DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL tNTET.IJO.ENCE
The following Intelligence organizations participate.kin fhe preparation otstinicte IheQyeniij .and the i'lt<Hi-ienaiUot>%Dep&.rtme.rds of
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UNITED STATES INTtLLIGUNCJ. BOARD3 e.'the. Director of Intelligence'andrhnenl ofirector, Defense jriteiligence Agency; the Atomic Energy Commission Reprei6nt0ve-uxthe
Securityhe Aslant to theederal Bureau of.Investigation, abstained, the subject being outiide of
CiASSIflCATtOR'Of TITLE IS^ENMSEb SEPARATELY
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AGENCY
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: COMJHIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONSOSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate foreign rcoctiona, particularly those of the Cccnunlst powers,pecified US course of action with respect to Victnan.
ASSUMPTIONS
For purposes of this rstlnate, we assume that tbe US decides to increase its forces in South Vietnam toovember. We further ooaune related decisions to call upeserves, to extend tours of duty at the rateonth, to increase the regular strength of the armed servlcca0 over the next year, and to double draft calls.
he further assume (a) that the increase in forces vould be accccpanied by statements reiterating our objectives and our readiness for unconditional discussions, (b) that us forces vould be deployed so thot no major grouping threatened or appeared to threatenb parallel, and (c) that we might either continue present policy vith regard to air strikes or extend these strikes in korth vietnam to include attacks on land (but not aea) lines of ccraminication from south china* and military targets in the hanoi-haiphong area.
THE ESTIMATE
see annexlacussion and map of both land and current sea routes free china to north vietnam.
1. ccexxinists and non-ccnnunlsts alike vould see in the increased us military involvement introng indication that tbe us saw little hope of early negotiations. this vould be particularly true if, at the sane tine, the us extended ita air operations in north vietnam.
i. viet coho art) drv reactions
2. at present the viet cong <vc) ond north vietnamese (dot) leaden appear confident that their course in scuth vietnam promises ultimate and possibly early success without iiriportant concessions on their part. they seen to believe thot they caneries of local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victoryombinationeteriorating south vietnamese amy (arvh) morale andollapse of antl-corjounlat government in saigon, and an exhaustion of the us will to perelet.
3- we do not believe that inauguration cf the us actions here assumed would basically alter these ccrpoctotlcofi. the vc and the drv probably hove come to expect increased us cocclt-oents, and they probably believe that the vc, with increased north vietnamese assistance, con find ways to offset the effect of larger us forces. nor do we think that the crtorstion of air attacks to military targets in the hanoi and haiphong area would significantly injure the vc ability to persevere in the south
or persuade the Hanoi Government that tho price of persisting vas unacceptably high.*
k. If the extension of air attacks were to include sustained Interdiction of land lines of comunlcatlon leading from South China, these actions would obviously make the delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid more difficult and costly, and would hove a
The Aos'iotant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with the judgment mode in this paragraph and would substitute tbe We believe that inauguration of tbe OS actions here assumed, which emphasize DS willingness and determination to become more deeply Involved in combat operations in tho South and eliminate the concept of an areain Worth Vietnam,easonable chance of basically altering tho Corsaunlsto' short-tern expectations. While the VC ond the DRV probably have cooe to expect scene additional US comitnents, and they probably believo that the VC, with increased North Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forcee, such confidence could be quite quickly undermined by effectively expanded US combat operations. Extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas would pose the added threat that urban/industrial targets night be next. The selective ond limited nature of US bombing target selections to date may have led Hanoi seriously to underestimate theof us determination to exert the power necessary to force discontinuance of DRV support for tho VC. US military actions resulting from the assumed program could well persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting was becoming unacceptably high."
serious tnpect on the United industrial sector of the DRV general eccecoy. It would still notritical impact on the Conomlet deterninatlon to persevere and would not, at least for the short tern, seriously impair VC capabilities In South Vietnam.
5- If, In addition, POL targets In the Hanoi-Haiphong area were destroyed by air attacks, the DRV's ability to provide trans-potation for the general economy would be severely reduced. It would also cccpllcate their military logistics. If additional PAVN forces were employed in South Vietnamcale sufficient to counter increased US troop strength, this would substantially increase the amount of supplies needed in the South. The VC oloo depend on supplies from the North to maintain their present level of large-scale operations. The accumulated strainsrolonged curtailment of supplies received from North Vietnam would obviously have an impact on the Ccrxainlst effort In the South. They vould certainly inhibit and might even prevent an increase In large-scale VC military activity, though they vould probably not force any significant reduction In VC terrorist tactics of haraoumettt and sabotage. These strains, particularly if theyorioua check in the development of VC capabilities for large-scale (multi-battalion) operations might lead the DRV to consider
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negotiations.* But the final decision on whether to seek negotiations would dependreat extent on political developments in the Indochina area end elsewhere, end on the actual course of ccobat in South Vietnam.
