TOP secret
4
No. of5
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIAAATE
Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through
sobfflffwk*
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ay th*
UNITEO STATES IKTELLIGENCE BOARD4
SECRET
IISSE
SacDor Cs.ii
J/tf
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
4
Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through
TOPT CONTROjlED DISSEM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
fug*
THE 1
L
II ORGANIZATION OF AIR AND MISSILE
III. AIB DEFENSE EARLY WANNING ANDINTERCEPTCoonofad
IV INTEBCEFTOB AIBCBAFT .. T
Ckm Facart
V. SUB FACET0-AIB MISSILE
9 10
-vs.v: .
The SA J
TkUcjI SyKenu
VI AIB DEFENSE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABIIiTIES VII. SOVIET CONCEPTS AFFECTING FUTURE STRATEGIC
iUiige SAM Syilvm AacrUlUtc Muuk
lex
VIII. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OK DEFENSIVE
Sarfacv-lo-Ax Mil .
I-.
Radarusd
K RECENT STRATEGIC DEFENSE MISSILES
MiilitoiillbcOwlilO
II II 12
12
2 13
li 11
lOf^CRET
ECENT DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT
Tallin and
11 PROSPECT'S FOR SOVIET STRaTECIC
A.r
Mnaifc
m. ANTISATKIIJTE cap
Xill. CIVILA
Tank I. Suvl* InWrnplntto
irt/iMnnlei(PVO
ANNEX
Figur- 1 SAM DeplayTiwm oi the Eair European Wuu- Pact
27
Figun- 1 SAM Drpluvni'ti' In Eax CcrnunyndaeJo.-ctt at the USSR
SOVIET AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH
THE PROBLEM
To evaluate the capaluiitsn of the Soviet air and misuse defense forces, and to forecast probable trend* in Soviet uu and missile defense jnugraius through
CONCLUSIONS
combination of urea ami point defenses provided bypresent force of mterceploo anil ihorf-range(SAM) tytbara affordslut mijn targetmedium and high altitude bomber attacks However, the airsystem has limited low altitude capabilities, ami special dif- lies are posed by supersonic aircraft aad air-to-swfaee missile* We brbevev^ rfl-,it durine, -He remamde.
ol thu decade will be focused on meeting these particular problems.
believe that improvements in the Soviet air defensetbe neat few years will make progressively more difficult success- penetraOoii by manned bombers to major large* areas by manned bombers will require Increasinglyof attack. Soviet air defense capabilities can be degraded b.
OtT- St"7
the Increasingly complex forms ol attack which the West will be able to employ, Including air-launched missiles, penetration tactics,counternsssasures. and low-altitude attack Despite these nmita-bxini of their air defense ivstem. the Soviets would expect toumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where tbe reacting damage to the USSR would be acceptable.
C. There are critical uncurlaintic* In our knowledge ofnd deployment in the jntllmlliUic missdeield. Fniin the evidence now avadable. however lertain general kwicIusIoos inn be drawn- tnt the Soviet Fta i1 effort hai been eatenaive aad of long cIuratKXi. and (he USSR several veanprobably solved the technical problem of Intercepting ballistic targets arriving tmt(lv ur tn smallecond, some initial ARM ileployment activity wa> probably begun at lone ago. but both ihe deployment anilprograms were evidently Interrupted and modified; third, the magnitudend the probable early deployment jctivitv pointrone, Soviet desire to obtain ABM da-tensei rapidly: fourth.ew antimissile rnutileas appeared, and some additional deplov meat activity may now be underway but the USSR dues not have any operational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today
uch ol our evidence indicates that die USSR, hits beenmethods of ABM defense which differ in important respects from those now favored by th* US Low frequency radars may play an importanthe Soviet program. Aa early Soviet effort may have involvedmissile deuerted to have dual rapatMhrm againstand aerndynainte vebicles The new AMM which was recently displayed by the Soviets it probably designed lo conductintercepts at constderable ranges,arjte nuclearto achieve its kill. We hellevp, isowever. that ihe Soviets have prnbably not cooductod many AMM firings to exoabrioH phericand that they have probably not attempted full system testsfcstercrptiorss at these alhrudes.
RecantDvpioymerin
E. The Soviets began construction of three defensive complcj.es at Leningrad. We believe chat the Leningrad system wua originally designed toapability against ballistic missiles, and perhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well. However, wethat the Initial design has been changed. We cannot determine the nature of this change, oras caused by serious tecb-nkalealization that the system was vulnerable toaids, or Important new developments in the siafe-of-tbe art. There are similarities between new construction at one ol thecomploaes and two recently discovered defensive complexes un-
RET
pydci
construction in northwestern USSR. In fight of these similarities, at least these three complexes mayntended for the deployment of the same defensive system. (Putaa.
the modified Leningrad complex Is open to some doubt. There is some support for the belief that the complexes areAM system to defend against aeiodyuamfc vehicles. On the other band, wc have rioted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses (or several yean and indications that the USSR has been working toward new andABM capabibtiei In light of this factor and otherwe think there are alsoreasons for believing thai the new complexes are related to missile deiense. However, any judgment at this time on their mission is in out view piemature.
