TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PHOBLSM
DISCUSS'ON
I.
RGANIZATION OF AIR AND MISSILE
DEFENSE EARLY WABNINC AND CROUND CON-
TROLLED INTERCEPT SYSTEMS 8
Eairy 8
Ground Controlled 6
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 7
Current Forces .. 7 .
Prospects 8
MISSILE 9
The
The
The
Tactical Systems
VI. AIR DEFENSE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES10
VIL SOVIET CONCEPTS AFFECTING FUTURE STRATEGIC
DEFENSES11
Long-Range SAM11
Antl-Ballistic Missile (ABM)11
Systems with Dual11
VI IL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE MISSILE
SYSTEMS12
Surface-to-Alr Missiles12
Antimissile12
Radar Development and Deployment13
IX. RECENT STRATEGIC DEFENSE14
Mlssile-in-tho-Canistar14
GCCRLT
O
X. RECENT DEFENSIVE
Leningrad
Tallin nut!
DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
XI. PltOSPECTS FOll SOV ETEFENSE
Air Defense
Ballistic Missile Dcfeii&c
XII. ANT1SATELLITE CAPABILITIES
XIII. CIVIL DEFENSE
. 27
ANNEX A
Tabic l: Sovietystems
Tabicoviet Suriacc-to-AIr Missiles Systems (PVO Strany)
ANNEX
FigureAM Deployment in the East European Warsaw Pact
27
FigureAM Deployment in East Ccrmany Figurendeployment in the USSR
i
T6SECRET
Ton
PROBLEM
To evaluate ihe capabilities of the Soviet air and missile defense forces, and to forecast probable trends in Soviet air and missile defense programs through
CONCLUSIONS
combinationrea and point defenses provided bypresent force of interceptors and short-range(SAM) systemsood defense for major targetmedium and high altitude bomber attacks. However, thesystem has limited low altitude capabilities, and specialare posed by supersonic aircraft and air-to-surfaceWe believeajor Soviet effort during thethis decade will be focused on meeting these particular55)
believe that improvements in thc Soviet air defensethe next few years will make progressively more difficultpenetration by manned bombers to major target areas.by manned bombers will require increasinglyof attack. Soviet air defense capabilities can be degradedincreasingly complex forms of attack which the West will beemploy, including air-launched missiles, penetration tactics,countermeasures, and low-altitude attack. Despite theseof their air defense system, the Soviets would expect tonumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they wouldthat they could reduce the weight of attackointresulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable.
&LCPCT
OOOOe-Sc-
G. There arc critical uncertainties in our knowledge ofnd deployment in thc antiballislic missile (ABM) field. From thc evidence now available, however, certain general conclusions can Iw drawn; first, theffort has been extensive and of long duration, and thc USSR several years ago probably solved thc technical problem of intercepting ballistic targets arriving singly or in small numlwrs; second, some initial ABM deployment activity was probably begun as long agout both the deployment and BAD programs werenterruptedmodified; third, th-gniludend thc probable early deployment activity pointtrong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly;ew antimissile missile (AMM) has appeared, and some additionalactivity may now be underway, but the USSR docs not have any operational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today,
of our evidence indicates that the USSR has beenmethods of ABM defense which differ in importantthose now favored by the US. Low frequency radars mayimportant role in the Soviet program. An early Sovietissile designed to have dual capabilities againstand aerodynamic vehicles. Thc new AMM which wasby the Soviets is probably designed to conductintercepts at considerable ranges,arge nuclearto achieve its kill. We believe, however, that thc Sovietsnot conducted many AMM firings to exoatmosphericand that they have probably not attempted full systeminterceptions at these altitudes.
Recent Defensive Deployments
Soviets began construction of three defensiveLeningrad. Wo believe that tho Leningradoriginally designed toapability against ballisticperhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well. However, wethat the initial design has been changed, Wc cannotnature of this change, or whether it was caused byealization lhat the system was vulnerable toaids, or important new developments in the statc-of-theare similarities between new construcbon at one of thecomplexes and two recently discovered defensive complexes un-
ion
construction in noithwcslcni USSR. In light of these similarities, nt least these three complexes may now be intended for the deployment of thedefensive system. )
F. We arc unable to associate the new complexes with any systems equipment, and any explanation for the mission of these complexes and the modified Leningrad complex is open to some doubt. There is
to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other hand, we have noted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several yean and indications that the USSR has been working toward new andABM capabilities. In light of this factor and otherwe think there are also persuasive reasons for believing that thc new complexes are related to missile defense. However, any judgment at this time on their mission is in our view premature,O) C. We have observed at Moscow three developments which may indicate ABM deploymentarge radar now undercould be the acquisition and early target tracking element of an ABM system. Other.facilities also under construction^could serve as the final target tracking and missile guidance element.ites which are now being modified could be used as the AMM launchfor the systems. However, the activities we have observed thus far may not be related, and some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function. The missile to be employedajor unknown; thedisplayed AMM could be used at Moscow to conduct exoatmos-pheric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several hundreds of miles from the city. In sum. we continue to believe that the Soviets may be deploying ABM defenses at Moscow, but we do not yet understand how the installations we have observed would function as an ABM system. )
ABM Proipflcts
H. If ABM deployment activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSR is likely to have some initial strategic ABM defenses operational within the next two years or so. Limited deployment, especially at Moscow, couldpecial, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and still unproved system. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever it occurred, would imply that the Soviets consider their ABM
ron arena
systems good enough to fustify extraordinarily large new expenditures. It would indicate that the Soviet* had achievedand perhaps, (hat they had taken high-risk production anddecisions. We cannot exclude this possibility, but oursuggests lhat thc Soviets have been proceeding cautiously since they modified their program. )
I. In considering whether to provide ABM defenses for many of their urban-industrial centers and other targets, the Soviet leaders will have to weigh the great cost of such an eflort against thc likelyof the ABM systems available. Area defenses might offer considerable savings over point defenses, but we cannot be sure of this and in anyajor commitment of resources would beThe Soviets may defer widespread deployment pendingork on existing systems, or in the hope of achieving better systemsater date. They might even decide that the cost of large-scale ABM deployment would not be commensurate with the protection it could offer against anticipated Western strikeWe are certain that the Soviets will push ahead withffort, but we cannot forecast whether or when they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs justifying widespread deployment.
