclear Program
n the basts of eondal French figures, we estimate that, by the endrance had spent3 bill Km on its nuclear program, mcluding expenditures Mr peaceful purposes. |
et
& delivery capabilities
or the next few Tears, the French intend to use the Mirage TV light let bomber for the delivery of nuclear weapons pendinguclear powered submarine ballistic missileoken delivery capability with the sslrage IV will probably exist by the end of this year, but the projected force ofill not be operational before the endhe French have suinouraced that they will achieve an Initial operational capability with nuclear submarines We believe this maybe somewhat opttmjaUc.
ellv-ry systems will add appreciably to the costs of the French nuclear weaponi program Thus, the force ofslrage TVs might wellotal equivalent to soma one-half billion US dollars, including one-quarter billion for the basic aircraft and the balance forankers, modincatlons, and such possibilities as an alr-to-aurface missile. Tbe three nuclear-powered ballistic missile ubmarines now programmed will cost on the orderillion to S3 billion, exclusive of warheads,odes'. surfsce^tOeurfece Intermediate range ballisticillion0 million, also exclusive of wsjrsnds,'
C. General
T, The oasts of these programs are to be met In part by increases In total military spending and In part by reductions In conventional forces. Defense Minister Messrner notedecent article that an Increase In military expenditures of one billion new franca (NF) per year Is expected0 even though military expenditures are limitedonstant share of gross national product. Earlier In tbc article he cited tba present military share of OKPercent (presumably at factor cost).
asUmaled costs ore for developing sod prodtwuig the deHvcrj systems and do not include costs for operation and maintenance
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