C. Wc have observed at Moscow three developments which may indicate ABM deploymentarge radar now under constiuc-tjon coold be the acquisition and early target tracking element of an ABM system. Other futilities also under construction could serve as the final target tracking ami missile guidance element.ites which are now being modified could beatIM launchfor the systems. However, the activities we have observed thus
in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function. The missile to be employedajor unknown; thedisplayed AMM could lie used at Moscow to conduct exoatmos-pheric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several
the Soviets may be deploying ABM defenses at .Moscow, but we do not yet understand how the installations we hose observed would function as on ABM system, i-Si)
ABM Prospects
H.BM deployrnent activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSR is likely to have some Initial strategic ABM defenses operational within Ihe nest two year, or so. Limited deployment, especially at Moscow, couldpecial, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and still unproved system. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever it occurred, would imply that the Soviets consider their ABM
TOP JECPET
systems good enough to ju.itily extraordinarily large now expenditures. It would indicate that the Soviets had achieved excellent RdD inc-reues. and perhaps, that thev had taken high-risk peoductioo and ile-pioymeot decisions. We cannot exclude thi* possibility, bnijour 01
I dence suggests that the Sovietsrn piocrecliiig cautiously sinif
hey mutmcd their prngrui Patau tJO-tll)
I la considering whether to provide ARM defenies tor manyurban-mdusmai centers and- .leaden will
have to weigh tlie great cost ulan effort against the likely eHo-livrcness of llio ABM systems uvadable. Area defenses might oiler considerable savings over point defenses, but we cannot be sure ol this and in anyajor cornmitiisent of resources sroukl beTbe Soviets may defer vsideipiead deployment pending further RAD work on existing systems.ui the hope of achieving better systemsater date. Tliey might even decide that the cost of Urge-scale ABM deployment would not be comnsensurate with the protection it could offer against anDciputeil Westera strike capabdi-iWe are certain that the Soviets will push ahead withffort, but we cannot fort-cast whether or when they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs juitilvlug widespread deployment
AnMofeilite CopobJrties
J. We believe that die Soviets are noweries of large, new radars, most of which will probably be completede believe that some or all of these radars will be linked togetherpace surveillance system.ystem will, we think,apability considerably in excess of that rexjtured merely io detect the passage ol US space veakJes- In our view, the chances are better than even tluit 'he Soviets intend to provide themselves, not onlypace surveU-lance system, but with an anrisatelliie capability asf noting types of missiles were used in an autisatelliteuclearwould probably be recjiured.issile for non-nuclear kill coidd be developed in about two years after flight tests began. (Panic
DISCUSSION
l. iNCfiODUCriON
im* the end ni World War II. the Snyu.ii. confronted byid powerful US itraiegje attackave steadily increased and improved their jitThey haveormidable capability against aircraft attempting to pcnetrnee .it medium and higb iltitudeirincipal targf* jku. However. US dryirJopoirtil of .itindoltnd low-.ilUtude penetrationu! aircrufrfurther -umplh'ittd the Soviet air defense problem.ect. therefore, (fuit (he Soviets will lonrinm! la apend large rami on air defense despite (bo planned decrease in thef the US tfcategic bomber force over the neat few year*.
2 In addition, tbe Sovietsbeen (need tor some years with (hi- certain knowledge that as this decade advanoat. ballistic missiles, presenting wholly Mn> defensiveill comprise the main strategic threat to the USSR-Tlte baliiitu: miude thrcit not only poses the question of bow much additional ['Hon ro poor into improvedut also raises the problem of whrther, regardless ofs feasible for the Soviets to create andefense of major targets against ihe US mategic strike lorees-
II. ORGANIZATION Of AIR AND MJSStlE DEfrJNSES
l* Soviet air defense musk* i> the responsibility of iho PVO Snany (Ana-Air Defense of thehoseeputy Minister of Defense, is ranked with the heads of the ground, naval, air and strategic snanle farces. Tbe PVO is composed of three majorach of which performs one ot the key funcuoru of tbe air defense. early warning and (ontroL interceptor, and surface-to-air misille (SAM) operations. In addition to foront directly oaHgacd to tbe PVO. other Soviet farces which can contribute to the air defense mutton are abo operationally available to this command.
In addition to airhe commander of the PVO probably is assigned tlio mioile defease mission. The Soe referred to me ealstcnoc of PRO (Anti-Rocket Defense) unifa. andsually indicated that these units are subordinate to, or at least integrated wtth, the PVO Strany. Tbe Ministry of Defense implements the civil defense program, but such oncrarMra are not subordinate to the PVO.
Tbe air defense system) of the several Warsaw Pact toon tries are leoante national systems. Ney-nheleas. (bey are coordinated one with another, and for moif practical purposes they constitute an extension of the Soviet system irsdf1 The Soviets undoubtedly "ill oootinae their policy of improving the air defense capabilities of these countries. Although the Chinese Communist air defense
.intern mil maintain)eontact with the PVO. cooperation between themlong been limitedchange of tontine air iniormjtiiwi. In Bar view. It i* unlikrl*cooperation between the PVO and tbe Chinese air deletoe IVtltm will be Increased during the ncrt several
ill. AIR DEFENSE EARIY WARNING AND GROUND CONTROUEDSYSTEMS
h* So**et> havediving 'be put two year* to daplm -arriW) and ground coaitrnfled into-ar* (CCD radar* and toarge numhar ot radar utea. We >vrurue that three are nawOO radan drpkited. atperation.il aim in the USSR Thii >yatern provide) overlapping ladar coverage olbe nation;ery denie wenthe Ural* and In peripheral ami. Almuvt all Wlea have at least two radan and rainy arc equipped with five to leven nets, moil ol whichMe im iMiruaawvl> The rcsultaag denuly ol coverage heiehrau the pmrwbikrv of demnoa, sad tbeSct uktk
ilaleiita Jgalral electronic
Early Warning
T Tbe altitude coverage ol the Soviet EW ivirun eiceecb lb" inmhatany US. arvia Under ojvimitm condrOooi. 'In Sovietcould iIkm aad tnct sweraft eVmg at owdw* or lujh airjrade*tQO nm away trass Sonet WTStory. and under normal condition)and tjieiinjet ermnvnnhrtualiy assured
. beyond the Soviet bccderi.t mpersonic uiriraft and cruoe rniiviiov became of tttinr very high ipnitdi. will reduce the warning ttrtte pconuVd by this system. The detecliua range ol the EWropemvety reducid agaanat aireraftat lower altitude*. Moraovar. even where
... - em ikrCud* pfT'-.n CCan ttvj
to acconspbah ounnoooo) tracijrig of an om.dmr, encrrrr aircraft
n Aa tho Sonet EW .yitern improve* In quuliry. the nvmber nf radar site* probably will be gradually reduced We caarnat* that0 the nittge per-tucmaoie nl tlie Soviet EW ryitern wiD be Limited only he tbe radar homoo line or ojjtt Thr Sonets will place (ncrraied etnpruon on the problem ol detecting aad tracking low aJbtcde targru HacUn better able to cope wint Buck target* probably wiU be deplored.oedar area* aad along bkefyoo route* NeveathvW, ndar perfonoania at low aratudn will reraua liauted.
