Created: 12/16/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible











Early g

Ground Controlled Intercept Jj


Current 7





Tactical Sy>(cmi




Long-Range SAMJi

Anti-Balliilk: Missile (ABM)u

System! with DualJt-



Siu-facej-to-Air Mtsitles12


Radar Development and DeploymentJJ






T-illi" and16



Air Dcfwui:17

Ballistic Missiiu-8




Tabic I: Soviet

Tabicovietir Missiles Systems {PVO27


FigureAM Deployment in trie East European Warsaw Pact


FigureAM Deployment in East Germany Figurendeployment in the USSR





To evaluate (he capabilities of the Soviet air and missile defense forces, andorecast probable trends in Soviet air and missile defense programs through


combination of area and point defenses provided bypresent force of interceptors and short-range(SAM) systemsood defense for major targetmedium and high altitude bomber attacks. However, thesystem has limited low altitude capabilities, and specialarc posed by supersonic aircraft and air-to-surfaceWe believeajor Soviet effort during thethis decade will be focused on meeting these particular55)

believe that improvements in the Soviet air defensethe next few years will make progressively more difficultpenetration by manned bombers to major target manned bombers will require increasinglyof attack. Soviet air defense capabdities can be degradedincreasingly complex, forms of attack which the West will beemploy, including air-launched missdes. penetration tactics,countermeasures, and low-altitude attack. Despite theseof their air defense system, the Soviets would expect tonumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that dicy wouldthat they could reduce the weight of attackointresulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable.

to? zicna


v-' ;

There arc uncertainties in our knowledge ofnd deployment in the nntibaliistic missile (ABM) field. From the evidence now available, however, certain generalan he drawn: first, theffort has been extensive and of long duration, and the USSR several years ago probably solved the technical problem of intercepting ballistic targets aniviug singly or in smallsecond, sonic initial ADM deployment activity was probably begun as long agout both the deploymentrograms wered modified; third, th-nitudend the probable early deployment activity pointtrong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly;ew antimissile missileas appeared, and some additionalactivity may now be underway, but the USSR does not have any operational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today.

D. Much of our evidence indicates that the USSR has beenmethods of ABM defense which differ in important respects from those now favored by the US. Low frequency radars may play an important role in the Soviet program. An early Soviet effort may haveissile designed to have dual capabilities againstand aerodynamic vehicles. The new AMM which was recently displayed by the Soviets is probably designed to conduct exoatmos-pheric intercepts at considerable ranges,arge nuclearto achieve its kill. Wc believe, however, that the Soviets have probably not conducted many AMM firings to exoahnosphcricand that they have probably not attempted full system tests involving interceptions at these altitudes.

Recent Defensive Deployments

E. The Soviets began construction of three defensive complexes at Leningrad. We believe that the Leningrad system was originally designed toapability against ballistic missiles, and perhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well. However, wcthat the initial design has been changed. We cannot determine the nature of this change, or whether it was caused byealization that the system was vulnerable toaids, or important new developments in the statc-of-thc art. There are similarities between new construction at one of thecomplexes and two recently discovered defensive complexes un-


too wan

dcr construction in northwestern USSR. In light of these similarities, al least tliese thiec complexes may now be intended for ihe deployment of the mm defensive system. )

F. Wc arc unable to associate the new complexes with any systems equipment, and any explanation for the mission of these complexes and the modified Leningrad complex is open to some doubt. There fx some support for the belief that the complexes areAM system to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other Iiand. wc have noted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several years and indications that the USSR has been working toward new andABM capabilities. In light of this factor and otherwe think there are also persuasive reasons for believing that the new complexes are related to missile defense. However, any judgment at this time on their mission is in our view premature.

C. Wc have observed at Moscow three developments which may indicate ABM deploymentarge radar now undercould be the acquisition and early target tracking element of an ABM system. Other .facilities also under construction could serve as the final target tracking and missile guidance elementites which arc now being modified could be used as the AMM launchfor die systems. However, the activities wc have observed thus far may not be related, and some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function. The missile to be employedajor unknown; thedisplayed AMM could be used at Moscow to conduct exoatmos-pheric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several hundreds of miles from the city. In sum, we continue to believe that the Soviets may be deploying ABM defenses at Moscow, but wc do not yet understand how the installations we have observed would function as an ABM system. )

ABM Prospects

H. If ABM deployment activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSR is likely to have some initial strategic ABM defenses operational within the next two years or so. Limited deployment, especially at Moscow, couldpecial, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and still unproved system. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever it occurred, would imply that the Soviets consider their ABM




good enough lo justify extraordinarily large new expenditures. It would indicate that the Soviets had achievedand perhaps, that they had taken high-risk production anddecisions. Wc cannot exclude this possibility, but oursuggests that the Soviets have been proceeding cautiously since they modified their program.

t. In considering whether to provide ABM defenses for many of their urban-industrial centers and other targets, the Soviet leaders will iiave to weigh the great cost of such an effort against the likelyof the ABM systems available. Area defenses might offer considerable savings over point defenses, but we cannot be sure of tin's and in anyajor commitment of resources would be The Soviets may defer widespread deployment pending further HAD work on existing systems, or in the hope of achieving better systemsater date. They might even decide that the cost of large-scale ABM deployment would not bemensurate with the protection it could offer against anticipated Western strike We are certain that the Soviets will push ahead withffort, but we cannot forecast whether or when they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs justifying widespread deployment.