Antisalellilo Capabilities
'The Director of Intelligence amioi State, bebevoa dut oaflabW evidence, tho affirmativehOe he deea not eaeiude the anttulcllilcouitMUty. present evidence doc* not pcnu.de hint that the SovMu Intend lo develop and deploy within the not two yean and at pent coifi-i complo aotiULtetlile ivitcm.
I OP 6EGBET
J. We believe that the Soviets are noweries of large, new radars, most of which will probably be completede believe that some or all of these radars will be linked togetherpace surveillance system.ystem will, we think,apability considerably in excess of that required merely to detect the passage of US space vehicles. Io our view, the chances are better than even that the Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypacesystem, but with an antisatellite capability asf existing types of missiles were used in an antisatelliteuclearwould probably be required,issile for non-nuclear kill could be developed in about two years after flight tests began.)
TOP CCCBOT
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCIION
Since tho did of World War II. the Sovicls. confronted by large and powerful US strategic attackave steadily inciciiscd and improved tlieir airliey havebility against aircraft nrianiHiiig to penetrate at medium and high altitudes to principal urge*vr. US dcveJoptncnl of standoff weapon and low-alt it udc penetration tactics for aircraft liavc furl Iter complicated lite Soviet air defense problem. We expect, therefore, that Ihe Soviets will continue to spend large sums on air defense despite the planned deerense in the size o( the US strategic bomber force over the nest few years.
In addition, the Soviets have been faced for tome yean with tlie certain knowledge that as this decade advances, ballistic missiles, presenting wholly new defensive requirements, will comprise the main strategic threat to the USSR. The ballistic missile threat not only poses the question of how much additional effort to pour inlo improved defenses, but also raises the problem of whether, regardless of resources commit led, it is feasible for Ihe Soviets to create nndefense of major targets against the US strategic strike forces.
RGANIZATION OF AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES
The Soviet air defense mission is the responsibility of the PVO Strany (Anti-Air Defense of thehoseeputy Minister of Defense, is ranked with the heads of the ground, naval, air and strategic missile forces. The PVO is composed of three major elements, each of which perforins one of the key functions of the sir defense mission. Le, early warning and control, interceptor, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) operations. In addition to forces directly assigned to the PVO. other Soviet forces which can contribute toair defense mission are also operationally available lo this command.
In addition to air defense, the commander of the PVO probably is assigned the missile defense mission. The Soviets have referred to the existence of PRO (Anti-Rocket Defense) units, and have usually Indicated that these units are subordinate to. or at least integrated with, the PVO Strany. The Ministry of Defense implements the civil defense program, but such operations are not subordinate to tho PVO.
Tlie air defense systems of the several Warstw Pact countries are separate national systems. Nevertheless, they arc coordinated one with another, and for most practical purposes they constitute an extension of the Soviet systemlie Soviets undoubtedly will continue their policy of improving the air defense capabilities of these countries. Although the Chinese Cornsnurust air defense
' For ilclai'j of SAM deployment in IK* Wirue Pact rouMrtri. tec Antra B,nd 2.
top secner
6
occmt
w contact wilh thc TVO. cooperation between*n limited io thc ochnngc of routine air information.1 view. it la unlikely that cooperation iktwccii five I'VOm Chinesedefense avalcm will be increawd during (tie neat acvcral yean.
III. AIR DEFENSE EARlY WARNING AND GROUND CONTROUEDSYSTEMS
lic Soviet* have uwtinucd during tl* past two year* to deploy curlyi (EW) andid controlled Intercept (CCI) radan and tonrgc number of radar sites. We estimate that there an nowadars deployed atperational sites in Ha USSR. Thb system provides overlapping radar coverage of most of the nation; coverage is very dense wetl of the Ural* and in peripheral areas. Almost all sites have at least two radan and many are equipped with Eve lo seven wis, most of whtchin different frequencyhe resulting density of coverage heightens the probabdity of detection, and the frequency divenificanon provides some defense against electronic counlermeainres.
Early Warning
he altitude coverage of thc. Soviet EW system eicccdi the combat ceiling of any US aircraft now in service. Under optimum conditions, the Soviet EW system could detect and track aircraft flying at medium or high altitudes atm. away from Soviet territory, and under normal conditionsand tracking of enemy aircraft flying at such altitudes is virtually assured. beyond the Soviet borders. The use of supersonic aircraft and cruise missiles, because of their very high speeds, will reduce the warning time provided by this ryitem. The detection range of the EW system is progressively reduced against aircraft penetrating at lower altitudes. Moreover, even where detection of low altitude penelrators occurs, the system is unlikely to be able to accomplish continuous tracking of an intruding enemy aircrafteet
S As the Soviet EW systemuality, the number of radar sites probably will be gradually reduced. We estimate that0 the rangeof the Soviet EW system will be limited only by the radar boruon Tine of sight. The Soviets will place increased emphasis on the problem of detecting and tracking low altitude targets. Radars bettor able to cope with such targets probably will be deployed, particularly in border areas and along likelyroutes. Nevertheless, radar pcjformance at low altitudes will remain limited.
