5
i>
L3)
Mandatory Review
5
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia
Sobmirfod by tho DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indicated overleaf5
FOR RELEASE
4
wo
CONTROLLED"
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:
The Central lriMiEgence Agency ond the irteir.ger.ee orgoniiarkxis of theof State, Defeme, ond NSA.
Concorring:
Director of Inrolligcnee and Research. Daportmant of Stale Director, Detente Intelligence Agency Director of the Notional Security Agency
Abstaining!
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistantho Director, Federal Buroau of Invetlfgallon, ihe subject being ourtido of theirHdiction.
WArlNtNG
kwet
This material contains informallon affecllng ihe National Defeme of the United Slate* within Ihe meaning of the espionage laws.SC,, theor revelation of whkh In any manner lo an unautrtorned person Is prohibited.
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet and Chinese Communist Strategy and Tactics in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia
e"
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
the problem1
conclusions
discussion
4
and
Military 8
Economic
Trade"
Cultural Relations13
Communist Movements
The Covert Mechanism19
IV. COMMUNIST PROGRESS AND21
South
The Arab
Iran. Turkey. Greece, and Cyprus28
V. SUMMING29
ANNEX; THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (MS)33
SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNISTAND TACTICS IN NORTH AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA
THE PROBLEM
To assess the nature, extent, and present effectiveness of Soviet and Chinese Communist overt and covert efforts in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia/ and to estimate the outlook for such efforts over the next several years.
CONCLUSIONS
of the countries in this area have been opened upand other Communist penetration by the liquidation ofcolonial empires and by the widespread emergence ofprotest against the concentration of political and economicthe handsmall ruling class. Over the past decade or so.has injected itself dynamically into the whole area. Chinasignificant role rnainly in South Asia. With the exception ofwhose progress whilealance between thethe West has gicady impressed certain leaders in the area,European countries have ridden into the area on Soviet )
influence in the area has been achievedthe customary instruments of contemporary statecraft.considerable degree of success, Moscow has exploitedanti-colonial resentments, encouraged neutralist sentiment,sides in local disputes. The USSR, andesser extentmounted cultural and student exchange programs andtrade relationships. The Soviets have extendedf theountries in the area, and six of them have armieslargely equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods.
'The following countries aie induded in this estimate: all the Arab states (including those In noilhem Africa.UAH, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia. Algeria, attdsrael, Greece, Turkey. Cyprus. Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Ceylon.
The economic and military aid programs have not only contributed to the Soviet image in the area, but also provide Moscow with some potential for leverage by slowing down projects, failing to deliver spares, and the like, though this leverage could not be exerted without some political cost.
overt Sovietexample, diplomatic, trade,cover for an extensive clandestineCommittee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief(GRU)ide role in carrying out foreignfrom the classic intelligence collection functions, theseoperations to denigrate the US and other Western powers,and exploit press and other propaganda outlets, and toin positions in local governments, political parties,they can influence policy in Moscow's favor. The Sovietslocal officials at various levels, including some holdingpositions. In general, the Soviet covert operationsfairly successful. )
Communist nations also strive to develop and usemovements and international frontew sizable legal or quasi-legal organizations, asGreece, and Cyprus,ozen or so small, mostly illegal,well organized parties. Their organizational strength hasthem to survive repression and, on occasion, to maketemporary gains in the wake of political upheaval. On theCommunist parties have made little progress as masshave done best in attracting discontented intellectuals,little headway among the peasants who comprise the bulkpopulation, and only somewhat more among workers. Thisthe Soviets, in some countries at least, to slacken their effortsa mass organization and turn insteadactic ofnationalist or revolutionary movements. )
both overt and covert operations, the Soviets probablythat they have metair degree of success inpresence and influence in the area. They have, bx"oad!ybeen most successful in the Arab world and least successfulof Slavic domination remainsin Greece, Turkey,They will probably continue their efforts to establish anfeeling and interest with the moderruzing forces in thethough tailoring their approach for individual countries.
Some of the countries we are dealing with have adequately functioning political systems, sufficiently coherent societies, or strong enough leadership to be relatively impervious to Communist efforts to make them into Marxist socialist societies,ajorumber of others lack most or all of these qualities, and upsets in their fragile political situations could present Communists with goodtoosition of power. )
prospects for the Communist powers in the MiddleAfrica, and South Asia over the next several years might bestas "more of thehe generally low state ofCommunist parties is likelv to persist, although the presenceof the Communist countries will expand. The influenceis likely to increase, particularly in those states followingpath. The Chinese will also be more active, althoughtheir effort will be directed against the Soviets, thusprogress. We recognize that in some placesdevelop so as to provide promising oppoi'tunities for theto come to power; nevertheless, we cannot specificallysuch situationthings considered-doubt that anythe area will come under Communist control, We believe thatof nationalism in the area will remain strong, and thatwill continue, by and large successfully, to play off East
sorts of development could give the Coinmunists avictory. The first, essentially unpredictable, iseader who decided to take his country into theeither rapidly like Castro, or by stages. Another woulda successful Soviet or Chinese effort toompleteidentity of interests with the nationalist forces of theAs long as this identity remains negative, devoted lospecial Western positions and the like, it will beserious, but not fatal. But if these nationalist forcesbelieve that the Western powers, and especially the US.opposed to their desire for national independenceprogress, the opportunities for the Communist powersa fundamental gain in the "Third World" would go upwhich felt they had no other way to turn would bestrong pressures to enter upon still closer collaboration withworld. )
DISCUSSION I. THE SETTING
n (he years since the end of World War II, the USSR lias turned outward from Us concentration on building "socialism in onet lias emergedowerful industrialized nation and has come to play an international role consonant with its military and economic power. Ii has reasserted historic Russian interests which had not been pressed in any such fashion since before the Revolutionoscow has expanded its diplomatic and commercial relations the world over, and lias enteredompetition with the US and the West for position and influence. In the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, this Soviet drive lias coincidedesurgence of nationalism and an area-wide drive for independence from European colonial rule and special influence. The Soviet Union and many of the emerging nations haveongruence of interest in reducing and eliminating special Western positions.
In consequence; the USSR has made great progress in projecting its influence in the area; nationalist forces, provided for the first lime with an alternative to traditional Western suppliers and markets, have thus had greater freedom of maneuver, and the Soviets have been able to exploit local situations to their advantage. Sovietthe limits posed by their far smallerCommunist penetration has been Assisted also bv another aspect ofwidespread emergence of movements protesting the concentration of political and economic power in the handsmall ruling class.
owever. Communist activity in the area under discussion was limited, as il was in most of the world outside of Europe and the Far East. The Soviets (and some other Bloc countries} maintained diplomatic relations wherever possible.he USSR had official missions in onlyf the countries we are dealing with in this estimate. The Soviets were making some efforts to promote local Communist parties, were founding front organizations, and were conducting propaganda efforts. In most cases, the Communist parties were too small and too poorly organized lo achieve much by themselves, and Soviet policy opposed "national front" techniques. In the instances wheresupported local Communist efforts to seize power byndia and Greece, the efforts failed, and the failure damaged the standing andof the local parties.
Following the death of Stalin, tin- Soviet leaders began to look on the newly independent countries not as hostile bourgeois states but as potentially useful instruments or allies in the Soviet conflict with the West. Every sovereign state but one. (Saudi Arabia} has established diplomatic relations with Moscow, and more than half recognize Communist China. (Sec map.astcountries have ridden into the area on Soviet coattails, although Yugo-
ia has achieved wide acceptance on its own. Soviet cultural, commercial, and propaganda activities have followed in the wake of diplomatic iclations. Economic and military assistance to countries in this area accounts for aboutercent of the total Soviet foreign aid effort.
II. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
looking at the area after the death of Stalin, the Soviets believed that anti-colonial animosities, certain local disputes, and desires for economic advance were such that Soviet aid and political support could accelerate developments in favor of both Soviet interests and those of local Communists. At the same time, the Soviet leaders probably saw an opportunity to check US progress inmilitary facilities and treaty relationships. As one country after another accepted Soviet aid and adopted neutralist and even pro-Soviet postures inmatters. Soviet confidence in the success of these tacticsowever, Moscowritical reappraisal. Soviet actions were neither winning countries quickly to alignment with the Bloc, nor were they advancing the interests of domestic Communist movements. The need for reappraisal was sharpened by anti-Communist moves in several Arab states and by the emerging Sino-Sovict dispute.
Soviet policy in recent years hasecognition that the struggle in this area willong one and thai the widely differing types of regime and societyariety of approaches. This has been reflected in theof new and interrelated"national democracy" and then "revolutionarydefined the "progressive'* political role of radical leaders and provided the Soviets with an Ideological rationalization for dealing with them. The former was intendedevice by which Communists could gradually move into government roles and, idtimately, assume control. "Revolutionary democracy'* went one step further: it has allowed such leaders as Nasser and Ben Bella to associate themselves with the Communist worldadopting Communist patterns of government or even necessarily accepting any important degree of influence by domestic Communists, In several Arab countries, this approach has involved playing down the Communist movement and encouraging local Communists to join and work within the ruling single party. In effect, Moscow accepted the view that if effective revolutionarydeveloped outside of Communist party control, they deserve support andat the expense of local Communists* interests.
The long-term goal of the Soviets is to supplant Western with Communist influence, leading in timeoscow-oriented Communist political, economic, and social system. Over the period of ihis estimate, their goals are more limited-The Soviets are trying to erode Western positions, to make their own ideas and techniques accepted in the area. They are, of course, interested in disrupting Greece's and Turkey's relations with NATO and eliminating Western bases and facilities in the area. They seek to establish ever closer lies with keyAlgeria, the UAR, India. They have little hope that local Communists will come to power soon, either through developmentass movement or through
coup d'etat, and they might find an avowedly Communist regime toactical encumbrance. Rather they arc working to bring nationallsl regimesInto such close .issodntlon with Moscoweversal of the trendvirtually impossible. The Soviets do not upprar to be seeking military lwses. but they certainly recognize that the denialiven area to Westernorks to their own military advantage. Moreover, the establishment of an Hoes and other communication facilities helps the Soviets give support to revolutionary groups, as it has already in Africa.
from their contest with India lot advantage along thespine, the Chinese were liardly active In the areaewwhen the Sino-Suvict split became acute. They did back the AlgerianFrance with arms and diplomatic support. Since Chou En-lai'sthe Middle East and Africaetping has worked hard toacceptance end influence The Chinese do not accept the possibilitytransition to social inn as the Soviets do. and tendesult lo lookmovements and truly revolutionary situations lo exploit. Wltcrcare unlikely, they are willing to use conventional aid andinstrument to further Chinese interests. Although the Chinese andare both pursuing the short-range goal of expelling Westernpresence, their mcdiods differ and their respective Interests arc comingconflict. This competition interferes with their eflorts to guidetoward coenmunlsrn and limits to some extent the effectivenesspolicies against Western Interests.
III. MEANS AND METHODS
of anti-colonial resentmentsajor feature of Ihrworlds approach to Ihe area. These sentiments generally lie closesurfnee; the populations of most of these countries are inclined tohistory of subjection to Western powers for much that is lvrongownt is remarkably easy for the various Communaltake advantage of this by associating themselves, through tlsesr propagatxLspositions in the UN, with the deeply felt antipathy to colonialism.and oilier special Interests. The Communists liave also made usevariety of Afro-Asian and similar international organisations, many ofcontrol or greatly influence- Both the Soviets and ihe Chineseto get these institutions to take an extreme anti-Western line,recent years Sino-Sovfet hostility has antagonized some members andeSectiveness.
Communist countries generally see their cause advanced notthe reduction of colonialist influence but else by Use decline or fall olconservative regimes, monarchical or otherwise. The current label
'Seine of the more important are the World fence Council, ihr- utlerriiiUonal Union of Students, ihe Afro-Asian Peoples' Solldnrily Organization, urul the World FedcratUm of Democratic Youth.
for both ti ntl-colonial and anti-conservative activities is "National Liberationnder this designation, Moscow has given direct support to republican Yemen and has permitted the uar and Iraq to pas* on Soviet weapons to terrorists in Aden and rebels in Oman.
The Soviets have also shown themselves willing to take sides in local quarrels, especially those between "progressive" anda, Westem-oriented) states. Moscow has often decided that more is to be gained by supporting one contestant than by trying to remain on good terms with two. In South Asia, the USSR has consistently supported India and Afghanistan against Pakistan in the disputes regarding Kashmir and Pushtunistan. The Soviets have backed the Arabs against the Israelis, though not to the point of being willing to actively support on all-out effort to "liberate Palestine."
Their ability to take sides is becoming increasingly limited, however, as their range of interests in the area widens, and particularly as they seclo court such nations as Turkey and Pakistan, which seek lo broaden their international lies. In nearly four years of intermittent and often bloody struggle with Ilaghdad, the Kurdish cause has received steady support on the "clandestine" radios broadcasting from Eastern Europe, but precious little else Except for the Erst months of Raathist rule. Moscow has felt lis Interests were served by maintaining good relations with the Iraqisupplying the weapons and ammunition used to combat the Kurds. The Soviets have seen little benefit for themselves in the Arab unity movement; Moscow's relations with Nasser have been complicated by its support of Iraq under Qasim and of Syria after the breakaway from the UAR. Moscow, despite Pakistan's nnhappine.it at US military assistance for India, cannot offer arms to Pakistan without undercutting its position inlhi.
Military Assistance
rimary feature of the Communis! drive ha* been the sale of military equipment on favorable terms to countries which have asked forrocess begun with the sale of arms to Egypthe Soviets are relativelywilli area stability and feel little responsibility for keeping the peace between antagonists. Hence, they have been frjrthcomlng as to the types and quantities of equipment they are willing to supply, have responded fairly quickly to requests for help, and have imposed no formal restrictions on use of arms. The Soviets perceive in tnibtary aid certain particular advantages which economic assistance does not provide. At modest cost, Moscow can serve as sole supplier to an underdeveloped country which lias been unable to procure elsewhere the type or quantity of arms It desires. Even more than economic aid, armsoffers an opportunity toontinuing dependence on the Bloc because of the recipients' need for training, spare pnrts, and technical support. Moreover, arms program* enable the Communist countries to establish awtli an elite which is likely to have an important port in tho future politics of ihe recipient country.
MAJOB ITEMS OF SOVIET MILITARY EQl'll'MENT (Figure* ri'fw to deliverieshroughot to current holding*.!
Af glia n.
rniamt-nu
eavy
edium tank
IS
edium tank
, srlf-propelled
mphibious light tank
Pcrsonni'l carrk'is ormoiV'l ami
02
Artillery Pieces-field, IKK)
Naval .
Motor Torpedo Bonis
'Homer1 Class Guided Missile
n
Other, Including Auxiliary and
Landing .
Aircraft
edium Jet bomber
ight
ighter
MIG-iO
7
eavy
Other: helicopters, trainers, uou-
jct eombat, 92
Surface-to-airites '
hw USSR and ibi European associates have provided military aid lo nine countries in theost of it has been supplied at discountshirdalf of established list prices, and payments have usually been spread out over several years. Of the5 billion worth ol" arms thai the Bloc has supplied to countries in the urea, overillion have gone to the UAR, and for this, the UAR has liad to pay only0 million. Other majorhave been Syria, Iraq, India, Yemen, Algeria, and Afghanistan. In all thesamilitary equipment lias become thefor the armed forces involved. While the bulk of it has gone to countries with foreign policies or political institutions having some degree of harmony with Moscow's, the USSR has also been willing to sell military hardware to Cyprus and to such regimes as that of the late Imam of Yemen and of King Hasan in Morocco.