Anfiiolellife Capabilities

J. We believe that the Soviets are noweries of large, new radars, most of which will probably be completed We believe that some or ail of these radars will be linked togetherpace survciUance system. ystem will, we think,apability considerably in excess of that required merely to detect the passage of US space vehicles. In our view, the'ehances are better than even that the Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypacesystem, but with an antisatcllitc capability as well.' If existing types of missiles were used in an antisateliitcuclearwould probably be required,issile for non-nuclear kill could be developed in about two years after flight tests beean. )


' The Director of Intelligence and Research. Oeputnieni of Slate, believes that on the basil of jvaibhle evidence, this .fRimilivereptirure. While lie does not cdude Ihe antiulcll.ts (unctionosiibility. present evidence docs cot persMsde him (Jut the Soviets intend io develop and deploy tvftlrin Oieean and at great oott an oitreincly cempki antisatcllite lyslem.



I. Since the end of Worldlie Soviets, confronted by large and powerful US strategic at|nekave steadily increased and improved thoir airhey haveormidable capability against aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes to principal target areas. However US development of standoff weapons and low-altitude penetration (attics for aircraft have further complicated the Soviet air defensec expect, therefore, that the Soviets will continue to spend large sums on air defense despite the planned decrease in the sue of tlic US strategic bomber force over the next few years.

n addition, the Soviets have been faced for some years with the certain knowledge that as this decade advances, ballistic missiles, presenting wholly new defensive requirements, will comprise the main strategic tlireat to the USSR. The ballistic missile threat not only poses the question of how much additional effort to pour into improved defenses, but also raises (he problem of whether, regardless of resources commitled, it is feasible for the Soviets to create andefense of major targes against the US strategic strike forces.


The Soviet air defense mission is the responsibility of the PVO Stony (Anti-Air Defense of theltoseeputy Minister ol Defense, is ranked with the heads of the ground, naval, air and strategic missile forces. The PVO is composed of three major elements, each of which performs one of the fccy functions ol (he air defensearly warning and control, interceptor, and surface-to-ai: missile (SAM) operations. In addition to forces directly assigned to the PVO. other Soviet forces which can contribute to the air defense mission arc also operationally available to this command.

In addition to air defense, the commander of the PVO probably is assigned the missile defense mission. The Soviets have referredhe existence of PRO (Anti-Rocket Defense) units, and have usually indicated that these units are subordinate to. or at least integrated with, the PVO Strany. The Ministry of Defense implements the civil defense program, but such operations are not subordinate to the PVO.

The air defense systems of the several Warsaw Pact countries are separate national systems. Nevertheless, (hey aro coordinated one with another, and for most practical purposes they constitute an extension of the Soviet systemhe Soviets undoubtedly will continue their policy of improving the air defense capabilities of these countries. Although the Chinese Communist air defense

' For < of SAM deployment in thert cw.lricf.Annei B.nd %




M contact with tt< PVO.n between them |uu MM been limited tolinnge o( routine air information. In oat view, it is unlikely (lull cooperation between tMir defenseo increased OVtag tl* MM several yean.


m Soviets km continued during the pad two year* to otx&oy early wanting (EW) and ground controlled mtempt (CCl) radars and toarge number ol radar sites. Wc estimate that there are nowadar, deployedperationall* USSR. Tlw system provides overlapping radar coverage of most of (lie nation; coverage is very deroe west of the Utah and in peripheral areas. Almost all sites lave at least two radars and many arc equipped with five to seven sets, most of whichin different frequency bands. The resulting density of coverage heightens the probability of detection, snd theney diversilication ptovides some defense against electronic countermcasures.

Eorly Worning

ix altitude coverage of the. Soviet EW system exceeds tlx combat ceiling of any US aircraft now in service. Under optimum conditions, the Soviet EW system could detect and track aircraft flying at medium or high altitudes atm away from Soviet territory, and under normal conditions de lection and tracking of enemy aircraft flying Ml such altitudes is virtually assured. beyond the Soviet borders. The use of superior ie aircraft and cruise missiles, because of their very high speeds, will reduce the warning time provided by this system. The detection range of the EW system is progressively reduced against aircraft penetrating at loweroreover, even where detection of low altitude penetrators occurs, the system is unlikely to be able to accomplish continuous tracking of an intruding er.cmy aircrafteet.

S. As (he Soviet EW system improves in quality, the number of radar sites probably will be gradually reduced. We estimate that0 the range per-formance of the Soviet EW system will be limited only by the radar horuon line "of sight The Soviets will place increased emphasis on die problem of detecting and tracking low altitude targets. Radars better able to cope with such targets probably will be deployed, particularly in border areas and along likelyroutes. Nevertheless, radar poformancc at low altitudes wOl remain limited.

