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iil a: miniHUlPa in iiixurunrar ULATIONS.
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"which may he contained herein, regardlessdvari-
iages to be gained. umess such action Is first approved by the
Director of Central Indulgence
An Analysis of the Vietnamese Communists' Strengths, Capabilities, and Will to Persist in Their Present Strategy in Vietnam.
6
This memorandum has boon produced by ihe Directorate of Intelligence of tho Central Intelligence Agency. It wos jointly prepared by the Office of Current Intslllgence, tho Office of Research ond Reports, the Office of Nationol Estimates, ond the Specialfor Vietnomose Affairs in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY
L
n The Vietnamese Communists' Investment in the
Communist Capabilities (or Persisting
in Their Present
Vietnamese Communists' Probable Estimate
of the Current State of the
V. Probable Communist Near-Term Military and Political
VI. Key Trends and
VII. The Day of
VIII. Alternate Communist Strategic
PRINCIPAL
ANNEX I
THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. North Vietnam
1
of the Rolling Thunder
State of Civilian
IL The Significance of Laos and Cambodia
Appendix A. Rccuperabihty of the Transportation System
in North
I -
TTJPSEGREX
a
Estimated Manpower Available for MilitaryNorth6
bor Force of North Vietnam with Sex
Breakdown,6 following page . . . .
Selected Recuperation Times on Repair Work in
Military Region IV following pa go
North Vietnam: Transport Performance,First6
1-1
1-3
. Military and Economic Damage Resulting from Air Attacks Against North Vietnam.6 and Projectedhart) following page
. Supplies Trucked from North Vietnam into the Laotian Panhandle During56 pry Seasons (chart! following page .
. Laos Panhandle Area: Communist Roadnet
Development (map) following page . . .
i
. Laos Panhandle: Road Capacities and
Development (map) following page
. Schedule of Road Construction in Laos,6 (chart) following page . . .
1-6
. North Vietnam: Destruction of Bridges1unefollowing page
. North Vietnam: Status of Highway Bridges.
1age
ANNEX II
THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. Introduction
II. The Significance of Economic and Military Aid .
Level of Aid
Aid
IX Bloc Aidritical Factor in Continuing
the War
UL The Rationale for Chinese Support
IV. Vietnamese View of Soviet Support
Tables
II-1, Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam.
ollowing paRg
II-2. Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries ofto Northunepage
1
n-i
4
II-6
I-9
II-3
ill -
Page
ANNEX III
THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITY FOR POLITICAL SUBVERSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Communist Concepts of Political Subversion
II. The Apparatus for
A- Party Organisation and
B Party Numerical Strength
C. Numerical Strength of the Party Youth Group . .
Numerical and Other Limitations on Party
Effectiveness . . .
E The National Liberation
j F. Numerlca Strength of the
Strength of tho Communist Political
Apparatus in Urban
Position
Strength in Saigon and Environs
of the Political Apparatus in Rural Areas:
[ A
V. The Communist Propaganda Apparatus and Its
I
of the
VL The Overall Effectiveness of the Political Subversive
the Rural
the Cities: Saigon in Particular
- iv -
Page
Illuatratione
Figure til-1. Communist Command Structure in South
Vietnam and Organization of the Viet Cong
Logistics System (chart) following page .
. South Vietnam; Population and Area Control
(chart) following
ANNEX IV THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Duild- Up of
II.
Appendix A. The Ground War in South
Tablea
IV-1. South Vietnam; Actual and Projected Growth of
Total US/Third Nation Forces.4 -
7 following page
. South Vietnam: Comparative Actual and Projectod hcgular Allied Troop Strength,4 -
7 following page
IV-3. Total South Vietnamese Armed Strength, December
7 following page
IV-4. Major South Vietnamese Ground Force Deployments
by Corps Area,
IV-5. South Vietnam: Estimated NVA/VC Forces,
IV-6. South Vietnam: Eatlmated Strength, Compos itDeployment ol NVA/VC Main ForceCorps Area,
IV-7. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment oi US/Third Nation Forces, by Function,
7 following
. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment of US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalions, by Service and Corps Area,5 -
7 following page
IV-9. South Vietnam: Actual and ProjectedARVN Maneuver Battalions, by7 following page
outh Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuverto Estimated NVA/VC Main7 following page .
outh Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuverto Estimated NVA/VC Main Forceby Corps Area.
outh Vietnam: Projected Critical TroopManeuver Battalion Strength toand VC Main Force
South Vietnam; Absolute Indicators of Communist
Performance in
Relative Indicators of Communist Motivations in
Battle, Expressed in Terms of the Scale of Combat,
South Vietnam: Estimate ofssc*.
7
Selected Wounded to Killed
Illustrations
IV- 1. South Vietnam: Major AlliedRegular Troops, by Corps,following page
IV-5
IV-2.
Figure IV-3.
Figure IV-4.
Figure IV-5.
Figure IV-6.
Figure-.
Figure IV-8.
Vietnam: Actual and ProjectedUS/GVN/Third Nation Forces andForces,unefollowing page
South Vietnam: Approximate Composition of Actual and Projected Growth in Regular Allied Forces (US. TN, and7 (chart) follow-
ln8 W
South Vietnam: Approximate and Projected Growth in Communist Forces, December
7 (chart) following page . .
Composition of US Maneuver Battalion and Artillery Battalion Strength to Total US Army and USMC Troop Strength, July
7 (chart) following page . .
Approximate Composition of ARVNStrength to Total7 (chart)
South Vietnam: Troop Disposition, byAllied Maneuver Battalions andMain Forcesunefollowing, page
Comparative, Actual, and Projected Allied and US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalion Strength to VC/NVA Main Force Strength.6 and Projected for6 and7 (chart)
1 jC
IV-8
IV-8
IV-i
0
IV-ll
IV- 11
IV-14
- VI1 -
TVTSEGREX
Page
Figure IV-pproximate.6 (chart),
Figure Relationship of Communist and US/Third
Nation KIA to Build-Up of US/Third Nation
Maneuver Battalion Strength,5 -
6 (chart) following page
Figure Composition of Reported VC/NVA KIA, by Inflicting Force,6
(chart) following
Figure Approximate Distribution of ReportedKIA. by Corps Area,hart) following page
Figure Relationship of Communist aad CVN KIA.
to Build-Up of GVN Maneuver Battalions.6 (chart) following
ANNEX V
THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Vlot Cong Economy and Its
Viot Cong
Economic Impact of Increased Military
Manpower
II. Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam
Appendix A. The Communist Logisticsouth
- Vlll -
. South Vietnam: Communistmap) following page
. South Vietnam: Daily VC/NVAas ofand Source of Supply (chart)
. South Vietnam: Disposition of VC/NVAby Corps Area,age
. South Vietnam: Daily VC/NVAas ofArea (chart) following page
. South Vietnam: Daily LogisticVC/NVA Forces at Varying6 and Projected Junefollowing page . .
ANNEX VI
THE MORALE OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES
Viet Cong View of Morale
of the Cadres
of the Soldiers
of Military Morale
V-13
V-18
V-18
V-19
I-13
- ix -
ANNEX VII
MORALf; AMONG THE PEOPLE IN VIET CONG
ANNEX VIII
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE LIKELY LENGTH OF THE WAR
Anticipated Timing of Victory56 .
IL Victory Timing in the
The Time Frame and Goals9
The Initial Deferral of Victory Anticipations Growth of Communist Optimism4
and5
VI. The Communist Reassessment in
ANNEX IX
THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION OF LESSONS LEARNED IN FIGHTING THE FRENCH
I. The Three Phased
II. Tactical Military Lesions
III, Political
I
ANNEX X
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE ON VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS AND CAPABILITIES
Public Opinion
Opposition in the United
Cambodian
The Effect of Links with Western
Public Posture of the National Liberation Front
TOPSEGREX.
r
Pace
ANNEX XI
THE PROBABLE NEAR TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. General Concepts
II. Probable Areas of Communist
A. The
13. Coastal Areas of II Corps ,
Corps
Corps . , .
UL Prospects and
IV. The Near Term Political Strategy of the Vietnamese
ANNEX XII
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC OF NEGOTIATIONS
CCP-KMT Civilo
Korean Waro
o
for Vietnam
1
SQ^affM
' ^UMBbIiI
.-bi
TVP-SEGRE^
SUMMARY DISCUSSION
I. Introduction
For thirty-six years the Vietnamese Communist Party has struggled unrelentingly to acquire political control of Vietnam. During this period the Vietnamese Communists have often altered their strategy but never their objective, which remains today what it was when the Party was founded 9 theirhas focusedWar of Nationalblend of military and political action in South Vietnam designed to erode non-Communist political authority, to create an aura of Communist invincibility, and,destroy the South Vietnamese. will to resist.
The Lao Dongietnamese Communist) Party now controls only the government of North Vietnam (theut it is national in scope, even though, for cover purposes, its members in the South operate under the name of the "People's Revolutionary Party." Itthe present insurgency and has controlled it from its inception. In every significant respect the Communist movement throughout Vietnamingleentity whose strengths, capabilities andintentions cannot be properly assessed unless it is analyzed as such.*
II. The Vietnamese Communists' Investment in the Strug-
the early years of insurgency, theCommunists fought at negligible cost to the DRV The Viet Cong's political apparatus and itsforces were almost entirely composed of Even cadre and techniciansNorth Vietnam were primarily Southerners whonorth in theegroupment. The insurgents
"Additional details on Vietnamese Communistare given in Annex III.
lived off the land andarge proportion of their supplies, including weapons and ammunition, fromaches or capture from GVN forces, while the war ravaged the South, North Vietnam's own territory and economy were untouched. All of this, of course, has changednd particularlyanoi's continued expansion of the insurgent effort has altered the complexion of the struggle and the ground rules under which it is waged.
This hasrastic increase in the Communist investment. opulation base of aroundillion. North Vietnam now isilitary establishment of aten. Byanoi wasorce of at0 North Vietnamese troops to fight in the South. We estimate that this figure will rise0 by the end6 and0 by Furthermore, toits commitment in the struggle, North Vietnam has undergone partial mobilization and has had- to divert ataborers to military or war-related tasks. North Vietnam's economy has been dislocated, its transportation system disrupted and the personal lives of its citizens adversely affected. Tothe dispatch of troops to South Vietnam and the external supplies they now require, Hanoi has had to develop and maintain an elaborate road and trailthrough Laos in the face of continuedand harassment.*
in South Vietnam, the Communists havean insurgent structure which includes an armed force estimated to ben addition to0 North Vietnamese troops already mentioned. This figure includes Viet Cong Main and Local Force troops, political cadre and combat support elements,and Southern communist irregulars. Recently acquired documentary evidence, now being studied in detail.
*Seeor further details on Northresources and capabilities.
-2-
suggests that our holdings on the numerical strength of these Irregulars (now carried at) may require drastic upward revision.* To direct the of their insurgent campaign, the Communists havearty apparatus in the South estimated to numberembers, supportedomewhat smaller youth auxiliary.** The Communists have also probably enrolledeople in somoof their front organization, the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam." This totalmust be controlled, funded and supplied,most of its requirements may be met fromwithin South Vietnam.
6. Casualties the Communists have incurred and are incurring in ever increasing numbers represent another major element of human cost. We estimate that total Communist losses in South Vietnamincaptured, seriously wounded00ounting both North and Southe estimate that6 those losses may range. We further estimate that the Cocaaunista nay incur0 losses during the first six monthsf current rates of combat areand presently projected troop strengths are achieved.
*Detuils on Communist military forces in Southare given in Annex IV.
0 party members and somewhere00 members of the youth auxiliary are thought to be serving in the Communist armed forces. Thoy would be included in the military strength totals already cited. If our estimate of the number ofirregulars proves to require upward revision, our estimate of the size of the party apparatus in the South and of its youth auxiliary will also requireadjustments. Details on the Communistin South Vietnam are given in Annex III.
Annex IV.
-3-
TOTSEGREX
III. Vietnamese Communist Capabilities for Persisting in Their Present Strategy
Northern Base: North Vietnam's role ininsurgency is thatommand and controla source of manpowerhannel of supplies.and control function is something relativelyto physical pressure or externalCommunist strategy is imposing some strainsVietnam's manpower reserves, but the strainsqualitative than quantitative, and they areto become insurmountable. The major pressures
on manpower have resulted from the Hanoi regime'sto manage manpowerelative scarcity of technicians and skilled laborers, and an excessive drain on the agricultural labor force. Over the nextonths North Vietnam should be able to meet the manpower requirements generated by its internal needs, as well as those generated by projected further deployments of troops to the South, but these needs will be met atcosts in the economic, educational and social fields.
Vietnam's own industrial plant makesmost marginal contribution to Vietnamesestrength. With minor exceptionsanna ammunition manufacturing capability) theCommunists' military hardware is entirelyfrom external sources. Thus Hanoi's abilitycontinued materiel assistance to CommunistSouth Vietnam is largely dependent on Northreceipt of materiel support from China,Onion and East European Communist countries.* the US aerial pressure program has notNorth Vietnam's receipt of materiel supportand its dispatch to South Vietnam. Despiteinflicted, the North Vietnameselogistic system Is now functioning morealmostonths of bombing than it did when the
*This aspect of Vietnamese Communist capability ii discussed in detail in Annex II.
TOPSEGREX
Boiling Thunder program started. Both internaland infiltration traffic6 were carried on at higher levels than So long aa the US air offensive remains at present levels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam's continued ability to provide materiel support to the war in the South.
9. The Logistic Supply Network: Communist forces in South Vietnam are supplied with manpower andprimarily over the Communist-developed andnetwork ofiles of roads and trails through southern Laos* andesser extent by sea or through Cambodia. Allied harassment and interdiction certainly complicate the Communist supply system. The volume of traffic now moving through Laos, however, is so much below route capacity that it is unlikely that conventional attack can ever reduce the capacity of the Laos trail network below the level required to sustain Communist efforts in South Vietnam, Communist forces use Cambodia with almost complete Immunity from allied countermeasures and with minimal interference froar, the Cambodian government. US and South Vietnamese naval patrols havo probably curtailed Communist seabut given the extent and nature of South Vietnam's coastline and the amount of small boat traffic in South Vietnamese waters, even this channel can never beclosed.
10. The Southern Apparatus: The buildup of both VC/NVN and allied forces in South Vietnam and the rising tempo of combat are placing appreciable strains on the Viet Cong's ability to support the war. Theof needed supplies, particularly foodstuffs, within South Vietnam has become extremely difficult. This problem has been aggravated by the concentration of VC forces in food-deficient areas.* Furthermore, thesqueeze on Viet Cong resources is becoming The Viot Cong have borne the brunt of Communist personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated
*Sec Annex V.
i
-5-
6 but will probably be inadequate to compensate for casualties and losses 7 the North Vietnamese will have to assume most of theof expanding force levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses* These manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from Horth Vietnamesebut they will impose additional strains on Northimited supply of skilled personnel and leadership cadre.
Apart from military manpower requirements,evidence indicates that the Communistapparatus in South Vietnam is already stretched thin and is not considered by the communists themselves as fully adequate to their needs, particularly inareas. Cadre and leadership shortages will almost certainly increase in the months ahead. Although these shortages can be ameliorated by additional personnel dispatched from North Vietnam, the injection of annumber of northerners into the Southernwill of itself produce some measure of discord within the Communist movement. Although the Viet Cong personnel needs are not likely to prevent theCommunists from persisting in their present strategy, they almost certainly represent the weakest link in the communists' capability chain.
Net Capability Assessment! The Communists' present strategy is costly in both human and economic terms and is taxing Communist resources in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itself. Alliedare complicating Communist efforts and raising the costs of their execution. However, neitherresource shortages nor allied actions withinpolitical parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Communists physically incapable ofin their present strategy.
IV, The Vietnamese Communists' Probable Estimate of The Current State of the Struggle
i
Communists' evaluation of the war andof its future course willariety of key factors, some ofdiscussed below.
The Communists1 "Timehe Communistscertainly do not have any/fixed or rigid"time table for victory. Their consideration of where they stand now, however, must in some measure be influenced by earlier estimates of where they had expected to be in Analysis of available documentary evidence suggests that inra, Hanoi's rulers thought it would take at least five years of all-out military and political action to gain control over South Vietnam. Untilhe Communists appear to have been reasonably satisfied with the progress of their insurgent movement and to have felt that things were going more or less as planned. Theefforts of the Diem regimeowever, and the expanded US advisory/support program confronted the Communists with unwelcome obstacles and led them to conclude that the conquest of South Vietnam would take longer than they had originally estimated.*
s the Communists watched thepolitical disarray in Saigon, and devisedto cope with the. assistance,documents discussing the war grew progressively more optimistic. Communist optimism apparently reached its apex in the spring They still carefully refrained from tying "victory"efinite calendar date, but the Communists appear to have believed that they were then perhapsear or two ofa major part of their objectives. They had every reason to be optimistic in the springhe GVN's strategic reserve was stretched to the breaking point, and the Communists were scoring tacticalsuccesses with considerable cumulative political impact.
The massive infusion of US combat strength which began inrobably saved the GVH from defeat and certainly disabused the Communists of any hopes of early victory. Their propaganda began to shift away from
the theme of early victory to its present theme ofvictory. ommunist documents and public pronouncements have indicated that the Communists
*See Annex VIII.
ong war. The Communists must be disappointed in comparing the present situation with that whichin the spring At least indirectly, they have acknowledged that the Infusion of IS and Allied combat forces has created new problems which must be overcome before victory can be won. Yet Conounistis presently tinged more with defiance thanthe Communists may be disappointed, but they do not yet seem to be discouraged.
Lessons of theiet Minh
War; Pres-influ-
17.
in making theolitically in metropolitan France. Communist inlimate in lost its will to fight even
ent Vietnamese Communist strategy is appreciably snced bytruggle in which tho Communist-controlled Viet Hinh forced the French to withdraw froa Vietnam. In Communist eyes, probably the mostfeature of this earlier successful campaign was the fact it was won withouttrategic defeat on the French Military Forces.* During their nine-year struggle, the Communists successfully used military pressureolitical abrasive. They worked more on French will than on French strategic capabilities, and
eventually succeeded unsaleable cornmodity strategy, in short, succeeded which the government in Paris
though the French Expeditionary Corps remained effective and largely intactilitary force. The Communists suffered horrendous casualties and went through periods of severe setback, but their persistence eventually paid
18. Soviet and Chinese Support** There isevidence that the political positions of the Soviet Union and Communist Chinais the Vietnamand the amount of military assistance they both provide, are major influences on Vietnamese Communist policy. essation of bloc war aid would probably make
*The battle of Dienbienphuajorrather thanfor the French. Itdid not destroy the French Expeditionary Corps as an effective military entity.
**Sfifi Annoy TT.
r&"-
it impossible for the Vietnamese Communists to sustain their struggle at its present level of intensity. Hanoi recognizes, however, that contemporary international Communist politics makeessation highly Hanoi views bloc support as valuable inand in some ways increasing, the militarywhich the Communists can bring to bear in South Vietnam and also sees itactor which at least partially inhibits and offsets the military pressure which allied forces can impose directly on North So long as bloc aid continues at least at its present levels, however, it will probably not be afactor in any basic determination the Vietnamese Communists might make on whether to continue the North Vietnamese assertions that, in the final analysis, they must rely mainly on their own resources to prosecute the revolution appear toenuine and deeply-held belief. Hanoi apparently believes that there are distinct limits to the amount of political and material support which it can count on from Peking and Moscow. Furthermore, the Vietnamese would not want toegree of externalhinese) aid that would jeopardize their control of the war, unless such aid were required to prevent the extinction of the Communist regime in North Vietnam.
Despite Peking's willingness to pressure Hanoi, the Chinese probably could not force the Vietnamese Communists to stay in the war if they decided of their own volition to end tho fighting. The Vietnameseestimate that, in view of the limitations on the Chinese commitment, Peking would do little more than complain if the conflict were terminated short of an insurgent victory. The Chinese, in fact, seem tothis, for they have repeatedly left themselves an out by emphasizing that all decisions on the war are "strictly" up to the Vietnamese.
On the basis of Moscow's assistance so far, the Vietnamese probably judge that the Soviet commitment
in the war is considerably more restrained than that of the Chinese. Hanoi is fully aware that Moscow, like Peking, is anxious to avoid steps which might leadirect military confrontation with. It is also doubtless clear to the Vietnamese that the Soviets
-9-
BKuBK: .
the Communists, but in both military and economic terms, the damage inflicted so far has probably not exceeded what the Communists regard as acceptable levels. In most cases the reconstruction or repair of damagedcan be postponed or effectively achieved by cheap and temporary expedients. In both financial and material terms, the cost inflicted on North Vietnam by allied aerial attack is more than covered by theand economic aid and technical assistanceby other Communist countries. Although economic growth has stagnated and will probably deteriorate further in the coming year, air attacks conducted under present rules of engagement almost certainly cannot'stop North Vietnamese activities essential to the support of the Communist war effort. In short. North Vietnam is taking punishment in its own territory,rice it can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in light of the political objectives it hopes to achieve.
Communist Capabilities For Additional Force Commitment; In absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot hope to match present and projected allied force commitments. However, it is extremely unlikely that they feel any need to do so. An analysis of relative force levels shows that the apparent present free world superiority of six to one over VC/NVA Forces is largely eliminated when one compares the relative ratios of actual maneuvertactical combat troops available for commitment to offensive ground The present ratio of allied to Communist maneuver battalions is nearly one to one. If present estimates of allied and Communist force projections are accurate, byhe Communists willlight advantage in this critical ratio. The Communistscertainly feel that if they cananeuver battalion ratio in this range, they will be able to prolong the struggle indefinitely and wear. will to persist.
The Calculation of Internationalhere is considerable evidence that the Vietnamese
*Maneuver battalion ratios are analyzed in detail in Annex IV.
**See Annex X,
Communists believe popular opposition throughout the Western world. policy in Vietnam can be anpolitical factor in the ultimate outcome of the struggle. Even though Hanoi appears to be concerned with the Vietnamese Communists' relatively limited ability to spur Western agitation against the allied policy by dint of their own propaganda apparatus, they obviously welcome the widespread belief that the struggle in South Vietnam has its roots in what isouthern civil war and not, as Washington claims, in Northaggression. Consideration of world. policy would certainly enter into any eventual Vietnamese Communist decision on whether to revise present strategy but would almost certainly notecisive factor.
The Calculation. Domestic Attitudes; The Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to evidence of opposition to. policy arising within the United States itself. Despite some occasional signs of realism about the actual political force of suchby and large the Vietnamese Communists almostoverestimate its present strength. Detailed knowledge of the realities. domestic politicsairly scarce commodity in Hanoi. Furthermore, not only do the Communists want to believe that there is strong American domestic opposition to. policy, but the course and eventual outcome of their previous struggle with the French almost certainly predisposes them to draw invalid parallels to French domestic opposition in the Indochina war and to look for signs of American domestic political pressures capable of forcing policy changes on Washington.
The Communists also appear to believe that. cannot match the continued input of Northforces into the struggle (particularly in light of the maneuver battalion comparison outlined above)goingirtual wartime footing. They believe this would involve at least partial mobilization and create economic pressures which would drasticallyAmerican opposition to the war, particularly as casualties continue. The Communists may hope that all of these pressures would be sufficiently unpopular within. to make the war politically unsaleable.
27. Morale in North Vietnam:* The wearing effects of the war are causing some decline of civilian morale in North Vietnam, and there are indications the regime fears there mayurther deterioration. The decline,has not had any meaningful impact upon theof the regime to continue with the war or the policy options it may elect to achieve its
communist Morale In South Vietnam;** Morale withinmilitary forces and the politicalin South Vietnam has declined sincet is conceivable that at some future point* the prospect of indefinite struggle if not defeat could break the morale of key elements of the Communist southern Although Communist morale is obviouslybadly in some parts of the insurgent structure, no-whoro has it yet deteriorated to tho point where the battle performance of Communist units is adversely It has certainly not declinedointsufficient to force any major revision in the basic Conmunist strategy.
Attitudes Among the People in Viet Congheroubstantial body of evidence that morale and, consequently, support for the Communist cause, isin Vietontrolled areas of South Vietnam. The flow of refugees from such areas has increasedand evenesire for safety is the main notive for this exodus, the exodus itself attests to popular realization that no Viet Cong region is nowfrom attack* Furthermore, there are indications that the refugee flow is caused not onlyuest for safety but alsoesire to escape increasingly onerous Communist levies of taxation, forced labor and
Annex I.
**The critical subject of morale in Communist Force is the subject of Annex VI.
his subject is examined in detail in Annex VII.
TVPSEGREX.
conscription. Even though distaste for the Viet Cong is not necessarily positive support for Saigon, this shift in popular attitude could eventually cause the Communists serious problems.
Course of South Vietnamese Political Communist prospects obviouslyduring periods of political turmoilVietnam. Conversely, the development of arooted, viable non-Communist Southis the thing which, over the longer term,have the greatest reason to fear. ignore the fact that although the presentregime is fragile, is far from effectivepopular, and is beset with internalhas nonetheless successfully weathered stormsof its predecessors were unable toCommunists must also recognize that the eventsspring made painfully manifest how weakin urban areas and how limited were theirfor capitalizing on political strifenon-Communist factions. While thegovernment would probably stand no chancesurvivalontest with the Viet Cong,all North Vietnamese troops were withdrawnVietnam, there are trends in Southlife which areource ofto the Communists. Furthermore, theythat the type of political activityby the Rural Development program, even if
it is only moderately successful, strikes at the roots of their insurgency's indigenous strength and alters one of the necessary conditionsar of national liberation" strategy.
V. Probable Communist Near-Term Military andStrategy*""
they are objective, the Communiststhat during the past year theirha6 lost momentum in both the militaryfields. There are signs that theindeed recognized that developments of thehave created problems which they must solve,
discussed in further deta:l in Annex XI.
alongituation quite different from that which they faced in fighting the French. Acknowledgment of the existence of these problems does seem to havedebates over strategy within the Communistbut there is no present sign of any Communist intent to abandon or significantly alter the Communists' present strategy.
strategy in the near terra willaround two major efforts: o keepfar as possible. Main Force units ino build up the Main Force strength, bothand in quality, in order to be able topower when US forces in Vietnam have built up
to the levelxpected by the Communists at the end The North Vietnamese leaders probably believe that if they can go7 with an ability toain Force strength of, as comparedS strength, they will be able to continue the war. Hanoi probably estimatesour-to-one absolute military manpower advantage in favor of the US will not be enough for the US to defeat tho insurgents; even under these conditions thewill be able to match allied forces in maneuver
of Communist materials indicatesmilitary strategy of the Communists during themonths will beontinuation of theirconcepts4 They willmainly on opening simultaneous campaigns inand the area northwestSaigon,occasional other major actions in theprovinces. The latter may accelerate asmonsoons begin. Their primary aim will be
to stretch the allied forces as thin as possible and inflict as many casualties as possible on allied units. The primary target of the Communists during the coming months will probably. forces, rather than South Vietnamese. The Communists will continue their attempts to reduce American military mobility and striking power by harassment and by concentration of Communist forces. base areas to tie down as manyas possible in static defense tasks.