VALUE Of COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE IOM-Jiiiu-
(Hollar values are ui-rircil from list prluutt epoclficd in agrcemrnts where these are known, or by analogy willi thrnt pnrcs In other eases.}
East era CoinmuuUt
Europe China
13
1 12
United Arab
28
Tho l'Altow arms agreement with the USSR in. We bollevo it to bo large buthave no tnforioatlou aa yet to indicate IU value.
Economic Aid
'Cliln'to military aid has- been limited to aboutmillion worthi wippli'fl to Algeria flitting the struggle forhina mny aim have ngrccd to fuuiuh ann* to the PalorgBntznlion.
oscow and its European associates have extended nearly S5 billion in economic credits and grants to countries in the area, of which8 billion has been utilized to date. India and the UAR together have gotten almostercent of total extension! In the area. Other principal beneficiaries are Afgluuustan, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria. The Soviets have gone inide variety of aidpenis, roads, schools, and industrialranging Irom steel mills to factories for light bulbs. Soviet aid is directed
to public sector enterprises which, Moscow believes, further the development ol srxiaiism in the recipient country. An important part of tile Soviet and East European ecoiiomic aid program is the provision of technical assistance, la the pastears, an0 economic tccssriicians have been employed in the area, of wltom0 were present during the last halfuring the same period,rainees went to the USSR and East European countries for various types of technical training.
ommunist China has provided aidar smaller scale Its extensions to eight countries have amounted7 million, of which lessillion has been utilized, almost entirely in Yemen, Ceylon, and Nepal. Pelplng's sluire of economic technicians and trainees has been correspondingly small.
COUMlNIriT ECONOMIC All) January
Million fs ^
Arab
Arab Republic...
h
i
Asia
I -1
- -
0
Trade
he Communist countries have established commercial relations with nearly all countries of the Middle East and South Asia. While total Iradehas tripled5 and reached almostilliont is licavtly concentratedew countriesew commodities. Much of this can be accounted forigorous trade offensive,ubstantial amount results from Soviet willingness to take surplus commodities and to provide goods on long-term credits. Trade and credits are already an important feature ofexperision and are likely to become more so. Of the area's trade with
Communist countries,ercent is with East Europe,ercent with the USSR, and the remainder with China. IndU and the UAR account for almost half this trade; other principal participant* axe Greece, Iran. Syria, and Afghanistan. The share of the total trade of these countries conducted with the Communist nations ranges fromercent for Afghanistan andercent for the UAR, downercent for Syria and the Sudan, andercent for India; the involvement of iho others fails below litis and in many instances is trilling.
he USSR and Czechoslovakia have acquired extensive civil air routes in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. (See map. pagesbey are continuing toubstantial international air service network to countries In the area, and tlirough them to sub-Saharan Africa and to Southeast Asia, Though other Communist countries have established some air routes, their development lias been limited by insufficient modem aircraft and low traffic potential. Local countries are generally willing to grant routes and landing rights. Soviet shipping is increasing andarge proportion of the bilateral trade referred to above. Soviet port improvement and fishery projects in Yemen, Sudan, and the UAR have given Moscow the potential to acquue special facilities for its own trawlers, both legitimate fishing vessel! and those used for intelligence collection.
Cultural Relations
The Soviet Union devotes considerable effort to educational, cultural, and propaganda activities. China is also increasing its activity fn these fields and lias equalled or surpassed the SovietsewPakistan midit Iwd special access or inteiest- More than half the countries in the area have concluded cultural agreements with one or more Communist countries. These may provide for any or all of theof delegations, performers, exhibits, and teachers, import of books at very low prices, and arrangements for scholarship study in the Communist world. The Soviet news agency, TASS, has offices in virtually every coiintry in the area, while the New China News Agency has offices in about half the countries. (See map,adio broadcasting by the Communist countries, in local or commonly used languages, has trebled5 toeek.
Communist propaganda, coming from countries: with no history of colonial domination in the area, emphasizes interests and attitudes which are at least superficially congruent. Consequently, in most countries relatively feware placed in the way of cultural and information activities, and themes of anti-imperialism and Communist progress go Over fairly well. Thecountries have cultural centers in more than two-thirds of the countries of the area, ranging in number fromn India lo one in Pakistan, in the UAR, and in Iran.tudents from the area have taken academic training in Communist countries. While some return disaffected with theirnd while the total number is small in comparison with the tens of thousands educated in the West, such education serves to spread Communist political and economic Ideas in the area. The number of students entering Bloc universities has declined sharplyeak of several thousand1tudents are generally selected through the mechanism of cultural agreements, but many, especially those from countries hostile to the Bloc, are picked up semi-clan-destinely when they run out of funds in Western Europe or through theyouth and student front mechanisms.
Communist Movements
Communist movements run the gamut from legal parties ofin India, Cyprus, andsmall numbers of Communists,to form ain Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In much ofCommunist parties are repressed and kept off balance byInewCyprus, anddieCommunist movements rank as important nationwide politicaltheir power derives from the fact that they are bettermost competing movements. This has enabled the Communists toand, on occasion, to seize opportunities presented by politicalSuch was the case9 under Qasim in Iraq and In
iijuii
SSJI11I
ssss
COMMUNIST PA It TIBS IN TUB AHltA
CP of Jordan
ci' of ix-iki
bore!
Co.
Allr-ciaiiof
Many Ivadeis in jail, sonic abroad.
OM kip lenders hew ntl, aliootwi- Ui Soviet nnii rmilidnnti?eilon,o. Younger, men nd echelon
orguui rations i'oiilrolkd hy parly "
orocco
Socialist RevolutionaryNo otgnnimiMoroMian CP
Nopal..
I) CPP.
CP of bast Pakistan
Saudioaity
CP of -Syr
Sudan CP
Tuiifaiu. Turkey.
iia if. ..
sr<i"
CP of Tunisia
CP of Turkey
of kwpi
National Ulnrulion
Noorunnixrd party
IOtM.Ouu.
|Up toa Unr tlioutuidd
NI
2SD-MKI
Moscow...
llegal; limited youth midia carried mi.Bil.
lk-gal. Lender* in India. Illegal.
. Itejado legality since. Novnnher. Parly divitkd luw lianl and soil line over political ladieslk'Bfll. lanig-timc Communist lender Khnlfil Itnk'Wi in exile in Hnrfern Burape.
. Illtaol Ultlo diseeruiblr BcUvily.llegal. UwlroMt. to. Both dissolved in liiufi, in favor of Arab Hueialisl Union.
. Illegal.
I tall way Workers Union.
more eoiiliilena'u nanna for Cyprus, Jiwli.
(Inline am rouftli tutlinaba, oflvn based on very fragmentary in forma lion. We mi Israel, and Umiue.
Moalponsor or uliempt U) sjkinsor the lenial rump* of Qimmiiuirtm-UNm- ofoutli, Htinii'iit, iiimiiomisltiprki. Werc Important orpmiialions oilier Hum lira.
he Communist partieside variety of tactics, including the infiltration of local organization* andpolitical parties, student groups, ethnic and religious bodies, labor unions, and security forces. They control important trade unions in India, Sudan, Crceee, and Cyprus. Communists have also infiltrated and influenced the National Awami Party in Pakistan. In Greece, the United Democratic Leftegal party which polledercent of the vote in the national electionsnront of the outlawed Greek Communist Party (KKKJ. In the Sudan, the Communist party collaborates with parties and organizations of professional people, youth, and students to oppose the traditional parties. In Algeria and the UAR. the official Communist parties have been dissolved in favor of support of the single socialist party established in each of those countries.