Ground Controlled Intercept

9 About one-third of the Soviet radar sites arc capable of conducting CCt operations Against targets at medium and high altitudes, we estimate

top scenn

Ct range capabilities vary from about about tOO nrn firjlllj on lite radar employed at the cite. Soviet CCI setsigh altitudewhich cscetds the combat ceihngs of all US aircraft Wc believe most CCI site* arc equippeddars having moving target indicator! or employing ant it hitter techniques in otdcr to improve low nllttudc coverage The Soviets piobably would have great difficulty in conducting effective CCt opcr-.itiuiit against enemy aircraft Hyingtwt. In addition. Sovicl CCI capabilities against super tonic target* arc generally reduced

lsc Soviets have lawn improving their air defense control capabilities In rrraK yzz- byaisystem in :ha western USSR andeaser crtent in other areas. This system is used for the rapid dissemination of hacking informatson from radar sites to air warning centers and probably to SAM units.ystem wouldajor inputround-to-air data link designed to vector interceptors. We believe thai the newer model all-weather interceptors aro equippedata link system.

he Soviets will continue to develop their CCI capabilities during the period of this estimate. An improved CCI radar probably will be deployed during the period of this estimate, possibly in combinationew EW set. Tim semiautomatic data system may be modified to increase trafBe handling

capabilities. "All new model interceptors brought into serv.eee

equipped to operate with the data lint


the Soviet air defense system, interceptor aircraft constitute theof active defense, performing bollt area and point defense roles. WeI..ring the past two years, ihe Soviets have been placing greaterimproving the mobility and coverage of their interceptor force,the use of forward deployment tactics. Air defense training liasincluded tlie dispersal and redeployment of PVO aircraft.

Current Forces

estimate that there now arcVOoperational service. Only aboutercent of these are Mich 2slightly morehird of the force is equipped for all-weatherIn addition to the PVO interceptor force, the fighters assigned toAviation units also can be used in die air defense mission. Wcthere arcighters now in service witli Tactical Aviation,of them deployed in western USSP and in tlwsc EuropeanSoviet forces are stationed Most of these 6ghters are notall-weather opera torn, and slightly less than half of the forceircraft The fighters of Tactical Aviation, partscularly tbemodels,ignificant potential to Soviet air defense capabilities.

Tlf Soviets nowperational service woic eight intermodels.of which have been deployed in a* many as five differenti.trpft can tnigagc Westernbomber* allaclmg at medium orllitudia. Ihough most of live Soviet fighter* and hllDniCptarj aretielr radar andail attack (actio and atv not capable ofl*rd asc missilesew alt-wcatlicr models. IWM of winch now ate entering service, have unproved AAMs and fire control systems.

Tlie introduction of newer model interceptor* has been relatively slow, probably reAeCu*.greaterand urn* of these weapons svsterns and possiblynculty in perfecting them. Tlie Sovietsplayed ibe. Firebar. Fiddler, and Flipper inlcrccplorse believe that they began this year to deploy the all weather Firebar and possibly another new mode! interceptor.irebar is believed to be capable cf performing radar intercept, as low aseet. The Fiddlerreater combat radrus than any operational Soviet interceptor and, with its improved fire control system, it probably can attack airborne targets from any angle. The Fiddler probably is in live late stages of development; weirm evidence that il has been operationally deployed.


lie Soviets will continue to conduct research and development on manned interceptor aircraft. We believe that two or possibly three new interceptors arc currently underew all-weather interceptorpeed of aboutombat radius of. may be operational byhe Soviets may alio be developing an advanced all-weather .ntercepcor with greater speed and combat radius, foe deployment toward the end of the period of this estimate. In addition, new airborne intercept radarsow altitude capability may become available by the end of the decade.

Forsetenraic. of SWable 1.

' The Assistant Chief of SUIT, Intelligence. usaf. comWcrs that die estimate projectoo.pieopi*-is decline in ia rVO fighter strength. He notes that the estimated cut bad. of between jt andereenr fro- present urc-gd. leveti toast] theearsare ofore doubleas occurredMLhe IA PVO sUll will includetciccplor atrcnfl.


lie inttoduetion of newer aircraft will probably continue to be relatively slow.he PVO interceptor force will piobably be reduced loircraft, more than two-lluxcts of which will probably be Machll-weatheractical Aviation fighters will continue toignificant potential to Soviet air defense capabilities. The capabilities of both these forces will increase because of the improved performance of the aircraft and the wider use of aams and semiautomatic control systems. We abothat the Soviets will arm some of their aams with nuclear warheads.


The SA-l

ystem, which has been observed only .it Moscow, isatites indouble ring around timnstalled inS. it was probably intendedefense against mass airthe changed nature of tin; threat and the age ot the system, wc believeSoviets will phase out (heetirement of llielmostbe compensated for by additional SAM deployment at Moscow.

The SA-2

great bulk of the Soviet SAM defenves consist ofites,deployed around moil mban areas ofopulation and atof the more important military installations* This system, whichOperational inis also been deployed in barrierin some border areas. We believe there are now morecite USSR, and that deployment of this system is continuing. Thepatterns lead usstimate that the Soviet force goal is someand we believe that this total will be deployed by the endS.