TOPSEGREX
To. and other allied forces fromand hurting large Communist units, the insurgents will probably stick primarily to ambushes, hit-and-run strikes, and guerrilla harassment in situations where they believe the odds of success are decidedly in their favor. Should favorable conditions arise,they will almost certainly attempt to conductin regimental strength and greater. Thewill be working in the meantime on efforts at better concealment of the locations of their main force units in order to counter the improved allied intelligence on the tactical disposition of Communist elements. When large-scale battles occur, themay attempt to devolve themeries of skirmishes in which Communist ambush and hit-and-run tactics can be used more effectively against small-sized elements of the allied attacking force.
On the political side. Communist strategy and goals for the remainder6 and7 will have to take account of recent insurgent setbacks. Captured documents indicate that the Communists will give priority to strengthening and improving their political apparatus, notably by trying to improve the quality of political cadres down to the village level, and by continued emphasis on the recruitment of party members and sympathizers in both rural and urban areas. They will probably continue to concentrate their subversive efforts on the South Vietnamese army and civil service. Laboring class elements may also attract increasing attention in the hope that economic discontent with the inflation spiral in South Vietnam can be exploited to the insurgents'.
There is an increasing number of reports that the Communists will make serious efforts to disrupt the constitutional assembly election oneptember. It
is doubtful at this time that the Communistshave any significant number of followers among the candidates who have filed, though many of the candidates are relative unknowns even to localofficials. Communist propaganda statements have vigorously denounced the coming electionarcerick. The Communists may feel impelled to take an active role through covert campaigning against candidates/ or through terrorism and other directefforts.
VI. Key Trends and Factors
addition to their own logistic,morale problems, future Communist strategicwill probably be primarily influenced byin three areas: the course of Southevolution, the course of the militaryin South Vietnam, and the attitude of themore accurately, their estimate ofwill and the US Government's politicalpersevere. The Communists, for example, willparticular attention to the outcome ofelections in Vietnam and theiron South Vietnamese political stabilityCommunist success or failure in matchingmaneuver battalion strength and achievingsome tactical successes; and the outcome andwhat the Communists believe to be thenext November's elections in the United States.
VII. The Day of Decision
timing of any Vietnamese Communiston altering basicthe natureabe greatly affected by aof considerations including those outlinedpreceding paragraph. We estimate that nonepressures upon the Communists which we can is severe enough toajorCommunist strategy over the next eight to The Communists would be even lessalter their strategy if they should findand military developments during thisin theirexample, seriousdeterioration in Southeries ofViet Cong military successes, or whatignificant rise of anti-war sentiment United States* If on the other handthem are maintained, and the course ofthem no grounds for encouragement, theyfeel compelled by late springtock andhange in their
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VIII, Alternate Communist Strategic 0ptiori3
the Vietnamese Communists decidepoint that continuation of theircurrent lines would not be profitable,have three basic policy options. They could:
convert the struggleajor war bymassive Chinese Communist military intervention;
relax Communist pressure and withdraw some North Vietnamese troops, in the hope that the appearance of tranquility would eventually impel the US to disengage the better part of its forces without any formal commitments from the Communists in return;
nter into some form of negotiations.
We believes the option the Vietnamese Communists would consider least in their long-term interests. , despite somewould entail major problems for the Cora* munists. It carries no guarantee that. would in fact disengage, and puts the Communists in aof bidding by successive increments to bring this about. It would engender serious moralefor the Communistsrotracted stand-down without. response. It would be hard to explain as anything but acknowledgementerious reverse for long-range Communist
In our view, the Vietnamese Communists would be most likely to try some variant ofnegotiation. They would hope initially to achieve
a reduction of allied offensive pressure,uspension of bombing in the North.* They would probably work to keep the talks going in order to prolongespite. During the course of the negotiations, they would probably determine whether they would seriously explore the possibilities of an acceptable political solution, or examine thecourses still open to them.
"Communist behavior in periods ofxamined in Annex XII.
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j;.l .
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
So long as. air offensive remains atlevels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnam's continued ability to provide materiel support to the war in the South. North Vietnam is taking punishment on its own territory, butrice it can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in light of the political objectives it hopes to achieve.
The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated6 but will probably be inadequate to compensate forand losses 7 the North Vietnamese will have to assume most of the burdon of expanding force levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses. These manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from North Vietnamese resources, but they will imposestrains on North Vietnam's limited supply of skilled personnel and leadership cadre.
The Communists' present strategy is costly in both human and economic terms and is taxing Communist resources in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itsolf. Allied actions are complicating Communist efforts and raising tlie costs of their execution. However, neither internal resource shortages nor allied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Communists physically incapable of persisting
in their present strategy.
t. In absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot hope to match present and projected Allied forceHowever, if present estimates of Allied andforce projections are accurate, byhe Communists willlight advantage in maneuvertactical combat troops available forto offensive ground operations.
5. Nevertheless, if they are objective, themust acknowledge that during the past year their
insurgent campaign has lost monentun in both the military and political fields. Although they may not be losing the war at the present time, they are certainly notit. The Communists are far from being defeated; but they are faced with problems greater than any they have had to contend with before in this struggle. Communist forces havo at least temporarily lost the aura of invincibility which was one of their most potent political assets.
Morale within Communist military forces and the political apparatus in South Vietnam has declined sinceut notoint presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Comtunist strategy.
The Communists must be disappointed in comparing tbe present situation with that which existed in the spring At least indirectly, they havethat the infusion. and Allied combat forces has created new problems which must be overcome before victory can be won. Yet Communist realism is presently tinged more with defiance than pessimism; the Communists may be disappointed, but they do not yet seem to be
Consideration of world popular opposition. policy would certainly enter into any eventual Vietnamese Communist decision on whether to revise present strategy but would most certainly notecisive factor.
The Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to evidence of opposition to. policy arising within the United States itself. The outcome of their previous struggle with the French almost certainlythem to draw invalid parallels to French domestic opposition in the Indochina war and to look for signs of American domestic political pressures capable of forcing policy changes on Washington.
10. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist decision on altering basicthe nature of such abe greatly affectedariety ofincluding those outlined in this paper. Kethat none of the pressures upon the Communists
i i
we can now identify is severe enough to force achange in Communist strategy over the next eight to nine months. The Communists would be even less inclined to alter their strategy if they should find political and military developments during this period running in their favor--for example, serious political deterioration in Southeries of major Viet Cong militaryor what they construeignificant rise of anti-war sentiment in the United States. If on the other hand pressures on them are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring7 they will probably feel compelled to take stock andhange in their basic strategy.
TOPTSEG&EX.
ANNEX I
THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 6f. THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM
North Vietnam
A. Manpower
1. The Population Base
The manpower problem in North Vietnam, viewed solely in terms of numbers, is not yet acute, althoughualitative sense it is becoming more severe. In spite of substantial manpower levies the country stillide range of unused opportunities to replace men with women, to withdraw males from sectors where labor Is underemployed, and to transfer labor from nonessential or postponable tasks. North Vietnam has not yet had to resort to full
The population of North Viotnam as6 is estimated at92 million persons, (see) North Vietnam's manpower resources for military service consistillion males inge group ofre physically fit for military duty. hysically fit males reach draft age each year.
Estimated Manpower Available for Military Service in North6
Thousand Persona
Low High"
Total 0
Persons age
Those physically fit for military
Pcrsonu of draft age
Those physically fit for military
2. The Manpower Drain
The major drains on manpower resources in North Vietnam have resulted from the build-up of the armed forces, tho reallocation of labor to military supportand the repair or reconstruction of bomb damaqed facilities, particularly the lines of communication in North Vietnam and Laos.
We are not abla to give precise estimates of the extent to which mobilization has taken place in North Vietnam. It is apparent that mobilization of manpower for military duty or military support activities has notoint of exhausting North Vietnam's manpower resources, although it has placed an increasing drain on administrative and management skills. Unless tho US greatly stepped up its bombing. North Vietnam could make substantial increases in its armed forces and make additional manpower inputs into military support activities without placing ansevere strain on its manpower resources.
Current estimates of the build-up of NVA forces in the past year indioateinimumersons were called for military duty. To this total should be added thoso numbers of NVA personnelinto South Vietnam, not as part of the build-up of NVA forces there, but as replacements and fillers for killed or seriously wounded NVA troops. nfiltrators can be placed in this category56 according to current estimates of the rates of infiltration and build-up of NVA forces in South Vietnam. On this basis we can estimate that certainlyersons havo already been called into military service. Thii total is aboutercent of the number of physically fit males reaching draft age5 Even if tho North Vietnamese armed forces should expanddrain on manpower resources for military service in numerical terms would not approach burdensome proportions.
In addition to tho manpower drain forservice, the North Vietnamese have had to reallocate labor to repair or reconstruction activities and to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency activities. These programs require the full-time servicesorkers and the part-time utilization of. An additional diversion of the labor force results from
1-2
the obligation oforsons to fulfill civil defense obligationsart-time basis.
Excluding the part-time diversions of labor, the measurable mobilization of manpower to date for military duty or war-associated tasks would seem toinimumersons. This commitment could be atersons if the armed forces were to expandorsons. The commitment would be even greater if air strikes against the logistics target system Increased and could amount to anersona. The additions to the labor force probably need not be greater because of tlie large amount of work already done in expanding the road system and buildingand other temporary crossings. The main thrust of future labor efforts will be in maintenance and repair of this expanded road systex. However, the requirement for anersona could create additional strains on North Vietnam's limited resources of skilled manpower.
3. Altornative Sources of Manpower
North Vietnam has several alternatives to be used in drawing upon its labor force ofillion people to replace the manpower mobilized for military and war-related activities. rimary source for theof manpower diverted to mobilization programs ia the large number of women in the labor force. illion women are reported by Hanoi to be ready to replace men in the labor force. We have little evidence, however, toa judgment that the number of females in the labor force has increased significantly since mobilization measures began in As late as5 tho regime still claimed that women accounted fororcent of the agricultural labor force, the same percentage claimed before mobilization. (See)
In addition to tha possibilities of women replacing mon in the labor force, Hanoi has several altema tive resources for manpower. The natural annual increawjnt to the total labor force ia in the orderear. We also estimate thatales could be released from trade and services enterprises, in-stitutiona and educational establishments withoutessential economic activity. Finally there aro
TWTSEGRET
substantialO--of draft-age maleat tho college and high school level that would be available if full mobilization were undertaken.
4. Pressures on Manpower
Mobilization in North Vietnam has not dried up the pool of excess labor. Although the manpowor situation is tight the regime for the most part still avoids coercive programs in channeling workers into essential jobs, ine withdrawal of manpower from production has not resulted in many of tho austerity measures which would be associatca with full mobilization. Rationing of food has been within moderate limits, agricultural taxes have not increased nor have food and cloth imports increased significantly. School enrollmentsfge group, are reported by tho regime to be double the level of last year. With the exception of oomo disruption to normal routine and somo minor deprivations, there are fewthat tho population has been asked to make extreme sacrifices in support of the war effort.
The major pressures on manpower result from the regime's inability to manage manpowerelative scarcity of skilled manpower, and an excessive drain on tha agricultural labor force.
The management problems reflect thoassociatedapid transfer ofow-level workers to essential wartime tasks. The transfers effected to date were disorderly and poorly planned andin uneven and unproductive allocations of the labor force. Tho drain of manpower from agriculture was, for exampio, an important factor in the disappointing fifth-month harvest. At the same time the regime found that the allocation of workers to construction work camps was apparently soor irrational that some of these workers could beto the agricultural labor force or to other proauction tasks.
Skilled manpowor resources in North Vietnam totalorkers orercent of the cl""a" labor force. This total is inadequate to meet ail the require ments of mobilization and normal economic activity. Tne strain on these resources has been reduced somewhat by tne presence of anen in Chineseengineer units engaged in railroad and alrrieic .
construction work in the northern part of North Viotnam. this Chinese technical assistance the supply of skilled manpower remains tight. Wator conservancy which is vital to agriculture is one area where the shortage or skilled manpower soems to be particularly acute. In the spring6 the regime noted that it had become difficult to man water conservancy brigades because of the loss of cadres to wartime tasks.
5. Prospects
If the commitment of manpower to regular military forces over the next twelve months doos not exceed currently estimated levels, North Vietnam should be able to meet ita manpower requirements but at an increasing cost to other economic, educational and social programs.
Although in terms of numbers -he Northhave adquate manpower to replace losses and toforcos in South Vietnam, there are factors that maytheir enthusiasm for sustaining this drain. Theboing sent to South Viotnam is in qualitative terms probably tho best the country can muster. Its loss over the long term is not one to be borne lightly by any power. Moreover, even though North Vietnam probably can meet its basic manpower commitment in South Vietnam, there isdrain on manpower within North Vietnam and the prospects are good that this drain will increase as the air war requires greater reconstruction efforts andagging agriculture requires additional Inputs of manpower. Finally an increasing scarcity of skilled manpower andmilitary andmake tne drain of North Vietnam's manpower an increasingly difficult burden.
If the manpower drain does become acute, it will probably be in the area of agricultural manpower. In6 the regime felt that the agricultural labor force could remain stable atillionat annual withdrawals would be almost exactly balanced by the normal annual addition to tho work force. By6 tne reqime had apparently concluded that this balance was too low andeallocation of labor back into agriculture was necessary. We do not know if this reallocation has been made. However, the disappointing fifth-month harvest makes it likely that the regime will be compelled to provide more
1-5
/orSECREl
agricultural manpower in order toh month harvest. If tho regime is unsuccessful in this offort, strong pressures will develop in7 for an even greater commitment of manpower to agriculture. Thiscould not be accomplished without disrupting theof other sectors of tho economy, particularly if tho reallocation of manpowor to agriculture involves largo numbers of skilled workers.
Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program
1- Economic and Military Target System
Damage caused by air strikes againstand military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam through6 amountedillion ofillion were sustained by the economyillion by tho military." (See)
If the bombing of North Vietnam persists duringmonths tolong the same scale and character (exclusive of the strikes against petroleum storage) as during the first five months* anillion of damage to tho economy may be expected. Tho cost of replacing the destroyed bulk petroleum facilities will total an additionalillion. The total cumulative measurable damage to the economy of North Vietnam byill thenillion.
Damage inflicted to military facilities and equipment during the first five months of bombing6 (February through June) amounted to onlyillion and was exceedingly low when compared Tho bulk of this loss consisted of the deatruction of aircraft and
dollar costs assigned to bomb damage are valueaeneral measure of the effectiveness of the bombing program. They are not intended to indicateoutlays which havo to bo undertaken by tho Hanoi regime.
"Thereause in the bombing of North Vietnam from5 through
CRCT-
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE RESULTING FROM AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
nd
ffitory Domg. I conomic Dantogo
86
6
7
A"1 'JmfU--
TOP^SEGREZ
naval craft. No Important military barracks and supply do-pots were attacked because of their location in sanctuary areas. The average monthly damage to military facilities and equipment amounted to3 million. On thethat the air war will continue against military targets at about this scale during the forthcoming twelve months, the total loss sustained by military targets will amount toillion. The total cumulative damage to military facilities and equipment as ofill then beillion.
Using the same assumptions, we estimate that the cumulative economic and military damage as aof the Rolling Thunder program will4 million by in addition, there are and will be other losses and indirect costs to the economy and the military establishment to which values cannot be assigned.
Losses at this level will not present adrain on North Vietnam's resources. Much of the cost represents damages to facilities such as military barracks which are not in active use, or to facilities such as bridges which do not require permanent repair. The North Vietnamese have ahosen so far not to repair the damaged petroleum storage facilities. The only knownof the damaged electric power stations has been Uong Bi station and this presumably has been done by or with the help of Russian technicians.
The damage sustained by air attacks against North Vietnam is in largeill that can be passed to tho USSR and Communist China. The increasing aid commitments of these countries far overshadow the small collar value of the damage caused by air attack. Theseimply an obligation on the part of the USSR andChina to underwrite the economic restoration of the country on favorable terms and explain in large measure Hanoi's attitude toward the loss of its modern economic
2. Effects of the Air Attacks at Present Levels
a. Economic
The bulk petroleum storage facilities in North Vietnam represent the first importanttarget system attacked in depth by the Rolling Thunder
program apart from the sporadic strikes againstin the northern part of the country. Theof the petroleum storage system will present Hanoi and its allies with an immediate problem in improvising anflow of petroleum products. Hanoi has already gone to considerable lengths to reduce the vulnerability of its bulk petroleum storage centers by dispersal and otherdefense measures, including burying tanks, so that an emergency plan for an alternative system of supplyexists. To the extent that off-loading and improvised storage cannot be fully realized at Haiphong, the logical alternative system would be based on China's Port Bayard and port facilities and its connecting rail links.
The immediate impact in North Vietnam will be felt, therefore, in the need to convertew system of supply and distribution. This conversion will necessitate costly measures and create significant problems in adaptinqew situation. etroleum shortage develops its burdon will fall on less essential of nonessential and civilian uses, which may comprise as much as one-third of normal consumption.
We estimate, nevertheless, that the supply of petroleum for the essential military and economicwill continue, and that the flow of supplies to the insurgent forces in South Vietnam can be sustained if not increased.
Even before the attacks on the bulkstorage facilities the bombings were causingdisruption of economic activity. Afterhave been made toakeshift supply and distribution system for petroleum the continuation ofon transportation will cause further disruption. Hanoi will have to reallocate capital and additional labor for repair and construction within the transport sector at the expense of industry and agriculture.
The cumulative debilitating effects of the bombing had already slowed down growth in industry and agriculture There will probably be no growth in industry and agriculture6 and theonthsnd some plans for economic developmentnew industrial construction projects will probably have to be abandoned. The stagnation of industrial growth
will have no overriding effect on the wagingar which, for other than manpower, is essentially sustained by material inputs from outside North Vietnam. North Vietnam's modern industrial economy makes almost no direct or significant contribution to the war effort. The stagnation ofgrowth may, however, create problems particularly ifh month harvest is poor. Even so the primarily agrarian nature of this subsistence economy means that there will be no sustained or critical hardship among the bulk of the population as a consequence of the effect of the air war at its present levels.
b. Military
Air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam tof maintained at the scale and of the same nature as that of the first part6 will notthe military capability of North Vietnam. The military targets being attacked in the present air war are not those that wouldighly disruptive effect on tho military establishment or significantly impair its training, andcapabilities or its capability to support thein South Vietnam.
3. Effects of an Expanded Air Offensive
The effectiveness of air attacks in creating burdensome pressures and strains on North Vietnam would be greatly enhanced by an expanded bombing programhour interdiction against the road and rail connections to Communist China and neutralization cf the many significant military/economic targots such as the remaining petroleum storage facilities and the Haiphong cement plant.
rogram could cause an overloading of tho main transport connections to China and create severe internal distribution problems.* Although expanded airwould not stop activities essential to support of the war, they couldrastic decline in the level and efficiency with which the economic and military sectors function.
*Seeore detailed discussion of the transportation problems resulting from this postulated at tack.
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Ki
TOFSEGREX
The Rolling Thunder attack against lines ofbridges and transportation equipment targets has resulted in losses to North Vietnam ofillion or over three-fourths of the estimated direct damage inflicted on all economic targets. Forty six bridges orercent of the bridges on the rail lines subjected to air attacks havo been damaged or destroyed,ighway bridges have been destroyed or damaged. In spite of the continued andarmed reconnaissance attacks on the five major railroad lines, on onlyto Vlnh and Hanoi to Laothrough rail service been effectively interdicted for most of the time since the bombings began. Theong Dang line has been interdicted for through service several times butotal ofew months. The Hanoi-Haiphong line has been interdictedotal ofew weeks. Thehai Nguyen line has been able to maintain through traffic almost constantly.
Losses of transporation equipment, particularly motor trucks, have increased sharply in recent months. to pilot reportsrucks have been damaged or destroyed. These pilot reports undoubtedly overstate results but even without adjustment, reportsthis level of destruction would amount to only two-thirds of the trucks known to have been imported by North Vietnam
The North Vietnamese responded to these attacksrash construction effort tore-strike planning program designed to keep lines of communication open to develop more sophisticated methods of concealment for roads, bridges and ferries, and to complete an impressive proliferation of bridge bypasses and alternate routes. Dy the end5 an0 workers had been added to the labor force of construction work-camps engaged in rail and road repairs.
The success of these counterraeasures is seen in statistics on the number of bridges destroyed or damaged and tho repair measures adopted by North Vietnam to keep traffic moving. Of the totalridgesrail or rail/highway bridgesighwayVietnam
TOP SULHET
l
has found it necessary to repair onlyail or rail/highway andighway bridges. The major emphasis has beon to construct temporary crossings or by-passes,f those having been constructed to replace damaged higfc way bridges. The savings resulting from these expedients are impressive. North Vietnam has had to expend only S3 million on temporary repairs comparedost ofillion if all the damaged or destroyed bridges were permanently repaired or reconstructed.
Although the air strikes have patently made it marc difficult and costly to maintain traffic movement, the countermoasures adopted have proved extremely effective* Overall transport performance has beon maintained at pre-bombing levels. The known movement of supplies into Laos and South Vietnam duringry season was double that of tho previous year.
After an initial shaky response to Allied, the North Vietnamese were able to consolidate their position and are now able to maintain and Improve theirsystem even though the bombings have increased. The ease with which they convertedartime construction base5 indicates that further increases in air attacks would undoubtedly be countered by an expansion of existing capabilities to keep open all important routes to South Vietnam.
The level of interdiction carried on through6 has been insufficient to create any major strains in the North Vietnamese transport system. If interdiction continues at current levels throughhe Northshould havo no difficulty in maintaining current levels of traffic, including imports and exports by land.
Meaningful pressures on North Vietnamesecapabilities would require an air attack program that denies tho country its ability to maintain seaborne imports and exports, increases import requirements, and concentrates transport on tho land connections to Communist China. Such an air attack program would have to include measures to close North Vietnam's major seaports, tho neutralization of remaining petroleum storage facilities and vital economic targets such as the Haiphong cement plant,ighlyprogram of armed reconnaissance against surface
transport and lines of communication linking North Vietnam and Communist China.
The two rail connections to China are currently used at only about one-third of their normal capacity. If measures against the major seaports could stop as much asercent of normal import trade, these rail lines would be forced to operate at approximately full capacity under interdicted conditions. If more seaborne traffic had to be diverted to overland movement and additional importwere generated, by neutralization of the cement plant for example, the rail traffic requirement would increase even beyond the uninterdicted capacity of the rail lines.
Sustained interdiction of tho lines would force tho Coannunints to allocate considerable amounts of manpower and materials to maintain the railroad lines and alternate highway routes. Virtually all daylight traffic would stop and night traffic would be disrupted thua slowing downand making the logistic rosupply of Communist forcesloss reliable than at present.
Some economic requirements would have to goand many of the Bloc aid projects and domesticprograms would have to bo postponed. Modern industrial production would be slowed down and there would be increasing though not critical problems in food and distribution
There would, of course, be adequate transport capacity to support the military establishment and tothe present level of aggression in South Vietnam and Laos. But tha support of these activities woulduch more costly and difficult burden. The population of North Vietnam would also be more keenly aware of tho deprivations and costs associated with the war.
C. The State of Civilian Morale
1. General Review
The initial response of North Vietnam's civilian population to the US/GVN air attacks waa characterizedigh degree of patriotic enthusiasm. The air attacks in large measure havetrong force for unifying thein its resistance to the "US aggressors," As the
air attacks have continued and intensified, there hasaning of popular enthusiasm. This has not, however, reached the point that it has any meaningful impact upon the determination of the regime to continue with the war or the policy options it may elect to achieve its objectives.
Almost every segment of the civilian population of North Vietnam has been forced to make some sacrifice in its standard of living as the result of the bombing. civilians living in the southern part of theaboutercent of thosuffered far greater hardships in the form of personal and property losses, shortages of consumer goods, and sharp declines in income resulting from interruption of normal economic activity. Letters from residents of the southern part of tho country to relatives in Thailand cite personal hardships and anxieties resulting from air strikes more frequently than in the past and more often than letters from residents of other parts of the country.
Data released by the Ministry of Labor in the spring6 on the excessive rates of absenteeism among construction workers in the southern provinces may reflect the poor state of morale there. Absenteeism due to illness among construction workers largely engaged in repair work on the transportation system in the southern part of the country3 days per worker5ercent of total working days scheduled.
indicate that morale and
uxbuxpiinu problems resulting from shortages of foodto hamper operations at both civilian work camps and at military units in the southern provinces.
Elsewhere, the hardships caused by evacuation from urban centers, splitting of families, reductions in quality of consumer goods and services, increases in work hours largely without additional compensation, and losses of income resulting from transfers from normal jobs to lower paying defense-related tasks are less severe but apparontly have depressed civilian morale to some extent. There is little explicit evidence available on the morale of civilians living outside of target areas. 6 Hanoi press report statedecline in the health and morale of workers at the country's second largest machineryTran Hung Dao Machinery and Tool Plant in Hanoi, which produces items for military as well as civilian
^OP-SECRET
had occurred due to the increase in regular working tin* and in outside duties.
Nevertheless, recent public discussion of the need to tighten control over both party members and the general population implies that the regime fears there may be some deterioration of public morale. An article in the6 issue of the party journal Hoc Tap, detailed weaknesses in tho party's techniques for disciplining erring members, and ino Chi Minh called for "harsh disciplinary measures"umber of party members and cadres in party cells who failed to carry out party policies correctly. Less than two weeks later the chairman of the Supreme Peoples Organ of Control ln the government colledevision of the sections of the legal code dealing with counterrevolutionary activities, protection of state property, and the rights and duties of citizens "in order to satisfy the demands of wartime."
This recent emphasis upon breakdowns ofimplies that patriotic appeals alone are no longer sufficient to maintain civilian enthusiasm for the war. The original strength of appeals to the patriots wasfrom tha response ofillion youths)illion women, or aboutercent of the working age population, to give active support for tho war effort by performing various essential economic and paramilitary tasks undor the "threend "threeovements. Intercepted letters indicate that the participants in tho movements were highly motivated to contribute to the war effort.
The continuation of bombing appears, however, to be gradually Intensifying economic and political problems to the point that the patriotic fervor with which theinitially greeted the air strikes ia being diminished.
"The "throe readies" for youth are: eady toeady to join the army;eady to go wherever the country requires them.
"threo responsibilities" for women arei to produce and do other tasks to free the men to fight;esponsibility to take over family affairs and to encourage their husbands and sons to serve in combat;to serve in battle if necessary.