Ground Controlled Intercept
bout one-third of the Soviet radar sites are capable of conducting CCI operations. Against targets flying at medium and high altitudes, we estimate
6
eccncr
that CCI range capabilities vary frotn aboutun. lon (lie radar employed at tlie site. Soviet CCI setsigh altitude coverage which eitcodn the combat ceilings of all US aircraft. Wo believeCI "lei arc equipped withhaving moving target indicators or employing antkhittcr technique* in order to improve low attitude coverage. The Soviets piobably would have great difficulty in conducting effective CCI opor-.ilium against enemy aircraft Hyingeet. In addition. Soviet CCI capabilities against supersonic targets are generally reduced.
he Soviets have been improving their nlr defense controlROOM yesrr byemiautomatic:in ths
wesrtern USSIl andesser catent in other areas. This system is used for the rapid dissemination of tracking information from radar sites to air warning centers and probably to SAM units.ystem wouldajor inputround-to-air data link designed to vector interceptors. We believe that the newer model all-weather interceptors arc equippedata link system.
LL The Soviets will continue to develop their CCI capabilities during thc period of this estimate. An Improved CCI radar probably will be deployed during the period of this estimate, possibly in combinationew EW set. Thc semiautomatic data system may be modified to increase traffic handling capabilities. 'All new model Interceptors brought inlo service probably will be equipped to operate with the data link.
IV. INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT" SYSTEMS
n the Soviet air defense system, interceptor aircraft constitute the first line of active defense, performing both area and point defense roles. We believe that during the past Iwo years, the Soviets have been placing greater emphasis on improving the mobility and coverage of tlveir interceptor force, especially through the use of forward deployment tactics. Air defense training hasIncluded the dispersal and redeployment of PVO aircraft.
Current Forces
ia We estimate that there now are0 PVO interceptors in operational service. Only aboutercent of these areodels and slightly morehird of thc force is equipped for all-weatherIn addition lo the PVO interceptor force, the fighters assigned toAviation units also can be used In the air defense mission. We estimate that there areighters now in service with Tactical Aviation, the majority of them deployed in western USSR and in those European Satellites where Soviet forces arc stationed. Most of these fighters are not equipped for all-weather operations, and slightly less than half of ihe force is composed ofircraft The fighters of Tactical Aviation, particularly the all-weather models,ignificant potential to Soviet air defense capabilities.
lic Soviet* now luw ni operational service some eigln mterceptor models, ionic of which have liceii deployed in as many as five dilTcrentliese aircraft can engage Wcilcrii subsonic bombers attacking al medium or high altitudes, (bough most uf tlie Soviet lighten and interceptor* are limited
liy (heir radar and aimamciit to tailnd are not capable of all*
weather opcralium. hird are equipped with air-to-air missiles (AAMs).
New all-weatherome of which now arc entering service, have improved
AAMs and fire control systems.
lic introduction of newer model interceptors has been relatively slow, probably reflectip* (lie greater compl'-viiy andf these weapons systems and possibly Soviet difficulty in perfecting them. The Soviets first displayed the Firebar. Fiddler, and Flipper intcicvptorse believe that they began this year to deploy thc all-weather Firebar and possibly another new model interceptor. The Firebar is believed to be capable of performing radar intercepts at low aseet- The Fiddlerreater combat radius than any operational Soviet interceptor and, with its improved fire control system, it probably can attack airborne targets from any angle. The Fiddler probably is in (he late stages of development; we have no firm evidence that it has been operationally deployed.
Prospects
Soviets will continue to conduct research and development onaircraft. We believe that two or possibly three newcurrently underew all-weather mterceptor with aaboutombat radius of. mayhe Soviets may also be developing an advancedwith greater speed and combat radius, for deployment towardof tbe period of this estimate. In addition, new airborne intercepta low altitude capability may become available by the end of the decade.
introduction of newer aircraft will probably continue tohe PVO interceptor force will probably be reducedircraft more than two-thirds of which will probably beall-weatheractical Aviation fighters will continue to addpotential to Soviet air defense capabilities. The capabilities offorces will increase because of the improved performance of ihe allthe wider use of AAMs and semiautomatic control systems. We alsothat the Soviets will arm some of their AAMs with nuclear warheads.
"For performanceof Soviet Interceptor weaponi lyitenti, are Anna* A, Table 1.
utant Chief ol Staff, Intelligence, USAF. coailders (hit the estimatear-too-iueciprtoui decline in IA PVO fighter strength. He notai that tha eaunuted cut back of betweenndercent (root present itrength leveli during the out Ere jean repreaenti aof reduction more (ban doable what hai occurrede ertiouia thai by.WTO the IA PVO lUl wCI Include morentecceptoi aircraft.
V. SUKTACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS
The SA-1
licystem, which has been observed only atensely deployed atitesouble ring around tlicnstalled in the4 lo. it was probably intendedefense against mast air raids. Willi tlic changed nature of tltc threat and llie age uf tlic system, we believe that the Soviets will phase out thectiremonl of thclmost certainly will be compensated for by additional SAM deployment at Moscow.