The Communist parties in most of the areu have been unable to capitalize substantially on tho widespread poverty and limited social mobility characteristic of these traditional societies. Hardly anywhere in the areaodern political party been successful in reaching the peasantry, and this is true also In the case of much of the urban population, which is still strongly tradition-bound. Nevertheless, it is within the urban framework ihat such parties,the Communist, seek their principal support, The expansion ofand the growth of industry are gradually eroding traditional attitudes end bringing awareness that change is both possible and desirable- Thus, both the working classes in the towns and the growing educated elements arerecruiting grounds for modernizing parties. Almost without exception, however, the Communists haveoor second to nationalist, reformist movements in winning Support and establishing themselves as the principal modernizing force in developing societies. For the most part. Communist parties have attracted discontented intcUoctuah and only moderate numbers of workers, often from minority groups.
Other factors liave also served to limit the usefulness of Communistto the Soviet Union. Policy direction from abroad often hurts the local Communist party's image and sometirnes creates suspicion' of Soviet motives among local leaders. Communist hostility toward religionetriment where religious beliefs me still strong, FactionalUm hasrominent feature of Communist parties in the area for severalas increased as the Sine-Soviet split has deepened and as the Chinese have begun to work actively within the parties.umber of parties, some factions have adopted the Chinese line, at least In partactic to work against long establishedleaders. In India and Ceylon, ihe local parties have split into two organizations. In Algeria, Cyprus, and India, ihc focal parties stood apart from independence struggles and thereby damaged their standing with the nationalistarrow personal involvement of somehaiid BaUataa, lias hurt Arab communism.
these problems and errors have by no means cUtrunatcd thethe local movements to Moscow, they have limited their usefulnessespecially when they have revealed baste conflicts between thecommunism and local nationalism. Indeed, the low estate of theand parties duoughout much of the area hasajorthe realignment of Soviet tactical objectives; the shift from attempts to"from below" byass organization, in favor ofinfiltrate ongoing revolutionary movements "from above' by the tacticsdemocracy" and "revolutionary democracy-"
The Covert Mechanism
1 In Coinniuniat usa^e, "intelligence" implies,ar greater degree titan In Western porlanuj Or practice, dandofUnr or subversive activity. The Soviet Intelligence Services mc deicribed in mote detail in the Annex.
For the formulation and execution of policy, the Soviels and die Chinese eachighly integrated parly and governmental apparatus. Moreover, the conspiratorial bad-ground and nature of Communist organizalion tend to make clandestine activity til well inio their overseas activities. The Soviet intelligence services, tha Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorateide role in carrying out foreignhe KGBubstantial amount of work in reporting and in influencing local officialdom. The KGB also plays an important role in the effort to gain influence and control over the persons and groups who dominate local political life.
Our information on the numbers and activities of ihe services in the area is necessarily incomplete. Ofoviet officials known to be in the area at the beginning ofof military and economiccan positivelys intelligence personnel. On the basis of establishedre suspected of being Intelligence personnel. The actual number is probably considerably larger; we know from KGB and GRU defectors and from analysis of Soviet installations in areas where more evidence is available that more than half of Soviet official personnelof military and economicintelligence officers.
Soviet intelligence officers arc heavily concentrated in diplomatic missions. In those countries of the area where on: coverage of Soviet embassies is most extensive, the known and suspect intelligence officers often occupy over two-thirds of the diplomatic positions. Such ratios obtain In Soviet diplomaticthe world over. Moreover, Soviet intelligence officers fill most of the principal positions in such embassies, sometimes including that of ambassador and almost always those of the chiefs of the political, economic, and other sections. The services also use other Soviet governmentAcroflot, military missions,cover for clandestine operations. Economic aid missions provide some cover for clandestine activities, though the specialized work done and the isolated lives of most technicians argue against extensive use of them for such purposes.
nalysts of Soviet covert operations in the area, based on evidence which ranges from extensive and intensive surveillanceoviet embassy In an Arab country, through fairly goodin soveral other countries, down to minimal coverage of the remainder, brings out discernible patterns of activity and of principal targets at which the Soviet intelligence services work. We know from defectors that the Soviets place considerable stress on theof assets able to influence or control the pohcies of local governments, political parties, and the like. The Soviets put great effort into influencing, buying, and subverting the press. They naturally do more where the press is relatively free of government control, as in Lebanon or India, but are very active even in countries where it is not. Tlw Soviets work consistently toUS installations, both diplomatic and military, and to discredit US policies, often by planting false intelligence and circulating forgeries purporting to be US Government documents. They mount operations aimed at developing sources of intelligence within the government and security services of the host countries. Finally, they attempt to monitor, support, and control localleadership.
The Eastern European countries also undertake clandestine operations in this area. Their services are small by comparison wtth those of the Soviets, seem to be fairly limited fn tbeir activity, and very often work quite ciosery with the Russians. The little evidence at our disposal Indicates that they work against emigre groups of their own nationality and in some case* collecton local governments. We have no evidence indicating efforts of Eastern European countries to acquire coo trolled press assets,
In various areas of the world. Communist Chinaattern of clandestine activities, including covert intelligence collection, politicaland the promotion of pro-Pclplng Communist parties or factions. Covert inrelhgenca collection is bandied basically by two intelligence services: the Intelligence Department of lite armed forces end the Investigation Departrnent of the Communis! Party. The other clandestine activities are conducted by other components of the Communist Party. In the area covered by this estimate. Our knowledge of specific Chinese Communist clandestine activity is sparse hut the general partem would seem lo be the same. There Is no evidence ofbetween the Soviets and ihe Chinese in Clandestine matters.
It Is impossible loery thorough assessment of Soviet Intelligence successes and failures. We do, liowever, have evidence that Soviet efforts in respect of the press haveood deal of success. Controlled press assets or overtly Communist papers are furry numerous in certain countries,India, Greece, Cyprus, Israel. Lebanon. Algeria, and Ceylon. Assets of both types mclude the well-edited Indian weekly. Link, the Lebanese newspapers Al'Akhbar end Al-Nida, and the Cypriot Haracghl. We luve good evidence of Soviet recruitment of several people who have occupied senior governmentwhile working for the Soviets. Theyormer foreign minister of
oneormer ambassador of another,ensitively placed military officerhird. Thetheir East Europeanhad several successful recruitments in Israel, including an agent who held Ben Gurion'sfor five years. There have alsoumber of successful Soviet recruitments of lower level assetsariety of countries. We must assume that the Soviets have other successful operations of which wc do not know. All tilings considered, we believe that the Soviets have been fairly successful in mounting covert operations.
IV. COMMUNIST PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
In particular countries, the Communist powers have gained entree,and leverage by military and economic aid and by support on issues of great importance to that country. The tactics of promoting nonaligninent,nationalist feeling, and moving to aid revolutionary regimes with arms and economic aid, have given theizable measure of prestige and influenceumber of countries. Six armies in the area arc largely or totally equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods. By such moves as denying military spares, the USSR lias some potential to exert leverage on those countries which look to it for aid. The expanded Soviet presence has given the Soviets good opportunities to acquire clandestine assets.
We believe, however, that the vast majority of actions and decisions by area governments which in one way or another favor Communist aims are the result of deeply held beliefs in nonalignmentalid national policy, of anti-Western prejudices stemming from the era of colonial rule, of predilections for an authoritarian socialist system, and of admiration for the rapid economicof the Communist countries. On occasion, clandestine Soviet assets have apparently been able to influence their governments" policies in ways favorable to die Soviets. There are other prominentMiihvi-al-Din in Cairo, Dr. Lyssarides in Nicosia, forhabitually advocate policies congenial to the USSR. However, in no case is there evidence to suggest thai either Moscow or Pciping canpecific decision of major importance made on command. Nevertheless, the Soviets through their overall activities are able toegree of influenceumber of area governments.