TOPSEGREJ^
Discussions of civilian mobilization inpublications6 indicate that theis encountering difficulties in effectivelyalready mobilized. These difficulties areon the lower level cadres in both the governmentparty, who are said to discriminate againstin general and women in particular in theof responsibilities. The morale-depressing effectsand discrimination in the mobilization effortby the shoor inability of North Vietnam'sto manage the task. Managerial inefficienciessince air strikes began inprevented an orderly reallocation of the laborhave been criticized in the North Vietnamesemobilizing construction workers and startingplan,
In an effort to stimulate patriotic fervor the regime's propaganda makes clear the direct connection between North Vietnamese support for the war in the South and the bombing of North Vietnam. Intercepted letters and reports indicate that civilians in North Vietnam do in fact see tho bombingirect consequence of the support furnished by North Vietnam to the Viet Cong. They, take great pride in their country's achievements in downing American aircraft and often mention the wellachievements of Communist forces in South Vietnam.
Despite the regime's propaganda on the success of the "liberation forces" in the south, the population in North Vietnam is probably increasingly aware that the war is not going well and that heavy casualties are being suffered by North Vietnamese troops who have been sent south, North Vietnamese soldiers who have been captured or who have defected in south Vietnam reveal that someof the hardships, sickness, and injuries suffered by Infiltrated troops is provided the people at home through letters and by eyewitness reports from wounded veterans who have returned home. If these casualties mount and the morale of the North Vietnamese troops in South Viotnam drops seriously, there is likely toomparable drop in the morale of the civilian Knowledge of military reverses in the field rather than the effect of bombing at homeajor factor in
TOF-SEe&EZ.
TUP-SEGREI
the decline of popular morale in Japan and Germany in World War II.
2. prospects
Civilian morale is likely to continue toin North Vietnam over the nextonths because of the probability of further declines in civilian living standards. Agriculturalat least in part from the mobilizationalready affected the current harvest, intensifying the already tight food situation in North Vietnam. Phamember of the party politburo and director of the Financial and Trade Bureau of the Premier's Office stated in6 that prices of food on the free market have already started to rise because of setbacks in the spring harvest and thatoubt it will be possible to stabilizo the situation in the forthcoming period." In addition to the pressure on food supplies, other strains on civilian living standards will probably increase. Despiteurther decline in civilian morale during the next year, such an eventuality is not likely in the foreseeable future to deprive the leadership of freedom to pursue the conflict in whatever manner it chooses.
II. The Significance of Laos and Cambodia
The ability of the Communists to launch and to sustain the insurgency movement in North Vietnam has been greatly facilitated by the essentially free access they have had to those areas in Laos and Cambodia which border South Vietnam. Laos has developed aa the major route for the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. which has been usedimited extentource of supplies and has served principallyafe-haven for Communist forces, is becoming increasingly important as an integral part of the logistics system. The unique value to the Communists of both countries lies in their neutral status. The logistic resupply activities in Laos are hindered only by aerial interdiction and such grouno activities as havo been conducted to date. Both of these measures have hadimited effectiveness. Cambodia, on the other hand, provides the Communists an almost complete immunity from US/GVN and allied military reaction. The opportunities to apply political or economic pressures toambodia reaction against Communist use of its territory are also extremely limited.
TUPSEGRET
A. Laoo
1. Supply Requiromonts and Road Capacity
The Communists havo been able to use three routes to supply their forces in Southsea route from North Vietnam (orhe Laotian land route, and the Cambodian route.* Although the use of anyroute has varied over time, the overwelming share of supplies needed to meet the external logistic requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam are being moved by truck from North Vietnam through the Laotian Panhandle.
The increasing use of the Laotian supply route is shown graphically inhich compares theof supplies by truck into the southern panhandle during56 dry season. During5 dry season trucks carried an average of somehort tons ofay into the infiltration corridor of Laosotal resupply ofons. During6 dry season, however, the daily movement of supplies into Southern Laos was aboutons or0 tons during the season of0 were delivered to the infiltration corridor. In both years the flow of supplies was also supplemented by atons aaround the dmk. lso shows the dramatic increase in the through movement of supplies to the borders of South Although the Communists had to increase the flow of supplies for their forces in the Panhandle they were at the same time able to increase the flow of supplies by truck to South Vietnam from atons5ons thus far
a. The Logistic Requirement
The estimated VC/NVA military strength in South Vietnam inashich includes anegular troops. These troops requireons of supplies daily
*The reference here is to supplies moved into South Vietnam from any point in Cambodia, and is not intended to refer to supplies that move on the Laotian route and merely cross northeast Cambodia before entering South Vietnam.
Tdpsegrex
1-2
SUPPLIES TRUCKED FROM NORTH VIETNAM
INTO THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE DURING56 DRY SEASONS
at present levels of combat. mall part of thisons of Class IIlass IV (quartermaster, engineer, and medical) andammunition)be obtained from out of We have noted in recent months, however, thatof internal distribution problems within Souththe Communist forces stationed in the food-deficit central highlands are obtaining rice supplies from Cambodia. The present estimates of the probably build-up of Communist forces and rates of combat byould, of course, increase these requirements substantially. The total daily requirement byould be in the orderay. The external requirement would then beay at present levels of combat or someay if the level of combat should double. These external supplyare small and their fulfillment requires the use ofmall percentage of the capacity of the supply routes through Laos.
b. Logistic Capacity
The capability to move supplies overland through North Vietnam and Laos to South Vietnam isby the capacity of the roads in Laos. Theuninterdicted capacity of the infiltration network in the Laotian Panhandle for truck movement to pointsew miles of South Vietnam isay in the dry seasonay in the rainy season, Come rain or come shine this capacity ranges0 times the current external logistic requirement of the Communist forces in South Vietnam andimes the probable external requirements under current estimates of the probable build-up of Communist forces by
The prospects are dim that conventional air interdiction can reduce the capacity of this networkevel that would represent an effective ceiling on the volume of supplies that can be moved through Laos. Duringday bombing pause from6orties0 tons of ordnance on the main supply routes in the Panhandle. In spite of this attack the level of truck traffic moving south during the sametrucks pertwice the level of truck traffic in the same period one year
TXJPSEGREX.
earlier. hotographic analysis ofoute segments interdicted5 in MB IV in North Vietnam showed that route capacity was reduced on only nine. On only two of those segments was capacity reduced more thanercent.
In view of these assessments and the fact that the level of traffic moving on these routesmall volume of military traffic using, on the average, only slightly overercent of road capacity, the Laotian supply network must be regarded as relatively invulnerable to conventional air interdiction.
2. Maintenance and improvement of the Route Through Laos
The difficulty in interdicting the supply not-work through Laos is compounded by the intensive efforts which the North Vietnamese have expended in camouflaging roads, in effecting rapid repairs, in resorting to night travel, and other innovations to keep traffic moving, and at the same time to improve and expand the original As shown in the map) the infiltration network through Laos now consists ofiles of roads compared withiles at the end of4 dry season.
a. Road Construction
At the end4 the truckable roadin Laos extended only as far south as Muong Nong. By the end5 the network had advancediles farther south. During6 dryoreeffort was put forth. The southward route wasanotheriles to tho tri-border area and moreiles of new roads were built in Laos andto connect the infiltration network with theroad system. In addition,iles of new alternate roads, including tho alternates to Mu Gia Pass, were built in the northern part of the country. The details ofonstruction are shown in. The net effect of the expansion6 has been to provide anroute for every road that existed prior to the end Furthermore the main north-south network has improved to the extent that some through truck traffic
TOPlSEGREX
apparently is moving for the first time during any rainy season.
b. Labor utilization
Tn earlier years the supply movement through Laos was essentially jungle trails,or example,en were required to operate the trail movement through Laos. The construction of an improved road system and the need to maintain it under conditions of airrequired substantial inputs of manpower.
The labor force engaged in building and maintaining roads in the Laos Panhandle has an estimated total strengthaborers, comprised ofengineering troops supported by locally conscripted labor. The Panhandle is sparsely populated soarge part of this labor force has been brought in from other parts of Laos or from countries adjacont to the Laos border including North Vietnam. We are unable to determine the number of North Vietnamese in this labor force. Available reports indicate that North Vietnamese labor does work onndf not others.
The labor force on roads in Laos isinto workcamps similar to those in North Vietnam. They are located along the entire road system and probably dispersed as follows:
Mu Gia Pass/Rteock quarry)
ock quarry)
2
Route 96
ofs
Strength
These workcamp organizations are responsible for designated segments of roads. The total strengthorkcamp will vary with the volume of work under way and the availability of local labor. llustrates the rate at which these laborers have been able to complete road construction projects. The rapid expansion of the road netnd increases in traffic havearger maintenance force necessary. Given the remarkable increase in the mileage of new motorable roads constructed in the past year, it is believed that the present labor force can maintain the road net and can expand the network even if the level of air strikes increases.
Some construction equipment is being used for road building in Laos and has contributed to the rapid completion of new roads. Aerial photography has shownpieces of construction equipment, probablyand roadgraders, at key routes under construction. It is believed that the inventory of constructionin the Laos Panhandle could be increasedf the level of interdiction by air strikes were increased,
c. Repair Activities
Workcamps in Laos have been as efficient in the repair of bomb-damaged roads and bridges as their counterparts in North Vietnam, They have been able toew timber bridge at Ban Nape onithinay interval of comparative aerial photography. Photography also reveals the clearing of landslides caused by bombings on routeays and repairs to interdicted portions ofours. Moreover, the repairs have been carried out while the road system wastage of considerable expansion.
3. Vulnerability of the Laotian Route
The Communists in the Panhandle are better able to counteract the bombings now than thoyear ago. They apparently have the ability and resources to increase and improve countermeasures to air attack. Experience in Laos and in North Vietnam shows that conventional airis unlikely to create any significant or sustained reduction in the road capacity of thenetwork in Laos, as long as the Communistmall volume of logistic support from North Vietnam.
The enormity of the task assigned to airis apparent in this example. We assume that tho nature of the VC/NVA external logistic requirements remains essentially unchanged and that air interdiction hasustainedercent reduction in the capacity of the supply network. Even under theseconventional air interdiction could notreduce resupply capabilities through Laos until the VC/NVA force structureevel of at least six times the build-up estimated byt current levels of combat, or until theorce engaged in combatate some ten times greater than that being waged in South Vietnam.
The most promising means of effectivelyCommunist resupply capabilities are by denying them access to supplies in South Vietnam, forcing themreater level of combat and at the same time denying them access to the Cambodian and sea infiltration routes. During the past dry season we estimate that the Communist forces in the food-deficit central highlands may have been receiving as much asons of rice daily from Cambodia. If this source were denied and the rice had to be supplied from North Vietnam through Laos the logistic problem would become more difficult. It would not be critical at this time, but as the VC/NVA build-up continues the excess of route capacity over supplywould be reduced significantly.
11. Cambodia
For years the Viet Cong have used Cambodiaanctuary andinor source of supplies. With the expansion of Communist activities and the introduction of NVA units into the conflict, even greater use is being made of Cambodiaanctuary area andource of supplies.
1. Sanctuary
The Viet Cong and, more rocently. Northforces use Cambodian territory in many areas alongilc border for sanctuary and bivouac purposes. Important Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army military facilities, such as rest camps, training areas, hospitals, workshops, and storage depots, now operate in Cambodia. Photography shows at least two Communist base areas in northoast Cambodia. (See the map.)
A recently captured Viet Cong document reveals in the clearest terms to date how the Communists have been using Cambodian territory for sanctuary with the complicity of at least local Cambodian officials. The documenteport of an early6 Viet Cong meeting dealing with problems associated with the use of Cambodian it makes clear the importance which tho Viet Cong attaches to its Cambodian sanctuary and suggests that Cambodia will loom even larger in Communist planning as the war intensifies in South Vietnam. The documentthat the principal use of Cambodian territory, at least in the Tayvay Rieng area. Is to harbor rest and recovery camps for Viet Cong wounded.
2. Cambodiaource of Supplies
Most of the supplies procured by the Communists in Cambodia have been purchased in the open market in small amountB and moved clandestinely across the border bytransport. In the past year, however, the volume of supplies moved to the Communists has definitely increased. Recent reporting, including captured documents, indicate that the VC are acquiring in Cambodia substantial quantities of cloth, pharmaceuticals, surgical supplies, salt, fish, gasoline, communications equipment, and office supplies. Sihanouk has also made so called "humanitarian" gifts of medicine and food to the Viet Cong. Wo estimate that atons of rice and probably as much0 tons have been sold to the Communists. requently reported figure0 tons appears to be possible. During5 and6 Cambodian traders reportedly movedamounts of rice northward on the Mekong River totowns of Kratie and Stung Treng. The rice was then moved onward by small water craft or by truck to the South Vietnamese and Laotian borders. For the first time we have reliable reports that truck convoys carrying rice also crossed the border four or five miles intoterritory after nightfall. The Viet Cong control the border on four routes that enter Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces. The purchase of rice in Cambodia probablyogistic expedient to supply VC/NVA units operating in rice deficit areas, instead of attempting to move the rice from surplus areas within South Vietnam.
The use of Cambodiaransfer area orource of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess.
Almost certainly, the Communists have established arms caches on Cambodian territory for support of the VC and NVA forces. Cambodian troops may occasionally havearms to the VC, but such incidents have not been widespread! and apparently have not involved collusion or foreknowledge on the part of the Cambodian government.
Arms shipments probably have also moved south from Laos through northeastern Cambodia into South Developments in the fair-weather road network during the past dry season strongly suggest that the route was intended to support such traffic during the dry season (See the map). This traffic could have moved withof the local Cambodian authorities but without the knowledge of tho officials in Phnom Penh.
Even without the cooperation of the Cambodian government the Communists could make greater use ofterritory. They could expand the current type of small-scale infiltration by sending more people to purchase supplies in the open market and by making more use of legitimate import houses and the Communistin Phnom Penh. Instead of moving these supplies across the border by clandestine means, they can hire trucks to move supplies to the border in the same manner that some shipments cf food have already been made.
Cambodia, accordingly, must be regardedefinite asset to the Communist forces bothanctuary andajor route for obtaining food and other supplies.
appi.:ndix a
RRCUPURABILITY OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN NORTH VIETNAM
"In the task of ensuring communications, we scored many good achievements and gained much good experiencen tho years to come, to develop past successes we mustreserve projects, means of production, tools and equipment, and rationally organize the manpower necessary to repair and restore bridges and roads rapidly so as to ensure continuous transport."
Nguyen Con, chairman, state Planning Committee, to the National Assembly of North76
i. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program A. Overall
As of6 direct losses caused by air strikes against the transportation system in North Vietnam amounted toillion or over three-fourths of the estimated cost of replacement of all economic facilities damaged by tho Rolling Thunder program. The air attacks have accounted for the damage or destruction ofail and rail/highway bridgesighway bridges. Losses of transport equipment were as follows*:
vessels Vehicles
Railroad Freight carse s
*These figures are basically those obtained from pilotbut adjusted downward on the basis of photography and analysis of bomb damage assessments of individual strikes in an effort to eliminate both exaggeration and duplication.
TOf^EGREH
In addition to those losses, damage andto the transport system has resulted fromstrikes against road systems and from attacks onyards at Vinh, Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, and Nam Dinh. Both the amount of tine and coat of repairing the damagefrom these strikes has boon negligible.
The air strikes to date have concentratedransportation targets in the southern part of North Vietnam. The most significant strikes, however, have been against transport routes in the northorn and central parts of North Vietnam. The interdiction program has produced relatively uneven results in attaining its objective of haltinq rail traffic.
Only one railto Thaibeen open for through traffic almost continuously since tho air strikes began. The Hanoi to Vinh line has been effectively interdicted for through rail service for most of the period. Through rail service on theao Cai line, which carried an estimatedercent of total rail trafficas been halted during most of the period since Interdiction of this line disrupted the export of apatite and stopped the movement of Chinese transitto and from Yunnan Province.
The importantong Dang and Hanoi-Haiphong lines which carry tho bulk of North Vietnam's imports have been subjected to the loast amount of bombing. They are alao the two lines transiting territory which provides morefor bypasses and othor expedients to maintain traffic movement. Theong Dang line has been interdicted for through serviceotal ofew months. The Hanoi-Haiphong has been interdictedotal ofew weeks. Successful interdiction of theong Dang line would have particularly important and measurable When the lino came under heavy attack in5 the import of Chinese coal was shifted from rail to sea transport. The coal movement was shifted back to rail transportation in6 but was noted to bo againby sea in May when the rail line was again interdicted for through traffic.
TOP 3ECRET.
B. Damage to Bridges
The status of the bridges damaged or destroyed by air attack is shown in the following tabulation:
and Rail/Highway Bridget
Bridges
Total
or
Des troyed Repaired To Be Repaired
4
The North Vietnamese have found it necessary to repair slightly overercent of the bridges damaged or destroyed. Rather than effect costly and probably short lived repairs they have chosen to concentrate on the construction ofbypasses such as fords, ferries and temporary bridges. otallternate crossings have beenby aerial photography. These alternate crossings have been used particularly to sustain highway transport. The net effect is that North Vietnam now has more highway crossings than it had before tho start of the bombings.
The use of temporary expedients to ensure continuous transport is particularly attractive to the North Vietnamese not only because the expedients are generally lessto air attack buu also because thoy can be implemented at far less cost. The permanent repair or reconstruction of the bridges attacked to date would cost North Vietnam anillion. The cost of tomporary repairs and other expedients to maintain traffic, however, has been9 million.
II. Countermeasures to Air Attack
A. Repair of Bridges
As indicated above, one of the major responses of the North Vietnamese to the air attack on their transportation has been to use temporary expedients to keep traffic moving. The following survey of the damage or destruction of bridges on the principal roil lines illustrates this point in detail.
Hanoi to vinh
This Una isautical miles (nm) in length and includesajor bridges (overeet in length) andinor bridges (loss thaneetleven of theajor bridges have been damaged by air strikes. Seven of these have an operational bypass bridge or one under construction. Pour have no bridge bypass, but in all cases there is evidence of some means of crossing such as foot bridges, pontoon bridges, or ferry crossing.
Althoughridges have not been damaged, three of thorn havo bypass bridges already under construction! aof North Vietnam's widespread pre-striko planning.
Vinh to Xom Khe
On this stretch of line, which is approximatelymajorinor bridges have been damaged or destroyed. Fifty percent have evidence of bypass efforts in addition to attempts at repair of the original bridge.
The North Vietnamese havo demonstrated considerable ingenuity and expertise in keeping traffic moving on this line and there is little or no indication that thosehave diminished appreciably.
Hanci to Dong Pang
The line from Hanoi to the Chinese borderautical miles in length. There areridgeseet and over in length. Ten of these bridges may beas major structures.
Photographic coverage is available on seven bridges, of which all but two have railroad bypasses either operable or under construction. At least three cajor bridges on this line have been damaged by U. S. air strikes. Repairs to these bridges are being carried out with modern oquipment; the new substructures are massive and the repairs appear to beermanent nature. The naturu of these repairs and tho installation of dual gauge track in certain locations give every indication that the North Vietnamese hope to keep this line open under all conditions.
Hanoi to Haiphong
This line, the most important for the movement of imported economic goods, ia approximatelyiles in length. Two bridges have been damaged by air attack.
Bypass activityew temporary bridge which is assumed to be operational, as well as an existing ferry crossing in the immediate vicinity. Repairs to tho damaged original bridges ara in evidence, though lack of photographyetermination of the pace of repair.
Hanoi to Lao Cai
The line from Hanoi to the Chinese borderautical miles in length and hasajor andinor bridges. Photographic coverage shows the damage or destructionajorinor bridges above Yen aai and in rough terrain along the Red River. The Viet Tri bridge, located south of Yen Bai, was destroyed late in Juno of this year. The rugged naturo of tho terrain and the constrictive nature of the road bed has forced the North Vietnamese to repair the damaged structures rather than resort to bypasses. Only two bypasses are discornible in available photography.
Highway Bridges
Damage or destructionighway bridge in North Vietnam does not present the complications associated with such an act in more industrialized countries. This is borne outraphic review of the status of damaged highway bridges since
hows the cumulative totals of bridges of all typos which have boon dostroyod or damaged plotted against the total number of bridges in need of repair at any given time. The difference between the two lines ls thonumber of bridges repaired. During the bombing pause from5 to6 the number of bridges repaired is seen to bo appreciable. The difference sinco that period generally remains the same. The costs to ropair or reconstruct the damaged bridges is shown in twocost of permanont ropair and cost ofrepairs that wero made to koop traffic moving around all damaged structures. The decreasing trend shown for the cost of temporary repairs reflects the increased use ofmethods ofiven vulnerable crossing. This is more clearly shown in.
resents the status of the highway bridges only. The total of highway bridges damaged or destroyed is plotted against the total of bridges actually repaired, the number of alternate crossings, and the number of crossings to which no repairs have been made and no alternate means of transportation have been provided. To further clarifyand alternate crossings this ls divided into total bridge repairs and total alternate crossings.
The total of bridges) is around one-fourth of the totalf new alternate crossings. The total of those two categories now exceeds the totalighway bridges which were damaged or destroyed. Asune, fords accounted forercent of all alternate crossings with bypass bridges, ferries, foot bridges and pontoon bridges ranking in descending order. Tho largest number of bridges destroyed have been at crossings which have shallow streams, at least during the dry soaaon. The longer and more important bridges are at locations requiring other than crossings by fords. At these more Important crossings, moro than one type of toraporary crossing isin ovidonce.
In sua, the North Vietnamese are presently in aposition to keep their lines of highway transportation open, by havingigh degree of skill in repairing damaged structures and in building more alternate crossings in order to Increase the options available for the routing of highway traffic,
B. improvement of Rail Linos
As the air strikes cxtonded into the northorn part of North Vietnam, the Hanoi rogimo undertook store permanent measures to ensure the operation of the vitalong Dang line, and the connecting lines to Haiphong and Thai Nguyen.
Construction ia undar way to provide greaterand limit the effectiveness of attempts to interdict these lines. hird rail is boing laid along tho Hanoi -Dong Dang lino at least betwoon the Chinese border and Kep, and possibly all the way to Hanoi. When this work isprobably within tho next few months to Kop, both standard-gauge and meter-gauge rolling stock can be used on the lino. Aa noted above several rail bypasses to bridges and at least ono bypass around the city of Lang Son have boon constructed or are currently under construction, in
tandard-gauge rail line is under constructionKep and the iron and steel complex at Thai Nguyen.of thehai Nguyen line, probably by the endill provide the North Vietnamese with an alternate mil supply route in case of interdiction of theong Dang line between Kep and the Hanoi area, and will alsothe use of standard-gauge equipment for the movement of coko and coal from China to Thai Nguyen. If the line iabetween Kep and Dong Dang, the North Vietnamese can use rail shuttle service between bombed bridges into shifting much of the volume of supplies to sea
Rail shuttle service also has been noted on the Hanoi-Haiphong line when the Hal Duong bridge is interdicted.ighway bypass bridgeailroad bypass bridge have been constructed to circumvent the Hai Duong bridge in case of interdiction. Both of these bridges have spans that can be detached during tho day and floated into placo for use at night. Large barges with rails across them are being used as bridge spans for the rail bypass bridgo. Inthero are several waterways connecting Haiphong with Hanoi ond other major citioa whichotal capacity in excess of the capacity of tho railroad.
C. New Road Construction and Improvement
The North Viotnamese haveajor effort to keep the road system functioning, particularly tho vital links in Military Region IV (KR IV) which carry supplies to tho Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Slnco the beginning of the allied bombingiles of roads havo been constructed andiles have been improved. At the present time aboutiles of new roads are under conatruction.
The emphasis on new road construction is toew inland route south from Thanh Hoa to Dong Hoi in MR IV. This new route, to be completed by the fallill provide an alternate to tha heavily interdicted coastal route. The new route follows terrain which avoids stream crossings and possible chokopoints. The development of thia new route and the improvement of existing routes arc providing the Vietnamese with an increased flexibility and capacity for the movement of supplies southward which iaincreasingly difficult to overcome by bombing methods.
D. Use of Labor, Materials and Equipment
By the endhe North Vietnamese hadits workcamp organizationiable system with an0 workers. The air strikes which started in5 concentrated first upon Military Region IV which has its headquarters at Vinh. The initial Worthresponse to the air attacks seemed confused and This state of affairs apparently lasted forelatively short period because the level of traffic flow at that time was only slightly diminished. Before the year was out the level of traffic in MR IV had reached new highs.
The labor force of construction workcamps in MR IV in5 totaleden of varying degrees of roadbuilding experience, Workcamps from northeast andNorth Vietnam were transferred to the Vinh area during April and May. Common laborers and youth from Hanoi and Haiphong also were sent south to Vinh in June-July and as many0 youth may have been added to the workcamp force. The original workers who had some skill became the nucleus for teaching the inexperienced labor on the job. inmall share of the labor force was sent to local training classes and to Communist China to learn themaintenance and repair of construction equipment.
These workcamps implemented the contingency plans set up in Hanoi by stationing units at chokepoints, shifting labor to heavily bombed areas, procuring building materials and setting up motor pools for construction equipment.
esult of this pre-strike planning the North Vietnamese are now better able to counteract the air strikes than theyear ago. They have the ability andto increase and improve the countermoasures still further. The chokepoints aro less critical now becauseroutes and crossings have been constructed. the labor force hasreat deal of experience in making quick repairs, using camouflage and carrying out other innovations to deceive the enemy.
The major share of repair work is carried out by simple repair methods and with basic building materials,timber and rock products that are at present insupply. There are anock quarries in MR IV near key routes such as IA,hat supply rock
products for repair and roadbuilding projects. Bamboo, the universal building material of southeast Asia, is usedin construction of temporary highway bridges. Two saw mills in western Nghe An Province provido large dimension timber for repairs to railroad bridges. The Northrecently have also purchased large dimension timber from Cambodia, whichossible shortage of larger sizes. Although the North Vietnamese use all salvageable componentsamaged bridge, shortages of timberight necessitate shipment of steel bridge girders from the north, particularly from the assembly area at the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine or Communist China.
The inventory of construction equipment used by the workcamps has increased since the start of the bombings and continued negotiations by the North Vietnamese with other Communist countries undoubtedly will provide additional units. The estimated inventory ofequipment in use for road construction and bridgein MR IV consists of the following:
Mobile
Road
Although the USSR and other Communist countries have supplied many dump trucks to North Vietnam for aid projects, it is not known how many have been earmarked for use in construction work in MR IV.
The experience gained by North Vietnamese inthe road network and in building alternate as well as additional stream crossings has given them greater expertise and spued in the repair of bomb-damaged structures and roads. As more labor and equipment is made available to the work-camps, even greater speed will be achieved in completingelective listing of the speed with which these measures are completed is shown in. The listing reflects activity in MR IV and cannot be consideredof the more extensive repair work that has beenon the rail bridges farther north.