The SA-2
hc great bulk of lite Soviet SAM defenses consist ofilo, which aie deployed around most urban areas ofopulation and at the majority of the more important militaryhis system, whichoperational inas also beenarrier defense patterns in some border areas. We believe there arc now moreites in the USSR, and that deployment of this system is continuing. The present defense patterns lead us to estimate that the Soviet force goal liites, and we believe that this total will be deployed by the end
The Soviets are likely to continue to rely on lives the principal SAM system for air defense during the period of this estimate. TheyodUfied ihe system several times; and Ihey will probably continue lo do so. but they are not likely to replace it completelyollow-on system. The most recent modifications, made during Ihe past year, were probably designed primarily to increase its range and improve its capabilities against supersonic targets. The Soviets almost certainly will provide some of theirites with nuclear weapons, and may have begun to do so.
Past evidence has shown that the low altitude capability of theystem has been limited toeet Recent evidence indicates that there are modifications which can be made to reduce the lower altitudeloeet Additional recent data indicate that the Soviets are willing to commit missiles against targets flying considerablyeet At these low altitudes, the effectiveness of tbe system may be degraded; the low altitude limitiven site would bo affected by local terrain and other factors.
The SA-3
the past year, the Soviets have continued to deployelatively (low pace; we believe onlyites have beensince the program begane estimate that this ryitemto cope with low-altitudeteet,have no evidence as to its actual minimum effective altitude. With few
performance chuacteruticj of SAM ryiWmr. ft Anne* A, Table x.
details o( SAM deployment; tee Annex B. Map 3.
exceptions.ile, liavc bee* deployed in it* border area, most vulnerable Io low-altitudc miack. TI*rogramar has been mmuUf small ever,ow-nK'l.idc supplement lo caillingonsidering the rate andolo date,he programfash-on. estimate llialeployment will totalSO6-
wo
he dow and limited deployment of tlway indicate thatarc Ml fully satisfied with fa capabilities. While we have non fullow -on low-altitudc tyitcnt, llw Sovicls may improve thernew system later in the period of this estimate. If Ihey do soMorelcyrrmt of
a Soviet attempt lo defend all ley targets fully again* low-altitudc at aefc is probably precl-KJed by the cost of the nossive deployment which would be required.
Tactical Systems
HA We estimate Hint aboutites now are dq.loycd in defense of Soviet field forces in Easterne believe that these sites would be usedefend against the Initial stages ofstrategic air attack. In add.boo, live Soviets may have begun in the past year or so toobile SAM system to ground force units Thi. system may employ the trackmounted ram jet missile which has been displayed inerformance characteristics of tlib system, butield force SAMs not likely to be fully integrated into the air defense battle plan of the Pm Similarly, when in port the Soviet destroyers and destroyer escorts equipped with SAMs probably would be employedupplement to port air defenses In tbe eventtrategic attack.
VI. AIR DEFENSE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
The Soviets expect that their air defense system will have to contend with electronic countermeasurcshe density of EW/CCl radar sites, the frequency diversification at these sites, and the probable use of microwave links and coaxial cables all reduce the vulnerability of tho Soviet a* defense system to ECM. The Soviets may employ frequency diversification in their semUutomatlc data transmission systems. In addition, the Soviets have used increased power to overcome ECM and have been experimenting with other techniques. The Soviets have placed great emphasis on training radar crews in operation, in the presence of ECM. Theesigned to operate In an ECM environment. However, tho Soviet air defense system still canombination of ECM and Uctks.
Thc Soviets nowood capability for jamming long-range radio communications and the navigational and bombing radan of Western aircraft
0nd pmaibly in tlic higher frequencies. Weate that Inward the end of this decade.iiipmcnt will be able totignah for lamming any of the ftcqi>cnoo likely to be used by the com-inuiikatinits. radar MhI ii.ivigatHm.-il equipment of Western aircraft. Inthe Soviets will probably employ electronic deception techniques, such ta the llnwilatKNi ni Western navigational aids.
VII. SOVIET CONCEPTS AFFECTING FUTURE STRATEGIC DEFENSES
Tlic massive deployment of air defenses over many years Indicates the Ingh priority that the Sovicu have assigned to ll* straiegic defense mission. The general Soviet concept has been toefense in depth for their major Centers of population nod national power. In addition, they haveendency lo deploy delemive systems having some capabilityortion of the threat, rather tlian to wait until more effective defenses can be developed. The expenditure of resources on strategic defenses has been very large; in recent years it has amounted to about one-fifth of the expenditures which we can attribute to the major military missions.
The foregoing generalizations are well-supported by the varioussummarized in preceding sections of (his paper. In addition to those developments, wc believe that the Soviets have been working actively on other new systems for strategic defense. The present state of our evidence and analysis is such that we are not able to estimate with confidence the precise nature of much of this work. However, some perspective On Soviet thinking about icquircmcnts for new strategic defense systems it available from classifiedliterature of recent years.
long-Ronrje SAM Systems
of the articlesecret Soviet militaryealt with the advantages ofong-rangeto defend against bombers and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs).then commander-in-chief of the PVO Strany. was cited asthat long-range antiaircraft missiles be deployed In "zonal" defenseprotect the key industrial regions of the USSR. In commenting onrecommendation, the Soviet officer who died him went on tothe SAM defenses of the USSR should consist of "boundary groupings"missiles to screen the approaches to vital regions and "pointof short-range missiles to defend Important targets in the interior.
Ami-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems
he Soviets haverowing concern for the threat posed by Western ballistic missiles, especially since the advent of the US ICBM and Polaris forces. Articles appearing in the classified Soviet military literature1 argued that an ABM system to defend against strategic missiles should be capable of performing intercepts at high altitudes and long ranges
13
sccncr
tin: target areas. In those few articles discussing ballistic missile defenseldl wo are cognizant, tbe most practical mctlwd of destroying an incoming ballistic missile wa* said to be caratrrmphcric. intercept prior toibead'* entry into thu dense layen of the atmosphere. One Soviet general asserted that minimum intercept altitudes against ICBMs and IflBMs should be fromoepending on tlie yield of the enemy warhead. Another Soviet general observed thnt it would be necessary lo have antimissile missiles (AMMs) capable of ranges on tlie orderun. and altitudes of not less lhaii.
