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CONTROLLFO DISSEM
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une 5
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE COiVlMJNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS
This is the fine! version, no further distribution will bo mode
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred In by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated5
APPROVED FOR RtLElSt
kUG'JST,ri;ll
JtROUED DISSEM
sensitive
Submitted by the
director of central intelligence
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate; The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.
Concurred in by the
united states intelligence board
unewere the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commissionto the USIB and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting the Notional Defense of tho United Stotet within the meaning of the etplonoge laws. Title IB, USC. iheor revelation of which in any manner to an onauihoriied person is prohibited.
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AGENCY
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SNIE PROBABLE COSKUHTST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN OS ACTIONS
To estimate the reactions of the USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam to US air strikes, Including the use of heavy bombers, aimed at destroying fighter and bomber aircraft and surface-to-air missiles in North Vietnam.
THE ESTIMATE
1. Present Communist Reading of the Situation. In failing to make
any meaningful response to thehe DRV has plainly Indicated that it is prepared to accept notontinuation of OS air attacks on military and transportation targets south ofh parallel, butonsiderable risk that the OS will extend such attacks nortrrward. The USSR, by supplying limited numbers of fighters, SAMs, and light boesbers to the DRV, probably hopes to deter the OS from air attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong
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from automatic downgrading and
declassification
area. The Soviets would not consider the actual combat capabilities of these weapons to be the primary deterrent factor; the deterrent effect would rest more in the recognition by the OS that to attack this element of Soviet support for the IJBV would risk Involving Moscow even more deeply. "In addition, the Communists may be testing US determination throughof offensive bombers Into the Hanoi 'sanctuary', and, if this provokes no reaction, it nay well be the Soviet/DRV Intention to proceed with creating aoffensive air threat capable ofajor DBV thrust Into South Vietaan and/or Iaos." Pelplng's apprehensions regarding an extension of OS air attacks northward are evident Id its propaganda. Its civil defense measures, and its public and private statements to outsiders, but It Is evidently prepared to accept this risk.
Probable DRV Reactions
2. Ia light of these circumstances, attacks on north Vietnam's Jot-capable airfields and SAM sites would be read by Hanoi to mean that military targets anywhere in the DRV were not safe fromttacks and that the chances of future attacks on urban centers and/or industrial targets were greatly increased. The DRV leaders would almost certainly believe that the OS was ready to apply substantially greater force if needed to attain its Btated objective of stopping DRV intervention in South Vietnam. It would also reinforce their concern that OS objectives
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may not be ae Limited Id scope as theas avowed. They recognize the vulnerability of their cities and industry to US or OS-aided aerial bombardment and realize that their Laborious efforts at IndustrlaLlzatlon over the past decade could be wiped out In short order.
3. Hanoi's decisions, however, probably have been and will continue to be influenced by its estimate of the likely course of the wax In the South bolstered by the memory of the Viet Mloh victory over the French and by Its doctrinal conviction that its determination torolonged and grinding struggle will prove stronger than that of the OS. It probably thinks that, given present VC military strength and the political fragility of the Saigon regime. Communist forces in South Vietnam are moving toward victories which could crack their adversaries' will to continue the struggle. If so, Hanoi might feel that punishment from the air would be an acceptable price to pay for the achievement of its political objectives, and the vindication of its doctrinal belief in the inevitable successPeople's War."
a. The present Problem postulates specified vehicles of, and precisely specifiedhe Soviet-supplied SAMs and jet fighter and light jet bomber aircrafthe former located close In to Hanoi, the latter located in the northerly areas of North Vietnam, and asks our estimate of probable reactions under the
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current political and military conditions. Oux present estimate Is that tha odds are against the postulated US attacks* leading the DRV to make conciliatory gestures toespite from the bombing; rather, we believe that the DRV would persevere In supporting the Insurgency in the South. *
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF disagrees with the Judgment made in this paragraph. He would substitute the following fox the Last sentence:
"Our present estimate Is that the odds on the DRV makinggeatures toespite from further bceablng will be markedly enhanced by successful acccjapllsbasnt of the postulated US attacks, which by eliminating any concept of aaanctuary' In Iforth Vietnam will pose the added threat that urban/industrial targets might bo next. The selective and limited nature of US bombing target selections to date may well have led Hanoi seriously to underestimate the extent of US determination to exert the necessary power to force discootinuance of DRV support for the insurgency in the south. o scow/Hanoi agreement on the requirementespite could provide both countries an acceptable 'out' which they could Justify forpurposes within the tenets of (knmnunlst doctrine."
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Hanoi did persevere. It would be unlikely to revisestrategy or basic timetable in response to the OSfor psychological.effect on both Communists andHanoi might order retaliatory Viet Cong raids,sneak attacks on major bases or installations In Southsimilar reasons, Hanoierhaps encouraged by Peipingalmost certainly re-examine the possibility of strikingUfl carrier force In the Tonkin Gulf by sea or from the elr
and would certainly study the feasibility of an air strike against OS installations in South Vietnam. Though Hanoi would probably estimate that the chances of seriously damaging US forces were not great, the effectuccessful attack would by psychologically so advantageous that Hanoi might make the attempt If it had the capability.
the OS strikes had destroyed their air offensivethe North Vietnamese might consider an overt InvasionVietnam. Because of the great risks of such an action,believe they would not do so. Hanoi would certainly continuethe extent possible, step up its support of the Viet Cong andcertainly seek to inject an increasing number of Jforthline units into Viet Cong forces with little or no effort The fearB engendered by the US bombings woulddestroy Hanoi's determination or loosen its control of theIt might have the opposite effect of rallying thethe regime.