The Soviets are likely to continue to rely on thes the principal SAM system for air defense during the period of this estimate. They have modified the system several times, and they will probably continue to do so, but they are not likely to replace ft completelyollow-on system. The most recent modificaoons. made during the past year, were probably designed primarily to increase its range and improve its capabilities against supersonic targets. The Soviets almost certainly will provide some of theirites with nuclear weapons, and may have begun to do so.

Past evidence has shown (Sat the low altitude capability of theystem has been limited toeet. Recent evidence indicates that there arc modification* which can be made to reduce the lower altitudetoeet. Additional recent data indicate that the Soviets are willing to commit missiles against targets flying considerablyeet. At these low altitudes, the effectiveness of tbe system may be degraded: the low altitude limitiven site would be affected by local terrain and other factors.

Tho SA-3

For performr-c- chirietrrtitia ot SAM lystemj. Me Aitnci A. Tabic i

For ecu* ol SAMwc Ascuap 3.

the past year, the Soviets have continued to deployelatively slow pace; we believe onlyites have beensince the program beganc estimate that this systemto cope with low-altitude attacks, Lc, ateet,have no evidence as to its actual minimum effective altitude. With few


saotored in th.^

alowiM deploy.ncn. th.olly aaiduft. capam-k,

ollow-onhe soviet, may^ later in th. prod ofoT lh* there wou'd Ik-more extent*oviet attempt tocy target.s probably precluded by lit. cos. of the massive deployment winch would be

required. tactical system.

estimate tltat aboutites now are deployed in dclensefield forces in easterne believe .hat theses.te. wouldo defend against tlx initial stage,trategicad,soviets may have begun in the past year or soaTground force units. this system may employ the fc.^mrtijwhich hm been dispuyed in moscow.characteristics of this system, but. fieldlikely to be fully integr.ted into the ai. defense battle plan of therK whenestroyers .nd destroyersam. prob.wy%rould be emphryedupplementport *the eventtratcgic attack.

vi air defense electronic warfare capabilities


he sovietstha, their .ir1 rave to contend with electronic countcrmeasureshe dens-ty of* the frequency diversification ates. and the probable use of rmcrowave linkseduce the vu.oc.abu.ry of jh.defense system to ECM. the soviets may employ frequencya sL.iautom.tic data mt-th. soviets have used increased power to overcome ECM and have beer, erperunenungothe. techniques th. soviets have placed great emphasis on traunng radar crews irop^tions in the presence of ECM. thes designed ECM environment. however, the soviet .ir defense system it.ll can be de gradedombination of ECM and tactics.

tapnd possibly in lU- higherWctc llmihe end of tin. demde. Soviet equipment will be able Iosignals* fur jamming any ill (Ik* frequencies likelyiled by (lie com.

in ilea Ik hiv. radarv" ( stern aircraft In addi-

Urjra. llic Soviets will pr.ibal.Iy crrtpioy cHxtrOrut tlttvpl:onsuch as tin- simulation ul Wcrtcni iiavigatrnual


he massive rieplriysncut of air defenses over many ycari indicates (he high priority thai ihe Soviets haw assigned lo tho strategic defense mission. The general Soviet concept has been toefense in depth for their major center* of pO|Milationtional power. In addition, they haveendency to deploy defensive systems having some capabilityortion of Ihe threat, rather than lo wail until mote effective defenses can be developed. The expenditure of resources on strategic defenses has been very large; in rc-cetV years il lias amouiiled to about one-ruth of the espendilures which we can attribute to the major military missions.

2fl The foregoing gcneraliialions are well-supported by the varioussummarized in preceding sections of this paper. In addition to thoseelieve that the Soviets have been working actively on other new systems for strategic defense. TTic present stale of our evidence and analysis is such tliat sve are nor able to estimate with confidence the precise nature of much of this work However, some perspective on Soviet (Junking about requirements for new strategic defense systems is available from classifiedliterature of recent years.

Long-Ronge SAM Systems

ome of the articles published in secret Soviet military joumab during theealt with ihc advantages ofong-range SAM system to defend against bombers and air-to-strfacc missilesarshal Biryuaov. then commander-in-chief of the PVO Sirany. was cited asthat long-range antiaircraft missiles be deployed in "zonal" defense patterns to protect tbe key industrial regions of the USSR. In commenting on Marshal Biryuaov's recommendation, the Soviet officer who cited him went on to state that the SAM defenses of the USSR should consist of "boundary groupings" of long-range missiles to screen the approaches to vital regions and "pointngs" of short-range missiles to defend important targets in the interior.

Anli-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Sysloms

lie Soviets haverowing ronccm for the threat posed by Western ballistic missiles, esr/ccially since the advent of the US ICBM and Polaris forces. Articles appearing in the classified Soviet military literature1 argued that an ABM system to defend against strategic missiles sliould be capable of performing intercepts a( high altitudes and long ranges



flic target areas In those few articles discussing ballistic missile defense of which we are cognisant, tlic moil practical mctliod of destroying an incoming ballistic missilesaid to be cxoaluiosphcrictorccpt prior to tlto warhead's entry into (lie dense layers of (lie atmosphere. One Soviet general asserted that minimum intercept altitude* against ICDMs and ItlBMs should be fromoepending onield of the enemy warhead. Another Soviet general observed that it would be necessary to have antimissile missiles (AMMi) capable of ranges on the orderun. and altitudes of not less0 ii m.


