DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Research and Reports
SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL RELATIONS SIX WMTHS AFTER KHRUSHCHEV*
Summary
Six months after the fall of Khrushchev there are few outward signs of the policy disputes that vexed Soviet military-political relations during the last years of the old regime. Military leaders haveuncharacteristic circumspection in their public comments since the coup, avoiding the sharp formulations on sensitive issues of defense policy that had signaled their opposition to official policy in the past. Political leaders, on their side, have steered away from direct comment on military policy, limiting themselves to occasional verbal assurances of their solicitude for the nation's defenses and of their high esteem for its military leaders. Military policy has moved into the background of public commentary under the new regime, and somethingolitical cease-fire on the defense front has prevailed.
* The estimates and conclusions in this memorandum represent the best judgment of this Office as of
Yet, despite the relative absence of internal controversy over military policy, there is little evidence that the issues left over from the Khrushchev regime have been resolved or that the tensions surrounding these issues have diminished. In terras of the substance of policy, as opposed to the formalities of public dialogue, the relationship between the Soviet military ana political leaderships appears to remain much as it was before the overthrow of Khrushchev. On the three principal issues that had been brought to focus by Khrushchev's policieshe size and role of the ground forces, the role of the military in national policy-making, and the share of the military in national resourcesigns of tension persist. What has been missing in the political equation over theonths haslear-cut formulation by the regime of its views and expectations regarding defense policy. With this missing, statements by military leaders have tended to lack focus, but they have not failed to give evidence that military leaders remain committed to the basic policy positions they have defended in the past.
1. The Ground Forces Issue
The issueut in the strength of the ground forces offers the clearest illustration of these features of the current military-political relationship. This hasouchstone issue in the long controversy over strategy and force structure that has divided the military leadership itself into missile enthusiasts on the one side and traditionalists on the other. But since the ground forces have been the favorite target of political efforts to economize on military spending and since many of the top military leaders belong to the more traditionalist side of military thinking, the ground forces question has also assumed the formilitary-political issue. The origins of the issue go back to Khrushchev's announcement in3 that the regime wasurther reduction of armed forces personnel. While the fate of the proposal has never been clarified, it is clear that military opposition to the measure was evident up to the eve of Khrushchev's overthrow and that the present regime has refrained from reaffirming or disavowing the policy.
It appears that the new Soviet leaders have sought to avoidon the issue until the settlement of broader lines of policy has been completed and the leadership situation has been stabilized. This objective appears evident in the one quasi-official pronouncement on the issue that has appeared since Khrushchev's overthrowtatement of the principal tenets of Soviet military doctrine included in an article by Colonel Sidelnikov and Major General Bochkarev published in Red Star on The significant aspect of the statement, from the standpoint of ground forces policy, is that itey word from the standard formula which had provided the doctrinal justification for the retention of large ground forces. The key word was "only" in the formula: "Victory over an aggressor can be achieved only by the combined efforts of all types of armedhe purpose of the deletion, it seems apparent, was tooctrinal fetter from the leadership's freedom of action on this question.
If the regime anticipated that this evasion of commitment would satisfy military opinion, Its calculation misfired. Far fromconcern over the issue, the statement appears to have stimulated renewed agitation. Onebruary, Marshal Sokolovskiyress interview in which he statedaccording to the original TASS report as well as the Westerners who were presenthat the size of the Soviet armed forces had been reduced toen, the level that Khrushchev had set as the goal of his major troop reduction policy What Sokolovskiy meant to achieve by this revelation is obscure. Xt is clear, however, that his statement was unauthorized since it was quickly muffled by censorship authorities. It is also clear that it ruffled military opinion, for it wasew days later by an article in Red Star, authored by Marshal Sagranyan, which cast aspersion on Sokolovskiy's qualitiesartime leader.
This skirmish was followeduch core significant eventaround an article by Colonel-Generaleputy chief of the General Staff, published in the Sunday supplement of Investiyaebruary. Although the content of the article was conspicuously innocuous, its title"The Queen of the Battlefield Has Yielded Her Crown?as provocative. It was apparently regarded by military opinionint of sone policy In the makingirect challenge to prevailing professional views on the role and importance of the ground forces. The rejoinder came from Pravda sone months later. Reportingpeech by Marshal of Tank Troops Rotmistrov in its issue ofpril, Pravda observed that the Marshal had "convincingly criticized views which have slipped into the press that allegedly 'the queen of the battlefieldthe land forcess relinquishing her crown to the rocket weapons.'" The clash between Pravda and Izvestiya. the main organs of the Party and the government, respectively, recalls similar phenomena In the post-Stalin period and suggests the possibility that differences of opinion on this issuo within the present collective leadership are being revealed. It also reveals that the issue of ground forces policy remains open and that controversy around this Issue continues along much the same lines that were evident in the past.