Ground Controlled
bout ooa-uVrd of tha Sovirt radar tua* are capable of cooductlng GCI Against cargetj ffrvng atand high aterrncWv wa eatvnate
TS
TOP JKRET
thai CCIapabilitlm vary from aboutjn. torn ihv radar cmplovwt at the die. Soviet CCI lata have aihe uenbai teUieej of ail US aareraft We bcbeve
am* CCI "teaedan having timing targetin* Soviets probably would have greol dlfnotlry in conducting effective CCJagainst enemy juriit Byingvv'. In addition. Soviet CCI capabdiura -gainst niprrioaic larg-ti are generally reduced.
The Sovietsaen(bear aat detrm* soeerol capab-liBc* hi mvM yean bymuulnmarie data rtanimiuaon lyiteaa In Ihe wolern USSB andiwei extent In other aies* Thu lysrem it tiled for thedissemination ol rrackmg information from rmlur liter to ait warning center' and probably to SAMystemayor inputOuod-to-ur data bnk cWgoed to vector oiiatnpron. We btUme that the newer mod if allmtereeptces are equippedale link system
The Sovicti will continue to develop their CCIduring tbe period ot this estimate An improved CCI radar probably win be deployed dairtof me period of ihtapoulhl* In oanbeutuiew EWTbe aeamaaenmaac data intern my be tnoddM to oKxeaae traaV handling capjlMltOai AH new inodrl interceptors brought into service probablv will be (quipped to opcrarc with the data link.
IV. INTtBCEPIC* AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
ii In th* SovM air datrnar >yi>em. anHrsvptor aareraft conaWuH (he Saw linr of active defense, performing both area and pom* detente roies. We believe tint during the pail twobe SovtnM have been plucing greater emphasis no Improving the mobility and coverage of their interceptor force, mpenally through the use of forward dcpluytnent ucrtca Air defense training haa prab-abfy oxioded the dnperval and (Ldaployant ofrah
Currant Force*
o intimate Uwt lliere now oreVO mu:rc*pMr*prraiional service. Only about SI percent of these aeeodelssightly morehird of th* force la remapped foropera*n addition to tb* PVO sssterccptar force, die Grnteri assigned to Tac-ical Aviation units alao con be uaed in tbe air defenae am. W* mimate hat there are0 tighten now in lecvice with Tactical Aviation, theol them deployed inUSSR and In those European Satellites dvn Sow* forces are itaOoned. Moat of these tgbten arc not eqwpfed ar alaotbrrbghth- Um than half of the force t*a-craft The fighters of TacOcal Aviatum. particularly the all-'cather models,gnUlcant potential In Soviet air defense capablbllct.
H TIk Soviet* now luivq in operational iwvn* vome eight interceptor maleU. MRM of which have bran deployril in aa many aa tv* del tibea* unJi can engage Wejrern mbtanac bomber* attsclong al mrdauaa or highhough most of the Soviet fighter* and interceptor! are (united by lliau radar and armament tn tail attack lactic* and arere eqiuraned withirAMi) New an-weothn aaodwh, aaaa* of wharfi trow are iiiteewag aernca.araneiMd AAMi uui bra control lyiicens.
IS The introduction of newer model MUvceptora hai been lelatlvelv Unw probably rrfksttaag theand com ol these weapon. svtleeB* and ponbly Vivwt daneulty in rrnfectng them. Tho Soviet* Afit dupaayed the Firebar. Fiddler, and Hipper aiterceptoria bebave that the* began thu year En depiav the (ii weather Firebar and possibly another new oaonwl mCrnrpea. Thaehe-wd to bo capable of raerlurrralng radar intercepts a* low a*eet. Tbe Fiddlerreater uanhot ruliu* than any operational Soviet interceptor and, wtlh Hi improved hre control fvrlrwv It probably can attack airborne target* from any angle The Pirtdlcr probably i* in tha late tragi* of oVvetopownt. we have ao farm (MOcnc that it ho* been operationally deployed
Proatwcn
he Soviet* will continue to conduct raeurcheJ)pmeut on manned intnrceptor aircraft. We believe that two ur possibly tbroe new interceptcat are currently iroder devabraraeat ew all weathrr mterceptorpeed of about Machombat radius ofm aaay ba operaeasnal by The Soviet* may alto be deven advanced all-weather iolerevpeor with greater ipoed and combat radkit. for deployment toward the end ot tbe period of ths*" lo addJDoo. new aarbrarnc waUstceut radarsow aicrude capability may become available by the end of the decide IT. The Introdiictioti ill newer tUrcroft will probably coMmua to be relatively slow Q. the pVO racceptor foro* wHJ probably bo rednced toJO toaircraft, more than two-third* of which will probably be MaehD-weather IMrroeptor*.' Tacdcul Aviation flghteri will continue toryimcant potential to Soviet oar defame Tbe copatahrjei ol bothdl asereaaa becaaao of the approvedef ttat anroraff and the wider use of AAMi and iem>autorn*ttc control rrrtoms. Wa aba run* mate that the Soviets will arm tome of their AAMi with nuclear warheads.