Systems with Dual Roles

he Soviets have also expressed' interest in the possibility of developing missile systems which could be employed against both aerodynamic vehicles and ballistic missiles. Some officers, according to classified Soviet military articles, believed that theissile could be modified for use against ticrical ballistic missiles. In addition, the Soviets have repeatedly referred toiff on missile (first displayedeapon capable of being employed against "all modem means of aerial and spacehich suggests that this missile was originally intended to serve asAM and an AMM.


development of Soviet defensive weapon systems has beenat two test ranges. Kapustin Yar and Sary Shagan. The activitiessystems at Kapustin Yar began in the; to the best ofthese activities have been directed toward the developmentof SAM systems and for training. Sary Shagan has servedan ABM development center, although it has also supported otherspace programs and work on SAM systems has been conducted there.

Surface-to-Air Missiles

have no specific evidence of any SAM system being, andowever, some new SAMs (eg, the Canef tacticalappeared in Soviet parades, and they may already be in the earlydeployment. Wo have therefore thoroughly examined our ability toidentify the development of SAM systems,ong-rangeand wc have concluded that such systems could have beentested without our knowledge

Anti-Missile Missiles

Soviets are continuing with theirffort, begunyears ago, to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. In the pastthere has been evidenceumber of changes in the Sovietprogram. These changes pointew phase or phases, the

which wc cannot determine. But t'.iey suggest that the Soviets

were testing new or modified svstem components, and that the new phase of the program was encounter ing SOme problems.

e believe it wotild be technically feasible for llic Soviets to simulate an (COM intercept at Sary Shagan. However, we cannot determine whether they have made any attempt to create ICBM re-entry angles or velocities during any of the tests. ivu no evidence that the Soviets have conducted tests

involving the use of decoys, multiple warheads, or other penetration techniques

at Sary Sliagass. and sve thiol it unlikely.

aken at face value, the evidence indicates aon the problem of intercepting mcdrtim-rangc missiles. The Soviets have not attemptedagainst ICBMs. but they have, of course, obtained considerable data on ICBM re-entry from their many ICBM tests. We believe that the Soviets have concluded that the problem of intercepting ICBMs is not significantly different from that of intercepting medium-range mfsiiles. except that greater radar ranges are required for the acquisition and tracking of an ICBM.

ffodor Development and Deploymenl

n important part of theork at Sary Shagan has raecn the develop-incnt of large radars, the Hen Rooit and Hen House, which we believe were ready for initial testing in

j The general

configuration of these

to Soviet development of radars which scan their beams election ica My rather than by physical movement of tbe antenna. Large fadars employing thisare particularly applicable to ballistic missile early warning, to long-range acquisition and early target tracking of ballistic missiles, and to detection and tracking of satellites. We believeumber of these large radars arc under construction in the USSR.

3S. Wo believe two Hen House-type radars arc now under construction on the Kola Peninsula. These radars probably will serve as ballistic missile early wartUng radars, but tlicy couldpace surveillance function as well. They could provide warning of US ICBMs directed towardample,inutes in the ease of Moscow. Additional radars in other locaUons would be required to provide similar warning of missile strikes against other target areas in the USSR. We have no evidence of the coostrucoon of radars suitably located for this purpose, but we estimste that the Sovietswilltheir ballistic missile early warning coverage. Wc believe that the Soviets require about two or three years to consiruct radars of this type in the field; the ones in the KolaI probably be in operation




W Another Urge radar (Ongnow under construction neartom .hosejU pmbnhly nnntm, the ekvhimfc scam.-ig pMplc. Il may he pan of an ABM eytUiii.racking


uJc i. described by tha SovietsTotkssmm be employed apiml "all modem MM of aerial aod spaceImissiles. Several months=,

TV film dip Inissileffons general appearanceIn an AMM roUv We Iteifeveffon was designed in Oilwhen (he Soviets may have been seeking toeaponcould be usedoth aircraft and milliter Our analyst,Cr.ffonapabihty for intercept,

(ie. within the atmosphere) againstophisticated balhst*nd that it has long-range, high altitude .rtuWt role. We believe that the Criffon missile wa. devetoped for use at the large complexes which the Soviets have been constructing at Leningrad sincetcr. (Sec later paragraphs.)


4 parade in Moscow, the Soviea displayeddescribed as an lIllttjfTl missile capable of destroying Dallisriegreat distances" fromargets. Preliminary analysis of parade pho-

what can be seen of its booster engines, we think that it is likdy to employ a

tORranhy leads us toMM role for this mis.ilc From its size ant

i Very

large warhead and to be designed to perform exoatmospheric intercepts. Very preliminary calculations indicate that the missileinthe-canister may be able to accomplish intercepts at altitudese- hundred miles and at ranges of several hundred miles from it, launch point,arhead in the megaton range.issile could also be used in an anltsatellite role.