North Vietr
Selected Recuperation Tiaes on Repair Work in Military Region TV
and Ferry on Route IA (unlocated) Same work alte
Cau Qiat Bridge)
ra
Dia LoiK/IO5UOB)
Routet Die Loi
Build ford and fill craters in road
Loc Yen Bridge (lSlOn/lOSllSE)
Khe Thoi Ford (unlocated)
Huong Sen FerryOUoSb)
Khe Quyen Bridge (unlocatod}
Hanoi-Vinh Rail line at Dien Chau Repair track at km 3CO
Bien Bridge (unlocated)amaged spans Routeegment
hours
(for small vehicles)
ours
(for large vehicles)
2 days
on vehicles)oursours
7 days ga hoursoursours ko hours
ours
ours
TOPlSBGREI^
E. Possible Innovations
The main effort by the North Vietnameseill be to further improve the lines of connunications within the Rolling Thunder target zone and additional pre-strike preparations in the Hanoi-Haiphong sanctuary area in anticipation of air strikes against communications in this zone. Additional alternate routes and stream crossings will probably be completed and greator effort made to camouflage them. The Chinese enginoor units northeast of Hanoi will continue to maintain the Dong Dang rail line, therebygreater Vietnamese flexibility in allocating resources to maintain lines of communications in other areas. Morecan be expected in bridge repair methods to speed up restoration, particularly construction of more pontoon bridges, ferries, and fords.
If the rate of air atrikes against the logisticssystem were doubled the North Vietnamese would probably be able to cope with the additional damage by increasing the labor force working on lines of communicationsersons. The additions to the labor force need not be greater because of the large amount of work already done in expanding the road system and building bypasses and other tonporary crossings. The mam thrust of future labor efforts will be in maintenance and repair of this expanded road The North Vietnamese have made an impressiveof their proficiency in the speedy repair ofroads.
III. Effect of Air Attacks pnTraffic Movements
A. Through6
Interdiction of the transportation network at the levels carried out throughas not succeeded inthe traffic carried by the North Vietnamesesystem. Unless thereubstantial increase in the level of interdiction, tho North Vietnamese should have nodifficulty in maintaining both the volume of imports and oxports carried by land transportnd in sustaining the total transport performance of all modes of The estimated volume of imports and exports moved by rail on theong Dang line5 was aboutercent greater than that carried This Increase created no additional problems for the rail system because of the loss of Chinese transit traffic during the last half of the year. Total transport performance5 by all modes of
transportation in terms of tons carried increased byercent above4 level. Total tons carried during the first half6 are estimated to have continued to increase slightly. (See The slight decreases in railroad performance were more than compensated byin highway, inland water, and coastal water Total performance in terms of ton-miles, however, is estimated to have decreased alightly5 and in the first half
NOaTH VIETNAM
Transport, and First6
Jan -
6
Total Performance:
Million tons
Million
international Trade by Rail:
Imports (thousand tons
A.
Exports (thousand tons
A.
The most serious problem for tho North Vietnamese in maintaining5 level of transport performance duringssuming tho current level of airand choice of tarqots, io the possibility of moreinterdiction of theong Dang andiphon< rail lines.
More frequent intordiotion of these lines wouldthe normal flow of through traffic from China but we estimate that the interdiction would not reduce the capacity of the lines below the lovels needed to handle the normal volume of military and civilian supplies imported over the rail connections to China.
B. intensive Interdiction of Transportation
A significant escalation of the air attacks against North Vietnam could have more meaningful results. Tothis we assume an escalated program of air attacks that results in the continued Interdiction of all major rail, highway, and combination rail/highway bridges,bypass bridges, throughout North Vietnam. Portat Haiphong, Cam Pha, ond Hon Gai, the major railroad repair shop at Gia Lam, and all major railroad yards arc also assumed to be subjected to offoctive and repeated air attacks. Significant military and economic targets such as the remaining petroleum storage facilities and the Haiphong cement plant are also taken under attack.
The postulated attack would present North Vietnam with an intnediate and severo problem in maintaining normal traffic movements, particularly tha vital import traffic.
Sustained interdiction of the lines of communication would force the Communists to allocate considerable amounts of manpower and materials to maintain the railroad lines and alternate routes. Intensive armed reconnaissance would stop all daylight traffic and disrupt night traffic, thus slowing down movement and making tho logistic resupply of Communist forces considerably less reliable than at presont.
In order to maintain imports normally carried by ocean-going ships the North Vietnamese would have several alternatives. These include the diversion of seaborne trade to south china ports and using land transport routes or coastal shipping to move cargoes to and from North Vietnam! tho use of small watercraft to load and unload ocean-going
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ships while they are anchored outside North Vietnam ports; and the use of other minor ports in North Vietnam,
If only one-half of the normal traffic throughcould be handled by lighters and other croft once the port is closed and watercraft are subjecthour armed reconnaissance, the other half would probably move through China by rail to North Vietnam. In thisons* per day of general cargo imports and upons per day of petroleum imports would be transferred to rail Railroad connections to Communist China are currently operating at only about one-third capacity. This addedwould compel North Vietnam and China to divert sometraffic via Yunnan Province and theao Cai line. Both lines would then be forced to attompt to operate at full capacity under interdicted conditions. If production in the cement plant were also halted at the same time, an additional import requirement for cement, probably as highay would be generated. This additional tonnage would raise traffic far beyond the uninterdicted capacity of theong Dang rail line, the principal import route. The overburdening of the rail lines would become more acute if even less traffic could be handled by lightering and/or coastwise movement.
The North Vietnamese would probably be forced to make greater use of highway and inland water traffic. it is extremely difficult to interdict these systems, their greater use would increase the opportunities forof actual traffic movement. The roads from China are estimated toimited capacity in the rainy season ofons EWPD. in the area north of Hanoi the height of the rainy season occurs during July through September. ustained high level of interdiction during this period would be more effective in reducing the gaptransport capabilities and the volume of traffic to be moved.
The intensified attacks would have little impact in halting either essential imports or the flow of petroloum
'"Short: tons are used throughout this Appendix.
necessary to sustain the logistic pipeline to South Vietnam. The amount of petroleum needed to sustain this system is small. North Vietnamese forces and civilian activities in Mr IV, which includes the four southern provinces of the country, were consuming petroleum at the rateons per month at the end With the higher level of transport activity observed during6 dry season, the average level of consumption in mr IV probably amounted toons per month. The delivery of this petroleum as well as other supplies (including food) to mr IVrequires anons of fuel per month.
The movement of supplies to and through Laosthe consumption ofmall share of themoved into mr IV. At the endt appeared that onlyons ofons per month shipped to mr IV were used in tho Laotian Panhandle. At present, this amount probably has increasedons. Trucks used to carry supplies destined for South Vietnam are estimated to consume about one-fourth of the fuel moved into the.
The restrictions of rail traffic and the consequent additional requirements on truck and inland waterwould seriously affect the availability offor all nonessential economic needs. This lack of transport availability in conjunction with the disruption of imports through the ports would soon cause modern industry to grindalt unless substantial stockpiles of rawhad been accumulated at the plants. Even if some of the plants had stockpiles sufficient to continue operating, internal distribution or export of their products would be seriously handicapped by insufficient transportation. Modern industry, however, representsmall portion of North Vietnam's economic output.
If modern industry wore forcedtandstill by escalated air attacks, demands for internal distribution for the industrial sector would be eliminated. The loss offor petroleum for the industrial sector would permit the allocation of most of the available petroleum to the transportation of military supplies, food, and otheressentials such as civil defenso items and medicines. This transport capacity would be supplemented by the use of primitive transport.
wifi.."
The immediate and direct effect of the increasedof the transport system on the availability of food would not be serious. Existing food storage facilities in the countryside are so decentralized that they require little transportation by modern means. The distribution of food to the cities, mainly Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, however, would be more difficult.
The long-range effect on the production andof food, however, could cause some serious problems. The intensified air attacks on the level assumed in thisprobably would aggravate manpower shortages and further disrupt that part of the irrigation system dependent on petroleum and electric power and could cause the decrease in food production. Decreased food production in conjunctionecrease in transport capability could aggravate the problem ofufficient amount of food to the larger cities. The transport problem probably still would not be critical, however, becauseercent of the population lives in the three largest cities and only 7lives in all cities of more0 persons.
T-39
TOP-SEGREX.
TOP^EGRET.
ANNEX ii
THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THU WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
There is substantial evidence that the politicalof the Soviet Union and Communist China on the war, and the amount of their material assistance to the wararc highly significant influences on Vietnamesepolicy. The importance of Soviet and Chineseand assistance has bcon readily admitted by the In his5 speech Betting forth theand tasks facing the Vietnamese after the US began bombing the North, Premier Pham Van Dong said simply that the "more" the Vietnamese are "supported and assisted in all fields by the socialist camp, the more they will be able to struggle vigorously and resolutely" against tho enemy in Vietnam. In Aprilong re-emphasized the significance of bloc backingeclaration that the "victories" of the Vietnamese people are not only theof their own efforts, but are also the "result of tho infinitely valuable sympathy, support and assistance by the fraternal socialist countries."
The Vietnamese view bloc support as valuable inand, in some ways, increasing the militarythe Communists can bring to bear in South Vietnam. They also see itrotective umbrella which partially inhibits direct alliod military pressure on the DRV and helps to negate the effocts of the bombing of the North. Firm Soviet and Chinese backing also holps complete the ideological equation in the conflict so important to the Communists,hiswar of liberation" and it is the duty of all Communists to support and encourage such wars.
Significance of Economic and Military General Level of Aid
In an apparent response to the allied airmilitary and economic assistance provided by the
II-l
TUPSEGREX.
USSR and Communist China increased sharply tho total amounts of aid extended5 are not known, reasonably firm evidence enables us to estimate that military aid amounting to0 million andaid of0 million was probably delivered Tho Communist allies have undoubtedly undertaken commitments to provido additional assistance but we arc unable to make any meaningful estimates of the total value of thaso commitments. There is reliable ovidenco that the USSR5 did commit itself to extend additionalof at0 million. We do not know if this extend ion is for military or economic programs. The weight of available evidence suggests that it is not for weapons but is probably intended as assistance in theof bomb damaged facilities or for defonseactivities.
The immediate significance of the military and economic aid provided by other Communist countries is that it provides North Vietnam the material meana to carry out its aggroaalve programs. North Vietnam is significant militarilyogistic base for the transmission ofsupplies to South Vietnam,ourco of manpower, and aa the center for control of the insurgency. rimitive economy itapability to produce onlyitems of military equipment and relies on othercountries for all of its heavy military equipment and most of ita small arms and ammunition. Materialto North Vietnam is also significant as an apparent commitment of other Communist countries to underwrite the material costs of the war and to assist in thoof North Vietnam's economy. These assurances undoubtedly underlie North Vietnam's apparent willlngnoss to lose its economic facilities to air attack and toin its pursuit of the war in South Vietnam. Thisis undoubtedly strengthened by tho knowledge that oven more assistance will be forthcoming data on shipping to North Vletram show that imports continue to rise5 levels. At the same time ax-ports are continuing to decline so that the growing import surplus can only bo financed by additional aaaiatance from Communiat countries.
II. Economic Aid
Known oconoatic credits and grants extended bycountries2 amounted to more6
million. (See Table Aboutercent of the total was in tho form of grants. By the end40 millionercent of the extension had been drawn. The USSR accounted0ercent) of total cxtonalons and Communist Chineercent). The0 million wasby the European Communist countries and token amounts were provided by Albania, North Korea, and Mongolia.
After an apparent hiatus of two years the Soviet program for economic assistance to North Vietnam was revived in5 when Premier Koaygin visited llanoi. As the war expanded substantial new extensions of economic aid wore made in The only publicabout the value and composition of the aid has come from Hungary which is reported to have5 million for trucks, telecommunications equipment, medical supplies, ond machine tools. Rumania is alsoby intelligence sources to haveredit4 million.
In5 and6 new aidwere signed with all Communist countries, suggesting that thegreements were small. Since then other Communist countries have promised increased assistance for North Vietnam. Inoscow reported an agreement to provide technical assistance; additional Chinese aid for agriculture was announced in July, All the Warsaw Pact members also pledged increased economic aid to North Vietnam in
We estimate that deliveries of economic aid5 were in tho order0 million orar-cent above the average annual level.
J in6 Soviet specialists
were reported in hortn Vietnam to determine equipment needs for constructing new enterprises and rebuilding those destroyed by US air attacks.
All of these developmentsubstantially increased aid6rend already confirmed by our intelligence on the volume and composition of North Vietnamese imports.
C. Military Aid
Military aid to North Vietnam which had previously beenelatively small scale reached at0 million* About three-fourths of this aid, by value, was provided by the USSR as the euppltor of North Vietnam's modorn air defenses, particularly its SAMand jet intorceptors. Theillion providod by Communist China was limited principally toarms,
1. Soviet Military Aid
Ry the ond5 Soviet military aid to North Vietnam0 million. The sequence and value of Soviet arms aid to North Vietnam waa aa follows (in million US $>
42
Military aid extended after4 and in5 probably was completely delivered by the end Major deliveries included equipment for abouturface-to-air missile firingight jet bombers,et fighters,et fighters,A guns ranging0nd hundreds of vehioles. (See Table
Tha USSR has also provided military tochnicians to instruct tho North Vietnamese in the operation of the SAM syotom. In addition the North Vietnamese havopilot training in Soviet jet fighters both in North Vietnam and tho USSR. Ke estimate that the number oftechnicians may have been as highnut diminished when the North Vietnamese began to
value of military aid is expressed in Soviettrade prices.
reported in rubles, have been converted toat the official exchange rate: .
Sable ii-a
Estimated Soviet and Chinese deliveries cf Kllitary Equipment to Sorth6
T
assume operational controlthe SAM system. The cost of this technical assistance was probably leasillion.
Following North Vietnam's active confrontation with the US in the Tonkin Gulf incidents ofhe Soviets extended Hanoi theillion grant listed above for antiaircraft andillion for surface-to-air missile systems and missile and flight training for North Vietnamese crews. Shortly after Kosy-gin's visit to Hanoi inas reportedly granted for aircraft and additional antiaircraft and SAM equipment.
An indication of continued military aid6 is contained in reports on the "Gratuitous Aid and Technical Assistance Agreement" signed in Moscow Reportedly, the USSR agreed to provide large quantitiesam antiaircraft guns, other ground equipment, and possiblydditionalet fighters. Although not enough is known on types and quantities of equipment to permit an estimato of the value of the arms portion of the agreement, the cost of the antiaircraft guns and jet fjghters alone willillion.
2. Chinese Military Aid
There is little information on Chineseaid to North Vietnam, but we estimate that total aid by the end5 was on the order5 million of whichillion was delivered Although the North Vietnamese armed forces are structured basically on Chinese rather than Soviet lines,hey were equipped largely with weapons from the USSR. 0 to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in4 Chinese arms aid to Hanoi probably increasedoint where itit did notarms aid. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the Chineseto provide some weapons, includinget fightershanghai-class fast patrol boats, but fell far behind the USSR as the major arms supplier. The major Chinese contribution to Hanoi's war effort has beenrovider of military construction units and materials and, possibly, operational antiaircraft elements.
Some elements of Chinese military units are positioned in Northeast and Northwest near the main railroad
HilB^SiiiiSS
lines leading to Yunnan and Kwangsi. Elements of twoengineer divisions of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and an antiaircraft division are known to be in these areas. Although little is known regarding the size of this force, it is estimated that00 Chinese may be involved.
Aside from these operational units, Chinese military technicians in North Vietnam may. Unconfirmed reports stateorth Vietnamese pilots and ground crews trained in China. Although little is known on the numbers of Chinese techniciansNorth Vietnam in the, they arenot to have been so large as to move the cost of this military technical assistance aboveillion spent by the USSR.
Communist Military Aid
aid supplied to North Vietnam by the Communist countries of Eastern Europe5 was negligible. The major items of military and emergencyaid extended or delivered by these countries since then may be summarized as follows:
Country
Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Rumania
of Aid
Small Arms, Ammunitionield Hospitals Medicines, Hospital Barges, Trucks, Hsopital Vehicles, Trucks
East European aid primarily isuasimilitary, defense support nature {even the Czechoslovakian small arms were mainly sporting rifles for training purposes). This aid has gained impetus6 and may be expected to increase substantially in the future.
Bloc Aidritical Factor in Continuing the War
Although Soviet and Chinese military and economic aid has been small in terms of their capabilities, it is absolutely vital to North Vietnam's ability to adequately
Tttp-secreo:
defend its territory and to support the insurgency in South Vietnam. essation of bloc military aid would, in fact, almoat certainly make it impossible for the Vietnamese to sustain the war in South Vietnam at its present level Of intensity.
North Vietnam has no productive capability to produce heavy military equipment or the new family of weapons with which the VC Main Forces are being equipped. The NVA and VC Main Forces are totally dependent onsources for2 family of weapons and the heavier weapons being introduced into South Vietnam. If these sources were denied, the VC/NVA forces would be deprived of their major offensive capabilities, and oncewere exhausted these forces would be compelled to revertuch lower level of military activity.
Since the available evidence points not onlyontinuation, butrobable increase in bloc aid during the last halft does not appear likely that the Vietnamese Communists will be faced with devising any substitutes for it or of altering their policy to take account of its cessation during the foreseeable future. Moreover, so long as Soviet and Chinese support continues at least at its presont levels, it does not appear that the Vietnamese Communists would view itriticalin any basic determination thoy might make on whether to continue the fighting. Vietnamese Communist assertions that, in the final analysis, they must rely mainly on their own resources to prosecute the revolution appear toenuine and deeply held belief. The theme of "self-reliance" hasersistent one in Vietnamese Communist statements, and has not at all been abandoned or dampened down in the face of the increasing alliedpressure on the Viet Cong and on the DRV.
In March for example, DRV party spokesman Truong Chinh declared that the 'strategic line" of the revolution was still to rely "mainly on our own forces" whilerotracted war. In April, Ho Chi Minhairo newsman that the Vietnamese people, while "highly appreciating" the assistance of the socialist countries would "basically depend on their ownn May, another North Vietnamese politburo spokesman, Pham Hung, reiterated that, even while employingfrom the bloc, "our dictum is to rely principally on our own strength."
II-7
III. The Rationale For Chinese Support
There appear to be several important considerations in the Vietnamese view which tend to reinforce their "do it yourself" attitude. They apparently believe, for one thing, that thero are distinct limits to the amount ofand materiel support which can be counted upon from Peking and Moscow. Vietnamese documents andindicate that they believe Peking is willing toonsiderable contribution of military, economic, andassistance to keep the fighting going along its presentprotracted struggle by proxy, fought if necessary to the last Vietnamese. Hanoi ia also well aware that the conflictest case of Mao's theory that "wars of liberation" can be fought withoutS nuclear response against either the local Communists or their sponsors. This war, moreover, isplace in anose to China andegion which the Chinese believe to be their rightful sphero of
However, the Vietnamese also appear to believe that there are limits to the price Peking is willing to pay to keep the conflict going. This is implicit, in part, in the DRVs handling and comment on public Chinese pledges of assistance. For85 editorial in the DRV party daily, which dealt with Chinesewas formulatedanner which made it clear that the latest pledges of Chinese support were not as strong as those earlier issued by Peking, prior to the escalation of the air war against North Vietnam. The editorial also treated the question of Chinese volunteers for Vietnamashion which suggested some doubt in Hanoi over the ultimate willingness of Peking to bring in combat troops should the situation deteriorate to the point where they might be needed. The editorialew aid pact between tlie Chinese and the North Vietnamese signed in early December. The pact was treated in the press of both countries with caution and without the usual fanfare. The aid, moreover, was in the formoan andrant. This, in itself, suggested limitations on the Chinesein supporting the Vietnamese.
Peking's caution is not, however,egative factor in Hanoi's view. The Vietnamese themselves wish to provent the introduction of such massive Chineseas would undercut Vietnamese Communist control
II-8
and direction of the insurgency, unless it was required to prevent the extinction of the Communist regime in the uRV. This was underscored by DRV politburo member, Le Due Tho, in an article published in the North Vietnamese party journal in The "lines, strategy, and methods" of the revolution, wrote Tho, are awhich our party must assume, as we ourselves and alone can realize most cloarly the problems concerning thein our country."
Tho was doubtless addressing both Peking and Moscow in his remarks, but he probably had mainly in mind theChinese political pressure on Hanoi designed to keep the Vietnamese steadfast in the war and block anymove toward negotiations. One prime example of this occurred in June when the Chinese lashed outoviet-sponsored World Peace Council proposal on negotiations to end the war. Although the proposal closely echoed the DRV's own four points, the Chinese maintained that because it did not insist on the "immediate and total withdrawal of US troops from Southt had left out the key clementietnam settlement. Hanoi itself has never insisted on immediate withdrawalondition forand did not make any comment on the proposal by the council. Peking, however, was clearly anxious to make It appear that the Asian Communist position on ending the war was tougher than indicated in the Council proposal to which the North Vietnamese hadarty. Peking's quick attack denied Hanoi the opportunity to voice anyof the proposal lest it indicate an open difference of opinion with the Chinose.
Even given the Chinese willingness to pressure Hanoi, however, it is probable that the pressure would not be sufficient to force the Vietnamese to stay in the war if they decide on their own volition to end the fighting. The Vietnamese Communists probably estimate that, in view of the limitations on the Chinese commitment, Peking would do little more than complain if the conflict wereshort of an insurgent victory. The Chinese, in fact, seem to recognize this, for they have repeatedly left themselves an out by emphasizing that all decisions on tho war are "strictly" up to the Vietnamese.
IV. Vietnamese View of Soviet Support
The Vietnamese Communists probably judge, on the basis of Moscow's assistance so far, that the Soviet commitment
II-9
TUP-SEGRKL
in the war is considerably more restrained than that of the Chinese. This can be seen, in part, in North Vietnam-coo statements dealing with Soviet assistance. Although Hanoi has, in the main, carefully attempted to express equal gratitude for the help of both bloc powers, someimplicitly critical of Moscow have occasionally come forth. Inor example,ime when the North Vietnamese signed aid pacts with both Peking and Moscow, DRV spokesmen were much warmer in their description of Chinese assistance than of Soviet. Peking's support was termed at the time the "firmest, the most powerful, and the mosthile China was hniled as the "most enthusiastic and resolute comrade in arms of all nations fighting against the imperialists."
Hanoi is fully aware that Moscow, like Peking, has also displayed an overriding concern in its actions on the war to avoid steps which might leadirect Soviet-US military confrontation. For example, Moscow hasthe conflict avoided sea delivery to Haiphong ofmilitary shipments. Moreover, important Soviethave gone out of their way in private to disavow the significance for Soviet-US relations of the presence of Soviet military-technical personnel in the DRV.
It is doubtless clear to the Vietnamese that the Soviets would liko an early end to the war. Evidence suggests that the Soviets did cautiously advise Hanoi to move toward asettlement of the conflict in Following Kosygin's visit to the DRV in February, the Chinese charged that Moscow hadormal proposal to Hanoi and Pekingeconvention of an international conference on Indochina. During the bombing pause early this year, party secretary Sholepin apparently took further soundings on Hanoi's attitude toward possible political alternatives to the conflict. In recent months, in view of the continuing hard-line stand of the Vietnamese, the Russians appear to have avoided applying most of the pressures they could exert on the DRV, probably judging thorn to be marginal at best. Soviet party chief Brezhnev displayed this cautious attitude during recent talks with De Gaulle. He told the French president that Moscow would be ready toonference only "if and when Hanoi agrees."
Despite the limitations on Soviet assistance andit is probable that Soviet backing has, on balance, the effect of buttressingVietnamese Communist will to
TOP-SEGRET
persist in the conflict. The Vietnamese probably judge that they can continue to count indefinitely on Moscow's assistance along present lines so long as the warin its present context. They probably believe, in fact, that the Soviets are now locked into the struggle in view of thn pretensions Moscow still holds to leadership of the Communist camp, and that it cannot afford to stepaside.
TDPSEGREX.
ANNKX III
TJiii COMMUNIS! UHC/iNlZATIUN ANDLITY FOR POLITICAL SUBVERSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Coaimunlat Concepts of Political Subversion
Certain basic principles long stressed by theCoasaumsts bear importantly on their efforts ataubversion. Of primary importance is the integration of both military and political forces into an interlocking whole in the conduct of subversion. As their documents put it, the insurgencythree-sidedomprising oracd struggle, political struggle, and military Lach participant is expected to "fight bothand militarily."
The Communists also believe it is necessary to develop and coordinate the insurgency concurrently in the cities and in tho rural areas. In genoral, they seek to secure the rural areas around the cities, towns and strategichamlet by hamletaunch pointinal in the cities. The OOBYAUBlatl hopealance of forces will be achieved botwoen government and insurgent military strength which will guarantee the success of the
general uprising" of both tho urban and rural populace which the Communists expect will oventually occur. Within trio cities, meanwhile, the ComatunlBts seek to undermine government strength and purpose, to gain control over tho
masses- through subversion and terrorism, and to buildcities the political and military forces which willthe "general uprising" and lead to collapse of the
II- The Apparatus For Subveraion
The apparatus which tbe Vietnamese CommuniBts ore using tor political subversion in South Vietnam comprises several major elements: (a) the Communist Partyj that is, the southern segment of tho North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, which for tactical purposesictional separate identity as the People's Revolutionary Party of South (b) the party's youth auxiliary, the People'sYouth Group; and (c) the National Front for theof South Vietnam and its associated web of regional,
1II-1
1SE&RET
functional, and social "Liberationllcontrolled by party cadres.
There is also an underground of covert agents andutilized by the party to gather information, to help in political agitation, and to procure supplies. Over the years the party has developed extensive and elaborate communications (courier andntelligence nets, and internal security and propaganda systems. These serve to reinforce the cohesion, direction, and unity of effort of the movement throughout South Vietnam, in its political as well as in its military actions.*
A. Party Organization and Hole
The Communist Party provides the organizational core for the subversive apparatus.** pecial department of the
party in Hanoi concerns itself with the problems of the struggle in the South and with the southern partyt acts by and large through the party's central office for south Vietnam (COSVN) locatedase area (Zone C) in Tay Ninh Province. COSVN functions in many reapect3 as afor the People's Revolutionary Party, controlling through covert party channels the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and acting through party channels as the high command of the Viet Cong forcesLiberation Array.** (See Figure III-l)
COSVN sends directives downraditional pyramidal partyseries of regional,and lower-ochelon party committees,icrocosm of the COSVN organization. The party committees of the provincos (not always identical with government provinces) appear to bo the lowest echelon permitted any significant latitude in adjusting policy to local conditions.
The village party committees, and the village or hamlet party chapters and cells they control, provide thegrass roots. Tho local party chapters and theirthree-man cells provide the party members who lead the local guerrilla units, control the local Liberation
overt indication of Hanoi's dirocting rolo in the insurgency is the fact that the head of thisajorice chief of staff in the North Vietnamese Army. He also heads tho government's department in charge of "reunification" affairs.