"twHt nmnWaf**! acjfvaa jyianw. sV
TabW I.
ote than doable -sal ha.WMi. H. "off, mTlA PVO -ellndwi. -rataWOO
)
V. SUBfACE-TOAIR MISSHE SYSTEMS Th* SA-1
IS. The'h hit. beenonly it Moscow, iiat S6 litnouble img around the city'herontendedele-noiuui jctheutor* of the threat and the ace ofelieveSoviets will phase out the SA-1. Peorerweot ol rha
wJJ be cooapeeawtrd for by addatsonal SAM derahwrnaa. at Moaoow
The SA-1
Tbe great bulk of the Soviet SAM defenwifutei. which are deplored around moil urban areas olopnta'ion and at the mofjntr of the more Important military In Italia ti oof Tbli intern, whichoperalWrail inai abo been ilvployed in barrier defense patrons in ronw. border jreai We believe there are now moreites in the USSR, and that deployment oi thu system It continuing. Theefense patterro lando eatimate that the SovSet forceites, and we baJune that thu total will be deployed by tha and5
Tbe Soviets are hkdy to continue to rely on (haa tha prSntSpal SAM ryttesn for ur dwfarasehe period of thai essatsute Thar havethe tyatetn wveial sane* and they will prooebK contaaiaa to do so. sot rbey are rati Uastr ta replace,coencletefyoOow-oaThe most recent mil iM rah* raw, aaade during tha pax ywar. were probably deaiened prnnarfy to aacreaa* sta range and improve Ha capanultSM agaanai mprraorache Soviet) almoit certainly will provid" ronse of thanitaa with nuclearnd may have begun to do n.
Past evidence hu ihown that the low altitude capability nf thavstero has been limited toeet. Kecent evidence indicates that there are modlficaboni which can be made to reduce the lower altitude luiuta-oon toeet. Additional recent data mdJeate that the Soviet! are willing to commit mittllai against targets flying considerably below iOOO (re* At these low altitude*.of th* lyitans may ba dawraded. the low altitude limitiven saw would be asfected by local terrain and other factors.
The SA-3
urmg tha put year, the Soviet) have contmocd roheyjterne jtiv-lv alow pace, wa bebeve onlye* have beensince the program begane evOraal* that that rystem was deitgnod to cope with low-altitudelthough we have no eMdeoo* aa to us actual minimum MTectliw altitude. With few
' Fiw pirlonuawi JiuwrwraOoi ot SAM lyitoo*,Aonei A. TaUaAUaw AnoeiMap 3.
TS
caccptton.ite*eployed inborder area* moat viiln-titible to low-alilhide attack. Therogram Unit far hat been unusuallyevenow-alotude topple'nent lo earning dcfctue-i. OmiMternig ihe rate and paaern of dipintimut IB daw. and at ibc pengraaa oonbnaei Inashion.etonuie that SAOiC total mm ITS-BOMS or
IT. Theand limited ileployrnentheay Indicate that the Soviebi are not hill* uuulied with itshile we have no evidencenw.ellituisu rntem, the Soviets ma" improve tberew ivimn later in the pi-innl ol tliu estimate hey do *u. we believe
ilu:ildardrphwminl. -afotodc SAMi Hon-
oeart attcrapt lo ifclaed all key rargeta *wlh agaaaM.fti-ixle
prwbabry prwiuded by the unt of rhe nuauvr depaoytneat wbacb wuuld be
nxfiiard
Todfcol Syitetni
jiMtv -hai about TOile* now areetente of Soviet trad lercea in Eaareme brtat-v* thate. wwad beefend agamstir attack In aahbrjoo. che Soviet! may have begun in iheear or mi toobile SAM rysrem to ground forcehin vy-item may ompkiy the (rackmounted ram fet mauiie wliich hai been ditplaved in Moscow. W. have little evidence of the prrfonnance cbaraeteristice of thu system, buteld force SAM ivKem it is not likely la be fully iniegraled Into tbe air deluise hattlo plan of the PVO SimiUlv. when en port tbe Soviet destroyers and destroyer auxnb SAM. teolubr* wcatkd be eanptoyed a* ato port ear detente* in (he even*tratcgtc artai V
VI. AIRLECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
ho Sonets expect that thetr air dofonso ryitem will have to contend -neb eWetronic emiotijTwuMjti (ECM> The dcratity of EW/CC1 radar otes. dse frenwocvhceeasd rhe probable use of anacrowaee links and coeaael cabie.reduce tbe -itorrabway of the Soviet ear defenseo ECM. The Sovieti may employ freiiweney diveeiiliir.iiun in their srosiautomaUc data (rarumunlon lystems. In addition, the Sovietsd increased power to overcome ECM and lave been espeainsennng with Other tecbneiuei. Tbe Soviets have placed great cmphaeti on trainang radar crews asbe presence of ECM. Tbo* deUgned to operate an an ECM jvsrooamax. However, da Soviet ak oVfeaas* systeos stvJ ean be it-gradedoeabinaaon of ECU end actio.
Ihiniigli Kl.rOO ir>igiii-ycl>'< J'mI pmsihly in the higher Impic-ncrmll. "tale thai rnwanl rtw end thliI hi able to pro-ilu tnpiab lor amunaig jar* ol theUet* Co lie enrd by the ion*aadolaerrnft, I- adWh-leavnHti will probaliv ferajdotda-rptiun letMgMf; inch latheerrt naviga'inriaj aidi
vii soviet concepts amp^ng furwe strategic defenses
IT The mawaav eV-ployaaewtair defcrnr* over aware mnit tbe
lii(fi nrinnti that theaw aeugrted lo ihe vtr.itrgii drlnw mixon
Tin" general Soviet mnctpl hn> Iwcti torlr-nu- in diplli lor tbur imjoi Ci'otcrt nf impiiltitiun nod "iiiionnt power In addilMrt.have eiliibltnl ti tendrncy toy dcti-naiv- <yitem> having uane eapiilobtvnrtionthe threat, rather the*wait vend earn etfectave detetuvt nan dewtofThrn vtiarrpeai tun very br-i a*
retm! yean it haa envunted lo alamt onealrti -il ihv iv- ndilvrtuh we
can attribute to ihe nia)ur muimiv monlin*
IA Tbe fonnphng genenuJutimi are welLtuppceted bv 'In varinm devakop. rawnti lomnwaiicd aa prei^iiiae. ntaon* el* thh. raarae In addnarm re tleaei drvakefeaent.hat theear Uvm emrimg actrvHy on othca new lyttecrn lor .trategrf deferoe. The promt Hateur evidencr anda tilth that we ain not aide to cvtinnte with tumfidencc the peerinc natuto ofha work However, anme perspective onnkingfutrc-eaenti tortrMegu detentevailable- Imai clamfiedbtiraturc ol meat yean.