6. In response to the US program, the Communists would almost certainly undertake measures to increase their own strength In South Vietnamigher level of struggle. They are already augmenting VC units and dispatching additional PAVN forceo to South Vietnam; the assumed US actions would probably resultpeeding up of this process. By the endhe total of PAVN regulars In organized units in South Vietnam could00 men. Although the Communists are aware of the dangers of concentrating their troops in large numbers, they might, during the next few months, attempt major assaults against GVN forces and positions, Becking to shatter AHVR before the Increased weight of US strength could be brought
to bear.
* the"Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Array, believe that in spite of greater damage and harassment caused by sustained air attack on lines of conoinicatlon (LOG) and other targets, tbe capacities of DRV and Loos LOC are sufficient to permit support of the war in South Vietnam at the scale envisaged in this estimate. Other significant factors supporting this position are theof doing irreparable damage to LOC capacity; demonstrated Communist logistic resourcefulness and ability to move large amounts of war material long distances over difficult terrain by primitive means; end the difficulty of detecting, let alone stopping, sea infiltration.
T. In coping with larger OB forces employedore eggrcsoivo fnohion, wc bolleve thot the Vict Cong would sock to ovoid the kind of engagemento whichcrlouo Cammist defeat. Instead, they would probably concentrate on haraosmontQ intended to bleed and humiliate US forces, trapping and dcotroy-lng Isolated unita where possible. inimum, tbe Communists would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land communication Unco and vould stop up tbe dispatch of small, expandable teams on sabotage and assassination missions designed to make the US look Impotent or foolish. Tbe Ccmraunlsto might also sock to incrooao their activities In Laos.
8* Over the longer run, tho Coanunloto' strategy will depend upon tho actual course of combat and their estioatcs of South Vietnamese ratability and US will to persist. Thay are predisposed to attach great weight to signs of disintegration ia Saigon and to manifestations of domestic US opposition to Administration policies. Those boost popular morale on the Ccamunlst aide and reinforce the leadership's conviction that Cccimunlat staying power lo inherently superior.
9. Should future military aad political developments bring this conviction into aerious doubt, the DRV might expreoo
increased interest ir. negotiations. However, they vould endeavor to preserve their own freed co of action while laying inhibitions on CS/gVB Bllitory operations, hoping to pronote disarray in Saigon end encourage us opinion in favor of withdrawal.
10. Faced vlth the buildup outlined in our cooumptiono, the DRV vould probably roquaot more air defense equipment from the USSR, including SAMo, flghtcro, technicians, and porhopo pilots, particularly If US air attache vere expanded. From tho Chineoc, Hanoi vould probably request more radar equipment,artillery, and technicians In additionurther Increase in shipments of infantry arms and ammunition. Hanoi might also request China (and, perhaps, Horth Korea) to furnish aircraft and pilots > Ir. general, however, ve believe thot Hanoi vould ulah to main tain oooe Unite on,ough balanco between, Soviet and Chinase personnel.
U. Deploymonta on the ocalc here assumed would cause tbo DRV some concern about US invasion. Tbic would be true even if US forces took up poeitlona vhlch wcro not suggestive of an invasion. We believe, hovovcr, that the DRV would not react to this concern by requesting the introduction of Chinese combat forces. It probably vould makeequest only if actual invasion seemed clearly imminent.
II. CURSE CCKMUN1ST REACTIONS
12. The Chinese ore prcbobly even taorc convinced thon the Vietnancoc Coooninlata that If the DRV/VC remain firm, In the end the US will be wholly defeated In Vietnam. Renewed UScvlder.ecd by the buildup aasumed In thlo estimate, would give the Chinese some pause but. In our view, not much. They would believe that the OS nooGurco were ouffIclcnt only to postpone defeat while magnifying ita eventual effect.