**COSVN is elaborately organized on the traditionalpattern. mall Current Affairscommittee of the principaldirection of all political and military actions and organs. Subsections and departments under COSVN execute policies andentral bureaucracy. In directing the Viet Cong military forces, COSVN functionsilitary affairs Committee, though some major Communist unit headquarters also have direct contacts with Hanoi. Tho relationship between COSVN political and military channels and between COSVN and Hanoi is not entirely clear. Allhowever, pointsarmonious command system which appears to give the Communists adequate capability and flexibility for action in South Vietnam.
III-3
Front associations, and recruit for the party, the Front or the guerrilla unit,*
If the party hasocal village orgovernmentillage "Liberation Committee"dministrative Committee" orhe partyadherence to its directives by planting its members in key positions or by ensuring that the local partymonitors village activities., In government-controlled areas and in the cities, it is the party member operating covertly who recruits and agitates and who enlists or buys agents or sympathizers.
In practice, this system has served the Communists well, giving them adequate control and flexibility. It has doubtless been strained, but certainly not critically, by the increasing demands put upon the party cadreesult of the faster pace of the war* These strains, however, are probably already severe enough to inhibit somewhat thecapability for expanding and consolidating control over insurgent assets in the rural area.
Within the Viet Cong armedandmembers occupy most if not all key command and staff posts. Political officers are assigned to every unit. Party chapters and ceils within the units seek to develop and maintain political consciousness andwithin the ranks. Documents indicate that partygenerally make up about one third the strength ofunits.** Party strength in the ranks of the irregular units appears to be considerably less than in the regular units.
*Acting as much as possible through the Front party cadre disseminate propaganda, round up local labor for Viet Cong military units operating in the area, and collect taxes andmonitor or control those who do. If the village or hamlet is under firm Viet Cong control, this may be done more or less overtly in the name of the party. If it is not, there may beew party members who must attempt all thisovert basis.
**One document, describing the activities of the party chaptersilitary unit formed in5 to handle the processing and training of recruits en route
(continued on next page)
III-4
Regret
Parallel to trie party at all echelons, servingeservoir of new members, is the party's youth auxiliary, the People's Revolutionary Youth Group, nominally made up of young men and women In practice, particularly where the number of local party members is small. Youth Group members perform many of the functions of regular party members.
B. Party Numerical Strength
It is possible to makeough estimate of current party numerical strength in South Vietnam since the evidence on the subject, mainly in the form of capturedmembership lists, is extremely fragmentary. No data of significance, for example, are available for the Mekong delta,ommunist stronghold, where party membership presumably would be high. The problem is furtherby the covert nature of party membership, even in some Vietontrolled areas, and by the party'sis attested in captureddevelop its organization and strength uniformly in all areas.
irm figure for party membership in the South at the end1 is available to usease for current estimates. It comesommunist document produced early3 which stated that the partyembers in the South at the end Thismembers in the Viet Cong armed forces. Since this document contained much other accurate information, it is probable that the membership figure is reliable.
Taking this figureoundation, we estimate on the basis of evidence contained in captured documents and
from the delta areas to central Vietnam, provides anof the party make-upnit at the main force level. Outtrengthere party menbers inarty chapters: ere Youth Group members. Ofen in seven of thearty chapters, three were members who had stayed behind1 had been admitted subsequently in the South,ere returnees from North Vietnam. No ethnic northerners were indicated, but this would not be unusual nit functioning in the southern part of South Vietnam. The proportion of party and Youth Group members is higher than thatumber of other units where figures are available; the higher the main force echelon, however, the greater the party membership.
IH-5
JUT
prisoner interrogation reports that party membership in the ^cuth had approximately doubled bynd that it stood at The documents and prisonersuggest that0 of the party members operated primarily as members of the insurgent armed forces, the bulk of them in the regular main forcehe remainder,eem to have been mainlywith political action, including subversive opera-tions -t^
G>ee footnoteon Page IIITi4 Although party members may make up as muchhird of main force strength, their numbers appear from the documents to decline drastically in the irregular units. eneral rule, the lower thethe fewer the party members. 5 document captured in puu Yen Province, for example, indicated that theof party members in the "village guerrillas" in one aietrict. The percentage among the "hamlet On the basis of such information, we believe
that party strength in the irregular forces averages less
than one party member for every ten guerrillas.
Inain force strength was estimated if one third of these were party members, they would number The balance ofarty members in the military, we believe, were in the irregular units. The total number of party members in the armed forces could be raised somewhat if, in fact, USof irregular strength of the Communist forces are too low. if irregular strength were, for example,, it would probably mean that there are an0 party members in the South.
**As examples of the material from which this figure was developed, several documents which provide some fairlydata on party strengths as ofn Hoai Nhon District of Binh Dinh_Province, and in Cu Chi District of Hau Nghia Province may'be cited. Both districts can beas Communist strongholds, the latter of many years standing. The documents indicate that therearty members in noai TIKoji inorking at the village or hamlet level. This-was approximately one third of one percent of the population estimated by MACV at that time to be under VC control in the District. In Cu Chi District, there werearty mem-vhers of the same category as in Hoai Nhon in This
(continued on next page)
HI-6
wae approximately one percent of the population estimated at the time to be under VC control in Cu Chi. If these two cases are averagedigure of about sevon-tenths of one percent is obtained. This fits in fairly well with the average of the other samples of party membership available. Seven tenths of one percent of the population believed under VC control inould"be0 party members. To this mustthe party members working throughout the coun>cy"at ochetons above the village level, including district, province, and COSVN cadre. Thesuggest that there are0 suchhis is the approximate figure also used byfwould thus appear that there were0 party members working mainly at political tasks in the South in
*One updated document5 specified the quotas to be met durrng-the yearoastal district in Binh Dinh It Called for one membereople inareas,n "disputed" areas, and onen government areas. The recruiting of women was to be stressed, to provideoercent of the total. this document reflected recruitment quotas handed aown by the Province Party Committee and would not include the party membership in rogular military units.
There are indications that in the "last halfarty leadersarticular effort to speed recruitment in the cities. They directed that party members be sent from the rural areas to the cities to assist in recruiting and other tasks. One analysis indicateshe despatcharty members to Saigon may have been Another document from Binh Dinh Provinceequirement to send about Si of the party members of one rural district to the district town and to the province capital, for "activities there."
Captured documents indicate that even before the effects of the US military buildup were felt, party leaders were not satisfied with the party's numerical strength. Sincehey have put heavy pressure on lowerto recruit new members in all areas.X he quotas reflected in many captured documents wer6 applied on abasis, they could theoreticallyartygoal oft the endxclusive of party members in Viet Cong regular military units.
There is insufficient evidence to judge how the recruiting drive has gone, it is highly doubtful, however, that the sort of recruiting goals indicated above have been met, particularly in those rural areas where CIS military power is felt most. Recent documente includelow pace in party development. Moreover, party doctrine calls for considerable caution in admittingthey must be tested, checked, and investigated.
Ke believe that party membership in the South as ofrobably still totals no moreoth political cadre and those in the armed forces. This would grant an Increase of approximately one-third in about one year, which seems quite generous. It iato compare the estimated numerical strength of the party in the South with that of the Communists in North Vietnam, in Aprilo Chi Minh declared thatin the North, our party has more This is approximately double the numerical strength announced by Hanoi It is also approximatelyf the total estimated population of the DRV. Usingor party strength in the South at present would mean thatS of the population estimated under Viet Cong control are party members.
C Numerical Strength of the Party Youth Group
Estimating the numerical strength of the party's youth group is even more difficult than that of the regular party itself. Analysis of the few captured documentson the question, however, indicated rather surprisingly that the party youth in the South are fewer in number than full party members. It appears that the party youth grouo may be around three-fourths the size of the regular party. On this basis, youth group strength inight have been0 with00 of these in regular military and support units. Recruitment to expand the youth group was also stressedith indications that in some areas it was to be doubled If possible.
We believe this estimate must be treated cautiously until more ovidence is available, since the apparentstrength of the Communist youth in South Vietnam stands in sharp contrast with the situation in mostcountries. In North Vietnam, for example, there are approximately five party youth for every full-time
party member. The reasons for the seeming scarcity ofin South Vietnam are not readily apparent,believe they are probably delated primarily to theconditions under which^the Communists mustmay find it hard to encourage the growth of theapparatus given the covert nature of many partyand the need to engage available youth inas rapidly as_
D- Numerical and Other Limitations on Party .
There is no evidence as yet of any weakening in the resolve of the leading political cadres to continuethe "struggle." There are indications, however, of limitations on the total capability of the party forfurther subversion. {Some oftodiscussed at greater length in ANNEX VII of this study.)
The party is stretched thin. The effort to expand testifies to this, as well as to the increasing demands placed upon it both to enable Viet Cong military expansion and to roplace casualties. The runninge factoin some regions, and particularly theof the economy of areas which must providesupportarge army, increasingly involves the party cadres in essentially logistic, bureaucratic, andtasks. Local party organs are increasingly being called on to send party and Youth Group members along with the contingents of local guerrillas ordestined for main force units. PartyBtaffs are pared down; documents indicate that even principal sections of the COSVN headquarters have been
"The age brackets for party youth in South Vietnam are not entirely clear. It appears, however, that youth from the ages of aboutore eligible. In North Vietnam, tho age of the party youth was recently raised fromoears to enable the regime to facilitate the handling of party-associated individuals in the military. It would thus appear that the buildup of armed forces in the North has disrupted the normal procedures for party youth; the same situation in the South mayearing on the apparent smallness of the youth apparatus there.
III-9
Thero are complaints in the documents about theand inexperience of the party cadree in several areas. Undoubtedly this reflects the need to reach further down into party ranks and into affiliated organizations for local leading cadres. Party members serving primarily in political capacities are suffering casualtiesesult of combat in their areas, the documents report. Moreover, there have been various directives calling for aproportion of tho party membership in various rural areas to Join the local guerrillas. Presumably thisthem from political tasks.
Thaae difficulties have probably not yet developed into critical handicaps. But they are factors to which the party loaders must devote increasing attention. Thohas almost certainlyimit on the ultimate responsivonooa and capability of the party apparatus toto Communist needs in South Vietnam. At the present time, it ie probable that any significant intensification of demands on the party political structure cannot be met as adequately as in the past.
B. Tha National Liberation Front
Under instructions from Hanoi, the communists In the South put together the National Pront for thoof South Vietnam (NFLSV) at the endear before they announced, again under instructions from Hanoi, the formation of the People's Revolutionary Party." The NFLSV was to sorvoacade for Communist political and military operations,odestone to attract and organize mass support for tho insurgency, and as an infrastructure for the political and economic administration ofareas (Seo ANNEX XIIiscussion of thoponturo of tho Front).
"The Communisto claim they are only one element in the Front, albeit tho "vanguard" element. However, through the selection and manipulation of tho membership of thocommittees making up the NFLSV and running itaregional and functional "Liberation Front"the party controls the Pront in classic, covert Com-aiunist fashion. The headquarters of the central coanitteee Pront ls known to be co-located with COSVN.
Regret
On paper at least, the Front structure parallelscture dow" to the hamlet level,eryts communist^ uinl>erActionalimed at almost every aspect of life in VieCnam: Thesignificant of these are the lib-wsnen oCiations forfor youths, and for
for then^ial enthusiasm tor the NFLSV, flowing from memories of the Viet Minh
hC FEenCh and fcon loealthe Diem government, there is no body of evidence
lfican^8Upport ofhetrOlatively effective. In that it rural areas, however, the evidence indicate. locai^slr* ^ -ciati0ns ateentities atns" tl tneor?ance ofliberated asaocia-
ie* Cong in toe rurai areastress in captured documents.
in one of the Front
rfPref,entamanyilling individual commitment to the Viet Cong cause-except, probably, for
covertly in government-held or nearby "die-?* nce enrollment is obtained; itSJ..intention to *at such commitment, Insn! d s' the co^unista see the organiza-Uon olJcl?tlonsa major step in the consolida-nip edge further separating thefrom the government. This appears to be one of the
kitafyjask8parCy cadre8 inillageamlet after government officials or troops have left?
instruments through which tofuit8nsurgent armedu*eful fof the political indoctrination off f' for recr"itment of demonstrators orand ?lche "taping of the economicJit !fnsthe country as far as the Communists^a^ thisthey are intended
co engage ana commit the populace in the over-all effort to undermine and destroy the government.
III-ll
DQar totheJN^SV apparatus does not ap-
rgenl ?SS3Xl
F" Numerical Strength of the The Problems that are encountered in*
SteoccaaiSSllJ partici-
pate tn the activities of some Front association.
lYPharfavailable on the numerical
siveparticipation may blpas-
ot fee fully committed to kflsv cZ in-
ateSo^^iVe3'some of those in ?hecategory may participate in Front-sponsored activities.
* Byur extrapolations from the
ical strength of thefV8 One document of theadmitted that "we stillot of weaknesses in
tllTtlllVZnthe ^eratJSn8bSdies exert lots of effect on them."
1SE&RET
captured documents listing Front membership indicate that the strength of the NFLSV had grown substantially Itthat inhe communists probably countedale and female South Vietnamese (presumably as being enrolled in one or another of theAssociations.* "Probably overercent of these were residents of rural areas where the Viet Cong were in firm control or where the government presence was very shaky.
Estimates at the time placed the total ruralin Viet Cong hands atillion. Withof these estimates and of the standard estimate that aboutercent of the Vietnamese population consists of persons abovet would appear that the Communists had enrolled aboutercent or so of the adults under their control in the Front or its affiliated organizations.
A number of documents of the period indicate that the Communists were exhorting their cadres to greaterin recruiting Front members5 and were highly critical of the cadres for their failure to use these mass organizations properly "in order to lead the
e following are several examples of regionalavailable from the documents: Inhe party committee of one coastal district of Binh Dinhclaimed0 liberation association members in eluding farmers, youth, and women. This is overercent of the then estimated population of the district. At the time, the district was reported to be largely under Viet Cong control or influence, except for the district town and its environs. The Liberation Women's Association in the Viet Cong province roughly equating to Quang Nam apparently claimed0 members in This could amount to overercent of the female population in areas under Viet Cong control. Tho Liberation Farmers' Association in Tay Ninh Province claimedembers This would beercent of the total estimated population not under firm government control inr aboutercent of the population estimated as being under Viet Cong control. By the end of the year, the Associationew members, an increase of overercent*
"One document complained that "in many places thehas not been organized yet; some places justew cells or core cadres." Cadres in an area comprising
(continued on next page)
Although hard evidence of the actual growth in Front membership during the lastonths is still sorely lacking, it is highly doubtful that the Communists came anywhere near meeting their recruitment goals, particularly in areas of considerable military activity where there havo been indications of growing reluctance on the part of the local populace to provide labor and other support
iet Con9* We think ifc probable, in view of the difficulties the Communists have encountered in enlisting popular support recently, and taking into consideration the past growth rate of the NFLSV, that its strength ig still nohighort the present time.
ri1* Numerical Strength of the Communist PoliticalUrban
A. General Position
In the towns and cities, the Communists must operate covertly. The main targets for recruitment both into the covert ranks of tho party and its youth group and into the underground of sympathizers aro the lower military and civil ranks of the government, the disgruntled, the poor, themanual laborers, students, and intellectuals. Documents suggest that the Communists expect few recruits from the practicing members of certain religious and"reactionary- Catholics, the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and the "reactionaries" among the Buddhists.
Fragmentary documentary evidence is available on the extent of the underground in the cities. Analysis of this limited amount of material suggests that while theis pervasive, it still falls far short of Communistin terms of the calibre of those recruited.
the bulk of the soven provinces immediately north of Saigon were exhorted to recruit until their Liberation Associations included by the end of lastercent (presumably of the populationn liberated villages andercent in newly liberated villages and hamlets,0 percent in rural areas "near cities, towns andinstallations." While recruiting was not to bemembers were togoodood "struggletarget setew members in tho area.
Available evidence also indicates that the party has long regarded its over-all political apparatus as weak in the urban areas, and that it has steadily exhorted its cadre to greater recruiting efforts.* The added recruitinghave partially involved the dispatch of party members and agents from the rural areas to the cities for proselvt-ing activities.**
B- Numerical Strength in Saigon and Environs
In the Viet Cong'sia DinhZone which comprises the Saigon metropolitan area and its surrounding rural sectors, it appears from the documentary evidence that by0 people were,.couEroiled or primarily influenced by thehis would Tlave^-meant that slightly under one percent of the total population of the Saigon metropolitan area wasin one extent or another to the insurgent cause.
"*inaptured summationigh-level logistics conference held by COSVN revealed that the Viet Cong considered the element of their apparatus which served to procure supplies in the markets of the government-held cities inadequate. According to the summation, thismust increase "threefold"6 to7 during the rainy season." The conferencethat "we have almost no cadre operating in the cities the purchase of goods is mostly done throughand it recommended strenuous recrditing efforts.
**Full analysis of the success of this effort must await further evidence, but there is already fragmentary matorial suggesting that it has been at least partially successful. For example, the party committee for the capital of Binh Duong Province, which borders the heavily populated Saigonia Dinh Special Zone to the north, reported at the end5 that it had succeeded during the year inin the urban areasew agents who had turnedntelligence reports.
ocument ofor example, consistedhart compiling the party's personnel assets in this zone, which covers an area of atillion inhabitants.arginal notation by the Communist compiler states that "several cadres have not yettbeomplete accounting. Nonetheless, it
(continued on next page)
The evidence is not adequate toumerical estimato of Viet Cong assets in the other major cities of South Vietnam. The impression conveyed by the fragmentary material, however, is that the insurgent political strength in the other cities is no stronger proportionally than in the Saigon area and its environs, except possibly in
Ava'Ilable*evidence clearly indicates that theong regarded its over-all political apparatus as weak in the urban areas.
of the Political Apparatus in Rural
Several captured documents of the party's district com-ittee in Hoai Nhon, the northern coastal district of Binh Lnh Province, provide some idea of the numericalhe insurgent political apparatus which might have been oundargely Viet Cong area outside the delta in Inhis district. Kxcept for the immediate area of the dit rict town, it was in Viet Cong hands. Priorhe rea hadiot Minh stronghold, itargely Bud-hist region,atholic minorityistory of atholic-Buddhist friction. As ofhereefugees in Binh0 of them Catholic.
Inhe District Committee reported that exclusive of any troops and cadres responsive to higher headquarters, there were slightly0 party and
.hough no numerical figures on political assets in ' Hue have been turned up, tho success of the Conaunlstsnfiltrating and influencing the 'struggle movement" there in April and May suggests that the Communists may havea better foothold in this area than in other urban regions. There are indications, for example, that aelement of CommuniBt sympathizers exists among the studont body at Hue universityariety ofmany of thorn extremist in nature, operato on the students. umber of prominent politiciana and teachers in Hue have been active in antigovenuuont, antirailitary movements In tho paat two years.
NFLSV members in thehis was nearlyercent of the total estimated population of the district prior to the large outflow of refugees from the area.**
Another document Indicated that the party had calledig step up in recruitment in the district by the end of the year which would, if achieved, have at least doubled party membership and more than doubled Youth Group Later documents during the year,reoccupation with "enemy" military activities in theand suggested that development of the party was not meeting requirements.
Communist Propaganda Apparatus and Its Influence
*They ware composed ofi
arty members (apparentlyadre and men organic to the districtarty Youth Groupiberation Partners Associationiberation9 Liberation Women
"The NFLSV members amounted to% of theestimated to be overn the Province. Military units under the district committeeegular uniten,illage guerrilla platoonsembers, and an additional unspecified number of smaller hamletin at leastamlets. Many of those in tho military units were probably also members of the party, tho Youth Croup, or the Liberation Association.
The Communists consider their propaganda operation an extremely important part of the insurgency. They attempt to ensure that it is continuous, ubiquitous, and pervasive. It is the doctrine of the insurgency that every revolutionary, no matter what his Job, iaropaganda agent. to the captured documonts. Communist propaganda seeks to "motivate" all segments of the populace to engage in the "struggle" against the government and eventually to "ri upeneral revolution. It also seeks to widen tha
"contradictions between various groups and the Saigonto furthor "proselyting among the enemy's troops andnd to eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of the US presence by creating hatred for the Americans.
A. Propaganda Apparatus
The importance the Communists attach to theireffort can be seen in the elaborate apparatus set up in the South to guide and control it. Beginning at the top with COSVN, the party structure providespecial propaganda section within its committee structure at each echelon. These sections coordinate, plan, and produceindoctrination material as well as the curricula for the schools in Vietontrolled areas.*
The propaganda disseminated by radio and through periodicals serves largely to underpin and to provide the general themes for "face-to-face" dissemination of The documents suggest that when new policies or tactics areface-to-face" propaganda campaign to explain and justify them is mountedighlybasis. One directive outliningampaignistrict of Dien Hoa Province, for example, scheduled precisely tho manner inew agricultural policy was to be read and explained to farmers in every hamlet. In addition to the propaganda work of local cadres, roving propaganda teams are assigned and dispatched by higher echelons as part of the campaign to "destroy" government control and presenceamlet or village* There arethat local party cadres arene latitude
*Tho Communists1 "Liberation Radio" producos broadcasts of news, instruction, and entertainment from several mobile sites and from the COSVN base area. There is not enough information to tell the size of the Conmunist radio audience, but the majority of the residents in Communist-controlled areas probably listen at one time or another.
Under the banner of tho Front, the Communists alsoa number of "revolutionary" newspapers^ they claimn the "liberated"well as periodicals andfor special audiences such as youth and women. Some are prepared clandestinely and are disseminated covertly in government-controlled areas. While much of the material is produced within Southot of it comes from bloc sources.
in adjusting the propaganda line to take advantage of local conditions and to exploit new developments. The Communists often attempt to follow up on their propaganda by promoting "political struggle" demonstrations in the towns andor by fostering the presentation of petitions orof grievance to government authorities.*
B. Effectiveness of the Propaganda
The US military buildup and the increased pace of military action have created significant problems for the Communists, partly because the prospects for early victory could hardly be proclaimed as convincingly following the buildup as4 and
The indoctrination line being passed down to the cadres, and thus to the people, shifted afterrom emphasis on the prospect of early victory to emphasis on the inevitability of victory. Documents suggest this line may not be going over well in those areas most affected by the war.
In their effort to ensure adequate material and manpower support for their armed forces, the Communists have found it necessary to rely increasingly on coercion rather than persuasion even in areas long under theirand to backtrack also on certain propaganda linessocial and economic goals. For example, inhey found it necessary to dampen down the propaganda directed against the wealthier farmers and landlords since the production of these people and their lands had become so essential to tho Communist war effort.
Assessing the effectiveness and appeal of thelines is difficult, if for no other reason than that it is often impossible to distinguish reaction to propaganda
"Directives5 called for the organization inand hamlets, particularly those close to government-controlled areas, of "permanent political struggleith responsible party cadres designated as leaders. The aim, apparently, was to have on tap crowds that could mount demonstrations on short notice. Reports from lowersuggest, however, rather spotty success in theof these groups.
from reaction to other important influences of the war. It is probable that even che Communists are not certain of the real impact of their propaganda. The documents apoear to reflect some dissatisfaction at the top, particularly with respect to the impactpropaganda on the population of areas not under firm Communist control. Assessments by lower echelons are sometimes equivocal, reporting favorable sentiments among the people but implying that theseare not deep and that "armed propaganda" or coercion by force is essential in obtaining their cooperation.
The anti-American lino of the Communists undoubtedly has had an impact. The Communists attempt to exploit parochial and nationalist sentiments, and in particular to appeal to those affected personally by the foreignpresence. They have moved peasants to demonstrate against bombings or against displacement from their homes. Through the infiltration of agitators in the northern cities this spring, they succeeded somewhat in adding to the anti-American cast of the "struggle movement" propaganda. there is no indication that the Communists havemanaged to evoke the "hatred" of Americans which they havo attempted. efrain seen in Communist documents, in reports to higher authority from lower echelons, is that dislike and hatred and fear of Americans is growing; at the same time, however, concern is expressedfierce" anti-American spirit and an anti-American movement aro slow in coming.
It is indisputable that the Communists have appealed successfully to large numbers of individuals and havewilling adherents to their cause; moreover, they have succeeded in engaging the aspirations of segments ofexample, of numbers of montagnards with promises of autonomy. But the lines on broad issues do not appear to have captured the enthusiastic support of anysection of the populace outside Communist-hold areas.
The net impression of the available evidence is that Communist propaganda has served more effectively as adevice and to neutralize or to assist inbroad elements of the populace thanedium forustained political movement.
VI. The Overall Effectiveness the Political Subversive
A. With the Rural Vietnamese
The net impression conveyed by the evidencein previous sections on Communist politicalthroughout the rural areas is that the Communists have achieved the willing cooperation and participation ofelements of the populace in the "liberated" areas, but thoy have not been able to get the willing participation of the large, unaffiliated, locally-oriented mass of the peasantry. The Communists must rely for continuingeven within their controlled areas,lend of suasion, agitation, and coercion. In the rural areas they do not now hold, but must, if they are to achieve their ultimatesurrounding Saigon, forCommunists hove recruited numbers of Their documents indicate, however, that they find it necessary to rely primarily on "armed propaganda" andwarfare to achieve significant influence.
Communist reports indicate an increasing concern over inability to counter effectively the impact of large-scale allied military operations on the populace. In areas where such operations have been mounted, there appears to be increasing popular reluctance to cooperate with,to, or shelter the insurgent armed forces. The documents speak of growing difficulties in recruiting the types of people needed for military and labor-support units, particularly those units which leave their native villages or districts. Coercion must increasingly be applied where propaganda suasion fails.
Lower echelons report that even some insurgentcadres are fleeing to safe places and stayinginactive." Increasing concern is also registered in the documents over the flight of refugees to government-controlled areas, over the government pacification programs, and over government counter-propaganda. Lower echelons report that political organization and proselyting are slow.
It is impossible as yet to judge the extent to which these difficulties are hurting the Communist waror to toll whether they will grow to the point where
they will largely block further Communist progress inthe rural populace through political action. It seems clear, however, that Communist progress through political action in the rural areas since5 has slowed significantly, at least in these areas affected by allied military operations. (Annex III contains additional discussion of the status of the rural populace under Viet Cong control.)
It is possible tooughthe basisata baso which is admittedlythe total percentage of the populace in South Vietnam which is under the direct control of the Vietnamese Communists. It would appear that atillion persons, or aboutercent of the total population ofillion (the latest US Government estimate of the total population of Southail into this category.*
Four million other people reside in areas where it is impossible to tell the exact degree of control orexorcised by either the Viet Cong or the Saigon Government. This group, approximatelyercent of the population, should probably be regarded as an essentially uncommitted group in that it does not give allegiance by choice either to the government in Saigon or to the Viet Cong. The balance of the population,illion, are considered firmly under government control.** Thissegment of the population, whichillion urban dwellers and one million refugees,some S4 percent of the total.
