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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Analysis of the Latest Chinese Letter to the Soviet Union
The Chinese Communists, believing that they areave which may engulf Soviet pretensions to leadership of the international Communisthave increased their pressure against the Soviet party on the eve ofuly talks. Central in their renewed attack upon Soviet policies is their comprehensive letter, datedune and handed to the Soviets the next day, in reply to tbearch Soviet letter to the Chinese party. They have pursued their campaign through editorials in the Chinese party paper condemning the Soviet caution in Laos, criticizing the Soviet response to the President's American University speech, and intensifying attacks on Tito and (byKhrushchev. ommunique signed jointly with the North Korean party provided yet another vehicle.
The timing of the Chinese letter and some of its content suggest that it was planned to anticipate the opening onuno of the Soviet central committee plenum. However, itsong, intransigent position paper, insulting in tone and bristling with unconcealed attacks on the Sovietseems intended more for the international Communist movement than for Moscow. It was immediately published by the Chinese, along with the other letters ln the Series,amphlet which is being distributed ln Moscow and the rest of the Soviet Bloc, as well as around the world.
more insulting and extensive thanletters to the Soviet Union, thishinese characters,nglish pages. It was designed to definethan ever before the differences betweenand Soviet Unionrucialhe
The Chinese Letter:
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TONFTDCNTlAf.
issues have been broadened. They now include theview of general policy the Chinese profess to see in Soviet words and actions, the USSR's incorrect tactics in foreign policy, its mishandling of problems in the International Communist movement, Its exercise of "great nation chauvinism" ln respect to otherregimes, and the degeneration of Marxism-Leninism In Soviet domestic doctrine and society.
Peiping's decision to set forth in soashion Its rigid, fundamentalist views, in opposition to the somewhat more pragmatic Soviet approach,its arrogant confidence, perhaps overconfIdence, that It can subvert presently pro-Soviet parties byto their rank and file over the heads of their "revisionist" leaders. The letterransparent call to Marxists "inside and outside" theseIncluding the Sovietoverthrow leaders who adopt "non-revolutionary" policies. Peiping's claim to be the only legitimate arbiter of "correct,Communist theory and practice makes itsto replace Moscow as leader of the international Communist movement clearer than ever before. Theexplicitly reserve the right to damn "anyone" who follows the "erroneous opportunist" line ofertain socialist country."
The exposition of Peiping's position on the firstf the "crucial Issues"uccinctof the argumentation the Chinese developed at enormously greater length during last winter's heightened exchange of polemics. Condensing the argumentation,has the effect of highlighting the differencesthe Chinese and the Soviet party, virtually ruling out any possibility for meaningful compromise. Peiping rudely dismisses Moscow's attempt to establish as the "general line" for Communist policy Its views on thefor peaceful coexistence, its realistic appraisal of the menace of nuclear war, and its assertion of the possibility of negotiating outstanding dangerous issues with the West. In place of this, the Chinese advance their own "general line." This Includes Bloc unity on the basis of the Chinese interpretation of the statements of70 Moscow meetings of world Communist leaders, intransigent opposition to United Statesmilitant support for revolutions, and renewed warnings against over-reliance on negotiations to the detriment of revolution.
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APPRIMO0
In itsarch letter, Moscow tried tosome of the fire of the Chinese attack byits relations with the Albanian and Yugoslav parties as peripheral issues; Peiping elevates them to "crucial principles." The question of Soviet-Albanian relations is called "an outstanding one atnd Peiping insists that the CPSU must take the initiative towardAlbania to the fold. On the other hand, the document reiterates Peiping's position that the question of the re-admission of Yugoslavia into the socialist camp la not negotiable. By asserting that "these two essentially different questions must on no account be placedeiping rules out in advancerade hinted at by the Soviet party. The Chinese extended their attack on Tito in People's Dally the same day their letter was delivered to the USSfTT Tito's May plenum speech attacking China wasas "spittle collected from the cuspidors of the imperialists and othernd thebetween the Chinese and the "modern revisionists" were baldly declared to be "irreconcilable."
The Chinese letter opened new areas forwithering condemnation. The Soviet party program, which had advanced some new theories involving the "State of the Whole People" and t'the Party of the Wholere treated as doctrinally nonsensical, practicallyegeneration of Marxian theories of the State and the class struggle. Terming thesegreat historical retrogression" the letter implies that such views have led to the developmentpettyatmosphere in the Soviet Union which willleadestoration of capitalism if not stopped in time.
Another new area opened to Chinese attack is the recent Soviet attempts rapidly to Increaseof the Bloc economies under the Council forMutual Assistance (CEMA). Passages on these problems are clearly meant for sympathetic ears in Rumaniaand elsewhere in the Bloc as well. Peiping has alreadymall return on this investment. hasong summary of the Chinese letter ln its party newspaper. Although the summary omits the most polemical parts of the document, the simple fact ofagainst the Russian refusal to print any of theRumania's dissatisfaction with Bloc economic developments and indicates its growingto act independently of Moscow.
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The Soviet Reaction:
temporizing Soviet reaction to theof venom emanating from Peiping suggestsand the other Soviet leaders are somewhat
ose in their search for the best way to deal with their relentless antagonists. Although the statements from Hoscow,ecision of the centralplenum onune, accused the Chinese ofslanderous" attacks on the Soviet party, thehave refused to counter even the blatant Chinese criticism of internal Soviet policiesharge of interference in the affairs of another party. Clearly seething with restrained anger, the Soviet leaders have contented themselves with reaffirming their intention to maintain the entire Soviet line in the forthcoming meeting with the Chinese and with explicitlythat Khrushchev and his views have the entire,support of the Soviet party.
Soviet party's decision to maintainas the champion of Bloc unity and non-polemicsattempt to place on tbe Chinese tbethe widening split in the Internationalwhile at the same time avoiding coming tothe sensitive questions raised by therefusal to meet on their merits the openlyChinese attacks suggests that it fears thatof the polemics will lead to greaterin winning supporters within themovement. Since the Chinese have made itthey will continue their oblique attacks anywaythreatened in their letter to extend them topersonal attacks on Soviet leaders, this can onlytemporary Soviet solution.
Prospects for the Talks:
11. Each side has indicated that it intends to go ahead with the bilateral negotiations now scheduled to openuly. The recent exchanges, however, make it clear that each looks upon the talks as but another forum ln which to continue their contest and not aswhich might lead to some amelioration of their strained relations. The meetings are certain to bein the extreme and will probably be used by each party to demonstrate that it made every effort to maintain unity and that the responsibility for tbe failure is due
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to tbe intransigence and erroneous views of tbe other. The Chinese will eserge from the meeting morethan ever about their attempts to undermine Soviet authority and replace it with their own.
12. Since each party has set forth diametrically opposed notions of what should be discussed, the talks may well founder on the procedural question of the agenda long before they get to substantive issues. In this event, the Chinese are likely to insist that only an International Communist meeting such as70 meetings can resolve the problem and may demand the early convocation ofeeting. The Soviets, who lost considerable ground in the last such meeting, are likely to stall as long as possible, asserting that sound preparations through further bilateral talks are necessary to ensure the successuture international meeting. Eventually, however, they will probably be forced to agree by the desires of the smaller parties for an active role ln discussions. Even more intense efforts by the antagonists to solidify their support among the other parties, and an increasingly rapidof the situation, is the certain result.
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Original document.
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