South Asia
India, bath the Soviet Union and China enjoyed an upsurge ofin the, when Khrushchev and Choti En-lai proclaimedin coexistence, mounted major political and propaganda programs,the Soviet case, extended large amounts of economic aid. The Chineselost as the border conflict developed9ndnow is confinedart of the Left Communist Party of India.on the other hand, haverowing and well publicized aidplus support for India on internationalprominently Kash-
T
gain substantial good will within India. Theirbreak with the Chinese has further contributed to this good will and permitted tliem greater latitude in courting India.
India will remain among the more moderate memlwrs of the Afro-Asian world. The influence of any foreign country will be limited by India'sto pursue its rational interests as ii sees them. India will continue to recognize its heavy dependence on the West. Nevertheless. New Delhi will place high value on Soviet military and economic aid and on Soviet support in its delicti Ities with China and Pakistan. Thus, India will take care lo avoid antagonizing the USSR, and its public postures on international issues will often coincide with those of the Soviets.
The Soviets have not been able to translate the good will they have won into any substantial Influence on ihe domestic politics of India. Sovietassistance has been of great assistance to India in carrying out its plans for expanding the public sector. The Communist movement, although it has gotten as much asercent of ihe vote in past elections, and maintains substantial influence in the trade union movement, has been weakened by the split into two parties. Indian Communists, particularly those on the left, appear to be movingtronger anti-government line, hut they cannot carry suchvery far test the security forces crack down on them still further. There is little prospect of either Indian Communist party achieving any major national gains in the next several years.
The situation of the two Communist powers with regard to Pakistan isthe reverse. The Soviet Union has made very little progress since it has chosen to identity itself with Pakistan's rivals. Afghanistan and India, in the disputes over Pushtunistan and Kashmir. China has capitalized skillfully on Pakistan's reaction to the US military aid program for India and has been willing to give at least tlte appearance of support to Pakistani security mtereats. Id return. Pakistan hasumber of Chinese positions in the Afro-Asian context, and tho Iwo countries haveorder agreement (In the Pakistoii-occupicd part of Kashmir) as wellivil air agreement, and have begun to establish economic and cultural tics, though these are so far minimal. Ayub has generally kept Pakistan's relations with China carefully bounded, and we think he will continue to make thu effort. Huwcver. thereanger that Pakistan will miscalculate US tolerance and carry lis relationship with Peiping so far as toajor crisis in US-Pakistani relations. In such aopf>ortunities for Ihe Communist countries to increase their influence in Pakistan could be greatly enhanced.
The domestic Communist Party in West Pakistan is insignificant. In East Pakistan, the small, illegal Communist Party works chiefly by exploiting Bengali suspicions ofair Dumber of Communists and sympathisers have joined and exercise influence in die National Awami Party, They trade on the massive poverty, student discontent, and general political negativismof Bengali political life. However, Ayub isontrol of Pakistan,
and his domestic: policies are designed to minimize Ihe weaknesses out o(ommunis! threat could grow. We see no significant Communist threatat least for some years to come.
Though Ceylon Is now ruledro-Western government, there ispotential lor Communist advance, despite the splits within the Marxist movement. The governmentirm parliamentary majority, and theby the former Prime Minister, Madameto be increasing lis radical and leftist orientation Indeed, during its last sis months in office, the Bandaranaike government included representatives of the Trocskyiterominent roles. The present anti-Communist government is faced with economicdepleted exchange reserves,will plague Ceylonong time to come. Thereair chance that the Bandaranaike government (or one like it) will be returned to power during the nexl few years. In such an event, Ceylon would almostmove toward closer lies with the USSR and with China. Moreover, the influence of the Marxist parties would Increase, and they would probably be able to influence the governmentweeping program of socialization.
Penned into the mountain barrier between China and India, Nepal has little choice hut to play one side against the other. It has pursued this tactic rather successfully, getting aid from both, and at the same time putting out lines to the US, USSR. Pakistan, and any other country likely to be of help inoff its neighbors. The local Communistpat, end Chinese efforts have won Peiplng some sympathizers in the Nepalese Government. We dunk the King will retain control of the country during the next few years and will continue to play off China and India. However, Nepal Is vulnerable to Chinese pressure, the more so because such power as Is exercised is concentrated in the King's hands. Moreover, Nepalese suspicions of India might hamper efforts by New Delhi lo couriier Chinese moves.
n Afghanistan, the large Soviet military and economic aid effort has helped to open up undemote nationery short time. The Afghan armed forces are almost entirely Soviet-equipped, and nearly half of the country's foreign trade is with the USSR. Moreover, Afghanistan, whileandeutral foreign policy, in practice sides with the Soviets on many international issues. Significantly, however, lite politicalmeasures of the past two years have been in the direction of Western patterns, rather thanne-parry socialist ideology, though politica! power in Afghanistan still remains largely in the hands of the King.
he massive Soviet aid program, plus the increasing trade ties, willcontinue lo keep the relalionship between Kabul and Moscow close. In the immediate future, the Soviets probably will have little Incentive to riskof this favorable situation by overplaying their hend. However.efforts a! modernization, particularly in the politica) field, will almost certainly lead lo serious strains in Ihe society. Such circumstances could present opportunities for Ihe USSR to use its presence and influence to shape the course of events. Chinese influence has been and is likely to remain minimal.
The Arab World
Arab resentments over European dominance and a! Western support for Israel have presented the Communist countries with opportunities- Nationalist feeling is widespread and is directed at eliminating the vestiges of Western specialmilitary bases, British dominance in portions of the Arabian Peninsula, and Western control of the oil industry. The UK-Krench-Israeli attack on Suez6 is still fresh in the minds of the Arabs, and even mod era ta elements suspect the West of meddling in area politics. In most Arab countries, the political leadership devolves on one man, and those who have emerged as the new leaders have been disposed to try to play the Soviet Union off against the West. Finally, tho Arab states are experiencingdifficulty tn evolving political and economic systems which combinewith their own cultural traditions. Some of the modernizing elements in the area have come to regard Yugoslaviatate which is makingprogress In development through authoritarian and socialist means and at the same time maintaining its independence from Soviet domination.
Soviet influence is strongest in the UAR. It has been built on Soviet willingness to provide substantial and continuing supplies of arms and Urge-scale assistance in economic development, and on shared interests in promoting revolutionary governments and cutting down Western influence in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviets are the source of almost all the UAR's armaments and so have the capability, should they choose to exercise it, of hampering Nasser militarily by withholding spares andat considerable political cost- In terms of state-to-stale relationship! and international affairs. Soviet prestige is high in Cairo.
airo is host to live secretarial of the Afro-Asian Peopleshich is heavily supported by Communist countries, andumber of other radical organizations. Moreover, Cairo has ambitions toeading role in African affairs. The USSR's military aid has enabled the UAR to intervene in such places as Yemen and the Congo much more effectively than it could otherwise have done. The Soviets have not only encouraged Nasser to transfer Soviet arms previously delivered to htm, but they have on occasion used the UARnnduil and transshipment point for their own supply to third parties. At other times, they have supplied arms directly to other countries in the area.
evertheless. Cairo is jealous of Its own independence; while itresponds to Soviet piessures, we believe it is determined to resist any significant efforts to undermine its freedom of action. The Chinesearge official and quasi-official establishment in Cairo, but appear not to have much influence. UAR and Soviet foreign policies are congruentide range of affairs and thereood deal of willing collaboration, but we have no evidence that any Communist state has the ability to exercise decisiveon the baste thrust of UAR foreign policy.