Military Role in Decision-Making
Tht evidence of military efforts tolaimore explicit role in the formulation of military policy has also been plain. It was expressed most clearly by Marshal Zakharov in an article published in Red Starebruary. The main theme of his article was the assertionalanced approach and scientifically grounded conclusions were required to solve the complex problems of military policy. While the tone wasesture to the political proprieties of the moment, in Zakharov's hands this themeerceptibly slanted argument carrying the implication that the "expertise" required in the elaboration of military policy belonged by right to military professionals. In view of the long history of military-political tensions over this Issueighlighted most dramatically by criticisms of the first edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strutegy for giving unwarranted support to militaryin this matterthe renewal of pressure along these lines must be rankedignificant index of military temper and assertivencss.
Resource Allocation Problem
On the question of the share of the military in the allocation of national resources,intilitary lobbying effort has yet emerged. This appeared most noticeably in an article by tho prominent military theorist V. Larlonov which appeared in Bed Star on ine of argument that had been developed within the
restricted pages of Military Thought over the preceding year, Larionov implicitly cautioned against false economies that might deprive the country of reserve means and forces required to successfullyar and stated that Soviet military strategy must envisage the needs bothast-moving warrotracted war requiring the combined efforts of all types of armed forces. In particular, he stressed the notion that the outcomeuture war would be decided by the forces and means available at the outset.
The importance of the Larionov article for the issue underll.es in the signal it gave that military claims on national resources were supported by weighty theoretical arguments. The ancestry of these arguments can be traced back to the beginningk, when the military leadership was preparing to resist the renewed pressures for economies forecast by Khrushchev's proposals of3 for reductions in the military budget and in troop strength. eries of articles appeared, mainly in the theoretical organ Military Thought, laying new stress on the need for preparing and deploying all necessary strategic reserves in the period prior to the outbreak of war.
The essential elements of this argument were set out as early askeemingly routine article by the deputy chief editor of Military Thought, Major General S. Kozlov. Discussing the natureuture nuclear war, he observed that the role that was to be played by the economic capabilities of the participants would be played predominantly in the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities. In other words, the outcome of the initial nuclear exchange would be decided by the men and weapons available at the beginning.
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The argument was carried forward by Marshal Biryuzov in an article published in Military Thought inU. Warning of the danger of surprise attack by the West, Biryuzov hammered on the themeountry unprepared for war runs the risk ofar that might be thrust upon it. With respect to the Importance of reserves^ Biryuzov saiS, "Considering the danger of significant destruction by the opponent of economic targets in the beginning of the war and the resultant difficulties of mobilizing industry, it Is necessary to create in advance specified reserves of military equipment, military supplies, production capacity, and strategic materials." The same point was reiteratedroup of discussion articles which appeared in the following issue of Military Thought and in an article by G. Miftiyev in Communist of the Armed forces,k.
That these articles were partsoherent argument rather than random expressionsommonplace military bias is attested by the coincident appearanceumber of counterargumentsthat is, the reactions of military theorists representing viewpoints other than
those expressed In these articles give evidence that these articles vere recognized asendentious line. One example of this countertrend was an article by Lt. Col. S. Bartenev which appeared in Red StarU. He noted that large military reserves would be targets of attack at the outsetar and hence unlikely to affect the outcome. Another was an article by I. Punanov which was placed as the lead article in the same issue of Cornir.unist of the Armed Forces which carried the Miftiyev article cited above. Punanov argued that the interests of military preparedness were best served not by hasty efforts to accumulate military means bub by the balanced development of the economyhole.
To summarize the evidence cited above, during the courseine of argument was developed in the military press aimed at justifying high levels of production for military equipment and supplies. The coincidence of this development with Khrushchev's last efforts to reduce military manpower and to force reallocations of resources to the chemical industry suggests that the military wasto buttress its claims on national resources. Since the change of regime, the argument has appeared again over the signature ofilitary spokesman whose credentialsodernistand, hence, as one qualified to represent the wing of military opinion most in line with the current direction of Soviet policyare impeccable. The lesson for the political leaders would seem to be that military opinion is unlikely to be any less intractible in the negotiations over resource allocations that lie ahead than it has proved to be under similar circumstances in the past.
The next step in Soviet military-political relations wouldbe up to the political leaders. The leadership of Brezhnevhas given every indication of an intention to press aheadeconomic development programs, particularly inwould appear to imply some tightening of the constraintson military production programs. The control figures for theplan are now being worked out with some difficulty, asfrom Kosygin's speech to Gosplan onarch. If the
succeeds in reconciling the demands df the military leadershiprequirementredistribution of budgetary means" in
of agriculture, as called for by Brezhnev at the March plenum, the military opposition of recent years may be expected to lose its potency as an active factor in Soviet policy formulation. If, however, as seems more likely, the effort fails to satisfy the demands ofelements within the military leadership, renewed conflict over military policy may be anticipated.
The latter possibility would be the more likely if splits should develop within the current political leadership. Inituation, factions within the leadership would be tempted to cast about for ways of rallying support among the powerful institutions and special-
interest groupe ranged below the top leadership level. The natural conservatism of the Soviet military establishment probably would tend to makeassive factor in any leadership struggle. But the raere fact that it exists and that it is capable of asserting and defending its interests wouldowerful influence on the content of whatever "alternatives" to existing policies any opposition faction might deem it expedient to champion.
Original document.
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