/
Systcmi with Dool Roles
Soviets have also expressed'interest in the possibility ofsystems which could be employed against both aerodynamicballistic missiles. Some officers, according to classified Sovietbelieved that theissile could be mod.Red for use againstmissiles. In addition, the Soviets have repeatedly referred to the(first displayedeapon capable of being employedmodern means of aerial and spacehich suggests that thisoriginally intended to serve asAM and an AMM.
VIII. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS
development of Soviet defensive weapon systems has beenat two test ranges. Kapustin Yar and Sary Shagan. The activitiessystems at Kapustin Yar began in the; to the best ofthese activities have been directed toward the developmentof SAM systems and for training. Sary Shagan has servedan ABM development center, although it has also supported other mspace piograms and work on SAM systems has been conducted there.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
have no specific evidence of any SAM system being, andowever, some new SAMs (eg, the Canef tacticalappeared in Soviet parades, and they may already be in the earlydeployment. We have therefore thoroughly examined our ability toidentify the development of SAM systems,ong-rangeand we bave concluded that such systems could have beentested without our knowledge.
Anti-Missile Missiles
Soviets are continuing wlih theirffort, begunyears ago. to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. In the pastthere has been evidenceumber of changes in the Sovietprogram. These changes pointew phase or phases, the
M^riit,f wliidi wo cannot determine. But iliey suggest that the Soviets were testing new or modified system components, snd that thc new phasee program was encountering some problems.
e believe it would be technically feasible for the Soviets la simulato an ICIIM intercept a! Saiy Shagan. However, we cannot determine whether tliey haw made any atiempt to create ICBM re-entry angles or velocities during any ol llic tests. We hnve no evidence that thc Soviets havo conducted tests involving thc use ofultiple warheads, or oilier penetration techniques at Sary Shagan. and wc think it unlikely.
at face value, thc evidenceoncentration on tlwintercepting medium-range missiles. The Soviets have not attemptedagainst ICBMs. but they have, of course, obtained considerable datare-entry characteristics from their many ICBM tests. We believe thathave concluded that thc problem of intercepting ICBMs is notfrom that of intercepting medium-range missiles, except thatranges arc required for thc acquisition ond tracking of an ICBM.
Rodor Development end Deployment
Important part ofork at Sary Shagan has been theof large radars, tlie Hen Roost and Hen House, wr-ch we^believcfor initial testing in
to Soviet development of radars which scan their beams electronically rather than by physical movement of rise antenna. Large radars employing thisare particularly applicable to ballistic missile early warning, to long-range acquisition and early target tracking of ballistic missiles, and to detection and tracking of satellites. We believeumber of these large radars are under construction in the USSR.
e believe two Hen House-type radars are now under construction on the Kola Peninsula. These radars probably will serve as ballistic missile early warning radars, but they couldpace surveillance- function as well. They could provide warning of US ICBMs directed toward westernfor example.inutes In the case of Moscow. Additional radars in other locations would be required to provide similar warning of missile strikes against other target areas In tbe USSR. We have no evidence of the construction of radars suitably located for this purpose, but we estimate that the Sovietswilt extend their ballistic missile early warning coverage. We believe that the Soviets require about two or three yean to construct radars of this type in the field; the ones in the Kola Peninsula will probably be in operation
TOP SeCSfrl--
top nucncT-
nother large rnd.ir (Dogow under construction nearimit* different in ciat figuration from those discussed altovc II. too. will pmhahly <tn|)loy the dec trunk- twinning principle. Il may he part ol" an ARM system, Iml II euuldlellitc tracking radar.
IX. RECENT STRATEGIC DEFENSE MISSILES
he Griffonescribed by the Sovietspilotless interceptor" which cm be employed ag.iiii.vt "all modem menus of aerial and spaceiip:il>ili(yImllinic mi idles. Several months ago. tlie Soviets. TV film dtp hiiuilc of Griffon's general appearance was |Mirt rayed in an AMM role. Wee Criffon was designed in the, when the Soviets may have been seeking toeapon system which could be used againtt ImiiIi aircraft and missile*. Our analysis Indicates (liat CrifTonapability for intercepts at altitudes of up to about. (Lc. within thc atmosphere) against an imsophiitieated ballistic missile threat, and that it has long-range, high altitude capabilities In an antiaircraft role. We believe that the Criffou missile was developed for use at the large complexes which the Soviets have been constructingniogrsd since the winter. (See later paragraphs.)