Current reporting indicates that aboutercent of South0 square miles of territory is not
*For the purpose here, an area and its inhabitants are considered to be under the direct control of the Communists wherever the Communists areosition of suchdomination that they have been able to establish atemi-overt insurgent governmental apparatus.
**They are, for example, given relatively effectiveby government forces and are relatively responsive to the day to day dictates of government officers who reside and move freely throughout these areas.
IH-23
.
SEGREX
effectively or lastingly controlled by either theor the government. Much of this area is wasteland, uninhabited or sparsely settled. The Communists are able to operate at will throughout the area, but probably do not try to exercise exclusive domination except where they have baso areas.
Theercent of the population which the Saigon government controls probably occupies not more thanoercent of the total land area of the country. Theof the population under direct Viet Cong control is situated on what is probably onlyoercent of the total land area.ay-to-day basis, then, the major populated areas of contention between the allies and the Communists constitute only about one-quarter of the land area of South Vietnam. (See figure III-2)
D. In the Cities: Saigon in Particular
The communists realize that it is in the cities that the greatest gains need be made if the armed forces and tho government are to be riddled from within. Of the cities, Saigon is by far the most important. Analysis of captured documents and other intelligence informationto Saigon suggests that the Communists may feel that they have succeeded in winning the sympathiesotsegment of the city dwellers. The information suggests further, however, that the Communists do notthistheir influence in the citiessufficient to ensure effective support for any major ovort action on their part. It is certainly clear that they do not believe they have sufficient covert assets within Saigon.
The communists appoar to see their efforts in the cities as proceeding along two mutually supportingone of organization and preparation for the day when the conditions they seek will ariso, and one of terrorism and agitation to help create those conditions. Inhe party's Current Affairs Committee for the capital zoni* claimed that terrorist attacks had "arousedamong the people" and had frightened government The result according to the document, was that the "people, especially the laborers, clearly sympathize with the Revolution" and "enthusiastically support and cover our They will be with us, the document claimed, when tho general uprising occurs.
il iimmil
-
VIETNAM POPULATION AND AREA CONTROL
m-2
Controlled
9
illion)
Sparsely Populated
or0 Square Miles
is*-
illion)
75%
Effectively or Lastingly Controlled by Either Side
illion)
illion)
6%
20%
I Million Refugees
2 Million)
0 quare Miles
12tol5%
Vie* Cong ControllBd
Com
POPULATION
illion Inhabitants)
oim
TOTAlhousand Square Miles)
il, a*
munistsocurnentthat the Com-son in llrt; 51 n septg,nber any majorin Saigon, it recommended that we "draft plans" for
our political movement through military activities."*
rad documents also register suspicion offfrou?fl.xn thendicating they should be"ploited if Possible, but not viewed as includt= thahe progressive ones and them*"m* the -bourgeois landlords, both progressive and
thahhe eyidence so far developed indicatesl"ddhist-backed dissidence andieS ?hla 8pcin* wera "ot created or con-tn nl^Jtl Communists, but that the Communists did move arid tothem as much aa iltration. There is evidence, for eiample,1 sr?^ipthemovement in the i ivirt?ommunists. There was apparentlylitary move in direct support of the dissidents, however. The Communists probably decided that
i??nove"ot right, since the over-all conditions wore not yet favorable and their own influence and support in the cities was too weak.
ubsequentotebook recording whatto constitute the views of the party leaders for the Saigon area at the endlaimed further progress in gaming popular sympathy, but again admitted weakness in
h^oiIt ciaimed thac the presence of US troopsblock the disruption of thein Saigon, but asserted that agents were still and that their low efficiency was leading toand
direcvive of the Saigon area's Currentcr;itically of the "intellectualnoted that rogressive faction has been joiningand is going to be more inclined toward theis nonaligned and adopts the at-
titude ofhilemall faction becomes more and more overtly reactionary by acting as imperialists'
ANNEX IV
THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIBTNAK
I. The Build-Up of Forces
The course,of the ground war in South Vietnam is marked by the extent to which, in the conventional military sense, it has becomeonfrontation between third country forces. This situation reflects the already heavy commitment of indigenous manpower resources to the war The heavy casualties sustained by local Communist forces (VC) are putting an increasing strain on their ability to mobilize additional military manpower. The GVN hassubstantial manpower resources to pacificationand Internal security and police programs. Over half of the GVN military forces are committed to these counter-insurgency programs. The GVN potential for expansion of its military forces, which would be limited under the best of circumstances, is restrained further by the political unrest in the GVN and the high desertion rate in the ARVN.
SinceVA troops in South Vietnam haveby They now0 of aboutercent of the total VC/NVA main force. By the endn0 NVA troops will account for nearly half of the VC/NVA main force. Byn0 NVA troops will account forercent of main force strength. US/Third Nation* forces at the end4 totaled0 troopsercent of Allied regular troop strength. InhereS/Third Nation troops orercent of total strength. Projected deployments indicate that US/Third Nation forcesroops orercent of the regular Allied Army strength in South Vietnam by
Regular Free World forces now outnumber the totalCommunist forceondargin
*Here and throughout the remainder of the text. South Korean, Australian and New Zealand Forces are referred to as -Third Nation" Forces.
IV-1
TOPSEGREX
over the VC/NVA main force units. Overwhelming air and artillery support, coupled with considerable troop mobility and naval participation also add significantly to theof Allied military strength.
Thereharp distinction between Communist andforces in the number of support troops needed to back up tactical combat troops. Only about one-fifth of the total Allied Array and Marina Corps troops are committed to engaging and destroying the enemy in offensive operations. Thusorce in6 totaling slightlyrmy and Marine Corps ground forces0 represented troops in maneuver battalions. roops werein indirect combat, logistics, constructionsecurity and other support tasks and0 troops are in artillery battalions. The Communist forces, on the other hand, have to commit0 troopsittle overercent of their regular forces to combat support, compared to overercent for the Allied forces.
When the relative build up of opposing forces is looked at in this manner the troop strength ratios change The troop strength ratio of Allied maneuver battalions becomesather. in the II and IV Corps area the ratio is in the favor of the communists. Theof estimated Communist main force strength and Allied troop strength in maneuver battalions inroop strength ratio which gives the over-all strength advantage to the Communists. The advantage is offset, of course, by the air, artillery and naval support of the Allied forces and their highly developed mobility. Nevertheless, the Communist build up, particularly of NVA forces,etermination to commit whatever forces are necessary to match the Allied build up and to extend the war as long as possible. Even if the Communists admit that they cannotonventional military victory in South Vietnam they may still calculateong extended war with increasing US casualties may eventually break down US will and determination to persevere.
II. Casualties
The toll in human lives is, however, presenting anhigh cost to the Communist forces. The heavy casualties sustained by VC forces has already stabilized the extent to which they can commit troops and has forced
IV-2
TOPSEGREX.
them to rely more heavily on NVA replacements. Totalin action, captured, seriously wounded andfrom an0 6 we estimate that these losses may rangend0 for tha firat six months7 if the current rater, of combat are maintained and projected troop strengths are realized. Ke estimate that0 of the losses6 will bo North Vietnamese; an0 North Vietnamese will be lost during the first halfhe bulk of these losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds. Local Communists will sustain estimated losses of06 and an0 during the first half About two-thirds of local Communist losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds. The remainder will be accounted for by captives and deserters.
In terms of the number killed in action on the battlo-field, the Allied forces will continue to maintain an We estimate that0 Communists will be killed6 and an0 during the first six months7 compared0 Freo World soldiers estimated to be killed0 US and Third0 ARVN) and anhat will probably be killed during the first six months
Reports on battle fatalities among Communist forcesthey have increased from slightlyonth during the first bIx months5 toach month during the second half of the yearonth during
On the basis of very limited data we estimate that the number of Communist troops seriously wounded and hencelost has increased fromonth5 toonth Our estimates indicate that the numbers of Communist personnel captured56 do not vary much, ranging5 to an
The Allied forces have achieved betterill ratio over the enemy. Our data on VC/NVA forces killed in actionharp change in the relative shares accounted for by CVN forces and US/Third Nation forces. In the last
IV-3
six monthsSAhird Nation forces accounted forercent of total Communists killed in action. In the first five monthsowever, US/Third Nation forces accounted forercent of total Communists killed in action.
The rising casualty rates among Communist forces have had no detectable influence on North Vietnam's desire to continue the war in tha South. The enemy continues to buildup his forces in the South, and the Communist forces arein battle as well today as they were4he manpower drain on North Vietnam, in numbers alone, has not yeturdensome level. Although the VC units have borne most of the casualties to date and are squeezed for manpower, Hanoi seems willing to increase its commitment. The drain on manpower could, however, become more critical as the casualty rates in the South and the competing demands for more manpower in the North increase. An increase in casualty rates in the South substantially higher than those already estimated throughould require an Allied commitment of maneuver battalions substantially greater than that indicated in current deployment programs.
IV-4
TOP^SEGREll
mtmrnsm.
Trrp-sEGiun:
APPENDIX A
THB GROUND WAR TH SOUTH VIETNAM
I. General Troop Strength
A. . and Third Nation
- General
. military commitment in South Vietnam, along with that of South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, has grown from0 troops at the end4roops at the end of Projected troop strengths Indicate thatThird Nation forces will be stationed in South Vietnam bySee Table IV-1)
In both an absolute and relativeThird Nation troop strength in South Vietnam has qrown more rapidlyhan has the corresponding buildup in the South Vietnamese regular forces (See Table Thirdforcesercent of total Allied regular troop strength1 percentndercent in They will account forercent of the planned regular Allied forces in South Vietnam by
Third Nation ground forces in South Vietnam are predominantly deployed In thend III Corps areas, with South Vietnamese troops, as ofaintaining complete military responsibility in the Capital Military(Saigon! and IV Corps areas. United States Marines are stationed at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai inorpR area. Field Force I, with headquarters at Nha Trang (II Corpsontains the 1st Calvary Division, elements ofh Infantryirborne Division. ROK forces, and the 5th Special Group. Pield Force II, with headquarters at Cu Chi (III Corpsontains the 1st Infantryelements ofhirborne Brigade, and Australian and New Zealand Units (See Figure
B. South Vietnam
1. eneral
At the end ofbe Republic of South Vietnam hadeople under arms (See Table
mmm
IV-5
Tabic
South Victaac: Oonparatlve Actual aad Projected Regular Allied Troop Strength7
nd Third Nation
3CO
'(70
T95
and Third Ration aa Percent of Total
Knd of year figures except for6 end
Excludeshousand quaal-xilltary/aeeurity personnel.
Table IV-3
Total South Vietnamese Armed Strength?
(in thousanda)*
6 7
South Vietnaeeae Forcce
Kllltary
ran
Popular
Araed Combat Youth national Police
Total
.0
' "owevar, does not accurately reflect the regular South Vietnamese military strength. Only aboutercent of the total south Vietnamese armed strength is committed to conventional military operations.
hulk rtf t-.Vlecna]nese have responsibility forof the pacification program and measures toneutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. en in"otionalun"s. The Southmilitary force consistsrmy troops, force0 navy/marine
he regular South Vietnameseaa increased by0 men or by about 25 Projected deployments indicate that the regular
byen, total strength upen by
2- Major Deployments
Theouth Vietnamese Army Order ofis presented in Tableelow:
Table IV-4
Major South Vietnamese Ground ForceCorps Area. Mid-lSS*
Units
I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corpa Capital Military Region General Reservo Support Units and Miscellaneous
Total
Strength
"
aGV? "ar}ne Battalionsotal strength
en. Approximatelyercent of the combat strength tfs tJ; ^ oros'ercent to II Corps,ercent to III Corps ercent to IV Corpsercent toand the Capital Military Region.
strength is heavily concentrated in III and IV areas andesser extent in IIorpsore detailed deployment is shown in Tableelow:
Table IV-6
South Vietnam: Estimated Strength, Composition and Deployment of NVA/VC Main ForceBloments by Corps Area,
Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps
Total
eq
0
0
rregulars, political cadre and combat support forces. Combat support forces are aboutercent of regular forces strength.
II. Analysis of Troop strength A. General
During the paat year. Allied strength has grown to the point where regular Free World forces' now outnumber the total estimated Communist forceondargin over the NVA/VC main forco units. (See Figure Overwhelming air and artillery support, coupled with extremely high troop mobility also add to theof Allied military strength.
Recently both the Allies and Communists have drawn heavily on outside help (Figuresndo build up military forces in the South.ilitary sense, the
war in South Vietnam is rapidly developing into abetween the United States ana North Vietnam with South Vietnamese forces on both sides playing relatively reduced roles. In spite of rapidly growing Allied troop strength and resulting heavy enemy losses. North Vietnam continues to send regular troops south in increasing The Vietnamese Communists apparently recognizelassic military solution, but may hope to attain their objectives by unconventional means andintend to extend tho war as long as possible in the hope of wearing down US will to see the war through.
An early and successful conclusion to the military struggle rests, therefore, with the ability of Allied forces to hunt down and destroy tho enemy on his own ground. It is ln this context that the numerical superiority in tho ratios of Allied to Communist strength became less More neaningful relationships and trends in analyzing the present and future course of tho ground war depend on tho actual number of Allied troops theoretically capable of engaging and destroying the enemy in offensive operations.
B. Critical Troop Ratios
1. Assumptions
Total Allied troop strongth in South Vietnam presently stands aten. Current NVA/VC main force strength is estimated to bet first glance it would appear that Allied regular forces presentlyumerical superiority over the NVA/VC main force. ractical sense, however, this is not tho case. Western troops and their South Korean and Vietnamoso Allies require considerable numbers of support troopB to maintain offensive combat units in the field. Since the scale of combat in South Vietnam at the present time is largely dependent on the level of Allied initiatedoperations, it seems logical to exclude Allied support
forces, political cadres and combat support forces are excluded from Communist troop strength in this analysis because of thoir limited role in conventional
IV-9
TUP1SEGREX
troops in deriving meaningful ratios of actual Communist/ Allied battlefield strength. The combat strength of the NVA/VC main force is taken at current estimateden. Allied combat strongth isto include the number of troops assigned to maneuvertroops who initiate offensive groundand conceptually come into direct contact with the enemy. The critical troop ratio is defined as NVA/VC main force/Allied maneuver battalion strength.
2. Offensive Combat Strength
S./Third Nation
For purposes of this analysis only ground troopsen in the Air Force and Navy ure excluded from the analysis. (See Tablepproximatelyercent of the total D. S. Array and Marine Corps strength in South Vietnam is committed to maneuver battalions. (See Figure Anercent is assigned to artillery battalions that primarily providesupport to the maneuver battalions.* The remainingercent of the Army and Marine Corps personnel performconstruction, engineering, security, and relatedtaBks. The percent of maneuver battalion strength to total Third Nation troop strength is considerably higherthese troops are largely supported by US service The deployment by Corps area and service of US/Third Nation maneuver battalions is presented in Table IV-8. As of1 percent of US/Third Nation maneuverstrength was locatedorps,ercent in II Corps, andercent in III Corps. Projected deployments for7 indicate that0 US/Third Nation troops in maneuver battalions will be distributed in the following manners orpsercent, II Corpsercent, and III Corpsercent.
Vietnam
In the analysis of the critical troop ratios only the South Vietnamese Army is given
battalions are excluded from the critical ratio due to the manner in which they are employed in com bat.
IV-10
TVPSEGREX
I
i
1
3*2
3T
XT
l
322 5
i am
II 5
1
a
3 r.
*
11
11
'8
I
i a
5 i
1
m JI)
JIM
i
EH*
ID
11
Xjlj
Hid ?
XTT1
Mil
His
en in the Air Force, Navy and Marinesercent of the total South Vietnameseis committed to maneuver battalions. (See6). As of1 percent of ARVN maneuverstrength was locatedorps,ercent in IIpercent in III Corps and Capital Military Region,percent in IV Corps. Projected deployments for Juneno change in present troop size ofTable
c. NVA/VC Main Force
_ Por purposes of this analysis regular enemy
combat strength is considered to include all NVA/VC main lorce troops. Although it is recognized that not all of the troops in this classification are performing combat tasks, there are several justifications for making such an assumption. These regular enemy troops must be hunted down and destroyed or eliminated regardless of their operational Junctions. It is also recognized that the NVA/VC main force requirements in terms of endogenous support troops aremall fraction of similar requirements needed by Western troops.
The estimated strength of NVA/VC main force Corps areas as of6 indicates that approximatelyercent of NVA/VC main force strength is locatedorps area,ercent in II Corps,ercent in III Corps, andercent in IV Corps. (See Figure NorthArmy troops are predominantly deployed in the two Northern corps while VC main force units are largelyin the two Southern Corps areas. Currently there are no known North Vietnamese Army units in the IV Corps.
3- Analysis of Critical Troop Ratios
a- Aggregate Field Strength Ratios
should first be pointed out that in the
tieid. Allied forces as defined, do notistinct numerical manpower advantage over the regular enemy forces. In fact. Communist forces in certain Corps areas possess superior numbers. Strong objections could be raised to this observation. The high degree of Allied troopand essentially unlimited air and ground support
IV-11
HU^SEGREX
probably help to makeratio of friendly to enemy field forces loss critical than it appears in Tablehe ratio of friendly to enemy field forces has increased slightly in favor of the Communists during the6 period. riendly to enemy field force ratio ofas observed inatio of It.9in Projections of enemy and Allied field strengths indicate that the Communists mayatio with opposing field forces in6atio by
Aspects of Increases inStrength"
The contribution of South Vietnam to both the Allied and local Communist field troop strength has stabilized in the past year. InVN troops accounted forercent of Allied field strength. In6 GVN troops made upercent of Allied field strength. Inouth Vietnamese Communists accounted forercent of the enemy field forces. Byocal Communists accounted forercent of the enemy field forces. United States/Third Nation field forces haveby3 during the6 period. Regular South Vietnamese Army field forces have increased byn the same period. Regular North Vietnamese Army force increased by0 troops in the6 period. Tho endogenouscontribution to VC main force increased strength by an0 during the same period.
Area Field Strengths
The critical ratio of opposing field forces in South Vietnam by Corps area as ofhat Allied strength varies considerably from one area to another (See Table The Allied field forces enjoy an estimatedndanpowor superioritynd III Corps areas respectively. In II and IV Corps areas the Communists enjoy ansuperiority In the field. Consequently, it isthat while Allied forces enjoy an aggregatesuperiority ofnuch anis not held equally at each Corps level.
IV-12
South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion Otrength to Estimated KVA/VC Main Force Troop Strength7
toataaii)
TUP^EG&El.
Table1
South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion Strength to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop Strength by Corps Area,
ICorps
Total
Total
Ratio Friendly to Enemy NVA/VC (OS/TN +
C. Projected Critical Troop Ratios
We estimate that by the end6 Communist field strength in South Vietnam will beySee Table North Vietnamese Army units will account forercent of the total. Projected Allied deployments for the end6 andhowroops respectively, will be allocated to maneuver battalions. Aboutercent of the projected Allied field strength will be accounted for by US/ Third Nation forces. The projected increases in both forces
IV-13
Stum
IV-
COMPARATIVE, ACTUAL, AND PROJECTED ALLIED AND US/THIRD NATION Troofit MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH TO VC/NVA MAIN FORCE STRENGTH
Has
'Mi
IZZ. Operations
A. Assumptions and Methodology
The statistics used to ovaluate the intensity and course of the ground war in South Vietnam take onar without fronts. Several of the factors employed to assess the war in South Vietnam are subject tomargins of error, and as such require discussion. The number of Communist troops reported killed in action is both the most important and least reliable statistical measure used to assess the progress of the military aspects of tho struggle. The figure la subject to error because of duplications, omissions, possibly inflated body counts, and the inability to identify non-military casualties. On tho other hand, it is well known that Communist forces exert considerable effort to remove both their dead and wounded from the battlefields of South Vietnam. Atthere appears to be no rational method for adjusting enemy body count figures. Consequently, the statistics on enemy dead are taken as received, subject toreservations on their accuracy.
The allocation of the reported enemy dead to the respective inflicting forces alsoroblem. US/Third Notion and GVN operations are conducted inanner that an accurate accounting of enemyby an inflicting force is difficult to achieve. imilar problem exists in trying to determine whetherair support or ground forces inflicted the Statistical problems also exist in allocatingto large and small scale operations.
To allocate the number of reported enemy killed in each engagement to the respective inflicting force, the number of Allied soldiers killed in each combined op-oration were weighted by their aggregate kill ratios. Tho number of Allied and enemy killed in action were also rounded in an effort to make the data consistent. It was observed that the majority of US/Third Nation inflicted and sustained casualties were results ofbattalion sized operations or greater. Aassumption with far less certainty was made with rospoct to GVH forces. South Vietnamese casualties, both inflicted and sustained, were allocated to their
respective corps areas for the6 period on the basis of relative April and May data. The July
6 period was examined withbecause of the relative wealth of data andinvolvement of US/Third Nation forces in
B. Operations
GVN and US/Third Nation Operations
During the6 period0 enemy troops were reported killed in action. Both in relative and absolute sense US/Third Nation forces are nowominant combat role in the Southwar (See Figure The number of US/Thirdforces (maneuver battalions) capable of activelyCommunist forces in combat operations has grown0 in50 in The number of GVN forces capable of initiating offensivehas remained0 in50 in
Nation*
During the6 period DS/ Third Nation participation in ground operations increased directly with increases in US/Third Nation maneuverstrength. (See Figure FromS/Third Nation forces accounted forercent of0 enemy troops reported killed in action; duringS/Third Nation forces killedercent0 enemy troops reported killed in action. (See Figure
OS/Third Nation field forcesill ratio ofuring theay
Of0 enemy reported killed in action
purposes of simplicity Third Nation forces arewith US. Combined operations are allocated to US/ Third Nation and GVN operations respectively.
Figure IV-10
OF COMMUNIST AND US/THIRD NATION KIA
TO BUILD-UP OF US/THIRD NATION MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH
6
*7A
OC
VAOO
Communist
a
400
5 Aug Oct Dec iii
C 0 0 0 0
USStrw^fth
d me*fo.
a-u
IV-ll
COMPOSITION OF REPORTED VC/NVA KIA BY INFLICTING FORCE
3 Moy-6
IV-I2
APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED VC/NVA KIA, BY CORPS AREA
3 -May
by them during theonth period, ercent werefor by US Marinesorps,ercent by US Army/Third Nation forces in III Corps. (See Figureeneral rulo US/Third Nation maneuver battalion kill ratios have been highestnd II Corps areas and lowest in III Corps.
3. GVN
During the6 period the South Vietnamese Army participation in ground operations decreased. FromVN forces accountedercent of0 enemy troops reported killed in action, ornemy killed per month. (See Figure Uigh desertion rates, heavy casualties, and political instability have adversely affected thecontributions of South Vietnamese military units.
South Vietnamese forcesill ratio over Communist forces during the56 period. Approximatelyercent of these kills were recordednd II Corps,ercent in III Corps andercent in IV Corps.
C. Communist Performance in Battle
The question of Communist troop morale is discussed in detail in Annex VII. Communist troop performancethat the enemy troops are not yet experiencing morale problems that adversely affect their behavior on the However, the number of captured Communist weapons, personnel, and desertions have increased considerably (See Table These losses can be explained by the increasing scale of combat and do not necessarilya decline in Communist battlefield performance.
IV-17
TOP
KtA
OF COMMUNIST AND GVN KIA TO BUILD-UP OF GVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS6
IV-13
Marteuvet Battalion Strength-Approximately OS,IOO
-ARVNattalion0
8 6ft CI*
TOPlSEGREZ
Table IV-13
South Vietnam: Absolute Indicators of Communist Performance in Battle
"Chieu Hoi" Military Desertions**
Weapons Captured
A.
for entireVN amnesty program for Communist deserters.
By relating the selected indicators to the scale of combat (the number of enemy reported KIA and captured) it is possible to illustrate thatelative senseforces are essentially performing as well as in battle today as they were4
Table IV-14
Relative Indicators of Communist Motivations in Battle Expressed in Terms of the Scale of
-ercent of KIA
ercent of KIA and Captured**
Hoi"ercent of KIA
"Ratios calculated on January-June data.
"Also includes weapons captured on junks and other infil-
the
tration craft, consequently this ratio overstate! true battlefield weapons loss.
IV-18
TUP-^EGREX
It is observed that Communist battlefield performance has not changed in spite of the growing scale of combat andUS/Third Nation participation. At present, the magnitude of Communist morale problems in terms ofbattlefield performance, seems toinor hindrance to enemy operations in South Vietnam.
D. An Approximate Allocation of NVA/VC6
1. Mothodology
One of the most difficult intelligence problems faced in South Vietnam is that of allocating enemyto their respective fighting units. The characteristics of guerrilla warfare make it impossible to distinguish be-tweon civilians, irregulars, VC main force and PAVN troops killed in action. Lack of uniforms and unit insignias are some of the basic problems encountered. The time alloted to body identification of the battlefield is Influenced by the pressures of combat and undoubtedly ia far too short to allow for accurate body counts, let alone extensiveof enemy unit identification. The importance of allocating enemy casualties to their respective units is crucial in assesalng the present and probable course of the war in South Vietnam. The extent to which the Communists must rely on internal recruitment and North Vietnamese regulars can best be determined by arriving at anallocation of enemy casualties.
It was initially assumed that all enemy reported killed in action were members of the Communist military establishment. Such an assumption obviously overstates enemy losses since it includes civilians inadvertently killed in and around the battlefields and counted as enemy dead. The inclusion of considerable numbora of SouthCommunist irregulars and combat support troops helps to relax this assumptionertain degree. However, the lack of any definitive study on such civilianmakes it impossible to adjust enemy casualties with any degree of precision. Consequently the killed infigures ara taken as given.
In order to allocate enemy battlefieldto NVA/VC units, it was assumed that enemy casualties
were sustained in proportion to their respective troop strength in the various Corps areas as of In the case of irregular and combat support troops it wasthat these forces were half as likely to engage in major combat operations as were the NVA and VC regular forces. Reported enemy battlefield fatalities were allocatedorps basis during the6 period. Enemy losses and respective strength by corps area were then compared. Since there were no known NVA troops stationed in IV Corps during6 it was concluded that all of the reported battle fatalities were sustained by local Communists. NVA strength in III Corps during tho relevant period accountedmall portion of the enemy main force5 percent in III Corps by The preponderance of enemy casualties in III Corps during the relevant period were assumed, therefore, to be sustained by local Communists. The bulk of the NVA strength in South Vietnam is stationed in IIorps respectively. Communist losses during tho6 period in the two upper Corps were allocated to NVA/VC on the basis of regular enemy troop strength as of By employing this methodology it was deduced thatercent of Communist battlefieldwere inflicted on NVA troops duringrojected enemy troop strengths indicate that aboutercent of tha enemy battlefield fatalities during the next year will be sustained by NVA forces.*
The use of communist regular troop strength as ofeights the casualties heavily toward NVA forces during the6 period. NVA troop strength has rapidly increased in recent months, thusprobable NVA losses during the early monthsias should counter arguments that NVA forces are employed more intensively in combat than are localforces. The use of total South Vietnamese Communist
*It is not possible at this time to refine theof fatalities by considering the actual frequency with which vc nva units engage in combat.
iv-20
YUPISEGREXl
troop strength may also overstate local enemy casualties ulnue It implicitly aasuntoa that local forces have and will be engaged as often as North Vietnamese troops.
