STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A conccticin ol articles on Ihe historical, eporaiional. doctrinal, and theoretical otpccls ol mtelliaence.
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Shortcoming, and net usefulnessharply policy-pointed class ofexercise.
ON EST1>IATING REACTIONS John Whitman
The meat fascinating and frustrating of (hentelligence Estimates which an estimates officer writes begin as (oUowi:
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist tractions course of action Invotv-
These estimatesuite distinct category. They originatenique way; they pose special problems of organization; their coordination with tha representatives of the USIB member agencies is exceptionally difficult; and final USIB approval almost alwaysmore than one meeting, often more than two Herein reside the frustrations, tohall devote the greater part of what follows. The fascination lies in tbe assurance that the drafter is involved in major and immediate decisionsolicy. No other estimates can generate in his breast quiteharp sense of relevance to action.
These papers are often miscalled "contingencyigure in almost all NIEs. Sometimes they concern what one foreign country may doeighbor takes certainhat Pakistan will do if India embarksuclear weapons program.ontingency lying in.xamined as partidern the courseeneral estimate on South Korea, ROK reactionseduction of US. military aid may be explored. To avoid confusion with these, it wflj be useful to reserve the term "reaction estimates" for those NIEs which aredelusively to the question ofostulated US. course of actionrisis situation,
Origination
Reaction estimates are never self-initiated. They are enmmissioned by policv making departments which are considering taking some
fffimoftl
specific course of action and want an appraisal of how the enemy will probably respond. They are invariably written against short deadlines and deal with immediately critical problems. Those of the last few years have dealt principally with threeBerlin. Laos, and Vietnam. The first were requested by lhe Berlin Task Force in tbe State Department; tha father of the other two sets is an alumnus of the Office of National Estimates who migrated to poHcy-maWng posts and"sustained fay the White House, the Joint Chiefs,reat variety of Indochina policy proposals to the estimative test
After writingumber of reaction estimates, I'm still not entirely sure why requesters keep oo asking for them. The results, as we shall sec, are often of dubious value.uspect that the corn missions come from opponents of the policy proposal who hope that tbe estimators will help them kill It. But the process doesundamental principle of intelligence: that when early enemy reactions are tbe critical testolicy proposal, these reactions should be estimated in advance, not by proponents or opponents, but by someone unlnvolved in the beat of policy contention. Fullis ofounsel of perfection,hink it correct not merely charitable, to say that the policy makers should and do feelprotected against the full force ofthey have an outside opinion. And since these matters are too sensitive to be submitted to public opinion, they turn to Intelligence as an inside outsider.
Terms of Reference
And Intelligence always bucks. We are never satisfied with tlie way the questions are put. They ere far too general; welearer idea of what the United States proposes to do; In particular we need sharper distinctions among the various steps to be takenequence. Very well responds the pobcy maker, and lists for us four major stepsozen specific actions within each, including inter alia, say, the exact inventory of Implements to be used in each of three probes oo the Berlin autobahn. Now we are reallyPerhaps, we say. we can provide some general guidance, but bow do you expect us to distinguish between reactions on the one hand to tee air sorties against troop concentrations In Laos with high
cs and on the other to fifteen sorties against lines ofwith napalm?
It would be nice to think that we eventually sort out with the requester the proper level of detail and can proceed to answerwhich are governed by the limits of professional intelligence and human judgment Unfortunately, this is often not the case, the question of proper terms of reference dogs us to the very end ofm sorry tnsay. 'is that we'are not "outside" after all Each of tbe intelligence agencies worksarticular policy maker. Even the Director of Central Intelligence is, under one of hisenior policy advisor to the President And it is uitcanny bow the choiceevel of detail will influence theenemy reaction, and therefore tha reerrung wiidom of the' proposedroposal may appear to bloom with fair prospects when viewedeneral way, yet prove to be studded with thorns when eramined in detail Surely everyone can understand this, how many bright ideas have we all had which might survive one or at most two levels of detailed criticism but fell apart at tbe third? And when that third level is reached, do we not insist thatood idea "in principle" and pleadeconsideration at the higher, more favorable level of generalization?
Other Kindt of Bias
Thatairly subtleore obvious one is that the pardrirsating agencies may already, at their policy-making summits, have decided what they think about the proposed US. course. Their intelligence arms are then under pressure, of course, to bend tbe estimate toward these conclusions. There are two barriers against tliis: the fortitude of the drafter and the chairman, and the collectivesense of mutual reiponribility,has grown up over the years tn the estimative community. The latter works surprisingly well most of the time.
Another source of bias, again oo tbe subtle side, lies in the fact that the estimators are American ciWzens. rooting for their country If the poUcy proposal is not outrageously unreasonable, it is well-nigh impossible for us to bring ourselvesirm estimate that the United Statea is bound to lose. We can make differential judgments in which some parts of the policy look more likely than others totbe desired results. But at some point the course of action will
usually culminateheer test of will, and how can wo bringto estimate that we will be the first to falter? 1
But having bared all theseemain persuaded that the policy maker is better off for having solicited an estimate of enemy reactions from Intelligence agencies which, buicaucratically tied though tbey are to policy departments, are by training and inebriation and conscience freer from cotrimrtments to policy than he and his colleagues are**And so we proceed with the^drafting, knowing that we will have to continue solving and re-solving the terms-of-reference question as honestly as we can.