Missile-in-the-Canister
n4 parade In Moscow, the Soviets displayed what they described as an antimissile missile capable of destroying ballistic missiles "at great distances" from their targets. Preliminary analysis of parade pho-tograohy leads us to accept an AMM role for this missile. From its site and what can be seen of its booster engines, we think that it is likely toarge warhead and to be designed to perform exoatmospheric Intercepts. Very preliminary calculations indicate that the missile in-the-caniiter may be able to accomplish intercepts at altitudesew hundred miles and at ranges of several hundred miles from its launch point,arhead in the megaton range.issile could also be used in an antisatellite role.
ome new AMM may have been tested initially at Sary Shagan as early as the end. There is some chance that the Soviets could have conducted propulsion or component testing of an exoatmospheric system,est program Involving moreew AMM firings would probably have been detected. All things considered, we believe that the Soviets have probably not conducted many AMM firings to exoatmospheric altitudes, and lhat they have probably not attempted full system tests involving interceptions at these altitudes.
ur evidence shows that the Soviets approach the testing of missile systemstrong presumption that the tests will be successful and that the system will be deployed. In fact, wc have observed initial operational deployment of certain missile systems at about the same lime as tost firings began. However, the Soviets have alsoroclivity for conducting full system testi prior to proceeding with wide-scale deploymentew system. We therefore
SLCftET-
bcaatvr thatoviet* nrc likely to carry out system tests before committing tlK-niwUvsAftM deployment program.
e me multlc Iu* iIk- missile-in-the-canister is to be cm-ployed ll ivuld Ik- intended aa ihe AMMystem to be deployed in tlx; vicinity of tritit.il targets, vuiliMoscow, It migbl be employederimeter nr area defense system designed Iu protect large areas, such as lite western uiban-indtulrial region uf ihe USSH.issile of this type could be empluyed in bolli llu-vc ways. Tlic kill mechanism could be designed to take advantage nf the ein.ilmrKplivri* effects of large-yield warheads to destroy incoming MHnaML evenivmpanicd by penetration aids, ic, cliaff. decoys,n Older tn reduce the problems of discrimination.
"Jmay imply that die USSR lias developed an AMM designed toifTwithay pulseuclear burst.
ystem of the foregoing type would differ in important respects from any US ABM system currently under development. Although it would have certain disadvantages. It might be attractive to the Sovicls, in part because it might be more compatible with their technical capabilitiesystemon highly sophisticated discrimination techniques.
X. RECENT DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT ACTIViriES Leningrad
onstruction of three new defensive complexes was begun at Leningrad in the winter. While our evidence has never been adequate toirm Judgment about live function of the Leningrad facilities, we have estimated for the past several years that they probably comprised ao ABM system which would be capable of engaging both IRBMs and ICBMs. Last year we estimated that the Leningrad system mightapabilitymall number of reentering objects arriving at about the same timeither more than one missileissilemall number ofut that it would probably have little capability against saturation attacks orpenetration techniques."
e believe that the Leningrad system was originally designed toapability against ballistic missiles, and perhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well, bul thst the initial design has been changed. We cannot determine the nature of this change, nor can we determine whether It was caused by serious technical difficulties, the realization that the system was vulnerable to penetration aids, or important new developments in thc state-of-the-art. There are similarities between new construction at one of thc Leningrad com-
Mciuoixnlum to Holders of NIE. "Soviet Bloc Air .nd MiuKe Defen* Cp.bfKHci throughatedovember ido. TOP SECRET.
(ilexes and recently discovered defensive complexes under construction aT" Tallin and Cliercpovels in northwestern USSR. (See latern light of these similarities, at least these three complexes may now be intended for (lie deployment of Uie same defensive system. However, we are unable to associate the new complexes with any systems equipment, and anyfor the mission of these complexes and for the modifications al Leningrad is open to *omc doubt.
Tallin and Cherepovets
Wu know of no Installations in tho vicinity of Tallin and Cherepovets which would call for this selection as early sites for an ABM system or even forew SAM system. -In order to function at part of an area ABM defense for thc western urban-industrial region, the complexes at Tallin and Cherepovets would need toissile with long-range, exoatmospheric capabilitiesompatible acquisition radar.ong-range AMM. complexes at these locations could defend against both ICBMs and Polaris missiles ontowards Moscow or other key targets in the western region. To defend Moscow from these locations, intercepts would have to be performed at altitudes of.
These complexes, however, could be intended to serveAM role If so, we believe they would beong-range system, and that they may bo thc startarrier torincipal route of US bombers toward the industrial centers of western USSR. The missile used byystem could be the Criffon or some other missile not yet identified. If used with appropriate guidance equipment, the Criffon would probably be effective to ranges on the order. against aerodynamic vehicles at medium and high altitudes.
Thus, there is some support for tho belief that the complexes areAM system to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other hand, wo have noted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several years and indications that the USSR has been working toward new and different ABM capabilities- In light of this factor and some of the foregoingwc think there are also persuasive reasons for believing that theseare related to missile defense. However, any judgment at this tirno on their mission is in our view premature.
Moscow
have observed at Moscow three developments which maydeployment there Southwest of tho city, thc Soviets arelarge radar (Dog House) having the shape of an inverted V. Theeet high andeet wide Construction probablyearlye know of no prototype for this radar; ilfrom developmental work at Sary Shagan and probably employsscanning principle. Because of Its size, the apparent orientationface to scan the ICBM threat corridor, and iu proximity to other construc-
lion whkli may be ABM related, we thin, that the radar could icrvo ai and early target tracking facility for an ABM iy>icm. It ij
aba piKvihlv, however, dial it will serveatellitc tracking radar and bears no relation lo ABM defense.
uring tin- past year the Soviets have continued wort on probable dec Inxlies futilities located at lour of tlic outer ringites al Moscow. Although we bclk've ili.it (hoe facilities arc intended lo serve some defensive function, we cannot dd ermine whether this function is connected with ballisticefense against aerodynamic vehicles.
In iidtlltiuii. tho Soviets havu begun to modify many of tlichea during recent months. In'somc cases, large new revetments arconsilient pattern has nol yet emerged, but some of the revetments are big enough to accommodate very large missiles. This activity may Indicate that the Soviets intend to utilizeites as launch positions for AMMi.ilossible that the activityodification of Moscow's SAM defenses.
