LETTER TO MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM W. F. RABORN RE RECENT SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGE

Created: 7/23/1965

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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THE EH HECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 5

's office 3

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The Honorable McGeorgej rgDAjjy

Special Assistant to the" ^

for National Security

The West Wing The White House

Dear Mac:

I transmit herewith our most recent Special National Intelligence Bstinatehich estimates foreign reactions, particularly those of the DRV, China, and the USSR, to certain US military courses of action In Vietnam. Tnese courses are set forth ln appropriate detail on the first and second pages of the document under the beading "Assumption*."

I Invite your special attention to Item (c) on page two:e might either continue present policy with regard to air strikes or extend these strikes in North Vietnam to Include attacks on land (but not seajfrom South

This effort to interrupt the flow of militaryChina to North Vietnam and the southern areasrecalls similar efforts and theirin other theatres of operations and lnframes. It is my feelinglose study ofto isolate battlefields In World War IIcampaign in Italy) and in the Korean War throughof land communications by air attacksvaluable lessons- Matters such as the rationaletarget selection; tbe handling capacity ofand the proportion of this capacity needed fortraffic; the recuperablllty of targets the enemy's use of lash-up repairs, detours,routes; the relationship between thea given route or routes and the level ofr.dbe greatly LUUmlnated

by my suggested reference to history.

DEC 9

We should bear two things in mind: first, whereas these lessons of the past will bem sure that they will not be strictly applicable to the much more difficult problem of interdicting overland supply in the Indochina area (ordinary levels of combat expenditure are comparatively small, manpower for repair and portage service is almost certainly not in short supply, and route capacities are probably much larger than those necessary for strictly military requirements); second, these lessons will obviously not be applicable totraffic whichIf not right now of major importance to the DRV/VCould become so as soon as the squeeze on overland movement began to be felt.

Sincerely,

W. F. Raborn

Original document.

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