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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONSOSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION
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Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARC as inducted overleaf5
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,C and NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELUGENCE BOARD
ononcurring were the Director of IntelUgence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE ISWHEN USED SEPARATELY
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5
: COMMUNIST AHD FREE WORID PJ3ACTIOHSOSSIBLE US COURSE OF ACTION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate foreign reactions, particularly those of the Cccnunlct powers,pecified US course of action with respect to Victnan.
ASSttSTTOHS
For purposes of this estimate, wc assume that the US decides to Increase its forces in South Vietnam toov caber. Ve further assume related decisions to call upeserves, to extend tours of duty at the rateonth, to Increase the regular strength of the armed services0 over the next year, and to double draft calls.
Wc further assume (a) that thc increase In forces would he accompanied by statements reiterating our objectives and our readiness for unconditional discucslons, (b) that US forces would be deployed so that no major grouping threatened or appeared to threatenh Parallel, and (c) that we night either continue present policy with regard to air strikes or extend these strikes in North Vietnam to Include attacks on land (but not sea) lines of ccccunicatlon froa South China* and military targets ln the Hanoi-Salphcng area.
THE ESTIMATE
1. Communists and non-Ccraunists alike would see ln the
increased US military involvement introng indication that the US saw little hope of early negotiations- This would be particularly true If, at thc same tine, thc US extended its air operations in North Vietnam.
See Annexiscussion and nap of both land and current sea routes from China to North Vietnam.
I. VIET COHG AMD DRV REACTIONS
At present the Viet Cong (VC) and Horth Vietnamese (DOT) leaders appear confident that their course in South Vietnam premises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on their port. They seem to believe that they cancries of local military successes which, sooner or later will bring victoryenbinotioneteriorating South Vietnamese array (ARVH) morale andollapse of antl-Comcunlst government In Saigon, and an exhaustion of the US will to persist.
We do not believe that inauguration cf the US actions here assumed would basically alter these emaciations. The VC and the DRV probably have come to expect increased USand they probably believe that the VC, with increased Horth Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forces. Hor do we think that the er^crjeien of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area would significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South
or persuade the Hanoi Govermcnt that the price of persisting was unacccptably high.*
k. If the extension of air attacks were to include sustained interdiction of land lines of ccmunication leading from South China, these actions would obviously make the delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid more difficult and costly, and would have a
5 Tho Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, disagrees with the Judgment made in this paragraph and vould substitute the We believe that Inauguration of the US actions here assumed, which eaphaslze US willingness and determination to become more deeply involved in combat operations in the South ond eliminate the concept of on areaIn Horth Viotnau,easonable chance of basically altering thc Conuunists* short-tern expectations. Wh.il* the VC end the DRV probably have cone to expect some additional US conmitnents, and they probably believe that the VC, vith increased Horth Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset thc effect of larger US forces, such confidence could be quite quickly undermined by effectively expanded US combat operations. Extension of air attacks to military targets In the Hanoi and Haiphong orces vould pose thc added threat that urban/industrial targets night be next. The selective and United nature of US bonbing target selections to date may hove led Hanoi seriously to underestimate theof us deteraination to exert the power necessary to force discontinuance of DRV support for thc VC, US military actions resulting fron the assumed prograa could veil persuade the Hanoi Govcrment that the price of persisting was becoming unacccptably high."
serious lnpact on the limited industrial sector of the DRV general economy. It would still notritical impact on tbe CcGxaunlst determination to persevere and would not, at least for the short terra, seriously impair VC capabilities in South Vietnam.
5- If, in addition, POL targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were destroyed by air attacks, the DRV's ability to provide trans-potation for the general economy would be severely reduced. It would also ccopllcatc their military logistics. If additional PAVN forces were employed ln South Vietnamcale sufficient to counter increased US troop strength, this would substantially increase the amount of supplies needed in the South. The VC also depend on supplies froa the North to maintain their present level of large-scale operations, lhe accumulated strainsrolonged curtailment of supplies received from North Vietnam would obviously have an impact on the Comcuniet effort In the South- They would certainly Inhibit and night even prevent an increase in large-scale VC military activity, though they would probably not force any significant reduction in VC terrorist tactics of haracsceat and sabotage. These strains, particularly if theyerious check in the development of VC capabilities for large-scale (raulti-battalion) operations might lead thc DRV to consider
negotiations.* But the final decision on whether to seek negotiations vould dependreat extent on political developments in the Indochina osroa and elsewhere, and on the actual course of combat in South Vietnam.