Thus we have observed under construction at Moscow what may be tltree key elements of an ABM system. The large radar could be the acquisition and eady target tracking element, the facilities at the outer-ringites could serve as live final target tracking and missile guidance element, and theites could be used as the AMM launch positions for the-systera.live activities we have observed thus far may not be related to eachnd some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function. Also, the missile toajor unknown; thecould be used at Moscow
to conduct exoatmospheric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several hundreds of miles from the city. In sum, we continue to believe that the Soviets may now be deploying ABM defenses at Moscow, but we do not yet understand how die installations wo have observed would function as an ABM system.
XI. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE Air Dofense
combination of area and point defenses provided by theforce of interceptors and short-rango SAM systemsoodfor major target areas against medium and high altitude bomberthe air defense system has limited low altitude capabilities, andare posed by Western supersonic aircraft andea major Soviet effort during the remainder of this decade will bemeeting these particularoreover, in light of theair threat and the high priority the USSR assigns toariety of Soviet measures to reduce the changes thatvehicle* of any type can penetrate to key targets.
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ver tlic ncrt fewlic Soviets will extend their network* of modern liW nnd CCI radan nnd semiautomatic air defense control systems, and diey will introduce more advanced interceptor weaponhese develop-nieuts will upgrade Soviet air defense* in general, and some of them will beto the pririrtYm of hrw-slljlude defense. The Soviets will sho seel-to improve their low altitude capabilities probably by modifying their widely deployedyslcins. ami by extending somcwhnt their present limited deployment of systems designed speeiRcally lor low-altitude defense. Finally, if Ihe developments at Tallin. Clieicpovcts, and Leningrad arcew long-laogc SAMom tlie Soviets may have begun lo deployystemarnerikely buuilwi ipproach route to theregion of western USSH. The Initial compleses forystem could bo operational within the coming year.
we are uncertain aboutew SAM system is towe believe that improvements in the Soviet air defense systemneat few years will make piogrcsstvely moro difficult successfulmanned bombers to major target areas. Successful penetration bywill require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. Soviet aircapabilities can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms ofthc West will be able to employ, including air-launchedlectronic coimtermeasures, and low-altitude attack. Despiteof their air defense system, the Soviets would expect to destroyof the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would bethoy could reduce the weight of attackoint where (he resultingthc USSR would be acceptable.
Bollistk Missile Defense
are critical uncertainties in our knowledge of thend deployment in the ABM field. At this point in time,make no confident estimate about the future prospects for Sovietstrategte ballistic missiles. From thc evidence now avaiisblc,general conclusions can bo drawn:
theffort has been extensive and of long duration, and the USSR several years ago probably solved the technical problem ofballistic targets arriving singly or in small numbers;
some initial ABM deployment activity was probably begun as long agout both the deploymentrograms wereinterrupted and modified;
tlie magnitudend the probable early deployment activity pointtrong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly;
ew AMM has appeared, and some additional deployment activity may now be underway, but the USSR does not have any operational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today.
fte-
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of our evidence) indicates thai il* USSR has twen exploring methods of aiim defense which differ in important respects from those now favored by the US. Low Ircuumiy radars may play an Important role n. thc SovietAn early Soviet effort may haveissile designed to have dualpttol hallidie and aerodynamiche missile most re-.ently displayed i% probably designed lo conduct exnntinospheric intercepts at com>dcral>h* ranges,arge nuclear warlvcad to aehieve its bill.
We cannot dutt-rmiiw wlicthw any of thc deployment we have noted since Ihe AIIM program wm modified it in fact related to ABM defenses, ltxplained in term, of improved SAMallutic missile earlycm, ondspace surveillance system. Tims Itpossible that the Soviets have at ksfSfl temporarily abandoned any ABM dei>loymenl efforts. At tlw Other extreme, it is possible that live recent activity include* two simultaneous ABM deployment programs:efense of Moscow, and the other an area defense of tise western urban-mduitrial region- If ABM dersloyment activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSR i* Ubely to have some initial strategic ABM defenses operational within the neat two years or so.
Limited deplovment activity, especially at Moscow, couldpecial, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and stillsystem. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever itwould imply that the Soviets consider their ABM systems-good enough to justify extraordinarily large new expenditures. It would indicate that the Soviets had achieveduccesses and. perhaps, that Ihey had taken high-risk production and deployment decbions. We cannot exclude thisbut our evidence suggests that thc Soviets have been proceedingsince they modified their program.
In considering whether to provide ABM defenses for many of their urban-industrial centers and other targets, thc Soviet leaders will havo to weigh the great cost of such an effort against Ihe likely effectiveness of the ABM systems available Area defenses might offer considerable savings over point defenses, but we cannot be sure of thb and in anyajor commitment ofwould be required. The Soviets may defer widespread deployment pendingork on existing systems, or in the hope of achieving better systemsnter date. They might even decide that the cost of Urge-scale ABM deployment would not be commensurate with the protection it could offer against anticipated Western strike capabilities. We are certain that the Soviets will push ahead withffort, but we cannot forecast whether or when they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs justifying widespread deployment.
XII. antisatellite capabilities
evidence Is Insufficient for us to estimate with confidence whetherare now des-eloping weapon systems for defense against spacewo think lhat they almost certainly are investigating the feasibility of pro-
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n
during such systems. The large radars, such as Hen House, wind. wc
now under construction in the USSR nnd theouse rnd,ir nearcandidates (or use in space surveillance and tracking. This may not beor primary role for tome olto. (or example, will
r.il-K-allistic missile early warning (unction. However, svesome or nil o( those radars will he linked togetherystem would enable llsc Soviets to observe and trackoilier orbiting objects during most of the passes over the USSR. Italso be capable of predicting live orbits and positions ofand space vehiclesigh degicc of accuracy afterhe USSR.
