UL Bf' 63
special
national intelligence estimate
.
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies
. b, lb.
plRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
. n by ftS. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
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Tho Central Intelligence Agency and tho intelligence organizations of theof Stole, Defence, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force; ond Thejav
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^stowi' Chief el Slafi;USAF Director for ImVltigence, Jointirecior of lhe Nartonal Security Agency :
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The Atomic Energy Commliiion Representative lo the USJB, and [the AuHton*
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THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON NORTH VIETNAM AND ITS POLICIES
the problem
To analyze the position of North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the effect this has upon Communist policies and actions in Laos and South Vietnam.
conclusions
Vietnamarge measure of independenceCommunist Bloc, and it has avoided committing itselfside in the Sino-Soviet dispute. We believe that itto continue avoidingommitment. (Paras.)
spite of its independent position, Hanoi hastoward certain of Peiping's positions in theits neutrality has recently shifted somewhat towardHence, if Hanoi is moved to commit itself further,probably be in the direction of fuller support todevelopment of an open, formal break between Moscowor the death of the influential Ho Chi Minh wouldthe pressuresorth Vietnamese commitment.Hanoi will almost certainly attempt to keep as great aof independence as possible, and to maintain ties
almost certainlyore sober view thanand Hanoi of the riskS intervention, andmore stress on political meansommunistLaos. For their part, the Chinese and North Vietnamesequicker victory through the application of military as wellpressure. Nevertheless, at the present level of activity,
Soviet and Chinese policies are in no essential conflict, and Hanoi has considerable initiative and freedom ofrastic change of the situation in Laoshe threat of large-scale US intervention) might exacerbate Soviet-Chinese differences over policies to be pursued in southeast Asia. However,risis showdown with the US, we cannot assume that Moscow would fail to support Peiping and Hanoi. )
discussion
I. SOURCES OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDUCT
The announced objectives of the Government of North Vietnam <DRV) are: (a) "socialisteconomic and political consolidation or the territory controlled by the DRV; andnification" of allvictory In the Hanoi-directedin the south. Hanoi wants the support of both Communist China and the USSR In the pursuit of these objectives.
North Vietnam's internal problems are many and serious,the pressures of rapid population growth against limitedresources and of an ambitious development programwith an extreme shortage of skilled and trained personnel.production is not fully adequate to meet the domestic needs of an expanding population, let alone yield an exportable surplus. Although North Vietnam appears to be reasonably well endowed with mineral resources, it lacks the technological competence to exploit them efficiently. Industry is rudimentary and inadequate to meet many consumer needs.esult, North Vietnam is dependent on its Communist Bloc partners, principally Moscow and Peiping, forin virtually every sector of the economy. This dependency limitsonsiderable extent Hanoi's power of decision over the pace and nature of its own economic development.
Hanoi's leaders would like to see Vietnamese hegemony extended over ail the states of former French Indochina. For the moment, their ambition appears to be focused primarily on taking over South Vietnam. Hanoi must move with circumspection in this effort, exercising care to consider the views of its senior Communist allies, Moscow and Peiping. and remaining alert to the danger of situations which might lead to drastic US action. This fearajor military confrontation with the US places an upper limit on the scale and tempo of Hanoi's militancy in South Vietnam and Laos.
Another basic factor shaping North Vietnamese conduct is the desire toaximum amount of independence within the general framework of the Communist movement. like Yugoslavia andChina, the North Vietnamese Communists came to powerard-won victory by their own forces, and in Ho Chi Minh theyespected revolutionary leader and national founder In the mold of Tito and Mao. Hanoi has the self-confidence which comes with this heritage. Long oppressed by imperial China, Uie Vietnamese remain fearful of and resistant to renewed domination by the Chinese, or, for that matter, domination by any other alien power. So far Hanoi has
:t
egree of autonomy that is uncommon in the Communist Bloc. It has accepted aid from both Moscow and Peiping, and It has prevented either fromreponderant Influence in its affairs.