2. Analysis
This distribution provides some insights into probable future trends in the growth and composition of enemy forces in South Vietnam. It is estimated thatbattlefield fatalities averagedonth during Average monthly North Vietnamese and VC battlefield fatalitiesespectively. Accepted saverage monthly Communist Infiltration during the same period. Combined accepted and reported NVA Infiltrationonth.
It is obvious that during6 North Vietnamese troop strongth grewore rapid rate than did direct sustained battlefield fatalities. increases in estimated North Vietnamese Army strength in South Vietnam during the same period confirm this trend. The relatively stable size of the VC main force during the period probably indicates that the local Communists have been able to offset battlefield deaths byfrom the irregular forces and the populace.
IV. Communist Losses
A. Total Communist Losses
t is estimated that00 Communists (See Tableere effectively put out of action. Projections indicate thatnemy forces will be effectively lost6 andill be lost during the first halfattle fatalities account for approximatelyercent of the losses, seriously wounded, estimated on the basis of captured documents, account forercent, and captured and deserters the remainingercent.
IV-21
South Vietnam: Estimate of Communist7
Hoi" Returnees)
TOTAL
Wounded
Killed
Action
monthly reported Communist battleincreased from lessuring theonths5 toach month in the second half of the year. Duringommunist battle fatalitieser month. 0 Communist troops were killed in action 0 enemy troops were reported killed in action during January-May of this year, and current estimates indicate that approxi0 Communists will probably be killed in action by the end
2. Wounded in Action
a. Methodology
Few if any official figures are released that give an indication of the total number of communistwounded in action. The primary reason for the lack of such information is that the enemyonsiderableof their dead and wounded from the battlefield in anto conceal their losses and prevent the capture ofpersonnel.
IV-22
Three basic components went into derivation of an estimate of NVA/VC wounded in action, consideration was given to historical factors such as; s, ANZAC, and Japaneso experience in Burma, Malaya, and the Pacific Islands in World War II; the experience of Southand US/TN forces in Vietnam; and Communist prisoner interrogation reports mentioning casualties and captured enemy documents such as medical reports and unit combat records. The observed ratios of wounded to killed during World War II and in Vietnam are summarized in Tableelow.
Tableelected Wounded to Killed Ratios
world War II
to Killed
Campaign (Australian)
1
Campaign (US)
(US)
(OS)
1
(Japan)
Japan)
1
, (GVN)
1
5
IV-23
Prisoner interrogation reports and captured enemy documents provideduantifiable observations on the relationship between Communist troops killed and wounded in action. Enemy casualties ranged fromn largo unit actions toasuaitios or less in small group actions. All of these lossos were sustained while fighting against South Vietnamese forces4 The obsorvodof wounded to killed in action ranged1 to
0 wel9*itod average ratio Since
these figures are not biased by enemy removal of dead troops from tho battlefield they may better reflect the distribution of enemy killed to wounded than those ratios which omploy Allied body countsase figure.
, nemy document captured by tho 1st Cav-
alry Division onn central Binh Dinhrevealed regimental data on Communist troops wounded in action The 2nd VC, lBth NVA, and Quyet Ram regiments which were estimated to bo the major enemy elements stationed in Binh Dinh ware listed in the docunent. The security of Binh Dinh is pro-aominantly maintained by US and ROK forces. Consequently, etween Communist troops killed in action (US/ ROK body count) and enemy accounts of those wounded inin Binh Dinh during the relevant period provides some indication of an enemy (WIA) relationship between US/Third
(KIA)
nation forces and the enemy.
. forcesommunists in Binh
uinh during the relevant period according to body counts Knumy documonts Indicateroops were wounded. Someommunists wounded in action were captured by US/ ROK forces. It is assumedS/ROK forces did most of the fighting in Binh Dinh Province;hat thu abovo mentioned Communist regiments comprise moot of the enemy ntrongth in Binh Dinh. The resulting ratio is
85 = orcea engaging US/
Third Nation forces in South Vietnam. The US/ROK body count probably understates the number of enemy killed and consequently results in higher wounded to killed ratio than was probably experienced.
A general relationship between the number of troops killed in action and those wounded in action was
TOPSBGRET.
observed in the samples examined. Troops with high kill ratios (Enemy killed? also experienced high wounded to
(Friendly killed) killed ratios (Friendly wounded). Conversely, troops with
(Friendly killed) relatively low kill ratios tended to have low wounded to killed ratios. Troops (such as NVA/VC) with low kill ratios probablyarge number killedelatively smaller number wounded, while troops (such as US/Third Na-
^rces) with high kill ratioselatively larger number wounded. Thiscan be rationalized by the fact that betterorganized troops with superior support fire fromand aircraft sustain fewer fatalitieB in obtainingan objective than do forces that lack such
Captured enemy documents further indicate that approximatelyercent of the wounded receivedbones and damage to internal organs that required immediate surgery. Aboutercent of the wounds were classified as light, and most of these cases were immediately returned to the battlefield. The remainingercent suffered slight wounds that required littleattention and were also immediately returned to the field.
It is difficult to estimate the number of seriously wounded Communist troops who die or cease to be effective fighting men. However, most of the seriously wounded are moved considerable distances by primitive means of transportation to surgical centers where, undoubtedly, the facilities and the quality of the medical personnel are far below Western standards. These factors coupled with the consideration that many Communist troops are alreadyby debilitating tropical diseases suggest that the majority of the seriously wounded troops are out of action for considerable lengths of time or indefinitely.
b. Estimate
00 Communist troops were seriously wounded End of year estimates indicate thatnemy troops will ba seriously wounded
TOP ShGREX.
ommunist military personnel were captured in action Given the current scale Ol operations it is estimated thatnemy troops will be captured
Hoi" Returnees_and Deserters
ommunist soldiers defectedthe GVN "Chieu Hoi" program Currentindicate that0 enomy military personnel are expected to defect under the "Chieu Hoi" program this year. No information exists on the number of enemy personnel who siirpiy desert and return to their villages. We estimate that unrecorded enemy desertions are at least equal to the number of defectors under the "Chiou Hoi" program. This iaonservative approach and the actual numbers of doserters could be significantly higher thar. theused in this annex.
D- Allocations of Present and Future Communistin South Vietnam""
It is estimatedaximum of00 North Vietnamese troops will be effectively put out of action in South Vietnam An00 will be lost in tho first half7 if current rates of combat are maintained and projected troop strengths ore realized. The bulk of the North Vietnamese losses will result from troops killed and seriously wounded in action. Relatively few North Vietnamese losses will be accounted for by captures, desertions, or defections.
Locai Communists (including main forces, irregulars and combat support troops) willaximum sustain00 effective losses in actionn00 will be lost in the first half Approximately two-thirds of the local Communist losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds. Tho remainder will be accounted for by captures and The relative shift in casualties from local to North Vietnamese Communist forcoa7 reflects the expected increase in the role of PAVN troops in the South Vietnamese war. In terms of comparative battlefield losses the Allied
IV-26
T&FSEGREX
forcesistinct advantage over the Communists. It is estimated that0 Free World soldiers will be killed in action00ompared0 Communists. Anllied soldiers will probably be killed byeflecting the same loss composition, compared to0 Communists.
ountry with an abundant population, whereatural deaths0 accidents occur each year, the loss ofouths annually for the sake of "National Liberation" does not, in an oriental sense, seem too high. The increased North Vietnamese commitment in South Vietnam is not, however, entirely based on patriotism. VC units have borne the brunt of enemyto date and appear pressed to maintain their current strength in face of growing Allied strength. The squeeze on VC manpowor is becoming more apparent, and the necessity of outside help more acute if the war is to be waged at the present level. North Vietnam appears both willing and able to take on this task in the hoperotracted struggle will give them ultimate victory. It may, however, find this commitment to be increasingly burdensome particularly as it required increasing numbers of the country's limitedof skilled manpower and leadership cadres.
IV-27
TZTP-SEGREX
ANNEX V
THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES OF Tllg COMMUNISTS IN" SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Tho Viet Cong Economy and Its Manpower
A. Tho Viot Cong Economy
The Viet Cong have successfully organized and expanded an oconomic organization to meet the basic task of funding VC revolutionary activity. The basic economic organization, operating through the Finance and Economic Section of tho People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party is assisted by the National Liberation Front and Communist military components in acquiring, transporting, andwithin South Vietnam almost all the non-military supplloe required by the Viet Cong. During the past five years, the VC economic organization has expanded with the development of VC forces. Startingocal solf-production unit, the economic structure progressed, first,oluntary fund drive, then, into an organizedand finance mechanism and, finally into anactivity supporting enlarged base and battlefield
Taxation appears to be the principal means used by tho Viet Cong to acquire financial and material resources within South Vietnam. Agricultural taxation remains tho most important source of VC tax receipts and is clearly dependent on continuing Viet Cong access to or someof control over tho rural population. The Viot Cong currently exerclso predominant political influence overoercent of the rice-cultivated area of South Vietnam which producesetric tons of rice per year. Annual consumption of rice by Communist regular forces could be obtained by an average tax ofercent of total production in VC areas alone. The Viet Cong usually taxubstantially higheroercent). There is no indication that resentment by the rural population against taxes of this magnitude has reached levels adequate to stop rice collections. in money or into be
V-l
TOP
support. Food supplies, especially rice, remain thebulk commodities required by these forces. Thoincrease in main force strength has been recorded in rice-deficitand II Corps and northern III Corps. There has been no increase in VC main force strength in the rlco-aurplus IV Corps whore logistic requirements for food supplies are relatively small.
Kith tho concentration of VC/NVA main force strengthnd II Corps and in northern III Corpsrice requirements clearly exceed tho total riceunder VC control in the provinces of Pleixu, Kon-tun, Phu Bon, tho western districts of tho coastalof central Vietnam, and the rice-deficit areas of VC military region 7. In all of these areas, there ia ovi-denco that tho VC are experiencing food supply problems. Forecently captured document cited thodifficulties experienced by the VC during an6 campaign in rice-deficit Quang Due Province that did not have sufficient rice for its own provincial forcei region forces assigned to the campaign woreto arrange their own rice supply "through thepresumably the Cambodian border. During the course of the campaign, one-third of VC combat strength wasto the transportation of rice.
The increase in allied military action hasto hamper the logistic system of the Viot Cong. military actions have had an adverse effect onproduction in VC controlled areas and on the percentage of the harvest that the VC can acquire ond transport to their base areas. The area covered andof crop harvested in theseot reported, and no aggregative estimate of their Impact is possible. Even with continued VC access toareas, the Viet Congeconddifficulty in transporting this commodity. Tho major portion of this movement haB been carried out by civilian laborers, but the danger of involvement in militaryhas caused serious disaffection among the VC-con-trollod population as the tempo of military activity has increased. hird major difficulty caused by allied military activity has been the disruption caused bydestruction of VC supply caches.
V-3
C. The Manpower Situation
The South Vietnamese population in VC controlled areas is atillion people and could be as much aa five million people depending on the extent to which tho VC have access to contested aroas. Moot of the VC controlled population live in the delta region. This controlled population probably containshysically fit young males. Anouths annually become old enough to fight. In addition to this controlled population the VC also draw on the population of military age in contested areas, on GVN deserters and on recruits from urban areas.
An increasing requirement for manpower5 forced the VC to resort to monetary inducements and to forced conscription and returnee programs to obtain local personnel. With these now methods VC hovo been able toignificantly higher level of05 comparednnually. Wo estimate that the VCapability6 to recruit and train0onth.
Recruitment at thla scale must be regarded as close to the maximum capabilities of the VC, particularly if those recruits are to receivo adequate training. There havo been increasing signsrowing squeeze on VC manpower This is reflected in the growing dominance of North Vietnamese troops as the NVA/VC force expands. There are also frequent prisoner reports of manpowor shortages and the poor quality and training of new recruits.
In addition to maklnq up for their own losses of ane estimate that VC forces will increase byroops The VC are also required, however, to provide replacementsrowing number of NVA losses. 6 wothat tho NVA will infiltrateroops at the same time that they are expanding the NVA troop lovel by an0 troops. NVA losses during tho year, however, will range. Thus tho VC could have to make up0 NVA
v-4
TOf JECREE
losses, depending on the rate of Infiltration andof NVA forees. Thisotal VC military manpower requirement6 ofhis requirement is within the higher end of the range ofestimates of VC recruitment capabilities.
If the casualty rate increases as expected7 to an annual rateommunist losses will be beyond the estimated recruitment and training capabilities of the VC. More of the manpower burder will then bo placed on North Vietnam creatingpressures on its manpower resources.
II. Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam (See Appendix A)
The Communist forces in South Vietnam haveighly centralized system of Supply Counoils to meet the logistics requirements of the VC/NVA forces. Thisoperates at each administrative lovel in South Vietnam working closely with counterpart economic and service organizations of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and the Rear Services Staffs of thecommand. This elaborate system controlsersonnel engaged full-time in logistic support activities. Additional thousands of personnel are conscriptedart-time basts to assist insupplies, the construction of logistics bases, and the maintenance of supply routes. The VC use an elaborate system of land routes, trails, and inlandconnecting the infiltration routes from Laos andwith the major COSVN base areas.
The VC storage system is greatlyarge number of small depots,0 tons of supplies each. This dispersedprovides maximum protection against large scaleor capture of supplies but also serves as aconstraint to the initiation of large sustained enemy actions.
The logistics system used by the Communist forces in South Vietnam has been able to satisfy adequately the minimum requirement for movement and storage of supplies.
V-5
ThiB capability has been weakened and nade more difficult as the scale of combat has increased and Allied ground operations have disrupted normal logistic movements and overrun storage areas. Difficulty in effectivelythe internal distribution of supplies has also been compounded by the manner in which VC/NVA forces ore dispersed throughout South Vietnam.
Inne-third of the enemy combat and combat support troops was located in the II Corps Aroa, one third in the III Corps, and the remainder about equally betweennd IV Corps. The IV Corps aroa with onlyercent of total VC/NVA regular forces, ia tho aroa in which the VC have the greatest self-sufficiency insupplies, particularly foodstuffs. The predominant share of VC/NVA forces is concentrated in food-deficit areas. Thus the II and III Corps areas which are the predominant rice-deficit areas account for almost two-thirds of the total daily logistic requiremant.
The inability to transport food from rice surplus to deficit areas has become more severe as Allied ground actions intensify. The Communists have been compelled to turn to Cambodian sources in order to provide rice to the forces in the central highlands. Use of this source of supply has incroased in the last half year and may now be as much asay. The need to turn to sources outside the country for rice indicates thatdistribution is one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists and is probably the mostaspoct of their entire logistics operation.
If the disposition of Communist forces in Southremains unchanged during the build-up projected throughnd internal distribution of food istheir dependence on external sources forcould double. Our present estimatesaximum external requirement of aboutay. But if internal distribution of food to the food-deficit areas cannot be effectively accomplished, thiscould bo increased to atay.
This added logistic requirement would not beparticularly if it were met from Cambodian sources. It would not even tax the Laotian infiltration route very severely but would aid substantially in reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic requirements.
v-6
The present disposition of Communist forces is much more favorable for the internal distribution of supplies infiltrated into South Vietnam. Overercent of the KVA forces andercent of the VC forces are innd II Corps areas in close proximity to the Laotiancorridor and the northern infiltration routes from Cambodia, These forces account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from external sources.
The data available on the destruction and capture of supplies by Allied forces during the past year are quite incomplete. Food supplies amounting to atons and0 weaponsounds of ammunition are the major amounts known to have been captured or destroyed. We lack almost completely any meaningful data on Communist stock-piles and areunable to assess the impact of these losses* But as minimum losses, the food stocks may be relativelyparticularly as Allied operations uncover more storage areas and interfere more with the internalof supplies.
The substantial increase in incidents of Communist terrorism and harassment of local population may indicate that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to obtain local support in terms of food and/or labor for its war effort.
APPENDIX A
THE COMMUNIST LOGISTICS SYSTBM IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Organization
VC/nva* logistic operations are under the control and supervision of Supply Councils found at everyof command from the central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to the village level. (See Figureillage Forward Supply Councils are responsible forand for the distribution of supplies to troops in the field. The province level controls the planning and regulatory agencies which furnish logistic data to the military Bear Service Staffs at the various levels of command. Communications and liaison sections, under tho Supply Councils, exercise an important role inall types of logistic operations. Party cadre associated with the communication and liaison sections serve as guides, security personnel, station attendants, and supervisory personnel.
Supply Councila also supervise the work of two basic transportationPeople's Revolutionary Party (PRP) Finance and Economic Section transportand the military Rear Service Section transport elements.
Transport and supporting elements under theof military Rear Services Sections are organized
*The organization structure outlined in this section is estimated to apply generally to both VC and NVA forces. Some of the material appearing in this section is based on an analysisaptured document discussing the VC Sao Vangivision containing both VC and NVA elements.
ollows pagen Annex III.
ransport elements of the Bear Services Sections which are organic to the various echelons of the VC/NVA regular military forces,eparate military transport units (not found below military region level) responsible for the receipt and redistribution of supplies,rdnance sections and armament sections. The RearStaff organic to the VC/NVA Division is organized into four functional sections: uartermaster section for procurement, storage, and distribution of food andan ordnance section for procurement, storage,and distribution of weapons and ammunition; asection for medical support and evacuation;inance section for financial support.
A. Personnel
Enemy forces in South Vietnam inmountedncludingersonnel engaged in logistic support. The composition of important VC supply elements is shown in the following tabulationi
Combat Support
Separate Military TransportOrdnance
and Ammunition
Other Combat Support
Other Forces
Finance and Economic Transport
Infiltration Corridor
Cocnminications and Liaison
Organic Military Transport
vc/NVA Crewmen on Water
In addition to these regular employees the VCthousands of temporary, civilian workersin logistic activities. Recruiting is carriedmen between the ages ofndnd womenages ofith the annual period ol!beingonths. This conscriptedgiven both political and security training. It isinto platoons and companies, and assignedand district forward supply councils to theorear services staff. ne or Classare used by combat units to transportfood supplies; to evacuate battle casualties; tocaptured supplies to collection points, and tosupply depots and defensive positions, as wellother miscellaneous tasks. Local inhabitants haveto carry weapons and ammunition inlandareas and to transport food to the Special groups are assigned to carryammunition from the Cambodian border area to
Storage and Distribution
The VC supply system is designed to satisfy bothcontinuous troop requirements and those requirements imposed by rapidly changing battlefield conditions. The VC have established an area supply system whicha large number of smallgenerallyapacity of five-tenthroughout areas in which VC units operate. Although classes of supplies in depots are usually mixed, some depots store foodand others contain only weapons and ammunition. Even in the larger war zones, supplies are dispersed throughout the area, villages that are located close to combat units may also act as supply points. In certain areas, only one-third of the prescribed stock isto depots, with the remaining two-thirds dispersed among civilians for custody. This system limits thethat can be caused by the destruction of one large depot or supply cache, but it also actsajorto the initiation of large, sustained enemywhen large amounts of supplies need to bein relatively small areas.
SECRET
A. Distribution of Food
Regiments are given an initial issue of0 day supply, which is to bewhen half of the supply is consumed. Rear service staffs are charged withtock equivalent to one month's supply for all forces operating in their area of jurisdiction. egiment leaves the area the remaining rice must be returned to these staffs. Troops usuallyeven-day supply of rice in their individual packseserve for emergencies; the unit draws rice from supply points located along the line of movement. This method reduces the supply train and the requirement for porters. Each regiment is assigned an area from which food is purchased. ear supply element of the regiment normally sends out purchasing teams to the area to contact local VC authorities and to arrange for purchase in the prescribed quantities.
HI. Transportation Routes
The enemy in South Vietnam makes useery large number and variety of lines of communication. Thesemajor South Vietnamese highways, secondary roads, waterways, trails and innumerable footpaths. (SeeV-1J. Many of the land routes, especially in the north, are narrow, unimproved trails, negotiable only by foot, animal, or small two or three-wheeled vehicles, but trucks are sometimes used on segments of the major routes when thoy are under Communist control, andon routes nominally under GVN control. Extensive use is made of water craft in tho Delta area,
A. Land Routes
The most frequently used land routes for the movement of personnel are probably the twoorth-south orientation connecting the Laotian and Cambodian infiltration corridor with the large established enemy base areas in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon. The first route, which runs just inside South Vietnam along the Cambodian border, consists for the most partonnecting group of trails although it follows orexisting roads in its southern segments. The second
V-ll
route runs between the first route and the coast androuteor many miles. Many lateral routesthe two major north-south routes and with coastal points. Some of the north-south routes in the eastern section of the country running roughly between routend the Saigon area are used mainly as supply routes.
Enemy forces attempt to use major Southhighways to the maximum extent possible. When such roads are only partly under their control, personnel and/ or supplies move parallel to the uncontrolledarge portion of the network is located near South Vietnamese provincial and military boundaries wheremay be least effective. The enemy selects routes in many cases which are just outside the fire envelope of static GVN artillery units*
Besideshe VC probably make extensive use of Routeorth from Saigon, Routeest from Khanh Hoa to Darlac, Routehrough Tay Ninh,Routesn the Delta region. Provincialest from the coastal province of Phu Yen, and Provincial,orth of Saigon. Most of the use of trucks occurs on these roads.
B. Waterways
The VC depend on water craft as the basic means of transportation in the Delta region of South Vietnam. The VC main and local force units in IV Corps alone probably possessraft of varying sizes; the0 militia in IV Corps probably use additional thousands of vessels.
Troops usually are transported in small three-man sampans, and supply movements vary from organized convoys of medium-sized craft capable of carrying loads of one ton or more to small individual craft. Theload per water craft is estimatedons but the enemy also has much larger types at his disposal*
Several factors permit Communist forces to make extensive use of waterways in tho Delta. There is no
r" 'r
registration of civilian boats, so that Communist boats are difficult to identify* Curfew restrictions cannot be imposed or enforced except on some major waterways because of the lack of adequate communications andcraft. Moreover, security is maintained by moving primarily at night, by taking advantage of foliage near river banks, by maintaining advance and rear units to warn of nearby flight activity and by sinking boats for later recovery when detection seems imminent*
IV. War Zones
War Zones usually consistroup of dispersed and relatively primitive supply caches, command posts/ arms workshops, training facilities, and troop bivouacs linkedetwork of unpaved roads, trails, and paths. They generally are located on major transport routes used by the enemy in areas which are sparsely populated and/or populated by ethnic or religious minoritiesto the South Vietnamese government. The war zones located near planned Communist areas of combat probably serve as staging areas, while those located well away from friendly forces most likely contain facilities for weapons repair and manufacture, training, and rest. Areas, such as War Zone C, adjacent to the Cambodian border also serve as access to sanctuary and as transit points for movement of supplies and troops. Untilhe enemy operated in these zones with relative impunity, but the areas have been coming underheavy ground and air attack in recent months.
V. Logistic Resupply Requirement for Communist Forces in South Vietnam '
The VC/NVA forces in South Vietnamailylogistic requirementons* This logisticis dividedlasses: lass XIlass IIIlass ZVengineer and medical) andhows the daily volume of each class ofand the amounts supplied from internal and external sources.
A. Food Supplies)
The Communist forces in South Vietnam obtain most of their food supplies within the country. Although
'SECKE
SOUTH VIETNAM DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OF6 BY CLASS AND SOURCE OF SUPPLY*
(Short Tout)
nternal Supplies I xternal Supplies
these forces control sufficient rice production toall VC/NVA food requirements, large quantities of rice apparently are being transported from Cambodia to enemy controlled rice-deficit areas in South Vietnam. This is because of the difficulty in sustaining internal distribution of large amounts of bulk commodities.
The principal rice-deficit areas with large troop concentrations include the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Due, all in the II Corps area, and Phuoc Long, Binh Long and the northern part of Tay Ninh in the III Corps. If the main andforce VC and NVA troops in these areas were madedependent on Cambodian sources for food, Cambodia would be providing aboutercent of the total daily food requirement for all Communist forces in South
Enemy incidents of terrorism and harassment have risenonthly average4uring the first four months Although theseare attributable to various factors they may indicate that the enemy is finding it increasinglyto obtain local support in terms of food, and/or labor, for the war effort.
B. Class II and Class IV Supplies
1. Weapons
The enemy stock of weapons has beenfrom several sources. These include weapons which have been captured, locally-produced, buried or leftin South Vietnam from the Indochina War, andfrom North Vietnam. Local manufacture ofsupplies, however, presently emphasizes ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than the fabrication of individual weapons.
Significant quantities of Soviet and East European weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam from North Vietnam. Aboutercent of the VC main force is estimated to have been at least partially equipped with the new family of2 mm weapons by
2. Clothin?
Enemy requirements for clothing and other textile products are not extensive, and most of it is obtained locallypecial VC clothingumber of clothing items such as khaki uniforms, underwear, and winter clothing for the mountainoushave been produced in North Vietnam and areto infiltrators- Some clothing is also required in Cambodia.
3- Medical Supplies
Medical supplies are obtained both locally and from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Antibiotics, plasma, and quinine are the principal items acquired fromsources. Medical supplies are in fairly tight supply so that their external procurementigh priority.
4- Transportation Equipment
Trucks, water craft, and otherequipment used by enemy forces in South Vietnam usually are acquired in the country, sometimes"bybut also by purchase or borrowing.
Supplies
Most VC communications equipment has been supplied by East European Communist countries orChina or is of US, Japanese, or French manufacture and has been captured on the battlefield. NVA equipment is infiltrated with military personnel.
and Chemical Supplies
Most VC/NVA chemical and engineer supplies are estimated to be obtained from within the country, although some chemicals are also smuggled in fromarge share of the chemicals is used for the production of filler for locally-produced ammunition.
V-16
SEtHREX
III (Petroleum)
The total requirement for petroleum products for VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam is small, being needed primarily for confiscated vehicles, motorized junks in the Delta region, generator equipment at command posts, and in some crude arms factories. The VC obtainfrom taxation of the content of petroleum tank trucks in vc/NVA-controlled areas of South Vietnam,of petroleum supplies, and purchase from local gasoline stations or in Cambodia.