Most of the large radars believed to be now under construction willbecome operationalll will probably be operationale estimate thai, when completed, tlie syslcm using these radars willapability considerably in excess of that required merely to detect thc passage of US space vehicles. In addition, the USSR already has the capacity to track its own satellites, utilizing transmissions from them, with greater accuracy than would be provided by the new system. Considering these factors, we think the chances are better than even that the Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypace surveillance system, but with an anh'sateliite capability us well.*
The kill mechanism which could be employed by an snctsatellite system depends on the capabilities of its tracking radars and the accuracy andof tho interceptor missile It employs. If the new radars are coupled with existing types of missiles in an antisatelllte system, the system would probably have touclear warhead toilL Non-nuclear kill ef awouldissile which would combine an accurate guidance system with an exoitmosphcric maneuver capability. We believe thatSoviets could developissile in about two years after the Initiation of flight tests. We have no evidence that thc Soviets are as yet conducting such teats.
The Soviets could probablyapability against salellilcs in near-earth orbits by modifying existing ballistic missiles and radars.apability could be acquiredew monthsecision to do so. but we have no
Diieetor of Intelligence and Research. Department of Stale, beliei-ci flat on the baiir of available evidence, this afflnn.live judgment ll premature. While he does aot taclude the aousateUila functionOuiMily. presentdoes not penuade ton thai tht Soviets intend to develop and deploy within the nail two yean and at great cmrernely complex artMllfr sy.trm. Theoted Inould probablyimited antuaiellite capability byling minuet and radarsew months after deciding to do so.
TW Director of 1SR notes thai space tracking neobLanw in future yeane aaada vastly more complicated by an ever IncrcaUng number of ipace eeperKnenU. oiing larger and mora complex components, which will be carried outrowing numbercountries. The Soviets ara likely lo be Interested Inorerpaoe wrvelllince capability to prepare foe ihb eventuality.
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evidence that llicy have madeecision. We bclicvo that, touccessful intercept by usingechnique, tlic Soviets would need touclear warhead.
XIII. CIVIL DEFENSE
Tlie Soviets have long rocogiiired rite value of civil defemeeans of preparing their nation to withstand and recoverull-scale strategic attack. Compulsory public training courses, initiatedrc beingWo believe, however, that tlw Soviets have concluded it is infeasiblo to devise and implement shelter rniulrnction programs which would effectively pfotect the Injlk of the urban population in thc eventarge-scale nuclear attack.oviet civil defense plans have emphasized the concept of urban evacuation. However, wc estimate that two to three days would beto conduct tlic evacuation of the population from the major Soviet cities. Thus, mass evacuation It likely to be feasible onlyarge-scale nuclearwere preceded by an alert period. Tlie Soviet civil defense system Is now emphasizing mobility of operational units for evacuation and mutual aid. and new units are being formed in the countryside to aid cities after attack.
Although we believe that thc Soviets have severely curtailed their urban shelter construction program, they probably have made provisions for including shelters in the schools, hospitals, and perhaps certain industrial facilities now being construct eel Wo calculate that there are someoillion shelter spaces available for the urban population, or roughly one space for every four city-dwellers. The Soviets have. In addition, encouraged the rural population to prepare their own makeshift shelters, such as root cellars, for protection against fallout. Thc Soviet leadership probably does not expect that the present civil defense program will provide adequate protection for moremall portion of the population. We have no evidence to indicate tliat the Soviets areesumptionajor shelter construction program.
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g
E 5C
'ju
nterceptora equipped with search/track radars havo the capability lo make Intercepts, with limited crTcciivi-ncss. in dynamic climb against subsonic targets at altitudes on the order0 feet when under close CCI direction.
external Cud.
4 Search and track performances denote mitres only.
'There la locne evidence now under study Indicating tbat the maximum apevd of the PIltEBAH could be significantly higher.
Aastitaot Chief ot SuS, Intelligence, USAF, notes thnt paragmpht Ihr estimate acknowledges the current dnvciopmcnt of "two or pearJbly tbreo newe beilevea lhat currant evidence as well as future Soviet mqulrctnenu make the developincni ol three nan* fighters tho more likely possibility. TheSAF. would therefore substitute for the last two cmrlcat tabic, thc following:
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OP SOVIET INTERCEPTOR SYSTEMS
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ESTIMATED CHAKACrivltlSTlCSI'KltFOIIMANCB OF SUItFACE-TO-AlltYSTEMS ASSIGN Ell TO THE PVO STHANY
put
(diul)
OpcmUoiuil Ita age
35
EltMu're AlumoU (ft.)
Effective Altilwh- (Ii.)
(CEP in ft.)
100
llnnec *ni varyspeed, and Approaching direction of thc target.
AguinM lubMBk tsrgcu. tlx ranges nrc ol shown; against supersoniche ranges
decrease.
TboiHlystem* Inve some cltoeUvciicas nbove thc shows altitudes.
a siting coodilloo* aod Urgoi speeds influence ktw-nltiloJ. capabilities.
ui indicates that there ara modification, which oa b* made to thcisaik to reduce the lower alUludc limitation of thc system toori. Additional recent data indicate that the Govtcte are willing to commit mini lea against UrgeU Hying considerablyeet. At these low altitudes, tha effectiveness of the system may ba degraded; thc low altitude limitiven site would be affected by local terrain.
hare no evidence aa te the minimum effective altitude upobUIUca ot thia system.
cecrct
WO fORFIGN OtSSEM
Original document.
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