13* Wo do not believe that the Chlnooo would react to the assumed US movco Including the present level of air attacks, by overtly intervening in the military struggle with combat forces. They arc ol ready otepping up their military aasiatance. Including the introduction of sane rear service elements into North Vietnam, ond would give more aid if requested by the DRV. Moreover, they would try to Increase alarm nmong non-Communists, copacially the US public, by intensifying tbeir propaganda ond reiterating their wilUngncso to accept hostilities if attacked by the US. They would probably continue to strengthen their forces In South China and might toko sone further overt steps towardation.
lb. If oir strikes were crtcDdcd to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to linca of ccamunicction from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intcrvontlon from Chinese baeco would increase. This would partlculoxJy bo true if the oir strikes were effective in cutting the main roads and rail lines over which the principal supplies arc moving. While we believe the Chinese vould be reluctant to engage the DS in an oir war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations, we consider the chances are about even thot Chinooe aircraft would deliberately engage the US over Berth Vietnam from bases within China. Wo do not boliovo, however, that this would lead to greatly increased Chinese Communist participation in the conflict. In any case, if large numbers of US aircraft were operating close to tho frontiers of China the likelihood of hostile encounters would bo high.*
15. If, in the circumstances described in paragraphhe Vict Cong and the DRV at same point wished to move towardon important divergence might open up between Hanoi and Poiping. The Chinese ore themselves not suffering direct military damage and they fear that negotiations would give thehance to incroaso its role in Vietnam. Thus they would exert atrong pressuros to dissuado tho DRV from entering into negotiations. * Footnotes of dissent from this paragraph appear on tho ncoct page.
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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Assistant Chief of staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Aool stent Chief of Naval Operationsssistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Director of NSA, do not agree with tha Judgment expressed in this paragraph. They believe that It should road as follows: "If air strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of communication from South China, the chances of Chlneae Cccmunist air Intervention from Chinese bases would Increase. Nevertheless, we believe the Chlneae vould be reluctant to engage the US In an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations. We therefore consider it unlikely that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China."
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the chances are better than even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US under these circumstances. Even if air engagements wore accidental they would have extremely dangerous repercussions and If they were deliberate they could not fall to leadider war.
III. SOVIET RE/lCTIOKS
Tho USSR hopes for co eventual Ccomuniot victory in South Vietnam, hut it ia marc conscious than Peiping ond Hanoi of the larger oilitcry risks. Moreover, the USSR wants to nolntain or improve its lnfluenco over the DRV and in tho world Communist movencnt generally; it does not wish the kind of Ccanunist victory which would magnify tho prestige and povor of China. Unliko Peiping and Hanoi, Moscow is concerned vith minimizing damage to Bcc'-West relations. In this situation, the USSRourse of negotiations,but it cannot afford to appear laggard in supporting the DRV, and it is deepening its commitment to Hanoi's cause.
In tho circumstances outlined in cor assumptions, wc believe that tho USSR would see no alternative to continued support of the DRV ond further expansion of Its military aid. It vould thus be likely toRV request for additional air defense equipment and personnel. It vould probably feel compelled to comply promptly with DRV requests to replace air defense equipment dcotroyed by US attacks in the Hanoi area. The Soviet aidmight be hampered by Chinese restrictions on transit righta.
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Tbe USSR vould probably Indicate that. If the US remains unyieldlng In Vietnam, it focao trouble clocvhoro In the world, ao, for examplo, in Berlin. Wo do not think, however, that Moscow would confront usajor challenge. Hor do wc believe that the Sovlcto would wish to foreclose the poooibillty of negotiations at bodc future stage; indeed, they would probably work to keep this possibility alive on both sides.
Wa bolieve that tho US decisions considered hore would produce important reactions In general Soviet policy. Moscow would almost certainly harden its general stance toward the US. For example, although the Soviets have agreed to renewedtalks, partly in order to check the deterioration in East-Wast relations, the aosumed US course in Vietnam vould probably lead them to devote too talks entirely to attacks on tbe US or even to break then off.
The assumed movoo would carry total US militaryaboveillion total which wo estimate for tho USSR; they would alsoeversal of the downward trend in US military spending which Koaygln cited in Justifying5 reduction in the overt Soviet military budget. Wc believe that
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tbe ussr's declared policy of restraining or even reducing mlll-taxy expenditures bos been under attack by allitary apokconcn in recent mootha and io the subject of debate within the collective leadorchip. it is likely that tbe us moves, plus the worocning of gGDorcl soviet-us relations, would strengthen the position of those arguing for additional nllltcry appropriations, in those circumstances, tho ussr probably would respond with an overt increase in its own military opending.
iv. hob-communist rsacticns
21. moot non-camauniflt nations have already realized that the us, already heavily engaged in south vietnam, is likely to increase its commitment if necessary. the measures hero considered wouldause rising alarm because, in combination with communist statements in response, they would revive and fortify fears of increased cold-war tensions and evenueh larger wor. this might moke seme governments moro reluctant to give public support to us policy, particularly governmento inhe uk, canada, and norway. significant extension of bombing in north vietnam would increase apprehension in tbcoo countries. over tho longer run, however, tho more importantwill depend on tho subsequent course of the conflict.