long-Ronge sam syhe-nt
ome of the arnolet publuJied in nxnt Soviet militnry ji.iinuli during theui daub with the advantage* olong-ramr? sam
lo find jg inert baardtm jd ait-Comm ilea SI:
Hevuaov. then cotiwrinruhem-ciWI of the PVO Stranv.ug thaiuntiaircrar" mimic* lie deployed in "runnl" deleme pattemiiiki'i.i. the key induatrlnl regiimi of the USSIl. In commenting on Manful niryumv'i ricommcrxiahoo.fficer wlm cited Inm went on to Mate that thel oW USSK vhonU ceawial ofmdarvlraacr mania* to acrren the aranroaehea to vital rrgxew jndef ibort-tangi' mcaolei tu eVhnd important targrti ai the inteuor.
Antl-BolllMk Mmile (ABM) Syinrmt
I.-.
Tbe Soviet, haw.rtiwing tonevrm tor the threat pnaed bv Wcvtem lulliittcmpecmJlv ,lnw ,hnot |hf, us (CBM ^
Polam. forcca. Articks ^pworing in the cUuufied Soviet militnrv1MI argncd that an ABM vywem to defend
be cupabfc; .rf performingt high altitude* and long range*
12
the targetn tho* fewdsSonaaegaaaJe defcrta*whichenuanr. (he moil pra.ttrilevtraynsgcaauntr. ballistic missile wa* said lo be en-atmosphericntercepr prior to thenlTV into ihr dense layers id (he atmosphere. One Soviet general ararrtas) (he* eaewflsuan aMereeptICIMi and IRBMl should3 nasi, ohpawduag cat Ihe ttrU ofeneenyAaorhrr soviet general observed Ihal II wouldrwceiaary lo have anirmmlv mmalnnpable of ranges em (he order. and altitude! of nol leeatlianSMlOaan.
we* Ossol iWn
he Soviet* have aim espreswd interest in ihe puvnbilirv of de-ieloplug misilluwhich could be employed against both aerodynamic vehicle! end ballirtic missiles Sorrw. effsevts according to classified Soviet nubtarv attacks,tbat tbeosaic could be rnod-Sed fa, use agaanO tacfscal baUlarac masukt In sdaleson. tbe Savin, have rtprae-dK referred a> rhe Cestoe irasnie (Srttpable ot buing employed agauui "all modem means of aerial and space attack.'* which suggests thai this missile was origloaJly intended to verve e>AM and an AMM
Will. RESJA8CH ANDOF Dr^NSJVT MISSILE STSTEAsS
he development ol Soviet dcfeniiva weapon systems has been cuocen-trated Bl two test langet. Kapiutin Yur and Sary Shagan. Tbe octivittes on defeaww ivsieem at Kapuetin Vat began In theQs. to the beat of our knowledge, ibex acQsstws have been darected toward the dii itopasssal and deploymenl of SAM syst-ini and for training Sary Shagan haa aerved prunanlvRM development center, although it haa aim supported other mimic end space programs and work on SAM systems bas biro conducted there
Suetoca>lD-Aar Missives
e Live oo apecutk- evidence any SAMbeing tetrad beyond theowever, some new SAM* (eg. the Canef tactical missile) have armeared in SovietoJay already be ia rlie early Stagei of depkiymaast. Webeicioee thw^gfajv esaenmed cear abaiatv to detect and identify tbe danrelopnseot of SAM lyeiems,ong-range SAM system, and we have concluded thai inch systems could have been developed and tasted without our knowledge.
bo Soviet* are con turn sig wirli theiroiD ctforl. begun about eight years ago, lo devulop drfen.es agaum baDunc nuailSes. In the put two years, there bat been evidenceumber ol ctiangct in the Soviet ABMaim! procrian. Tbeae craaasge* raosntew pbaae or phases, dx
top
which w* lunnui defuminir- But they mggest that the Soviets wvre letting new i* modified lyMem lompimcnts. anil that the new phaic of ftV pmgrrm wai encmmtermg inme reub'emi
Hicrewould heV- for thetaICBM mirrrepl al Jury Shegsn Hiisrwr. we caoiv* determinehax> made any an.rnpt ICBM re-entryr ;
anolwi tmea Wq run. nuhat the Sovam have conducted BaatlnV aa of decayvwurbeadi. or ceaer rwoattwaon teciestuwe* at Sortad wanl.Hv
JB. Takra at banr value-ttkrnroncrooaooo oa (hen-unptmgring*Soviets have noteaaar-urnu agaanat ICBMs. hute. ot course, obtaanrd eoroadcrabke data on ICBM rronrrvum tbcw man* ICBM teera. Wr betnr that thei have cowdwilid thatntercepting ICBMi e> notfft from that of intwcwptlng nvdlum-rangoecent that errate* radar range* an required le. the 'and tracking of an ICBM.
