SNIE 10-7-65 IMPLICATIONS OF A CERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION

Created: 6/4/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

5

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

' IMPLICATIONSERTAIN US COURSE OF ACTION

This ib the.esnrriale. No hirther verdorrsvrill republished.

by mi- -

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred In by Ihe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE! BOARD-

Ai indicoled5

" Tc^-SiCltlL,

iti by fhe K-^'v*"^

NITED.STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

unewere the Dir%cidr':of

-Intelligence and Research, Department of State; theIntelligence Agency; the Atomic EnergyRepresentative to the USIH; and the Director of theAgency. The Assistant to the Director,Bureau ofhe subjecthis

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

It5

SUBJECT: : IMPLICATIONSERTAIN US COURSE

OF ACTIOS

THE RICBIEM

To estimate Cceeaunist reactions if the US does not attack the surface-to-air missile sites, light bombers, and fighters recently furnished to the DRV hy the USSR.*

DISCUSSION

1. Since April, the Soviet Unicn has been furnishing to Northariety of weapons. Among these the most important are about, some with limited all-weather capabilities, three SAM sites under construction near Hanoi, and eight light jet

Reoctiono if the US does attack ore considered in SNIECommunist Reactions to Certain US2

bombershich have been ferried across China to Ihuc Yen airfield sinceay.

think this program of military assistance wa3deter the US from extending its air attacks to the In tbe Comnunist view, the deterrence would rest not sothe combat capabilities of the weapons as on the manifestation ofSoviet comrnitment. In effect, Hanoi and Moecov arethis new program, added to other pressures on US policyand worldill dissuade the US from extendingnorthward. The Soviet program of military assistancea part of Moscow's effort to increase itsto that of Cornmuniet China, on the Hanoi regime.

Chancea of Further Buildup

the US refrained from extending air attacksthe Soviets would probably continue to augment Worthdefense capabilitiesy providing additional SAMs,andhey might not increase the supply ofmuch beyond present levels. The USSR and the DRV mightthey had already succeeded in establishing an effectivejudge that significantly greater numbers of weapons such asonly raise the chances of eventual US attacks on keyofh Farallel.

Cn the other hand, the uupply of Jet lifcht bottomhange in the clor.ietoriet aid vhich may pointarger buildup. Thecc oircrufttho DRV oto strike ogDinut tar^etoth Vietnam, Thailand, ond laoa. The UiJSR also realizes tliotanly charged issue during the Cubon ml3ollo crisis, and that tho ua inolutod upon their removal while permitting Cuba to retain defensive systems. If the US tacitly accepted them, Moscow and Hanoi might conclude that an important test had been passed and tbat they could extend the buildup of offensive weapons without incurring unacceptable ricks. In this event, they would probably exi>ect theirefenaou, oo thooe became operational, to reduoo US reconnaissance andurther buildup.

f the

5. We think it unlikely thot the DRV now intends to usen offensive operations. Hanoi would almost certainly calculato tbat this action wouldS retaliation which would probably not be limited to the airfields supporting the operation of the bombers. Moreover, ue think that the gonoral line of DRV strategy still lo to coneontrote on the guerrilla war In tho South which they expect to win, and not themselves to take tho initiative in widening tho war.

6. But these aircraft would widen the DRV'5 offensive options, and circumstances might arise in vhich Hanoi chose toora. In particular, we cannot exclude tho possibility that, evenanoi woono to try en individual raid agulnst some psychologically important target such as Da HangS aircraft carrier.

Political Impllcatlona

7* Vbatever tha CccBnmlsta' precise Intentions at present, US acceptance of tbe present buildup would ba encouraging to then* They would probably infer that the US, at least for the time being, had accepted, certain limitations and ground rules in the bombing of tho DRV.

0. The Chinese would be concerned by the probable increaso in Soviet influence in Hanoi, but ot tlie came time they might be rco unwed by the anticipated hardening ol' DRV determination to carry on without negotiations. They would olao ba somewhat relieved of theirthat the US would escalate the war to bomb targets in China.

9> Tne Soviets would probably view their involvement aa now gofewhat less dangerous, although etill not without risks, and thoy Blight bo encouraGOd tooro rigid position with the US. At the Game time, the Sovioto almost corto inly etill hopeegotiated settlement and might see the US inaction ao increasing the prospecto of negotiations cn terms favorable to tho Communist side. But Hanoi

Original document.

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