4S.ong lime Nasser suppressed the Egyptian Communists, and Moscow put up with this. Nearly all of them were releasedecently, in line widi Moscow's policy of treating certain "socialist" parties as fraternal parties, the Communist Party of Egyptecond Communistsmall in size and heavily penetrated by Egyptian securitythemselves and ordered their members lo seek membership in Nasser's Arab Socialist Unioneveral Communists and Marxists already occupy responsible positions in ihe ASU and in the government-controlled press. Nasser apparently has little fear that the Communists will take over the ASU and thinks that their organizing ability can contribute to making It more effective. This development clearly offers Opportunities for expanded influence on the part of theover the longer term. However, the ASU must overcome many difficult obstacles before it can become an effective political instrument.
The emergence of an independent Algerialoody war against the French presented attractive opportunities to the Soviets and the Chinese. Under Ben Bella, Algeriaillingness to align itself with the Communists on sensitive world issues. Algeria also claimed to be following scientificand the CPSU treated the FLNraternal party. Ben Bella's ouster by armv chief Boiimediemie hasetback for the Soviets. Boumedienne has declared that his regime will turn its attention to internal affairs, and this Is likely loore genuinely nonaligned foreign policy.he French will remain the most important, thanks to linguistic and economic ties as well as substantial financial assistance. Nonetheless, Algiers will want to continue to receive Soviet military and economic aid, and it will endeavor lo keep good relations with Moscow.
The Communist record in the remainder of the Arab world is uneven. The Soviets provide virtually alt the military supplies for Syria and Iraq, and considerable economic aid as well.esult, tltey have correct statc-to-state relationsirm presence. Both Syria and Iraq are suspicious of Moscow's close relationship with Nasser, and this tends to limit Soviet influence. The fortunes of the local Communist parties have fluctuated greatly. Tn Syria beforeS trnion with Egypt,raq under Qasim. local Communists made spectacular gains. However, these advances were wiped out in subsequent political upheavals, from which the local Communists have not yet recovered. Evidence is appearing thai both the Syrian and Iraqi Communist movements are having internal difficulty, due to the efforts of the Chinese to capture or influence them and to internal opposition to Moscow's policy of support for such one-party systems as Nasser's and Ben Bella's.
In the Sudan, the small and well-organized Communist Party tookof the confusion attendant on the collapse of the Abboud regime in4 to get four posts in the first civilian cabinet However, this thrust alarmed the conservatives; the Communists were forced out and failed to win anv seats in the regular parliamentary elections. They are still influential in the labor movement and in the professional organizations; they have wonf the 15
parliamentary seals allotted to secondary school and university graduates. Sudanese relations with Communist countries are limited to$ of trade and aid, and Soviet influence is small.
In most of the rest of the ArabTunisia. Libya, Jordan, andCommunist countries have been able to do little more thaniplomatic presence over the past decade. They are unrepresented in Saudi Arabia, as well as in Aden and other British protected states In the Arabian peninsula. Local Communist perries, where tbey exist, are small and repressed, and the several rulers are hostile to communism, although Tunisia and Morocco have taken modest amounts of Soviet aid. On the other hand. Soviet and Chinese presence in Yemen overshadows that of the West, though so far svithout noticeable impact on the politically important elements, most of whose energy is spent on working with or against the UAR. Lebanonenter for area-wide Soviet clandestine activity. However, although the local party has scored occasional minor successes. Communist influenceebanesepolicy iseparate, pro-Chinese party has been formedmall group ofCommunist Party dissidents.ountry with apoUtical system,mall, anti-Zionist, legal Communist Party, which has little political or subversive potential.
We believe that the Soviets regard their efforts to extend their presence and Influence in the Arab world over the pastears as having been fairly successful. Their initial hopes ofominant influence among the nationalists have not been fulfilled and they have on occasion been discomfited by the sudden occurrence of anti-Communist measures. The ouster ofgovernments in Iraq3 and in Algeria5 havelo Moscow that local political Instability does not always work to 'hen advantage and that they must expect periodic setbacks. Nonetheless, the Soviets have helped the erosion of Western positions and they see in theand spread of socialist ideologies some potential for manipulating developments in their favor over the long term. Thus we believe that Soviet policv will continue to follow the same lines as in the past several years, stressing military and economic aid, improved relationships, and the acceptability of certain forms of socialism. Moscow will seek where possible to expand influence and leverage, as it recognizes that direct pressureay to gain its ends is often self-defeating.
Throughout the area, the Communist presence will almost certainlyto expend, though with broils on Ihe amount of Influence that can be exercised, and though developments transcending dieas policy changes Inaffect the trend. We think tliat Soviet economic and military old will continue to flow to the countries whwe tliey arc alreadythat die trade of these stales with the. Communist countries win rise, and that cultural relations and the like will increase. The Soviets are alto likely to extend economic aid to conservative regimes such as Jordan. Moreover,
(hereignifican( clianoc dial in one Or another of (he Arab countries where Soviet presence is now limiled or oven nonexistent, Ihe replacement of aregimeadical one would resultapid growth in Communist influence. Conversely, it is possibleegime in which the Soviets have invested heavily may be replaced by one less tractable. All things considered, we do not anticipate any decline in the overall Soviet presence, which has become an established element in the affairs of the region.
e must assume that Soviet efforts to penetrate and control the military services of the countries for which Moscow is the major arms supplier willbill we cannot assess with any confidence the probable degree of success. We assume ihat Soviets and Chinese will strive, at times successfully, to create assets In government ministries, political parties, and other centers of influence. We think that the Soviets svlll strive for influence rather than outright control of governments, at least for the next several years. But efforts to cope with, influence, and try to control the growth of types ofbeing developed in such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Syria willontinuing and difficult task for the Communist powers.
e think that socialism In the Arab world will continue to have char-actcristics distinct from classicright of private property and support for religion, for example. However, the international movement itself Is growing steadily less dogmatic on such points. The forms of socialism practiced in the UAR end Be'tfust Syria (and at least until recently in Algeria) have been hecomiog less parochially Arab; this trend svill be augmented ax relationships are developed between local socialist movements and the CPSU and other Communist parties. At the same time, ideological bonds within ihe Communist world continue to loosen, as former satellites emphasize nationalism and Increased private initiative while the older parties not in power explore compromises suitable to their political circumstances.
n time, these processes may converge. As the Arabs draw ectecttcally from communism as weB as other philosophises and methods, their own versions of socialism are likely to endybrid (which may or may not call itselfhe appeal ofocal ideology, in which communism has been acclimatized and reconciled with nationalism, could be great (allhough still greatly influenced by tho leader or leaders who sponsorubstantial Increases in membership and influence might ensue. But, although the USSR would greet such developments as major victorice. It is far from certain that parties of this character would align their policies with the Soviet Union orthat is. than the normal convergence of interests already described. Tin net effect of this development wouldationalism somewhat moreil-Western thanendency to experiment with forms of social and political organization Isased on Communist-world models, and regimes slightly more vulnerable to bona fide Communis! penetration because thebetween Commiuiists and nationalists woulden lost.
Iron, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus
5S. All these countries except Cyprus have been the object of Russian or Slavic expansionism and, hence, in some measure are conditioned lo look on the USSRational enemy. This attitude is strongest in Turkey, and onlyless so in Greece; it is also deeply embedded In the attitudes of Iran's rulers. However, the deeply discontented In those countries are lessfleered by such feelings. Rather, they are concerned primarily with altering thesocial, and political fabric of their own homelands.