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non-Caxninlst Asia, Ja-^an off era the cost We believe tbe Sato Government would maintainof supporting US policy in oplte of howls from theoppoaltlon forces. Sato's position would be made muchhowever, if Okinawa or especially Japan werea greatly expanded conduit for support of US foreeoor if it appeared that China was about toIn the flchtinc- India would deplore Increasedthe DRV but would otherwise continue its position ofand private acquiescence in US actions in Pakistan, hoping to continue to receive Americanreraainlne on pood terms with China, would reaffirmand its noninvolvement In Vietnam.
V. REACTIONS TO THE MODE OF AIWOUHCEMEHT
the announcenents were made in piecemeal fashionno more high level emphasis than necessary, thea crisis atmosphere might be mitigated. It Is alsoprivate assurancoj to tha USSR that the US Increasemilitary strength vas directed solely toward thoVietnam, and not meant to improve the US positionis
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soviets, might soften the tone of the soviet response. this avoidance of strident recriminations might in turn decreasethe negative reaction of non-communist countries. we believe, however, that the reactions of the communist powers, particularly in the military field, would not be basically changed by the method of announcement. we also believe that there would still be increased apprebenoion among non-conmunist countries.
AKNEX
LAND RAIL
The North Vietnamese roil oyotcn io octcr gouge. Tho two rail linco which connect the railroads of North Vietnam vlth those of Conmuniot China arc the moot Important logistic liuko for tho movement of military oupplioo from Cooouniot China to North Viotnaa. The main routeanoi to Dong Dongconnectb vith the Chinese standard-gauge network at Ping-hoiong in KVaugol Province, where cargo lo then tranoloadod. The Hanoi-Leo Cni routo continucoetor-gauge lino into China'o Yunnan Province terminating noor Kunming. Thio is Kunming'o only rail connection with the main rail aye-ten of China. The railroad froa Haiphong to Hanoi ia important because Haiphong is tho main port of North Viotnaa.
North Vietnam is short of rolling stock, withocccotivcoreight euro,mall number of potroleua tank earn. Mditional motor-gauge rolling stock and locoraotives could be obtained quickly only from Yunnan Province whore the supply is not large.
the maximum capacity of each of tha rail routes to china leetric tons per day each way, but theong dang line is the more important for the movs tent of military supplies because itink with the rail system of all of china. some of the vulnerable points en this line are the bridge over the 3ong ceu aboutiles noilhesst of hanoi, the bridge over the red river in hanoi itself, end the bridge over the canal des rapidesiles northeast of hanoi. some of the vulnerable points on the hanoi-loo cai rail route ore the bridge over the song lo (claire) river aboutiles northwest of hanoi, the bridgeiles southeast of vinh yen,ridge over the ham si river at the border with communist china.
laud transportation: road
k. the capacity of all reads leading to hanoi from kwnngsi province is metricay during the dry seasonetricay during the wet seaoon. the most importaut is highway route ia, which runs generally parallel to the hanoi-dong dang railroad lino. the limiting section of this roadapacity ofetric tons per day during the dry season andetric tons during the wet season. there are alternate, but longer, road systems through hong cai and
Cao Bang. There la only one through road between Hanoi and Lao Cai. This roadniting sectionapacity ofetric tons per day during the dry season and is not capable of supporting truck traffic during the wet season. Another rood west of the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line also connects Yunnan Province with Hanoi. The capacity of tho limiting section of this road Isetric tons per day during tbe dry soasonetric tons during the wet season. Tbe most important single target for disrupting road traffic is tbe Dsuner bridge across the Red River in Hanoi.
INLAND WATER ROUTES
Red River could be used to supplement other meansfrom Yunnan Province, particularly during the wetroad capacities are reduced.
SEA ROUTES
Vietnam'a only major port, at Haiphong, laand haa relatively modern cargo-handling facilities. ports at Cam Pba ond Hon Gai are well equipped toexport of coal from nearby mines, but have very limitedhandling other types of cargo and ore not connected torail system.
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7. Tbe bulk of ocean-going traffic from China to North Vietnam originates at Canton, Swatcw, Port Bayard, and porta on Hainan Island. In addition, there arcotor-povorodoo soiling Junko operating in tho coastal waters of southern China and the adjacent northern coasts of North Vlotnam. If one-third of tbe available Junka were devoted to supplying gooflo to North Vietnam, they would be capable of transporting anons annually. These shallow-draft craft would not require port facilities for off-loading, but could discharge cargoes over the beach. This type of traffic, which could move close to shore, would bo difficult to detect and intercept. Such cargoes would, of course, bo limited to Items which could be easily handled by tbeBe methods.
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Original document.
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