6, In response to the US program, the Communists vould almost certainly undertake measures to increase their own strength in South Vietnamigher level of struggle. They are already augmenting VC units and dispatching additional PAVN forces to South Vietnam; the assumed US actions vould probably resultpeeding up of this process. By the endhe total of PAVM regulars in organized units in South Vietnam could00 men. Although the Communists are aware of thc dangers of concentrating their troops in large numbers, they might, during the next few months, attempt major assaults against GVN forces and positions, seeking to shatter ARVN before the Increased weight of US strength could be brought to bear.
* The Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Deportment of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believe that in spite of greater damage and harassment caused by sustained oir attack on lines of communication (LOG) and other targets, tne capacities of DRV and Laos LOC are sufficient to permit support of the war in South Vietnam at the scale envisaged in this estimate. Other significant factors supporting this position are theof doing Irreparable damage to LOC capacity; demonstrated CcmnuniBt logistic resourcefulness and ability to move large amounts of war materiel long distances over difficult terrain by primitive means; and the difficulty of detecting, let alone stopping, sea infiltration.
U'tf' S-
In coping with larger US forces employedore Degressive fashion, we believe thot thc Viet Cong would sock to avoid thc kind of engagemente whicherious Communist defeat. Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended to bleed ond humiliate US forces, trapping ondisolated units where possible. inimum, the Communists would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land communication lines and would step up thc dispatch of small, expendable teams on cabotage ond assassination missions designed to moke tbc US look impotent or foolish. The Communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos.
Over thc longer run, thc Communists' strategy will depend upon thc actual course of combat and thoir estimates of South Vietnamese otability and US will to persist. Tbey are predisposed to attach great weight to signs of disintegration in Saigon and to manifestations of domestic US opposition to Administration policies. These boost popular morale on thc Communist sldo and reinforce tha leadership's conviction that Communist staying power is inherently superior.
Should future military and political developments bring this conviction into serious doubt, thc DBV might oxprcao
increased interest ln negotiations. However, they would endeavor to preserve their own freed on of action while laying inhibitions on CS/gVH nllitary operations, hoping to promote diDarray in Saigon nnd encourage US opinion ln favor of withdrawal.
10. Faced with the buildup outlined ln our assumptions, tbc DRV vould probably request core air defense cquipacnt fron the USSR, Including SAMs, fighters, technicians, and perhaps pilots, particularly if US air attacks were expanded. Froa the Chinese, Hanoi would probably requeot moro radar equipment,artillery, and technicians ln additionurther increase in shipments of infantry nrmo and ammunition. Hanoi night also request China (and, perhaps, Horth Korea) to furnish aircraft and pilots. Ic general, however, wo believe that Hanoi would wish to maintain some llmitc on,ough balance between, Soviet and Chinese personnel.
U. Deployments on thc scale here assumed would cause thc DRV Bono concern about US invosion. This would be true even if US forces took up poeiticsm which were not suggestive of an invasion. Wc believe, however, that thc DRV vould not react to thlo concern by requesting thc introduction of Chinese ccabat forces. It probably would mokeoquust only if actual invasion seemed clearly imminent.
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II. CHIHESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS
12. Thc Chinese ore probably even more convinced than the Viotnaneae Communists that if the DRV/VC remain firm, in the end thc US will be wholly defeated in Vietnam. Renewed USevidenced by thc buildup assumed in this estimate, would give the Cbineoo some pause but, in our view, not much. They would believe that thc US measures were sufficient only to postpone defeat while magnifying its eventual effect.
13- He do not believe that the Chinese would react to tho assumed US moves Including thc present level of air attacks, by overtly intervening In the military struggle with combat forces. They arc already otepping up their military assistance, including tho introduction of some rear service dements into North Vietnam, and would give more aid if requested by the DRV. Moreover, thoy would try to increase alarm among non-Communists, especially thc US public, by intensifying their propaganda and reiterating thoir willingness to accept hostilities If attacked by the US. Thoy would probably continue to strengthen their forces in South China ond might take oome further overt steps toward mobilization.
ih. if air strikes vera extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area
and particularly to linos of ccaiunlcctlon frca South China, tho chances of Chiacso Communist olr intcrventien free Chinese banco vould increase. Thlo vould particularly be true if tbe air strikes verc effective in cutting the nain roods and roil lines over vhich the principal supplies are nerving. While vc believe thc Chinese would be reluctant to engage the US in an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military inntallations, we consider the chances are about oven thot Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over Horth Vietnam from bases within China. We do not believe, however, thot this vould lead to greatly increased Chinese Communist participation ln the conflict. In cny case. If large numbers of US aircraft were operating close to the frontiers of China the likelihood of hostile encounters vould be high."