Probable Chinese Cctanninlat Beactions. Although tha Chinese Communists have professed to believe all along that the US would expand Its air strikes, the bombing of SAM sites and airfields north of the SOtb parallel would still be regarded In Peipingajor and serious development. However, the Chinese leaders probably are more optimistic than Hanoi, and certainly more so than Moscow, that the US isumiliating defeat In the South, and will urge Hanoi to stand firm whatever the cost. The use of SAC bombers would increase Peiping's concern that eventually these strategic forces might be used against targets In China, particularly in nuclear attacks against advanced weapons facilities, nevertheless, the Chinese wouldtrong need to do something more to help the North Vietnamese, and to prevent Moscow from gaining more influence In Hanoi and In the Vietnamese situation in general. They would also seek to exploit the situation to further weakennfluence in the international Coreaunist movement and in theworld.
It is likely that Hanoi vould requestand that the Chinese would provideadditionalroundand personnel for air defense purposes or engineering help for constructing and repairing airfields. The Chinese probably would also supply fighter aircraft units on request, providing
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they could be based ia Horth Vietnam. They would not wish to use bases in China, because of the risk of US retaliatory strikes against these bases.* The Chinese night offer to send ground coabat troops to Horth Vietnam as an earnest of their ccfsnltment to defend their ally, but ve do not believo bombing of airfields and SAM sites would bring Hanoi to the point of accepting such an offer by Peiplng. Unless and until Peiplng concluded that the existence of the Hanoi regime was in danger. It would probably not unilaterallyrescue mission" into Horth Vietnam. Peiplng might, however, make threatening troop movements and additional air deployments in South China with the objective of deterring the US from farther bombings.
Probable Sovlet Reactions
9, US bombings or airfields and SAM sites, especially by bombers
from the Strategic Air Command, wouldrisis for Soviet policy.
So far the Soviets have been pursuing three somevhat inconsistent
objectivesto cosrpete with Peiping for influence over the DRV, to
contribute to deterring US pressures against Hanoi, and at the same
I The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the assumed vigorous US air attacks on major DRVwould probably evoke the employment over Horth Vietnam of Chinese air defense from bases In China. Current deployment of Chineseto South China, the apparent completion of an airfield Just north of the DRV border, and explicit Chinese statements alleging willingness to accept US bombing of China, suggest Chinese readiness to test US assertions that no sanctuary will necessarily exist should Peiping provide important support to Hanoi.
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time to avoid becoming overly involved In the present US-DRV As noted in paragraphhe Soviets say also be testing US determination and be prepared. In the absenceS response, to further Increase the DRV'n offensive capability. They have apparently hoped that. In view of the situation In South Vietnam, tbe US vould sooner or later have to negotiate Its way out of the var. TbeUS actions wouldlov at such calculations and vould probably convince the Soviets that the risks and costs of their Involvement vould be greater than they had assumed. In particular, there wouldreater loss of prestige In Ignoring any casualties among Soviet personnel then might have been the caseonth
ago.
10. The Soviets vould almost certainly feel compelled to comply promptly vith DRV requests to provide substitutes for those veapons systems destroyed by the US attack, though they might not again provide bomber aircraft. It is also probable that more Soviet personnel vould be supplied to man such equipment. Moscov might evenoviet presence In the hope of deterring the US from further attacks, though this vouldurther loss of prestige If deterrence again failed.
SorietB would clearly recognize the danger ofparticularly since SAC bad been employed. Hence,probably urge Hanoi to open up political avenues forconflict and would put pressure on theo stop bombing and Soviet pressures would be exertedariety oftheemonstrated unwillingness to involve the OH inIt unlikely that that organ wouldajor political OS-Soviet relations would further deteriorate. If theand Hanoi chose to continue the struggle, the Sovietstheir most serious dilemma since the Cuban missile crisis.
Hanoi stood adamant against negotiation. It isthe Soviets, recognizing the growing chances of being forcedthe OS in Indochina, would break with Peiping and Hanoiaway from any deeper commitaents. Moscow almost certainlythe USocal military ad-ventagels the USSR in nevertheless, we doubt that the Soviets would pay theof backing down and thereby bandingajorand weakening Its own prestige and influence throughout
*" See Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF footnote to
paragraph h, page k.
TjjVrrZaSITIVE
13. Thus In the aftermath of the US attache, ve think the Soviets would probably conclude that they had little choice Vat to increase aid to the DRV. If the war continued without the prospect of US-DRV negotiations, the Soviets vould probably extend new commitments to Hanoi and level new pressures and threats against the US. What precise moves Moscow would make in this direction would depend greatly on Hanoi's demands, on the nature and degree of Chinese involvement, and on how the Soviets interpreted US actions and estismted US Intentions.
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