ii. north vietnam's position in the sino-soviet dispute
orth Vietnam's jealousy of its independence and its desire (or support from both Moscow and Peiping have been the primaryot Hanoi's i'umIiiu: in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hanoi desires the military and political backing ol asoalition as possible and is shaken by the prospectplit or disintegration of the Communist Bloc. The DKV feeU that the political support and military backing of both Communist China and the Soviet Union ure essential to the maintenance of its Integrity and as strategic supports for its foreign policy.
fl. Accordingly, the North Vietnamese have avoidedlear-cut stand in favor of either party and have continually worked to bring the two together. Ifo Chi Minh pursued the role of mediator, with at least superficial success, nt0 all-party conclave in Moscow, and has persisted In his efforts to heal the breach. Ho's skill and his prestigeenior Communist statesman, an associate ofnin and Stalin, has contributed lo North Vietnam's ability to avoid committing itself when all other Bloc parties have done so.
There are longstanding rivalries and jealousies within the North Vietnamese leadership, and factions have formed around various key personages. However, the associationeaderactionpro-Moscow"pro-Peiping" line is more likely to be based onof Vietnamese national interests thanesire toHanoi with one side or the other in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
We believe lhat Hanoi's self-interest willontinuation of this attitude for as long us possible. We must keep in mind, however, that ardent Communist sectarians do not always follow the course which seems to us clearly In their best interest. Pelping's costlyto Moscow0ase in point. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that Hanoi may decide or be forced to come down off the fence.
Two contingencies would makeevelopment more likely. The death of Ho woulderiod of jockeying for power within the DRV leadership and the impulses toward Bloc unity and toward remaining aloof from the Sino-Soviet dispute would be weakened. During this period also, DRV actions toward Laos and South Vietnam might be lessefinite break between Moscow and Peiping would lead both pnrties to be more forthright and aggressive in seeking allies, and each would bring increased pressure upon Hanoi to commit itself.
Although Hanoi deplores the Sino-Soviet polemic and seeks to mitigate its bitterness, the DRV line on particular substantive Issues more frequently corresponds to the Chinese than to the Soviet position. In general, Hanoi shares Peiping's views on how the world Communist movement should be run. Hanoi's desire lo preserve Its freedom of action leads it, like Peiping, to oppose Moscow's demand lhat tbe movement observe the principle of "democratic centralism" (Le.,submission to the decisions of the majority, which is controlled byanoi's irredentism toward South Vietnam, like Peiping's toward Taiwan, leads it to oppose devotion to "peaceful coexistence" and to object to disarmament efforts exceptevice to "expose the insincerity of theanoi also joins Peiping Inmaximum "struggle" and support of "liberation" movements.and racial affinities also incline the North Vietnamese toward the Chinese rather than the Russians and the overwhelming power of China is closer at hand. Hence, we believe that Hanoi, if moved fo take sides, would throw its suppon to the Chinese.
If this came lo pass. Hanoi would have to face the possibilityurtailment or termination of Soviet economic and military support. But unless the scope of DRV military moves is considerably Increased, Soviet military assistance is not vital. Moreover, it seems likely that Hanoi, In conducting Its operations at current levels In Laos and South Vietnam, does not rely very heavily on the Soviet deterrent. In the economic field, both Chinese and Soviet aid programs arendithdrawal of Soviet assistance would cause inconvenience and some damage to DRV development schemes. It would not be critical; much of the slack would probably be taken up by expanded Chinese assistance and by purchases In the Free World.
It should be emphasized, however, that support of Peiping on the Issues of the lntra-Communlst dispute does not automatically entail either Hanoi's subservience to Peipingefinitive severing of Hanoi's ties to Moscow. Therereat variety of Intermediate stages, and the DRV would strive, probably with considerable success, toarge measure of independence and an effective connection with Moscow as well as with Peiping.
III. INTERACTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE AND COMMUNIST POLICIES AND ACTION IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM
The Situation in Laos
primacy of Hanoi's interest in Laos is almost certainlyby Moscow and Peiping. However, both of them wouldpressure to prevent North Vietnamese actions which ap-
rief description ot the Soviet and Chinese economic aid programs is given in the Annex.
peared to Imperil broader Chinese or Soviet interests. At present levels of commitment and activity, Hanoi appears toelatively free hand within Laos, where itigh degree ol control over the Pathet LaoCommunist military force Initscounterpart, the Neo Lao Hak Xatithin theof political and military objectives laid down by North Vietnam, the PL/NLHX appears to exercise some degree of independent activity. Peiping appears to have some direct contact with the PL/NLHX, though Moscow does not.
In considering overall strategy in Laos, the Soviets almostsee their interests as best servedontinuation of the political "solution" achieved In2 Geneva Conference on Laos; theystill expect (hat Communist objectives would be eventually achieved almost wholly without risk, through penetration and subversion of Premier Souvanna Phouma's coalition government. The Soviets feel that mililary pressures should be controlled so as to promote this aim.
For their part, Hanoi and Peiping almost certainly believeommunist takeover can be accomplished more quickly and more directly. Moreover, they may fear that the Soviet-preferred method would significantly delay, and perhaps prevent, this achievement by allowing the Souvanna regime to become stabilized and, given USstrengthened. In their view, the way to win is throughapplication of military and political pressure, capitalizing on quick, limited military victories and eroding the enemy's determination to fight. Thus, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese have acted to debilitate the neutralists by all available means, but particularly by limited military action to exploit Souvanna's weakness and indeclsiveness.
In any event, Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi almost certainly agree on the classic principle of combining military and political action, with the differencesatter of degree and emphasis. Bloc policy in Laos will almost certainly continue to reflect this overall Communist strategy, with Hanoi's choice of tactics dictated primarily by itsof local developments rather than by considerations of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The Soviets will probably continue to compete with Peiping for the allegiance of North Vietnam, and they almost certainly would prefer not to give Hanoi andree hand to decide Communist policy in Laos. However, the Soviet Union's interest in the Laos situation is peripheral In contrast to its deep involvement In Cuba, Berlin, the dispute with Peiping, and several other immediate issues. The Soviets almost certainly prefer not to make much out of the Laos crisis and are unlikely to do so unless the situation threatens to flare up and bring the risk of an East-West confrontation there. On the other hand, Communist China, bordering on Laos and loudly promoting the
cause of national liberation wars, is more directly involved. In the coming Tiii nits Moscow and Peiping approach another crisis in their relations, the Chinese may try to make Laos an issue In the Sino-Soviet dispute claiming that the Soviets arc demonstrating an unwillingness to support wars of national liberation in underdeveloped areas. But it seems unlikely that Peiping would risk significantly escalating the conflict In order to put the Soviets on the spot.
any case, so long as Moscow and Peiping continue tothe allegiance of Communists everywhere, wc believe thatbe inhibited in opposing Hanoi's and Peiping's desires In LaosVietnam, unless these seem to be endangering Moscow'srastic change of the situationosof large-scale US intervention) might exacerbateover policies to be pursued in southeastrisis showdown with the US, wc cannot assume thatfail to support Peiping and Hanoi.
The Situation in South Vietnam
policy and action in South Vietnam appears towholly dictated by Hanoi. As in Laos, Moscow andcertainlyoice in policy decisions involving theirnational Interests, but, in general, both appear content to"struggle" in the south as an irredentist issue and to permitVietnamese to pursue their subversive activityace andmanher which Hanoi deems appropriate. Neither Moscow norknown to have any direct contact with either the Viet Cong ormechanism, the National Front for the Liberationlthough both, particularly Peiping, have madevisiting NFLSV delegations.
annex
sino-soviet bloc aid to north vietnam
North Vietnam has received extensive economic support from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The initial phase of the Bloc aid program consisted largely of grants to support the North Vietnamese economy after the partitionoodstuffs and other consumer goods were dispatched under these grants as well as equipment and materials for economic reconstruction. The reconstruction effort was mergedroader buildup of the economyhich required additional financial aid during thehird round of financial assistance was extended to North Vietnamo support the economic development anticipated during the First Five-Year. The Slno-Sovlet conflict probably has had some adverse effect on Blocof the foreign aid program in North Vietnam, but its extent cannot be Judged.