I
'aaoi Development and Deployment
It. An importanthe BflrU wutk at Sary Shagan has been tho develop-ment ol large tnduiv 'he Hen Burnt and Hen House, which we believe wore ready for kWBal teetlng
fJW
general
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to Soviet development of radart which ican their beams electronically rather than by pbywal movement of the antenna. Large radar* employing thai prin-cepte are particularly applicable to ballistic masWle early "inng to long.range jctpuntion and early target Hacking of ballots: rnua&ts. and to detection and tracking ol nueilite. Wa believeumber of these large radar* are underhe USSR
Wewo Itaatype radars are now srader ccorrroctaon oaPiaakaaak. Than* radon probabt. will terve a* baUorx nsanueradan. but the* couldpacefunction aiooOd provvie -aramg of US ICBM. directed towardS mioutn in the case of Moscow. AdditSonal rarlars inwnild be required to provide lomlar warningagunit
other target area* an the USSRhave no evidence of the consrrucSMn of radan nntablv looaiedii purpoer. but we estimate that the Sovietswill cotfend thau ballunc itusiui early warning coverage. We believe that tbebout two or three year, to corutruct radar* of thu type lo thube unci ini Peninauh will probably be ViDAS.
anuthcr large ibubi|ow i. mrwruii>or, nearinure difirrcnir-nn rhuw discussed .iww il loo.purwlple ii may be pin ol jn abm
tsvrni.it eniddilillilr tinsf.td.11
ix. recent strategic defense misshes
a-wr.linl he ihe sawaeaeeres space' wavb ca* be easssiwed agsiswlarnaerial and space attack."
g ai ullwth- aei-iavt vvaral (aonehi aro rhe sinarts
a tv iba ckp oaitoev > 1
a amm role w* ujerw 'i* ccssfoei waae soviets may have hen wrbing in develop acmiw becamtr lnah airirart and our irsalyta.griffon has . ir intercepts at ihitudes of np loufainst an unsssphrticatrd bullish', rnaeisle ihreal.
and that if baa long-iange. lit<l> altmnlr capabilities in an anliautraft role we believe that the cnhoni developed for uae al the "urg* completeshe soviets hawmirlnisting al leningrad <inte llie winter. (sec later paragrnolri)
he-cantite r
november t'.j'l [mindi in moscow, (he soviets displayeddescribed ai an iiiitlmitsilruhle o(llutitgreat diilanm" 'nun thru targets preliminary analysiso accept an amm role foi ibis mniile. from ila starcan be seen of itsleigines. we thank that il is likely to employwarbead and to he designed to pesfurm eiiwfmaapbrrlc if
adauont ladid'c tkil 'i- isivsilrbe able to
acttenpisaht ekeiidnew hundred assies and al rangri ot* severalran its laomb piieat.uk-ad in tbe iingatun range such asssssssab coasm abas be iswd an an aa'iaalellatr role
ii snear new amm aaee hate hern leviedat sarv shegan i> early ass. thereeeesedsat the soviets ceasbj have eoasdwtrdf ae rssaitmotpberse rysecm.est prsgtam aisih.mg moreew vmm irnacsave been detected. allceesaaiinwd. we ik-lane diat rhe setnrts has- paesheasly not castsducted many amm firing!aoaomisphieic ahaindes. and that they have probebfa not attempted full systeass tesli mvnulag interceplloni ar these airttssdes.
ur evidence shows (hai the sovieti appriaach 'he leamg of missile systemstrong pruiumptim ili.it the ti-sli will he luitetafut ind that tbe system wdl be deployed. in fuel.issvu ohseevcil inllsul oprratlonnl deployment of certain tntufk systetns atamt time as test brings begao. however, the soviets have ahnmcllvlly for .imdiicttng rud system tests prior to proceeding wilh seide-icnle rbployinvtitew system. we therefore
that tha Soncti are Irbrhf ta carry out mtera tro> beforeweree*irj^ teal. ABMrogram.
hawo be raa-
r-tor-rL ll .weld baaa uwejrxm ro ba Ii aught be emrs-oyodMewter
orepfeme ivumc.amjathe mvadc ofe could
cerrfHoredath thrae -ay. The lull er-achaoom could be deugned ro late advantage of'd warhead* lo dertra* mcomingnte ihmigli accompanied bv penetrance!hafi deciiyi. de. in oidet lo reduce the penhkimi of
I may imply thai tha UWH ha* developed an AMM deriflned tnill vnthayuclear burnt
M type -mid differ in important reapeet*any LS ABM lylcm et-runtf. under development Although -would.rrfamvgtvt Ik attractrv, to the SW*.rwti <night bejnorc- .nmpabblc -a* their eavhen.nlalat-r* than acWr-od
X "KENT CERNSIVI CEf.OTMENI ACTTViTKS
f rhreetefettuva oompWtm wa* began atthe wmrcr of IWMMi. doncw ha*eenim ludgrrmnt ahool th. bnctkm of the Uningrade they probably .oenprued an ABM
ayatata which woojd be capable ef engaging both IHBM. and ICBM*.wc- mnmated tha. th. Leningrad ryrrmn mightapabllitvtmafi number of rs-entenng. arrtvmgboot thehan one mi-lie o, aa .mail number oft would probably have little cupabtlity agaimt utuiaboo arrack* Or"penetration
elieve thai the Uninipud wvtem wa* eeijpnallv daaiened toapabilitylUiticnd pmh,p,ehicle, a. well but that th. initial dealgn ha.ch-oged. W, tbe nature of tha* change, nor tan we detaravme whether ttechnicalhe reuJ.rnrmn tfwltem. rot-netnewhe iral*-of-the*rt. There are miUmn hutweeai* one of the Leomgrad com-
Koaatri at XIX L an- Hkm Aar and lliw Drteena CanaaaU_
ima Tor MCat-T
TO-
(linn imt recently discovered defensive complexes' iintter cmutmcnon at Tallin and Cltt-repovct* inUSSR. ISee latern fa'ghl olsimilarities, at Inuthr-e. cornplrxet ma* nmrntended
tot ihr deptovcoentaine rbtensivs- ti HoweiH we iaubl-
eeaeciat* the new coraptftei erstk any-^niprr-nr md any ereiane ana Ice theof rboe enaeatWuntor -he wod.atcateiaja*pen inoubt.