Some new AMM may have been tested initially at Sary Shagan as early as the endlvere is some chance that the Soviets could have conducted propulsion or component testing of an exoatmosphcric system,est program involving moreew AMM firings would probably have been detected All thing, considered, we believeoviets have probably not conducted many AMM firings to esoat mo spheric altitudes, and that they have probably not attempted full system test, involving iatercepoons at these liutudes.

Our evidence show, that the Soviets approach the .rating of missile systemsong presumption that the tests will be successful and that the system will be deployed. In fact. w0 have observed initial operational deployment of certain missile systems at about the same lime as test firings began. However, the Soviets have alsoroclivity for conducting full system tests prior to proceeding with wide scale deploymentew system. We therefore

too sccof*-

l fhe snvfcu an likely lo tarry out system tests before rammittmgimgrara.

e mn ni.ili.'i Id determine how |he nuivlc-in-thc-caitislor is loulcntlettihc AMM inystem to be deployed inof crtlkal targets, such j* Musin. |might be cmtpjoycd in aarea dt-frnsc lytrtciii designed to protect large areas, such a* lliclegiyn of the ussii_issile of this typet-mpluycd mx both these ways. the kill encebn-jm could be designedadvantage i4 the es-oalinosplicnc eltects ol large-yield warlicads tooven though ac-vumpanicd by pcnclraliontc. in order to reduce the pmblcmi of dii

"jmay imply that (lie ussr lias developed an amm designed toiftwithay pulseuclear burst.

ystem of tlie foregoing type would differ in important respects from any us abm system cunenlly under development. although it would have certain disadvantages, il might be allractive lo ihe soviets, in part because it might be more cc*npat-blc with tlteir technical capabilitiesystemon highly sophisticated discrimination techniques.

x. recent defensive deployment activities leningrad

4fi construction of three new defensive was begun at leningrad in ihe winter-. while our evidence has never been adequate loirm judgment about ihe function of the leningrad facilities, we have estimated forast several years that they probably comprised an abm system which would be capable of engaging both irbms and icbms. last year we estimated (hat ihe leningrad system mightapabilitymall number of reentering objects arriving at about the same time, ether more than one missileissilemall number ofut tliai i( would probably liave little capability against saturation attacks orpenetration techniques.*

e believe that ihe leningrad system was originally designed toapability against ballistic missiles, and perhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well, but that the initial design has been changed. we cannot determine the nature of this change, nor can we determine whether it was caused by serious technical difficulties, the reajixslion dial the system was vulnerable lo penetration aids, or important new developments in the state-of-the-art. there arc similarities between new ccnstnictjon at one of the leningrad com-

'o holders ofsoviet bloc airmissile dtfrnico-emw ifrq. to? secret.


and recenti wove red defensive complexes under construction at Tallin and Ce.epo.cts in rwrthwesrern USSll (Sec latern light o( time limilarities. at least tl>ctc three may now be intended lor the deployment ol the sameystem. However, wc are unable to associate the new with any systems equipment, and any caplana-lion for tlic mission of these complexes and lor the modifications atpen to some doubt.

Tallin and Cherepovets

Wc know of no installations in the vicinity of Tallin and Cherepovets which would call for this selection as sites for an ADM system or evenew SAM system. -In order to function as part cf an area ABM defense for (he western urban-industrial region, the complexes at Tallin and Cherepovets would need toissile with long range, exoatmospheric capabilitiesompatible acquisition radar. Usinglong-range AMM. complexes at these location, could defend against both ICBMs and Polaris missiles Mjnfo tories toward* Moscow or other key targets in the western region. To defend Moscow from thesentercepts would have to be performed at alutudes of.

These complexes, however, could be intended to serveAM role. If so wc believe they would beong-range system, and that they may ne the sta'rtarrier torincipal route of US bombers toward the industrial centers of western USSR. The missile used byystem could be the Crifion or some other missile not yet identuSed. If uicd with appropriate guidance equipment, the Crifion would probably be effective to ranges. on the order. against aerodynamic vehicles at medium and high altitudes.

Thus, there is some support for the belief that the complexes areAM system to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other hand, we have noted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several years and indications that the USSR has been working toward new and duTerent ABM capabilities. In light of this factor and some of the foregoing considera-lions, wc think there are also persuasive reasons for believing that theseare related to missile defense However, any judgment at this time on their mission Is in our view premature


c have observed at Moscow three developments which may indicate ABM deployment there Southwest of the city, the Soviets arearge radar (Dog House) having the shape of an inverted V. The radar is welleet high andeet wide Coostrucoon probably was begun earlye know of no prototype for this radar; it probably evolved from developmental work at Sary Shagan and probably employs the electronic scanning principle. Because of its sire the apparent orientation of one face to scan the ICBM threat corridor, and its proximity to other

lion whicji mayABM related,int the radar could serveong-range acquisition and early tinge! tracking facility for an ADM system. It isowever, tlrat it will servecliitc tracking rath- and bean no rchtion to ADM defense.