The Drafting
(Though the precepts which follow may all be golden truths, they are not likely to be of much help to the oeit estimator who has toeaction estimate. This poor fellow will have to read the request, negotiate its unclaritics with some iH-mformcd representative of tbe requester, eichange confusions with the newly appointedof the estimate, andirstwithinr ten or even six hours. Theory is gray, Lenin remarked, but the tree of life is ever green. Or, as Stalin put it, cadres decide everything)
Through the bitter cjrperience of manyave learned that it is absolutely indispensable toeaction estimate with an analysis of the situation preceding. action proposed. Usually, in fact, it is necessary to back up two steps: In many cases the US. policy presupposes an enemy initiative which then sets us into motion along the hypothesired line. What, then, did he mean by this action? Did he expect Our reaction, in which case he presumably has acounter-reaction? Or would he be taken aback by what we did and discover himself in the midst of some major miscalculation, unreadyext move and wholly uncertain about. intentions? These questionsreat deal of difference. Often no single answer can be given, and instead there emerge alternative analyses which must then be run out in parallel through theof the estimate Well why not, you say,romise you
BieducibU 'Wo.nl of bku probably savad of {Urn estimators, not tba failed Stain)nea ot Berlin estanutas. Tha USSR's heal ad*ancaga teemedtad ft was try bud lohow vinous US. course* of action could sunreuiit tba crisis. Gritrang our teeth, wa estiroated some even chauon. Mora Important, tbe Pmndent grilled hU Weth and mad* us right.
that ihli plays bell withaper simple and Intelligible enough to be useful
An ordinarySoviet military policy, say. or the outlook foraompetent drafter will marshal hit facts and his ideas and construct an argument which leadsingleew major conclusions. If ho does not, there's no use writing the estimate. If be does, and if he constructs well, then his betters1 may tug and pull at his paragraphs, alter his adjectives, and qualify his estimative passages, but hit message still cornet through.
It is fatal toeaction estimate in this fashion. The drafter willong succession of close judgments as be works his way through the paper. Most of them will be nearark; if they were not, the estimate would not have beenuested. He will make some of them In one direction, others in the opposite He will estimate "desirable" reactions to some VS. moves, "undesirable" ones to others. Out of the sum total of these, some general tberne may in the end emerge, but he bad better let this happen rather than aim at It For his paper consists essentially of nothing but this succession of judgments, and many of them will be changed before the USIB finally signs off. If his draft Is builtheme, he will have to restructure, probably sooner rather than later.
But he can make bis contribution. In thinking through thehe can try to find the turning points, the stage or stages which constitute, in Aisopian language, thehink,eal service. It tells the poUcy maker, not what will happen, but what lo worry most or pray hardest about It tells him about the moment ofits content will be and where, as be gropes along an uncertain path, be may expect to encounter it To do this wellriumph.
Ifucky enough tourning point the wise drafter will stop and point in both directions. He willcrupulouslylist of arguments why tbe enemy might do what we want him to do. Then he will give an exhaustive set of reasons why the enemy might do just the opposite. This fa another service. It gets tbe policy maker to think about all the' factors, the unpleasant as well as tbe pleasant ones. And it insures that he cannot dismiss
' Pin* the Board of National KrttniW, then the tsfpreaeetaOvas of tha USIB Goals' the USIB
SECRET
Estimatmt
the conclusion which followj on the groundj that the intelligence people forgot something important
The Result
Once this is done, the drafter can be rather casual about which direction he chooses. It doesn't much matter; the Director will make up his mind, some USIB members will Join him in the text and others will take footnotes of dissent But if the text has not laid the proper groundwork for these decisions, the drafter will have to endure ao hour of confused argument at the USIB table and then start over again.
ould tnaintaln, should it make very much difference what tbe USIB decides. The President surely would be silly to let his decision be determined by whether intelligence said the chances, were "slightly better than even" or "slightly worse thann the first place, the policy proposal has probably been changed in two or three minor ways, just enough to render the estimate slightly inapplicable, when be gets it In the second place, the policy would assuredly be modified in the course of its Implementation, enough to render the estimate more than slightly inapplicable. In the third and resounding place, everyone from drafter to President knows that the future is plain unknowable.
Well then, whyeaction estimate? Because it iselp to have the issues defined. Because the estimate may serve toorgotten or glossed-over problem. Because it may dispose of some wild, far-out ideas which heretofore had not been adequately confronted-ober and at least partiallyaccounting of risks and chances may not be available from any other source. Because subsequent policy argument can perhaps be more realistic.
You will noticeave been very sparing of examples. This is because all reaction estimates are classified Top Secretmall readership. In fact, they are not evenermanent printing. Carden-variety NIEs get their conclusions distributed as rapidly as possible, after USIB approval, in an informal offset version. Subsequently the readerandsome printed version of the full text. Reaction estimates get the first treatment but not the second. Thus their covers bear two of the finest, most lucid sentences ever written in. Government:
"NOTE: This is tbe estimate. No further versions will be
Original document.
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