Tallin and Cherepovets
IHknow of on iiulallaKmi In Ih* vicinity ol Tallin and Clirriprneb, whbii would oil foi this selection in imiIu nits ior an ABM yyilein or evenow SAM mbrrn. In order loari of an area ABM defense lor th* wntcra urlain-induitrial region. Ihe completes at Tallin and Oierrpoveis would nerduinle withoinaoipheric cipahillrwsompaohl* ae-piBaQonong-iaisgc AMM. complim atcould defend afaaiHlM. and Polaris anaiulel oa Wsiee-
towarda Moscow or nthri Lev utfeta an therrgn To deeVnd Meacow free* these beaaejos. cstenrpei would have to be puturiated al tlrmaiileii of S) to ICQ am.
HI Theeehowever, could be Intended to serve mSAM role.. we believe (hey would benrig range svitem, and (hai they may bu the Hartarrierrincipal route of US hombrei toward the olduimal centers of western USSR. Tbe missile used byyilrm cou'd be Ihe Outon or some Other missile nol vet idennfiod II used withguidance equipment, the Crtflon woulde effective to ranges on the ordereaexhsiaanKat medium and high aJrarndes
SB. Then,oori far (he belief that rhe (oeafdaaoe areAMefead agasnktades. Oa the aeher hand, weoted intensive Sovlirt research on missile defeases for several years and iivdacanon* that the USSR haa bee* wmsjtrg toward new and dafereot ABMn lisjhl of this factor and some of tbeeenuden* nana, wehere are also persuasive uuton* far believing thai lhrsi> .nm pleies are related to missile defense However, any judgment nl this tune on their mil 1I* In our view prematuie
e have observed ar Moscow three desvscewseriti which mav Hsdicaie ABM(here. South*t the cars', the Soviets are ccea4rs>ctaDg
radar (CVsejhaving (he tbape of anheell over XO feet high andeet wide Cfeomiction probably seas begiin3 We know af so prototype for rfu* radar, it probably evurved from deieiorimenlal wnrk at Serv Shagin and probohly employs (he electronic scanning pnnciple. Became ivf Its sue tbe apparent orientation ol one face to scud the ICBM thruui corridor, and its pronmity to other construe-
IOC SrifMT
which may be ABM related.thrnk that ihe radar could verveong-range nctiuiiition nnd euly target trackingn ABM ay item. II i< abo passable, however, chat It willatellite tracking radar and bran no rdaliro ro ABM
uring the pur veir the Soviets luveork on piahiblefaiilinet located al four of ihe uuli* lingin -it Moscow. Although wv liellcvr that timete intended to srjrvr vame defensive function, we cannot den-iminc wlietbcr tiki functiononneClcdlli*rirr miialle defeneeefeni" against aerodynamic vehicles.
n .iddition.vi-ti have begun toiy of ill*Hm during recent months. In iume caiet. large new revetment? areoiuiitent pattern liaj not yet emerged, ljeit some of Ihe revetment* ate big cnongh to accommodate very largo mimic. Thii activity truy indicate lhat the Soviets intend to utuire theites aa launch position* fortrnmble tlxU the atttvltvodifiennnn of Moscow's SAM
5a. Thus we liave obticrvud under vonatnictum at Mohcow what mav be throe lev elements ol an ABM syitcm.gi> radar could beiii*itkin anil earry target travkiog element, the facilities at tho outer-ringites could serve as ihe final taiget trackuig and nutiile guidance elcmeni. and theitio could be uied aj ilie AMM laumJi poxition* tor tbe lyntemthe atttVibc* we hup ohietved thus far may not be related to each other, and some af them may rt-prereoi improvementa in Moscow's deteme against aerodynamic vehicles orpace function. AL>o, Ibe misule toajor unknown; tha musile.in-tbc-cunliter could be uied at Moscow to conduct emaimatpbertc intercepts of haUutic mi&sdci, perhaps al duiance* uf .evctiil hundreds of miloi from tlse dty. In >um. weelieve fiat ibv Soviets may now be deploying ABM defense* at Moscow, hut wc do not yet understand how the initaiUtions we have obicrved would function a* an ABM system
XI. PROSPECTS FOB SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE Air Defense
he combuiitiOo of area and point defense* provided by the L'SSR's present force of intercept^ej and lhert-rarqje SAM sytrrm*oodfor major target arena against medium and high altitude bomber attacks. Howevn, the air detenu* system has limitedroth- capabilities, and special -llfacullief are pcued bypertonic airemft nndeajor Soviet effort during the remainder of this dcoade will be focused on meeting these parocoluorrow, in light of the continuing; Wei teen air threat and rbe high priority the USSR assign* to strategic deferne. weariety of Soviet meusuros to reduce the change* that aero-dynainic vebades of any typo can penetrate to key targets.
Of^ooSa
Rt:
!Ht Over the nest lew ee-rc tlw Snvivii will etieml iheir mi-iuli lit md<tn EW and CCI ridui>*miiui turns tie ilr tleleiivu iimtnsl svilems. ind Uiev
will mom .nlviiiti.il intitwptnr wir.ijn.ii systems These deveiop-
mcnis will upgr.Ji ImW air dc-tensc* us general, anil >in .il them will belo rhvlli:iidV dsi>mn Tbei.hrii sum oMtrtr.lveiiliahlv bvim wHjHv rScjskncdvstemt. and bv rUendjncr-wntr.'ii ka ow^ii4 uWeine FiauCk
i the devetateanssis TJW aad Lawntf/ad SSSS] lor
caaatjc SAMihr.hrgeas ca depes*estrsn
amrikely hncnhrr arpmistcb runts- in Ihr
at western I'UI. The Hiitnl cmwpbmvi furWm omU far jft-ciiuml within the coming year
Alrluughimrtam abeaitew SAM. to becomewe hvlivvi* llmi improvements in the1ver the neit tew yenis will mule1mori- dJRculis (it! pensxr.iiiun by nuiiiivd bmnbieifM target areas.iil pel wi ml urn by ihauu.il botnbers will rrouari' increasingly -oeihiiUcjIed lorrn. ol attack Simet air de-broe capilalaM* isn In- degraded he the Dicre.uiuajly consplrs lnrm> ot attack whUt. Ok. Wratbbmploy, including in UunvHad eaaatlvt.ctrmm iihvi.enstiasisrer.trute thevrt the* -u>vsaesra. theeekd npet toansber of the erlaaheev We dowbr. bse-evee. thaie coaeadert that ihe* could redan* th* weightutnt where the resiattssgto the USSHuiptaWe.