15. If, in the circumotoncoo described In paragraphhe Vict Cong and thc DRV0 point wished to move towardan important divergence might open up between Hanoi and Peiping. The Chinese ore themselves not suffering direct military damage and tbey fenr that negotiations would give thohanco to increase its role ln Vietnam. Thus they vould exert strong pressures to dloouado thc DRV from entering into negotiations.
Footnotes of dissent from this paragraph appear on the next page.
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The Director, Defense InteUigence Agency; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Assistant Chief of Baval Operationsssistant Chief of Staff, InteUigence, USAF; and the Director of MSA, do not agree with the Judgment expressed in this paragraph. They believe that lt should read as follows: "If air strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention from Chinese bases would increase. Nevertheless, we believe the Chinese would be reluctant to engage the US in an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations. We therefore consider it unlikely that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China."
The Director of InteUigence and Research, Department of State, believes that the chances are better than even that Chinese aircraft would deUberately engage the US under these circumstances. Even if air engagements were accidental they would have extremely dangerous repercussions and if they were deUberate they could not fail to leadider war.
III. SOVIET REACTIONS
16. Thc USSR hopes for on eventual Communist victory In South Vietnam, hut it is more conscious than Peiping and Hanoi of tho larger military risks. Moreover, thc USSR wants to maintain or Improve ito influence over tbc DRV and in the world Communist movement generally; It does not wish the kind of CcojmuniBt victory which would magnify thc prestige and power of China. Unlike Peiping and Hanoi, Moscow is concerned with minimising damage to Ben*-Hoot relations. In this situation, tho USSRourse of negotiations, but it cannot afford to appear laggard in supporting the DRV, and it Is deepening Its coanltoent to Hanoi'a cause.
In thc circumstances outlined inssumptions, we believe that the USSR would sec no alternative to continued support of the DRV and further expansion of ito military aid. It would thuc be likely toRV request for additional air defense equipment and personnel. It would probably feel compelled to ccaply promptly with DRV requests to replace air defense equipment destroyed by US attacks in thc Hanoi area. Tho Soviet aidmight bo hampered by Chinese restrictions on transit rights.
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The USSH would probably Indicate that, if tho US remains unyielding in Vlctnco, it faces trouble clocvherc in tbc world, oo, for exoople, in Berlin. Wc do not think, however, thot Moscow vould confront uonjor chollongo. Hot do ve believe that tho Soviets vould wish to foreclose tho possibility of negotiations ot some future stage; indeed, they vould probably work to keep this possibility alive on both sides.
Wc bellevo that the US decisions considered here would produce important reactions in general Soviet policy. Moscow would almost certainly harden Its general stance toward the US. For example, although thc Soviets have agreed to renewedtalks, portly ln order to check the deterioration in Eaot-Woot relations, tho aooumed US course in Vietnam would probably lead them to devote tbc talks entirely to attacks on the US or even to break then off.
Thc assumed moves would carry total US militaryaboveillion total which wo estimate for the USSR; they would alsoeversal of the dovnword trend in US military spending which Kosygin cited In Justifying5 reduction in the overt Soviet military budget. We believe that
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tbe USSR's declared policy of restraining or even reducingexpenditures ono been under attack by aiUtory opokecnen in recent aonths and ia thc subject of debate within tho collective leadership. It is likely that tho OS moves, plus the worsening of general Soviet-US relations, would strengthen the position of those arguing for additional military appropriations. In those circumstances, the USSB probably would respond with an overt increase in its own militory spending.
IT. RCH-COHMuBIST REACTIONS
21. Most non-Ccrauniot nations have already realized that tbe US, already heavily engaged in South Vietnam, is likely to incroaso its canmltment if necessary. The measures here considered would nevertheless cause rising alarm because, in combination with Coaaur-iot statements in response, tbcy would revive and fortify fears of increased cold-war tensions ond evenuch larger var. This night make some governments more reluctant to give public support to US policy, particularly governments inho UK, Canada, and Norway. Significant extension of bombing in North Vietnam would increase apprehension in thono countrieo. Over tho longer run, however, thc more importantiocs will depend on thc oubaoqucnt course of thc conflict.
22. In non-Coacuniet Asia, Japan offero theerious problem. He believe the Sato Government wmld maintain itB policy of supporting US policy in spite of howls from the press and opposition forces. Sato's position vould be made much more difficult, however, if Okinawa or especially Japan were toreatly expanded conduit for support of US forces in Vietnam, or if it appeared that China was about to become Involved in tho fightlnC- India would deplore increased bombing of the DRV but would otherwise continue its position of public questioning and private acquiescence ln US actions in South Vietnam. Pakistan, hoping to continue to receive American aid while remaining oo good terms with China, vould reaffirm its neutrality and its nonlavolvement ln Vietnam.
