ffiBA**
SENSITIVE y
5
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
This Is the estimate. No further versions will be published.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated5
Submitted by the
director of central intelligence
The following intelligence organizations participated In the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, AEC and NSA.
Concurred in by the
united states intelligence board
on unewere the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
This moieriol contain! Information affecting (ha National Defense of tha United Stole* within the meaning of thelaws.SC,, theission or revelation of which In ony manner lo on unauthorized person it prohibited.
CB3TRAL IBTE&LIOESCB AGEHCT
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SUBJECT: : PR0BAST3 REASONS TO CERTAIN US
OODBSBS OF AJPTCW
Tot OLWtm
To estimate Ccnnrunist and Free World reactions to SAC heavy bcasber strikes on enemy positions In South Vietnam.
THE ESTIMATE
1. AC heavy bomber strike on enemy positions in South
Vietnam which occurredAC raid on airfields in the Hanoi-
Bolphong area of North Vietnam vould produce relatively little
additional hostile reaction from Hanoi, Peiping, or Moacov over
and above that already produced by the strike on these sensitive
North Vietnamesehough there vould almost certainly be
The conocquonces of such an attack are dealt with in SNIEProbable Ccimnunlst Reactions to Cortaln USOP SECRET, SENSITIVE.
GROUP 1
from automatic
downgrading
samepropaganda outcry over this fresb evidence of "Imperialist aggression."
8. Ifac strike on targets Tlthln South Vlotnam occurred before SAC had been employed against targets north ofh Parallel, the reaction wouldittle different. OS aircraft (both land and oarrler based) are already conducting intensive bombing missions within South Vietnam, however, so the new ingredient would not be the nature of the target or the severity of the bombardment but, simply, the fact of SAC's participation.
3> The SAC flight from base to target (and any concomitant increase in SAC'S worldwide readiness posture) would probably produce some short-term heightening of tension the nature and impact of which would depend in large measure on how soon the Communists picked up evidence of SAC'S mission and how Peiping and, especially, Moscow read overall US Intentions. After the raid, there would probably be Increased apprehension in Pelplng, Hanoi, and especially Moscow that this use of US strategic forces foreshadowed the use of SAC over Hortb Vietnameneral heightening of tensions. Including for example, new deployments of long-range nuclear-capable forces. Such apprehension would be sharedumber of Free World capitals (notably Paris, London, Borne, and Tokyo) where some adverse reaction
would almost certainly be registeredoth on military and on political groundsto" this use of SAC' Foreign preen comraent would be extensive and generally hostile.
k. The raid itself, whether it occurred before orAC strike in North Vietnam, might temporarily disrupt VC tactical plans but would probably have no substantial effect on their military strategy or timing. It might, however, heighten the urgency of Hanoi's requests to Peiplng and Moscow for air defense support. aid would almost certainly prompt new Communist warnings and would probably impel some Western countriesrance and perhaps the UK) to step up diplomatic activity designed to promote early negotiations.
Original document.
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