In response to hostile Soviet policies in the postwar period, Greece. Turkey, and Iran entered into defensive arrangements with the West, but during the pest two or three years the Soviet approach to lids area has changed considerably' and Moscow now seeks lo gain acceptance as"goodhe Soviets have renounced border territorial claims against Iran and Turkey and have accepted partial responsibility for the deterioration of relations that occurred in the postwar period. Thus. US-sponsored regional defensive alliances In the area are now confronted not by the cohesive effect of Soviet hostility and threatened aggression, but by Ihe erosive effect of Soviet "friendship" capitalizing on the emergence of neutralist sentiments and local discontent.
The USSR has succeeded In normalizing and improving its relations with Iran in recentodest Soviet economic assistance program has begun, and cultural exchanges have increased. However, Iran's foreign policy and Its voting record in ihe UN have generally been responsive lo US initiatives. The sizable American presence in Iran, the Western orientation of the regime, and the present arrangements between the US and Iran have made it difficult for the Soviets to acquire significant leverage in the country. But the Iranian system is fragile, and the country's stability restsigh degree on the Shah. Some Communist activity persists, bul the Tudeli Party is effectively suppressed. More importantly, there is considerable discontent among politically conscious elements who feel thernselvcs denied parbdnettoo in the system. Should the
Shah be removed from the scene. Iran would probably become extremelyituation which the Soviets might liave considerable success in
exploiting.
the USSR nor the local Communists have acquired anyduring the past decade in Greece or TuHceu. both of whichtheir NATO membership. In the past year Or so, the Soviets haveexploit the frustration that all Ihe parties lo the Cyprus dispute feltWestern powers. Tliey have provided arms to Archbishop Makarios.lent qualified support to Ankara's position regarding the TurkishCyprus. This multiple approach lias had some success, and has placedNATO ties in the Eastern Mediterranean. There hasotablethe past year of official contacts between Turkey and theype that have not occurred since. At the same time,relaxation of tensions on the international scene has made rigidwith NATO appear less imperative to Athens and Ankara. Accordingly,
2G
we think Moscow will continue its present approach. Both Greece and Turkey will come to look (or expanded eccoaornic relations with the CommunistThe former, in particular, will probably find the USSH and Eastern Europe willing to buy crops that cannot be sold in the West Both may be expected on occasion to lake foreign policy stands which parallel Soviet ones, but no basic shift in their foreign policies Is likely.
Both Greece and Turkey are stable societies, lave well-developedsystems, and an advanced degree ol social cohesion, factors which severely limit opportunity for the Soviets or the local Communists to make substantial advances, The Communist front EDA vote in Greece has declinedigh ofercent8 toercentommunist voting strength will persist in Greece, hut Is unlikely to grow signiftcandy save- possibly in the event of severe economic difficulties or an extreme and bitter fragmentation of the Center Union. In Turkey, Ihe Communist Party is suppressed and insignificant Since0 revolution social ism has become more respectable, and thiscombined with pressures far social and economic changes, has led theew steps toward the left. Some further moves in this direction are likely, but Turkey almost certainly wfC not change enough to provideopportunities for the USSR or local Communists.
Cyprusather differcnl matter. The Communist Party of0 is the largest, in relation to lotal population, in Ihe area. It is also the only organized political party. The Communists alsoarge and effective labor organization us well us an active youth group, and Ntnkarios has accepted Communist political support. The Archbishop is, however, determined that he will be the political power in Cyprus and has contained Communist power when it suited his interests. The presence of0 mainland Greek troopsurther Inhibition upon Communistettlement of the Cyprus dispute involving union with Greece would leave strong Communist influence in Cyprus itself, but would add relatively little to overall Greekpower. If the bland remains independent, the local Communists might increase their strength and Influence lo the point where they coulderious bid for control when Makarios leaves the scene. The USSR is interested in preventing enotti, in supporting the local Cypriot Communists, and inpressure to bear against Western bases and facilities on the island. To this end It has provided subslantiol military aid, by way of Egypt; tlie island has also developed economic ties with Communist countries,
V. SUMMING UP
believe that Ihe Communist presence will continue lo expandnext several years, both in numbers of personnel and in activities.of any conservative. Western-oriented regimeadicalwould open the wayrogram of Soviet military and economica majority vote in the UN for the admission of Peiprngisesentiment in Peiping's favor among Ihe Afro-Asian group couldestablishment of Chinese embassies in several more countries. There is also
likely to be un increase in the acceptability of Communist political and economic ideas, and in the use of Marxist terminology; however, the conflict between Marxism and local cultures will continue to inhibit Communist progress-ew countries, residual European influence is not large and could perhaps be outweighed by that flowing in from the East. However, we think it unlikely that, even in these countries, Western influence would be wholly eliminated. The benefits of maintaining some sort of balance between East and West are certain to continue to appeal strongly to area leaders, who will aim to avoid domination by either party,
Differences in tactics between Peiping and Moscow are likely to increase in the area over the next few years, reducing the effectiveness of the twoprograms and Inhibiting the development of local Communist apparatuses. Further splits within local parties are probable as Peiping offers an alternative pole of attraction for radicals and other malcontents. Chinese attempts to prod local groups into aggressive postures and support for such entities as the Palestine Liberation Organization will probably bear some fruit, but in general the area does not lend itself to the more extreme courses that Peiping is likely to advocate. Russian and Chinese national interests arc likely to be most in conflict in South Asia, where Soviet military and economic support for India will continue to build up that country's capabilities to oppose the Chinese.
Some of the countries we are dealingndia, Turkey, andadequate functioning political systems, sufficiently coherentor strong enough leadership lo be relatively impervious to Communist efforts to make them into Marxist socialist societies. They would by no means be invulnerable iti the eventajorrolonged depressionajor war. However, they have elements of strength which enable them to tolerate domestic Communist activity or to carry out relations with Moscow without succumbing to Communist blandishments or intrigues. Others lack most or all of these factors of strength, for example, Iran, Jordan. Saudi Arabia, and Libya. Though all these regimes haveonsiderable degree of durability and are making significant economic progress, all are made vulnerableoncentration of power at the top. In each, the sudden demise of one man would probably resultcramble for political powerariety of competing forces.umultous situation would give opportunities for radicalseize control of politicalcontesting for supremacy-
The generally low state of the Communist parties and movements in the area is likely to persist tlirough the period of this estimate. While it is not possible toommunist movement which appears likely toational threat in any of the countries of the area, we must note thatfor domestic Communists to advance couldelated danger lies In the possibility that local political leaders may associate themselves withaims and tacticseans of achieving personal power or fortune. Individual leaders might even decide to take their countries into theworld; cither rapidly, like Castro, or by stages. ritical situation of
ihfs lype could arise almost without warning. At this time, however, we can idemtify no stale where It appears likely to happen.
ore serious danger lies in the Soviet and Cliines* attempt loeep and continuing identity of interests with the nationalist and modernizing forces of the "Thirdotheans of strengthening their ownand undermining that of the West. As long as this identity of interest remains negative, devoted to eliminating special Western positions and the like, tt will be troublesome, occasionally serious, but not fatal. But If these nationalist forces came to believe th.it (lie Western powers, and especially the US, were inevitably opposed lo their desire for national independence and domestic progress, the opportunities for the Communist powers toundamental gain in the "Thud World" svould go upouulrius which felt they had no other way to turn would be under very strong pressures to enter upon slill closer collaboration wilh the Communist world
he picture we have sketched for the successes and failures of thepowers in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia over (be next several years might be called 'more of then balance we do not believe that the Communists will lake over or come to control indirectly any of the countries of the area, but there are some places where situations could develop in such fashion as to provide opportunities for the Communists. We think that the forces of nationalism in the area are strong, and thai the political leaders who derive their strength from nationalism will continue, by and largeto play oft East against West
ANNEX
THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (RIS)
The Soviet intelligenceandtechnicallyto the Council of Ministers of the USSR. More important, however, is the relation of the services to die Communist Party of Ihe Soviet Unionembers of whose Central Committee have alwayslose interesl in RIS activities. The current CPSU secretary for police and security affairsormer chairman of die KGB. The intelligence services, in particular the KGB,ery prominent role in the Soviet system of government andadder for many of their members to high level positions in the Soviet hierarchy, including membership in the CPSU Central Committee.