ining tin- nm* year the Sovii-lc have continued work on probable clvc-Ironies fatilii.v* lixfltcd at font of tlie outer ringites at Moicow. Alllsougli wc hclicvr lhat these facilities arc intended to serve some defensive function,ut wlscthcr tin. fursrtior. is connected with ballistic missile defense or defense against aerodynamic vehicles.

n addition, Ihe Soviet* nave begun to modify many of thesitus during recent months. In'some cases, large new revetments arconsistent pattern hat not yet emerged, but some of the tevetmenU are big enough to accommodate very huge missiles. TTiis activity may indicate lhat the Soviets intend to utilize theites as launch persons for AMMi How-cvor, it also is possible that tlsc activityodification of Moscow's SAM defenses.

M. Thus we have observed under ewmtruetion at Moscow what may be three key elements of an ABM system. The large radar could be the acquisition and early target Iraekuig element, the facil.ties at the outer-ringites could serve as the final large! incking and missile guidance element, and theites could be used as the AMM launch positions for the system. the activities we have observed thus far may not be related to each other, and some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function Also, the missile to be em-ployedajor unknown; the missile in-the-canislcr could be used at Moscow toatmosplieric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several hundreds of miles from llie city. In sum. wc conlinue to believe thatoviets may now beBIM It If Will II. bat, do not vet understand how the installations we have observed would function as an A system.


5S. The combination of area and point defenses provided by the USSR's present force of interceptors and short-range SAM systemsood de-fensc for major target tireas against medium and high altitude bomber attacks. However, the air defense system has limited low altitude capabilities, and special dsfScullle* are posed by West cm supersonic aircraft and ASMi We believeajor Soviet effort duringemainder of this decade will be focused on meeting these particular problems. Moreover, In light of the continuing Western air threat and the high priority the USSR assigns to strategic defense, sveariety of Soviet measureseduce the changes that acre-dynamic vehicles of any type can penetrate to key targets.

ver tint- next fewhe Soviets will extend tlwic networks of usodem EW and CCI radar* andair defense coniiul systems.ihcv will inlrodmc more advancedeaponhese develop-irtaiU will upgradenirvtWB fa general, arid some ol litem will beto HN prubh-intWaltitude defense Tlie Soviets will alio seek to imitfovc llt-eicprobablyfying tlseir widely deployed SA IEnd by r* tending somewhat tlieir present limited deployment of system* designed ipeeineally (ot low-altitude defense. Finally, if tlte dc-vsJonments; at Tallin.nd Leningrad arcewAM system the" tlie Sovieti may lave begun to deployystemiarticrro^kh routec urbacegion of western USSU Tbe initial complexes forystem could be operational within tlte coming year.

lthough we are untertain aboutew SAM system is to become operational, we believe that Improvements in the Soviet air defense system over the neat few years will male progressively more difficult successful penetration by manned bombers to major target areas. Successful penetration by manned bombers will require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. Soviet aircapabilities can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able lo employ, including air-launched missiles, penerra-tion tactics, electronic co- inter measures, and low-altitude attack. Despite these limitations of their air defense system, the Soviets would expect toumber of the altackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to tlie USSR would be acceptable.

Ballistic Missile Defense

here ere critical uncertainties in our krtowledgc of the present status ofnd deployment in the ABM field. At this point in time, we can make no confident estimate about tlie fulurc prospects for Soviet defense against strategic ballistic missiles. From the evidence now available, however, certain general irroncJusicns can be drawn:

theffort has been citensivc and of long duration, and tho USSR several years ago probably solved the technical problem ofballistic targets arriving singly or in small numbers;

some initial ABM deployment activity was probably begun as long ago as lflfiO. but both the deploymentrograms wereinterrupted and modified;

the magnitudend the probable early deployment activity pointtrong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly;

ew AMM has appeared, and some additional deplcyment activity may now he underway, but the USSR does not have any tsperational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today.

uch of our evidence indicate? dial the USSll lias been exploring methods of ARM ilcftiuu1 wlilcli differ in important respects from those now favored byUS. Low frequency radar* may play mi important role in tlic SovietAn early Snvivt cllort "lay haveuuilu designed lo havepiiltilitui ag.iinvt luKMie and arradyiiainiche missile mostdisplayed is pmlKilily designed In conduct exnalmnsphcric intercepts at considerablergc unclear warhead to achieve its kilL

GO. Wr cannot determine whether any of the deployment we have noted since tlic ABM prngrain was modified is in fact relatedM defenses. It could he explained in terms of improved SAMullistic missile early warning system,pace surveillance system. Tims it is possible that tlic Soviets haveleast temporarily abandoned any ABM deployment efforts. At the other extreme, it is possible (hat the recent activity includes two simultaneous ABM deployment programsefense nf Moscow, and the other an area defense of the western urban-industrial region.BM deployment activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSll is likely to have some initial strategic ABM defenses operational within the next two years or so.

