SNIE 10-6/1-65-PROBABLE REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

Created: 6/4/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

5

. special national intelligence estima te

probable, reactions to certain

; us courses of action

by the DIRECTOR OF' CENTRAL INTELtlGENC^E

Concurred in by the -UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated5

m

DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE '

- The following intelligence organizations participated in

' preparation oQhls estimate: the Central Intelligence . V/:

and ,he intelligence organizations of the Departments Z* SH'*

Concurred]in by the

united states.intelligence board..

unewere the Director of .

4 .v' '* ntelligence and, Research. Department of State; the Director, Intelligence Agency the Atomic Fnergij Commission

epresentative to the VSlB;gnd the Director of the1

Security Agency. The Assistant'Jo the*Director <Fed'efal - * Bureau nf Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside ,

mm

<tffe jurisdiction. ;

CBMTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

une

Subject:: raoBAsrs Rmcnojis to certain us

CjUK5ESPIOH Tit! PSOBM

To estimate Communist and Free World react lone to SAC heavy bomber strikes on enemy positions In South Vietnam.

THE ESTIMATE

1. AC heavy bomber strike on enemy positions in South

Vietnam which occurredAC raid on airfields in the Hanoi-

Haiphong area of Horth Vietnam would produce relatively little

additional hostile reaction from Hanoi, Peiping, or Moscow over

and above that already produced by the strike on these sensitive

North Vietnamesehough there would almost certainly be

"Mil _

* The consequences of such an attack are dealt with in, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain USos-fiSCRtv,

some supplementary propaganda outcry over this fresh evidence of "imperialist aggression."

IfAC strike on targets within South Vietnam occurred before SAC had been employed against targets north ofh Parallel, the reaction wouldittle different. US aircraft (both land and carrier based) are already conducting intensive bombingwithin South Vietnam, however, so the new ingredient vould not be tbe nature of the target or the severity of the bombardment but, simply, the fact of SAC's participation.

The SAC flight from base to target (and any concomitant increase in SAC'b worldwide readiness posture) vould probably produce some short-term heightening of tension the nature and Impact of which would depend In large measure on how soon the Communists picked up evidence of SAC'a mission and how Peiping and, especially, Moscov read overall US intentions. After tbe raid, there would probably be increased apprehension in Peiping, Hanoi, and especially Moscow that this use of US strategic forces foreshadowed the use of SAC over Horth Vietnameneral heightening of tensions. Including for example, new deployments of long-range nuclear-capable forces. Such apprehension would be sharedumber of Free World capitals (notably Paris, London, Rome, and Tokyo) where some adverse reaction

would almost certainly be registeredoth on military and on political groundso this use of SAC. Poroign preao comment vould be extensive and generally hostile.

k. Tbe raid Itself, vhether it occurred before orAC strike in North Vietnam, might temporarily disrupt VC tactical plans but vould probably heve no substantial effect on their military strategy or timing. It might, however, heighten the urgency of Hanoi'a requests to Peiping and Moscow for air defense support. aid would almost certainly prompt new Communist warnings and vould probably impel some Western countriesrance and perhaps the UK) to step up diplomatic activity designed to promote early negotiations.

Original document.

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