The KGB. The First Chief Directorate of this organization is devoted exclusively lo clandestine operations abroad; it has eight geographiccovering Ihe world, except for Eastern Europe, and nine functionalThe geographic departments maintain operational stations (legal residencies) abroad; the Sixth is responsible for Africa and the Seventh for ihe Near Easl. Functional components perform such specialties as scientific and technical information, counter-intelligence, liaison with East European services, and work against emigres. Two functional components have noin Western intelligence practice. One (the "Disinformation"initiates and coordinates operations specifically designed to influence the policies of other governments and to reduce the effectiveness of inimicalorganizations, or governments. The other employs assassination,sabotage, and certain other activities, such as inciting riots orThe Second Chief Directorate operates against diplomats, students, tourists, and other visitors to the USSR. As the general rule it turns over to the First Chief Directorate for continued handling abroad those agentsinside the Soviet Union who are returning to their own countries.
The GRU. Soviet military intelligence is also organized along geographic and functional lines. Willie its primary mission abroad Is the collection of military and related information, Ihe CRU concerns itself with all activities of the armed services in the host country. If local military forces have afor politicalinstance, by participation in coups orCRU is permitted, and has been observed, to engage in operations designed to establish control over politically influential elements of the armed forces. The military intelligence service lias the responsibility for strategic sabotage and other paramilitary activities. GRU residencies are run by the
geographic component and.irectivere headedBU officer under non-mililary cover and not by the military attache.
Tha Soviet intelligence service* arc organizations whose professiona)ism lias been developedong period. Their ability to recruit, control, and keep agents productive over extended periods of time is attested by such svell-knovvn ease* as those of the Englishmen Blake and Philby. the Swede Wenner-strom. and the Frenchman Pacqucs. Within the Soviet Union, the KGB works methodically against targets assessed as potentiallyagainst students and diplomats from Western and underdeveloped countries. Testimony from defectors Indicates that the Soviet services have considerable success against the Moscow diplomatic installations of these countries, and In recent years have recruited agents from the diplomatic staff of almost all of them. Two particularly successful techniques are straight-forward monetary Inducements and blackmail, the latter often based on provocation or fabricated circumstances. Sexual entrapment operations are common; in four recent cases, recruitment approaches have been made to citizens of Middle Eastern countries on the basis of paternity charges arising from sexual indiscretions arranged by (he KCB. Homosexual entrapment appears to be used less frequently against Easterners than against Westerners. In heterosexual entrapment, KCB blackmail threats seem more often based on possible legal consequences than upon threats of public disclosure.
In areas contiguous to the USSR, ethnic, religious, and linguistic similarities have given the Soviets some advantage over the West.umber of countries, the Soviets are able to establish effective operations qineJdy. more quickly than in the sub-Saharan countries where they experience difficulties similar to our own.
The overt Soviettrade. Information, and thepiovid.-srcVesser role, acts at the clandestine executive arm of the Soviet party and government In promoting Soviet long-range political goals incountries. Aside from the classic intelligence colloction functions, Ihe services conduct operations to denigrate the US and other Western powers, to capture and exploit press and other propaganda outlets, and to place individuals in positions in local governments, political parties, and organizations where tlvey can influence policy in Moscow's favor.
The KGH and GRU residencies in countries of tho area are the dominant factor in the official installatioris- The KCB has the responsibility forsecurity over other Soviet nationals, and officers from both services have considerably more personal freedom than other Soviet officials abroad. In the area under discussion, observations of Soviet operational activity Indicate that Soviet intelligence officers respondighly professional maimer to thein which tltey operate. In Turkey, for example, the effectiveness of the local service makesigh standard of tradecraft on Ihe part of the Soviets. In India, on the other land, the Soviets can operate with relatively few precautions. While Soviet professional standards arc generally high, we have observed Iho Soviets in Libya using routine patterns of meeting and on occasion making recruitment pilches wilhout sufficient assessment of the larget's
susceptibility. In their operations abroad, the Soviet service* have the authority to "co-opt" employee* ol other Soviet government agencies to assist in clandestine uetivitics. Soviet employees routinely Inform the local residency of potential recruits; they may also help develop such potentialhere arc numerous cases on record of the iuvulvement of co-opted agents up to the point of the recruitment attempt"
dentification of RIS Officer) Soviet intelligence officers whom weas "known" lave been identified beyond reasonable doubt, either through identification by defectors from the KGB or GRU or through observation of their agent-handling of ouSer clandestine activities. Defector sources, as well as our own experience. IndicateYrsrrwn" intelligence officer seldom abandons his profession to tiecome, for example,iplomat, although there are exceptions lo this; some Soviet ambassadors with backgrounds in intelligence have beicome Foreign Ministry officers. The criteria foroviet as "suspecl" are based on fairly detailed knowledge of Ihe KGB and GRU: their work methods, cover, patterns of assignmenl, and fields of interest. No single criterion Is sufficient tooviet In the "suspect" categoiy, hut several taken together will. Wlien wc have been able to test our estimates by the testimony of later defectors or other sources, the degree of confirmation has been very high, and there are always several more errors of omission than of misplaced suspicion. Therefore. Soviet officiab not >denlifted as "RIS" cannot automatically be assumed to have do intelligence affiliation
mong the criteria used tooviet in tho "suspect" category are:
and lack of continuity in assignment of covera Soviet employed by tlie Military Attaches office at one post maya trade official at anodier,oviet may arriveostlerksecondew months later, or be Iwo or three gradesrank In succeeding posts;
divergence of an officer from normal pattern* uf office hours;
association with known RISulways KCBand GRU with GRU. Private parties celebrating the anniversaryfounding of Soviet State Security onecember each year offerlo identify KGB celebrants;
of or driving an automobile (in thesend failurediplomatic license plates if entitled to them;
association wilh foreigners;
with Communist party, Communist front, and emigre
suggestive uf intelligence methods of work, such asmeasures and unusual or frequent travel to locations ofinterest.
'The dominance of thoicence servient fa alleateil lo inatornr more of Soviet offlilnh on ihe (liplomativ lal are known or itiiinvr rnlelliftrncentelligence ofSeeni pnrrlrt|>ale directly in. or areosition to vsploit, till ra*rtsSoviet activity nbroncl which Inlnjj Soviet* into contact with foreigners.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
his document wasby the Control Indigence Agency. TM* copy it fc the information and use of ihe recipient and of persons under hU jurisdictioneed to know basis. Addiltonal essential dissemination may be authorized by the following omcolt within their respective depart menlst
of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of Stole
Detenu Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretory of
Defense ond lha organization of the Joint Chlefi of Slat! e. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army, for the
Depot! ment ol the Army d. Assblont Chief of Naval Operationsar the Department of The
Navy
Assistant Chief of Starr. Intelligence, USAf, for the Deportment of the Air Force
f. Director ol Intelligence, AEC, for ihe Atomic Energy Commmion
Director, FBI. for the Federal Bureau of Invosllgatlon
ol NSA. lor the National Security Agency
I. Aiibsarrl Director for Central Reference. CIA. lor any other Dopartment or Agency
this document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accedence with applicable security regulations, or returned lo the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with Ihe Office of Central Reference, CIA.
When misisseminated overseas, the crreriexss recipient's reay retain Iteriod not In excess of one year. At Ihe end of this period, the document should either be desn-oyed. returned to the forwarding agency, or per-
rwssion should be requested ol the forwarding agency to retain It in accordance with
2
he title of thn document when used separately from the text should be dot-titled. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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