deployment activity, especially at Moscow, could be aeffort to defend the Soviet capital With an early and stiltsystem. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever itwould imply that the Soviets consider tlicir ABM systems goodjustify extraordinarily large new expenditures. It would indicate thathad achieveduccesses and. perhaps, that (hey hadproduction and deployment decisions. We cannot exclude thisbut our evidence suggests that (he Soviets have been proceedingsince they modified (heir program.

considering whether to provide ABM defenses for many of (heircentersr targets, the Soviet leaders will have to weighcost of such an effort against the likely effectiveness of (he ABMArea defenses might offer considerable savings over pointwe cannot be sure of this and in anyajor commitment ofwould be required. The Soviets may deferork on existing systems, or in the hope ofsystemsater date. They might even decide that the cost ofABM deployment would not be commensurate with the protection itagainst anticipated Western strike capabih'ties. We are certain thatwill push ahead withffort, but wc cannot forecastwhen they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities ond costsdeployment.


he evidence is insufficient for us to estimate with confidence whether the Soviets arc now developing weapon systems for defense against space vehicles, but we think that (hey almost certainly are investigating the feasibility of pro-

ducingt Tlrt brgc <adars. suchMen House, which wcbe now under constructionSSll andg House radar fo, use in space surveillance and .racking. Tim -nay not beor primary role fo. SOW) ai theseew. forallistic missile warning (unction. However, .vesome or all of .bese radars willinked together

system.ystem would enable .he SovicM fo observe and -rack and other orbiting objects during roost of five passes over (he USSll If would probably also be capable of predating the orbit, and position, of non-Sovct and space vehiclesigh degree of accuracy afterlw USSTl

ost of .he Urge radars Ixbcvede .ww under eonstfuctic* -SIbecome operationalill probablyc estimate that, when complcfcd. the system using theseapabilityin excess of that required merely to detect the passage of US vehicles. In addition, the USSR already has .he capaoty to track its own satellites, utilising transmissions from them, with greater accuracy than would be provided by the new system. Considering these factors, we think the chances arc better than even that the Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypace surveillance system, but with an antisatellite capability as welf

The kill mechanism which could be employed by an antisatellite system depends on the capabilities of its tracking radar, and live accuracy and maneuvcr-abibty of the interceptor missile it employs. If the new radars are coupledxisting types of missiles in an antisateihte system, the system would probably have touclear warhead toall. Non-nuclear fallatd-life wouldissile which would combine an accurate gu-dance system with SO exoatmospheric maneuver capabdity. We believe that the Soviets could developbout two yean slier the initUtion of flight tests. We have no evidence that the Soviets ate as yet conducting such tests.

The Soviets could probablyapability against satellites in near-earth orbits by modifying existing ballistic misnles and radars.apability could be acquiredew monthseeiiion to do so. but we have no

elief thst on the

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evidence thathave madeecision. We believe thai,uccessful intercept by uihigechnique, llic Soviets would need touclear warlicad.


he Soviets hive long rccoguiccd Ihe value of civil defenseeans of preparing their nalion to wil list and and rccoveiull-scale Strategic attack. Compulsory public training courses, initialedrc beingWc believe, liowcver. lhat the Soviets luvc concluded it is infeasihle to ncvisc and implement shelter rotisti"Ction urograms whidi would effectively protect the hulk of the urban population in the eventrgc-scale nuclear attack.oviet civil defense plans have emphasited Ihe concept of urban evacuation. However, we estimate lhat twohree days would beto conduct (lie evacuation of the population from Ihc major Soviet cities Thus, mass evacuation is likely to be feasible onlyarge-scale nuclearwere preceded by an alert period. Tlie Soviet civil defense system is now emphasizing mobility of opeiational units for evacuation and mutual units are being fotmed in the countryside lo aid cities after attack.

GS. Although we believe that the Soviets have severely curtailed their urban shelter cor.stn-eooo program, they probably have made provisions for including shelters in the schools, hospitals, and perhaps certain industrial facilities now being constructed. We calculate thai there are someomlboo shelter spaces available for the urban population, or roughly one space for every four city-dwellen. The Soviets have, in addition, encouraged the rural population to prepare their own makeshift shelters, such as root cellars, for protection against fallout. The Soviet leadership probably does not expect that the present civil defense program will provide adequate protection for moremall portion of the population. We have no evidence to indicate that the Soviets areesumptionajor shelter construction program.





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Effective Altitude (ft.)

Encelisx- Altitude

(CEP ia ft.)


Range willi.e. altitude,and dtfrelion ol the target. Againstgets, tltc mngrt arc as il'O-n: atn^nst aupensonu targets. Use ranee* decrease,

' TheysU.nisome effectiveness above the ahowa altitudes.

Seen factors aaad target apced* irutMcne- iow-altitacc upabditka.

* Recent evidence indicates llsat there are rectifications whit* can be made ta UVrusaile to reduce the .'o- er altitude linsitalion ol the system toOO Int. Additional recant data indicate that the Soviet* are "Xing to commit missies against targetseat. At those low altitudes, the effeeliveoesa of the ayitcm may be degraded; the to- altitude limitiven site would be affected by local terrain.

- Wc Lave no evidence as lo the minimum effective iltited: capabilities ot thia system.


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