Ballistic Missile Oe* antes
3S. Tlieie are criticalIn our luiowledgo at Ihu present status of Soviet rUd> and lUipkmneiil In the ADM He'd At this point In time, we con inakn ou cnnHdirrit cttmalito luture prospects lor Soviet defense .igalrul strategic ballwtii mlssili-s. Frcin ilw evidence now available however,gnieml cumlusaeii can be drawn;
Ihe Sosv* MO ettort has bevn catniaive andmg duration, and AW b'SSJI aanaral reeei ago proeiafalv mivedrrteprang balbsTK -arg-ta arriving angb or as tssaall asiaatbVn.
ABM deraioysricrat activtrt wea pmKablr begun _t
long ego aa IV4D. hwt hath tbe eSepkrrinewr and Ml)
dtmtv ibtirrtpt.il and inodlied.
rhe magnitudend therlv deploynsent activiry pcanttrong Soviet desire to obtjin ARM ddeissvi rapidly;
HAD iini'imiesew AMM lusmi some oilditsona!ls.lv muy now We underway, but the- USSH doei nut linworaltvnulgainslhalliitic rnnsiUl roday
.
top *cRer
Muchour evidence indicate* tlun USSR has been .'iplorlngARM delerue whkh dirler
'cnev radars muy pby .in important role ingram. An early Soviet effort may )ijv, involvedis.ik. designed lo have dun:mstmi aerodynamictie missile mostdisplayedpriiluhly Jc^ncd inr. .spheric inlciti-pit at considerablesingarge miclfiir svaibcad to achieve irs kill.
nnul dctcimuie whether any u, tlx-i we have noted ,ineeBMuddied Is in fact related to ABM defenses. It couldfipaahmf in term.mproved SAM defenses.uliiji, missile early warning sysilein,tan- virveiJianceThusv-ihlc dial thee at least temporarily ahandnrted any ABM deploymentt rheesTreme. It is possible that (Ik recent ,ciisliv mciiiattsc (wo simultaneous ABM cieploymcnicltvu* of Macaw, .md the other an area detente of the westernegion. I! ABM ileplirvrnentow underway at either Moscow nr the oilier location, we bus* noted, the USSR i* likely to nave some initial strategic ABM defenseshm the near two years or so.
dtploymcoi actiyity.yw.e aetfort to ilriend the Soviet capital witti an early and alii!system. But widespread ABM deployment activity. sehenever itwould imply that tbe Soviet, consider rhei. ABM systems godJustifyluge new expendiruri-s. It wouid indicate thathad achievedueeessei and. perhaps, that they hadproduclfon and deployment decisions. We cannot escfside thisbut our evidence suggest. that tho Soviets have been prmeedimrsince they modified their
ceassidering whether to provide ABM defenses tor manytheircenters and other targets, the Soviet leaders will have to weighcost of such an effort against the likely effectiveness of the ABMArea defenses might uffer considerable savings over pointwe cannot I* sure of tbb and in anyajor commitment ofwould be requited. The Soviet* mas- deter widespreadfurther BID work on ousting sytems. or in theolaystcmvater date. They might even cleeKle that the cost olABM deployment would not be commensurate with the protection itagainstestern strike cap.hdities. We are certain thatwill push ahead wi* their RtJ) effort burannotapabllitie. and costs justifying
XII. ANTISATaUTE CAPABIUriES
hensufficient for u. to estimate with confidence whether the Soviet, are now developing weapon .ystems for detenso against space vehicles, buthink that they almost certainly are invesrigniing the feaaibiliiv of pro-
CC^oSc
evidence thai they have traadeecision. We beQeve that, louccessful intercept by tilingechnique, the Soviet* would need touclear warhead.
XIII. CIVIL DEFENSE
he Soviet) have long nieogniitod the value Of civil detenteeans ot* prvparing their nation to withstand and letoverull-icaie itratrgic attack. Gwnpulsory public traloingifiatedre beingWe believe, however, that the Soviets have concludedifeaiible to devise and implement shelter coruttis^ttuu programs which would eifectively protect the bulk of tbe urban population ih the eventarge-vale nuclear altack.. Soviet civil defense plan* haws emphaured live concept ol urban evacuation. However, wc estimate that twothree day* would beited to conduct the evacuation of the population fromor Soviet cities.aasikely to be feasible onlyarge-scale nuclearwere rur-wded by an alert period. The Soviet civil detente system is now ernphasirlng mobility of operational unit* for evacuation and mutual aid. and new units are being {wised in the countryside to aid cities after attack
& Although we believe that the Soviet* have severely curtailed their urban (belter construction program, they probably have made provisions for including shelters in ihe schools. Hospitals, and perhaps certain industrial facilities now being constructed. We calculate that there arc someillion shelter spaces available ice; tbe urban population, or roughly one space for every four ciry-dwefJen- Tbe Sovietsddition, encouraged the rural population to prepare their own makeshift shelters, ruch as rootor protection agonist lallout- The Soviet leadership probably does not expect that the present, civil defease program will provide adenuate protection for moremall portion of the population. We have no evidence to indicate that thereesumptionajor shelter Lflustruction program.
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