V. REACTIONS TO THE MODSINCUNCEMENT
23- If tho announcements wore made In piecemeal fashion and vith no more high level emphasis than necessary, the developmentrisis atmosphere might bo mitigated. It is also possible that private assurances to the USSR that tbe US increase in overall military strength was directed solely toward the situation in Vietnam, and not meant to improve tho US positionis
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the Soviets, roicht soften the tone of the Soviet response. This avoidance of strident recriminations micht in turn decreasethe netjative reaction of non-Communist countries. We believe, however, that the reactions of the Cccmmist powers, particularly in the military field, would not be basically chanced by the method of ennouncanient. We also believe that thoro would still be increased apprehension among non-Communist countries.
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ANNEX
LAND TRANSPORTATION: IL
The North Viotnooooo roll oystcn ic meter gauge. The two mil linca which connect thc railrooda of North Viotnon with thocc of Cconuriot China ore thc moot important logistic linko for the oov-xjeat of military supplies frco Ccttomiat China to North Victual. Thc coin routeanoi to Dcrg Dongconnects with the Chinese standard-gouge network ot Ping-hciong io Kwangel Province, where cargo io then trar-oloodod. Theol routo continuesauge line into Chica'o Yui'.nan Province tcruinoting near Kunming. This la Kunning's only rail connection uith the main rail oyoten of China. The railroad fron Haiphong to Hanoi ia important because Haiphong lo the main port of North Victnon.
North Victncn is short of rolling stock, withocomotivesreight cero,nail number of petroleum tank cars. Additional motor-gauge rolling stock aad locomotives could be obtained quickly only from Yunnan Province where the supply is not large.
Excludedutomatic dcunsrojjmng and
lification
AKIIEX
3- The maximum capacity of each of tti rail routeo to China ioetric tone per day each way, but theDang line is the more important for the mova ieot of military supplies because itink with the roil system of all of China. Some of tbe vulnerable points cn this line are tho bridge over tho Song Cau aboutiles noitheast of Hanoi, the bridge over the Bed River in Hanoi itself, tnd the bridge over the Canal des Rapidesiles northeast of Hanoi. Seme of tbe vulnerable points oo the Banol-Loo Cal rail route are the bridge over the Song Lo (Claire) River aboutiles northwest of Hanoi, the bridgeiles southeast of Vlnh Yen,ridge over the Ham Si River at the border with Communist China.
LAHD TRANSPORTATION: ROAD
fc. The capacity of oil rcado leading to Hanoi from Kwongsi Province is metricay during the dry seasonetricay during the wet season. The most important is highway Route IA, which runs generally parallel to the Hanoi-Dong Dang railroad lino. The limiting section of this roadapacity ofetric tons per day during the dry season andetric tons during the wet season. There arc alternate, but longer, road systems through Kong Cal and
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AHHEX
Cao Bang. Therely one through road between Hanoi and Lao Cai. This roadimiting sectionapacity ofetric tons per day during the dry season and is not capable of supporting truck traffic during the wet season. Another road west of tho Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line also connecto Yunnan Province with Hanoi. The capacity of the limiting section of this road Isetric tons per day during the dry seasonetric tons during the wet season. The most important single target for disrupting road traffic is the Daumer bridge across the Bed River in Hanoi.
UltARD HATER ROUTES
he Red River could be used to supplement other means of transport from Yunnan Province, particularly during the wet season when road capacities are reduced.
SEA ROUTES
6. Horth Vietnam's only major port, at Haiphong, is roil served and has relatively modern cargo-handling facilities. Two secondary ports at Cam Pha and Hon Oai are well equipped to handle the export of coal from nearby mines, but have very limited facilities for handling other types of cargo ond are not connected to Horth Vietnam's rail system.
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ANNEX
7. The bulk of ocean-going traffic fron Chi no to North Vletnoo origlnntco nt Cnntoc, Svetov, Fort Bayard, and porta on Hainan Iolcnd. In addition, there areotcr-povcrcd0 oailing junks operating in tho coastal waters of oouthern China and the adjacent northern eoooto of North Vietnam. If onothird of tho available junks vcrc devoted to oapplying goods to North Vietnam, they would be capable of transporting anons annually. Those ohullow-druft crart would not require port facilities for off-loading, but could discharge cargoes over thc beach. This typo of traffic, which could move clooc to shore, would be difficult to detect and Intercept. Such cargoes would, of course, be limited to items which could be easily handled by these methods.
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Original document.
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