Communist China has been the largest contributor of aid to the development program of North Vietnam. The Chinese assumed arole In the early rehabilitation of North Vietnam's transportation and communications facilities, as well as in the reconstruction andof Its Irrigation system. In more recent years, China has undertaken the construction of several important light Industrial projects, Includingice-husking planis, two sugarigaretteatchubber goodsojp factory,nitted goodshinese creditillion, extended Ins being used to finance construction of several heavy industrial plants, including two power plants and an Iron and steel plant. Inhina extended another credit, amounting7 million, to be used during the7 for theor expansion ofndustrial and transport enterprises. This credit will provide for an expansion of the Chinese-sponsored Iron and steel plant and for the construction of several smaller iron and steel plants. The iron and steel plant represents by far the largest foreign aid project In North Vietnam and will absorb the major share of Chinese aid to North Vietnam in the first Five-Year Plan Other assistance will be provided to Uie chemical and cement Industries and tor railway and bridge Installations. In the field of light industry, China will construct three mills for the manufacture of sugar, paper, and cotton yarn.
The role of the USSR in North Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan centers around8 million credit extended In0 for economic and technical assistance in the construction ofndustrial projects. Soviet aid will be used to expand the fuel and power In-
dustry, lay the foundationsodern machine-building industry, and strengthen the scientific research Institutes in the country. This aid will include the construction of eight thermal and hydroelectric stationsotal capacityegawatts; the expansion of the Hongay-Camplia coal mines; the construction and equipping of three scientific and research training institutes; and the exploration of mineralIn addition, lhe USSR also extendedrant of S3 million for medicine, insecticides, equipment, and specialists for an antimalaria program.
KoLh the USSR and China provide agricultural assistance to North Vietnam. The Soviet programreditillion, extended inor the expansion of production and for the processing of troplral rrops in North Vietnam. It envisages Soviet assistance in establishing stale farms with supporting workshops and the construction of factories for processing tea, coffee, and fruit. Chinese aid to North Vietnam's agricultural development began5 with work on the Irrigation system and the dispatch of agricultural technicians. Inhina agreed lo build eight farmsiddletechnical school.
Chinese and Soviet assistance to North Vietnam includes specialists in many fields. The number of Soviet personnel working in North Vietnam probably is. The number of Chinese personnel appears to be more numerous, perhaps amounting to. although some of the Chinese probably arc laborers rather than specialists.
Nearly all of the trade and aid moving to North Vietnam from Uie USSR and Soviet Bloc countries Ls transported by sea. Ooodsby rail from the Soviet Bloc very likely make upmall percentage of the total volume of Imports arriving In North Vietnam by rail from China. No information ls available, however. Indicating that armaments or munitions move to North Vietnam from the USSR by sea. and fragmentary data suggests that such materiel moves bythrough China.
The rail line into North Vietnam from Communist China's Kwangsi Province, via P'ing-hsiang. is used fur trade between North Vietnam and China. About two-thirds of the traffic passing through P'lng-hslang, however, is Cliina-to-China traffic which transits North Vietnam inbetween Yunnan Province and the rest of China. About one-half of Uie volume of nonmilitary iiii|xats by North Vietnam from China move by sea.
TABLE
CREDITS AND GRANTS FROM THE USSR, THE EUROPEAN
SATELLITES, AND COMMUNIST CHINA (MILLIONS $US>
Satellites
China .
457
Onhe USSR signed an agreement on further Sovietassistance to North Vietnam in tho development of agricultural resources. No details concerning the amount of Soviet assistance have been released.
Original document.
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