V (Ammunition)
In the present situation of relative independence from external sources for most supplies, ammunition is the principal determinant of the volume of supplies which must be infiltrated from North Vietnam. The supply of ammunition is particularly important to the major combat elements equipped with the new family of weapons who are completely dependent on outside sources for their ammunition. Due to the extensive useariety of weapons, however, the enemy utilizes both internal and external sourcfes for the supply of ammunition. Standard ammunition is generally manufactured in the Communist countries. The remainder of the supply is from captured stock or is manufactured locally in VC engineer Viet Cong munition factories are not estimated toresent capability to2 mm There is no evidence that expended shells are reloaded, and2 mm ammunition is not compatible with Communist weapons.
The heavier ammunition employed by them antitank grenades,m andm recoil-less rifle rounds,m,am,m mortar rounds, andm,mm howitzer ammunition. All heavier ammunition is either captured or obtained from external sources.
VI, Geographic Distribution of Logistic Requirements for VC/NVAouth Vietnam
As of6 the strength of VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam stoodersonnel. The
Secret
disposition of these forces by Corps area ia shown inhich also shows the major areas of rice Tho predominant share of thoso forces isin rice-deficit areas.
ine show by Corps area the currentof total logistictons aand that portions-someons amust befrom external sources. The distribution offorces reflects an unevennoss in dally logistic requirements by Corps area and leads to internalproblems.
Thus tho forces innd IV Corps areas require onlyndercent respectively of total daily The IV Corps, with the smallestof forces, is also the area in which the Communists have the greatest self-sufficiency in food* The II and III Corps areas, in which most of the Communist forces are concentrated, account for almost two-thirds of the total daily requirement. These areas are also therice-deficit areas.
The inability to transport food from rice surplus to deficit areas is apparently becoming more severe. The Communists consequently have had to turn to Cambodian sourcesogistic expedient to provide rico to some of the forces in the central highlands* This movement has increased in the last half year and haa reached an estimateday. The need to turn to Cambodian sources for rice indicates that internal distribution is one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists and is probably the most vulnerable aspect of theirlogistics operation. As US/GVN and allied forces have increasing success in capturing or destroyingstockpiles and in disrupting Communist control of transport routes this problem would be oven more It would not, however, be critical,as long as food supplies could be obtained andfrom Cambodia. Even if they hod to beby Horth Vietnam through Laos the volumes which we estimate would be required could be accommodated on the Laotian infiltration network.
V-18
iTETrrrrcrr
DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OFY CORPS AREA
The curront estimates of the build-up of Communist forces and the highest probable levels of combat throughield an external logistic requirement for Class II and IV andupplies ofay. If the disposition of Communist forces remains tho same and internal distribution of food is impoaaiblo,ons of food could be required daily in the food-deficit areas (See Thia added logistic requirement would not tax the infiltration routo through Laos very severely, but it would aid substantially in reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic But as the Communist build-up continues and the level of combat increases the excess of road capacity in Laos ovor logistic requirements could be diminished substantially.
Tho pcosent disposition of Communist forces in South Vietnam is much more favorable for resupply from external sources. Overercent of the NVA forcesf the VC forces are innd II Corps areas in close proximity to both the Laotian infiltration corridor and the infiltration routes from Cambodia. These forces account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from external sources.
VII. Effect of Destruction and Capture of Supplies
The destruction and capture of Communist supplies by CS and Allied forces during the past year as compiled from available data for selected categories of supplies ara shown below. The data for food, ammunition, and POL basically represent losses incurred in the provinces of Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh in III Corps area, and Quang Due, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Pleiku in II Corps--areaa where US forces engaged in large search and destroy operations. Weapons losses include those inflicted by South Vietnamese troops as well as US and Allied forces.
Food
Ammunition
Small arms7 nr.
machine gun
POL
V-19
WW
SOUTH VIETNAM DAILY LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF VC/NVA FORCES AT VARYING LEVELS OF COMBAT
rojected7
'SAort Torn!
Requirement for
II ond Cien IV
Suppiici andmrmm'rHon
E**ernal
forood Suppliei
Requirement
V ';
ieM b
The quantity of food known to have been captured or destroyed represents an amount sufficient to feed the current Communist main and local forces in South Vietnameriod of about throe months. This quantityrelatively significant when considered asf food to the enomy. Moreover, recent allied operations have not only destroyed enemy food crops and uncovered VC food storage points, but protected rice harvests from enemy acquisition and interdicted theof some food to VC distribution points.
Known losses of small arms and heavy machine gunhowever, represent only about three days'for the current order of battle of VC/NVA troops at present levels of combat. Although the magnitude of losses sustained in engagements with ARVN forces oresult of air strikes cannot be doteniined at thetime, such losses to date have had little discernible effect on the enemy's ability to initiate attacks or on the rate with which he expends his ammunition.
Known losses of POL in South Vietnam represent lesswo week supply for VC/NVA forces. Lossesagainst POL stocks by ARVN forces and air strikoe probably have added to the quantity of such suppliesthe enemy, but due to tho small requirementfor VC/NVA forces operating in South Vietnam these losses probably have no effect on enemy capabilities.
The known number of weapons captured or destroyed by friendly forces through6 was sufficient to equip somoattalions. Losses incurredesult of air strikes have raised the total weapons loss, but again, if such losses aro oxamined in the context of the number of VC-initiated attacks over recent months, it becomes clear that total weapons losses have not been prohibitive.
The quantities of destroyed and captured Coamunist supplies undoubtedly have added to the logistic problems faced by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam but the extent of these adverse effects cannot be estimated since we are almost totally lacking in knowledge of Communist stockpiles in South Vietnam. The data presentlydo not include losses Inflicted by South Vietnamese forces (with the exception of losses of weapons);lostesult2 strikes; oresult of numerous strikes. tactical aircraft.
V-20
ANNEX VI
THE MORALE OF THE COWUNIST FORCES
The morale of the Viet Cong haa declined gradually aa the impact of the US force build-up has been felt. It haa not yet, however, deteriorated to the point where the battle performance of Communist unita is adversely affected and certainly notegree sufficient to force any major adjustment in basic Communist strategy.
k ,To,all,aPPearancear the Viet Cong organization is still Basically intact, and its cadres* appear resolute. This is particularly true of the middle and upper echelons, lower level cadres continue to accomplish everyday tasks, but their quality has declined considerably.
The battlefield capability of the southern Vietregulars andhigh. Theas actually gone down. Therehowever, of erosion in the ranks which hasbeen reflected in the overall combat performance. southern troops are apparently being killed orthe recruits who replace than are ofton inferiorquality and in motivation. Tho lowering enthusiasmViet Cong troops shows up in increasingparticularly among reguiaro, andate ofby Viet Cong regulars which ia probably at leastas the rate for the South Vietnamese Army. evidence suggests that as manyf allregulars deserted lost year (compared to an ARVNrate52 por thousand perhis included an
defecting Viet Congthree percent of tho mean regularseveral hundred battlefield surrenders. rregularis also defected last
word "cadre* in thio discussion is defined as one who has the rank of assistant squad leader or above in the Cosnunist Army, or his civilian equivalent.
this discussion distinction is made between battle* field surrender, desertion from the Communists, andto Allied control.
rate takes into account the number ofwho later returned to military control.
Ttyp-SEGREXV
year. There Is little hard evidence on the extent of simple desortlon or "resignation- froa irregular ranks.
Southbound NVA units apparentlyewin North Vietnam and Laos, and some also tn South Vietnam. Byhoro had beenurrenders from NVA units.
Tho continued resolution of the NVA is in sharpto the decline in morale of the southern Viet Cong Army in part because its cadres are good, but alsoNVA soldiers who want to quit believe they have no place to go.
arked improvement in Viet Cong military fortunes or another round of political instability in Saigon, Southern Viet Cong morale seems likely toits downhill course. Tho deterioration in morale seems likely to accelerate as the quality of low level cadres continues to decline and as the proportion of poorly motivated draftees in army ranks increases. The erosion of morale will probably be reflected by rising ratos of defection and desertion. Desertion ratea could begin to hurt tho Viet Cong seriously in the not too distant future.
The NVA troops in South Vietnam are likely toresolute, in large part because they see noto fighting. If the resolution and quality of the southern Viet Cong continue to deteriorate, the NVA units will probably assume an even greater share of tho fighting.
A. The Viet Cong View of Morale
The Viot Cong, like Napoleon, consider morale far more important than materiel. Accordingiet Cong document writtenpparently by anon the COSVN staff, "the Americans fail to realise that neither the size of an expeditionary force nor the quantity of modern weapons canecisive factor in any liberation war. They (the Americans) are not aware or not willing to admit the fact that the key factor that leads to victory in any war is the
top^segrex
determination of the people to fight andhe Communists do not leave the maintenance of morale to chance.
A Viet Cong document which discussed several missions of training italicized only one: that of heightening "the will to fight and morale of our it prescribed "reindoctrination"ays long for Viet Cong regulars,ays long for village guerrillas. Such courses areby froguent spot lectures, several drafts of which have been captured, and by attempts by the Viet Cong to excludp government propaganda from their**
The Viet Cong constantly assess tho state of their own morale. Foraptured memorandum, datedoncerning the censoring ofletters stated "the purpose of censorship is to detect anti-revolutionary thoughts or loss ofore recent memorandum, datedsked subordinate units to report on the 'status of political ideology" together with "the number of North Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese (Viet Cong) deserters, stragglers, ralliers and missing."
whilo determined to preserve their own morale, the Viet Cong are equally resolved to undermine their enemy's. Government officials are assassinated not simply to eliminate specific officeholders, but to sow panic and confusion. Attacks are often launched for psychological effect rather than for purely military reasons. Viet Cong psychological warfare efforts aro massive, much larger in proportion to resourcesthan thoso of the allies. All PRP Committees, from
Vietnamese Minister of Defense Giap reiterated the thomo In the January issue of Hoc Tap, tho party's theoretical journal in North Vietnam.
**Ono Viot Cong document even suggested that people in the "liboratod zone" be forbidden from listening to "plays and soap operas" broadcast by government radio.
VI-3
COSVN down to village levels, have Military Proselyting Sections to induce GVN defections."
The Viet Cong hierarchy is aware that the morale of iLs rank and file has been gradually eroding, but it apparently believes thatSouthis deteriorating even more rapidly. the Viet Cong view the war primarilyontest of wille, evidence of crumbling or lowered morale on the part of their adversaries takes on particular Tales of South Vietnamese ineptitude and lack of motivation are frequent and often well-grounded. ARVN desertion rates may give the Viet Cong considerable grounds forhe recent Buddhist upheavals may have reinforced the Viet Cong's opinion that the fabric of the South Vietnamese government is weak, and that its will to continue over the long run is questionable.
B. Morale of the Cadres
The Viet Cong's greatest strength lies in the organization and in the cadres who keep it going. As long as the cadre structure remains intact and cadres are determined and willing to impose discipline, the rank and file, who may become individually disheartened, are unlikely to give up in large groups.
The level of cadre spirit, although generally high, varies from echelon to echelon. Among theof the party, there is little evidence of aof resolve, and raid-level cadres also appear Low-level cadres, although they continue to get the jobs done, are often less sanguine than theirhowever, and there is considerable evidence that many are discouraged, oderate but increasing; number of assistant platoon leaders, squad leaders, assistant
proselyters aim at US aa well as Vietnamese soldiers. tudy of US troops, written late last year by COSVN's Military Proselyting section, assorted that while US officers were well-indoctrinated, most USman in South Vietnamarge-scale and protracted war, and favor negotiations." Thus far, no American soldiers have defected.
**ARVN desertion rates per thousandi Monthly onthly average, 2 Monthly t quarter)
topsegrel
squad leaders, and hamlet village officials, have appeared at government Chieu Hoind many others haveor
North Vietnamese formations apparently are notfrom cadre desertions. Captives from an antiaircraft unit established in North Vietnam in5 said that tho unit had had "many sudden changes in command" because cadre deserted before arriving in the south. Cadrefrom North Vietnamese units are probably nothowever. Interrogations, RAND studies, captured diaries, and letters indicate that most NVA cadres, despite hardships, are resolute. ecent MACV study on the NVA states that "the quality of its cadre is one of the NVA's strongest assets."
The lowering quality of Southern Viet Cong cadres probably accountsarge dogree for recent increases in cadre desertion. aptured party directive from the Viet Cong province of Can Tho, datedof the party cadres' "inability to cope withnd ascribed "the drop in quality., [to] recent heavy recruiting, which resulted in members' putting too much stress on The directive stated that "at present weumber of comrades who have not
and researcher has noted that outalliers who defected in the last six monthslaimed to be cadres. arger percentage ofhan) said they were cadres. The same researcher said in6 that the overall ratio of cadres to total defectors is rising. Exact figures are unavailable.
**Capturod documents indicate that on some occasions cadres have boon about as prone to desert as the rank and file. Foriet Cong reporttated that an ARVN operation in the deltaadres androops" to "rosign."
Vi-5
top-secret
TOP-SEG&EI^
yet been able to eradicate their bourgeoishen tho going gets rough, they drag thoir feet.*
The shortage of experienced cadre has become an increasingly common theme in Viet Cong documents. Thein the delta where many have been withdrawn to reinforce units outside theforced tho Viot Cong to employ what may turn out to be unpopular expedients. AND researcher in Dinh Tuong Province in the delta has reported thatumber of cases, women ore now being employed as party officials. Despite the Communist doctrine of the equality of sexos, this is probably deeplyby vletnomoso men. The same researcher states that in some instances, "outsiders" are being put in charge of local units in Dinh Tuong. Although many reports havo boon received about "dissension" arising from the use of outsiders, there are no hardas yet that the disagreements have reachedproportions.
C Morale of the Soldiers
1. Tho Korth Viotnainoso Army (NVA)
By most objective measures, the fighting spirit of the North Vietnamese soldier is good. AsnlyVA soldiers had defected, and allied soldiers had captured only, despite frequent engagements and heavy fighting. No NVA infantry unit as largequad, has surrendered en masse. field officers report that with few exceptions, North Vietnamese soldiers fight tenaciously and are wellin battle. On the basis of interviews oforth Vietnamese soldiers, the RAND Corporation has concluded that "most NVA soldiers see no option but to go on"
*Other captured documents make reference to the poor quality of new cadre. For5 "Top Secret" document from Phu Yen Province complained that the "new cadres used for replenishment of our VC units causesecurity problems due to their low politicalater document from the same province contrasted the "old timeho were "experienced but somewhatith the "new cadre" who were "ardent but The document added, however, that "poor cadre are better than none."
Av^ilablo evidence, however, indicates that many
of the rank and file, and some cadres, are in lowlevel of an NVA soldier's morale, of course, dependshe is and what he has experienced. Beforetrip south, most North Vietnamese are in goodof prisoners and ralliers, and capturedof which there are at leastxamples,most feel thfir cause is just, and that theirof American "imperialists" and "pup-
... .ith some exceptions, the NVA soldiers retain their spirit as they march through the southern part of North Vietnam toward the Laotian corridor. After they cross into Laos, however, their mood begins to shift. Steep hills, tight marching schedules, bombing raids, mosquitoes and leeches help induce tho change. Diarists frequently become eloquent about their troubles during the march through the corridor, which takes from one to three months. An NVAwrote in his diary, after three weeks in Laos, that
twelve days had passed with innumerable hardships. Marches and marches. Rains and rains." Another diarist wrote,onth on the trail, that he was going through "tho deepest sorrow and utmost hardship" he had everhird diarist, also on the trailonth, wrote on 25
tha* h? wasn the ground, suffering from the stings of Laotian flies andourth doclared that "no word is enough to depict the rigor and hardship we have been experiencing."
Once he reaches South Vietnam, an NVAoften rises, particularly if his unit is allowed One infiltrator, on reaching the south,friend that although "the infiltration trip to Southwas filled with rigors ande was now Not all of them can rest, however. Many
NVA soldiers who fought at Plei Me last November orhau this March were relatively fresh from the trail.
Once in South Vietnam and committed tothe average NVA soldierife of hardship and danger. Frequently, he is sick. 36 entryedical record picked up by the Air Cavalry in Binh Dinh Province noted thatan NVA battalion, "sick personnel accountedf the assigned strength." The sicken who had malaria,uffering from
1
nd two who contracted berl-beri. More recent documents indicate that the NVA sick rates continue
Hardships, fighting, and air and artillerysometimes combine to dishearten individual NVA soldiers, even units. iary captured ineptoldier in an antiaircraft detachment infiltrated into South Vietnam late last summer, indicated that the "morale of cadres and soldiera" in his unit "continued to be unstable." Another diarist wrote6 thataveonths in theegan to wilt under the strain of privations, hardships, and loneliness in the heart of theave soon nothingungle, stream water, and bombs and bullets. itter truth! m hoodwinked at the point of noeep distaste for the warm really fed up with the liberation undertaking, which has been heraldedturning point of history'goldonnstead there exists onlyolitical trick tothose who are engaged in the fight." Not all diarists, of course, react to their hardships tho same way. One had written earlier, "Damn the Americans! They force us to sleep in forests and eat nothing but rice and aalt. m determined to fight and serve my people until my last breath.
Although NVA unitB continue to perform well, there is considerable evidence that their composition has been changing, probably for the worse from their point of view. The ratio of recruits to veterans is rising.** as NVA unite suffer heavy casualties, thoy are taking
* B Division, which infiltrated in Hay directly through theasuch lover malaria rate than other NVA units. ON said that onlyf tha divisionfrom malaria. The trip across thefs far shorter than that through Laos.
** ocument captured late last year indicatedf the soldiers in one NVA battalion had been conscripted NVA units infiltrated earlier in the yearuch higher proportion of veterans.
in southerners as replacements. eneral rule. South Vietnamese fillers are less eager than their northern*
On balance, however, neither the rising percentage of draftooa nor the inclusion in NVA units of poorlysoutherners seems likely in the near future to affect seriously NVA combat performance. The quality of NVA cadres is still too high, and the base rates of defection,and surrender are still too low toudden or rapid deterioration in the NVA's ability to fight. It seems likely that for the foreseeable future the Northsoldier will continue to follow the path of leastof obeying orders of his cadre, and of staying with his unit.
2. Viet Cong Regulars**
Like NVA formations, indigenous Southernregular units have good combat morale. Almostthey fight well, and under skilledfar, no regular unit has given up en masse. Fewofficers have surrendered. Whatever the rank andfeel off the battlefield, they are tightly
* An NVA document captured in Binh Dinh complained of the
relatively low political awareness of the newly-recruited southerners."
** There are two types of regulars:
Main Force units, directly subordinate to COSVN, orilitary region headquarters.
Local Force units, directly subordinate to aor district headquarters.
Yet the morale problems of Viet Cong regular units are more numerous and more concrete than those of NVA battalions. Exact statistics are unavailable, but it is estimated thategulars defected to the government last year. (That is, aboutf the total mean regular strength.) Several hundred additional regularslast year. The overall yearly desertion rate of regulars, including defectors and those who go home,runs, somewhat higher than ARVN rates. The high desertion rateelatively recent development.
The decline in off-battlefield morale has come about principally for two reasons. The first is theharassment and heavy losses inflicted on regular units by the Allies. Captured documents attest to theof the pounding. eport captured in Hau Nghiaissued in5 by the "Unifiedegional party organization) outlines some of the problems that Viet Cong regulars face:
To cope with our mobility on the battlefield, the enemy increases his air and artillery activities day and night or conducts continuous sweep operations to wear down our armed forces or foil our plan of attack if he foresees our (Our) movements frequently take place at night. Troops must carry heavy loads and move great distances... (They) mustbivouac in the field, lie on the ground, endure bad weather, and are kept awake by enemy aircraft and arillory; therefore, their health is highly affected... (Consequently) the troops' morale and nerves are permanently high strung and many complications arise in case of alarm.*
The second reason for the decline inmorale among regulars is the changing comoosition of the Viet Cong army, egular units consisted largely ofotivated volunteers. Since then, the Viet Cong have had to rely increasingly on unwilling conscripts. tudy of Chieu Hoi records shows that recently-rocruited conscripts makearge portion of those who defect. They are also far more prone than volunteers to desert. As the proportion of poorly-motivated draftees among Viet Cong regulars increases desertion and defection rates should rise.
It wouldistake, however, to picture the morale of Viet Cong regular forces as completely gloomy. Neither the low-level cadre nor the rank and file are as
and prisoners captured in other parts of the country attest that such problems aro widespread.
VI-10
TOr SECRET-
staunch as thoy used to be, but many noncoms andmost officers appear as determined as ever, Yot the trend in the quality of regular personnel soomsdownward. Eventually, the erosion in quality of regulars, accompanied by an increasingly highrate, may limitthe Vict Cong's ability to carry out thoir present strategy*
3- Viet Cong Irregulars*
Viet Cong irregular forces continue in large part to perform their tasks. In fact, the incidence of terrorism andcarried out by guerrillassubstantially in the last quarteruasonal drop around Tet, has stayed at high levels ever since.
A considerable body of evidence suggests, however, that the morale of the irregulars has beenover the past year. Last year,efected to the government. ore surrendered.efectedurrendered. The overall frequency of defection and surrender has continued to increase this year, nosnrtions among guerrillas appear to be increasing, although hamlet militiamen who nerve at home, apparently seldom desert.
When Allied activity is intense, irregulars in some areas have surrendered and defected in large Early this year in Binh Dinh Province, for example, while the six-week*long Operation WHITE WING wasrregulars gavo up andallied. AccordingS official involved in the Chieuan groups" were among those who de* fected in Binh Dinh.
*Viet Cong irregular forces are those subordinate to the village and hamlet. They include:
Guerrillas, consisting of full-time squads and platoons, not always based in their village or hamlets.
People's Self-Defense Force (often called thoonsisting of part-time paramilitary forces assigned to defend hamlets and villages.
VI-11
The rise in defections among irregulars probably has occurred for the same reasons that an increase took place among the regulars. Allied operations have resulted in an increasing decline in guerrilla morale, and the quality of personnel has declined." As Viet Cong casualties mount, both trends seem likely to continue.
4. Recruitment Problems
Until the middle of last year, the Viet Congto be able to fill its ranks with relative ease. Volunteers were still fairly plentiful, ond draftees usually went willingly. Somewhere aroundowever, the situation apparently began to sour. As Viet Cong demands for manpower soared, volunteers became scarcer, andjoined the Viet Cong moro reluctantly. The trend is illustrated by an undated document captured inn Long Khanh Province. The document stated that "the Youth'sn January, February and5 increased over that in the last six monthsowover, tho result of enlistment obtained in the first six months5 failed to meet the requirements of the armed forces... The draft movement in May, June and July Some Viet Cong draftees interviewed by RAND have stated that "they wanted to avoid military service with either side, but that if they had to serve, they preferred to do so with ARVN, where they were paid and their families received death benefits."
The Viet Cong are using several expedients to relieve their manpower demands. They have resorted to kid-napings, are employing large numbers of women as
t
* ubstantial number of documents indicate that one of the main reasons for the decline has been the Viet Cong policy of sending guerrillas and militiamen who show promise to serve with regular units. The "upgrading" process has been particularly intense in IV Corps, where Viet Cong fortunes are gradually deteriorating.
** Other documents and PON interrogations indicate that the problem is widespread.
iet Cong directive written in5 stated that one-third of all "guerrillas" should be women.
topsegrez
and are increasing the use of ARVN defectors and POW's to fill regular ranks.*
Such measures probably provide some temporary alleviation of Viet Cong rocruitmont problems. They do not aolve the problems however. In addition, as casualties mount, it is possible that the Communists will eventually be unable by any device to roplace their losses from within South Vietnam, thereby placing an even greater demand on North Vietnam for troops.
D. Gauges of Military Morale
1. Defection
Sinceccording to the Chieu Hoi office in Saigon,0 Viet Cong regular andsoldiers have rallied to the government. Of these,efectedhe number droppedargelyesult of the American intervention, Communist military defectionsto. In the first half of this year,oldiers rallied.
Generally speaking, the low-level, poorly motivated Viet Cong soldier defectsar higher rate than does the cadre.** Nonetheless, defectors tend to share certain characteristics. They aro usually of short service, and they tend to rally near their homos.
A directive issued by tho Central Trucg Bo Liberation Army, Unit 2B, datedtated that units were required "tof surrendered RVNAF soldiera to fill vacancies in our units." umber of documents indicate that the Viet Cong are wary of ex-government troops.
** The percentage of regular defectors appears to be rising, however. Monthly percentage of regulars to total military defectors: ii;;. Although thoro haveilitary defectors in the first half of this year (compared toll last year),defectors this year) already outnumber regular defectors last year
VI-13
topsegreh
2. Desertion
a. Southern Viet Cong
Desertion is an oxtromely serious problem for the Viet Cong. Available evidence, direct and indirect, indicates that deserters who d6 not defect are far more numerous than those who do. landestinely obtainedprobably genuine, issued by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) late last year stated thatfor the specific purpose of defecting to the enemy (is) rare in comparison with desertion from otherOSVN undoubtedly is aware of how many of its soldiersand also knows how many of these defect.
COSVK's assertion about the ratio of do-aertere to defectors ie supported by other documents. iet Cong "Top Secret" Directive datedaptured byrd Airborne Brigade in earlytated that in one area "desertion ia prevailing in various armed and paramilitary forces. According tostatistics, thereosorters from January tofive defected to the ARVNnother Viet Cong document mentioned thatne-month period in oneen deserted to go home and two defected to the enemy." heck ofeserters listediet Cong roster captured in lategainst records of arrivals ln local Chieu Hoi centersthat none of the deserters defected.
Although desertion is frequently mentioned in captured Viet Cong documents, only seven so far haveall the ingredients necessary for establishing rates: the size of the unit, the number of deserters who loft it,ime frame. If all soven units are added together, and their respective time frames stretchedear, their overall projected annual desertion rate would. two of the seven documents Imply that the unitshad unusually high rates. If these units arefrom the total, the overall average annual rate of the sample drops. The seven-unit sample includes two battalions and fivo companies. The five-unit sample includes two battalions and throe companies.
Twenty-seven percent--or rounded off,seems plausible as an overall dosertion rate5 from regular Viet Cong units. eading of most POW and rallior interrogations would suggest that tho rate is substantially
VI-14
Ttyp-SEGREX
nd sector, may bo inclinedt interrogations appear to indicate that
Jorce units ISalUnits than incommon ift "in force units re-
cruited locally than in like units serving away from home.
, , ,. If the moanf the reqular Viet Conn army (excluding NVA soldiers)0 last year SuSS 2J! rfed laSt year"* Since ^Proximately who qonedear' thG ratio of deserters e *hnu? cL^ defecCors ^ong regular units would appear to
8even to one. it should be noted that available documentary evidence suggests the ratioood deal higher.
, the first six monthsn estimator!
IfC?n9esertionto defector, and if defection/ desertion rates continue at current rates durinq the rest of the year, then there willotal0 defectors and
Sern Viet
. the mean size of the southern regular force will be0hen the Viet Cong regular force Sj-
bTretriovelWOUldrsTwouTd
, Little is known about desertion amona Viet Cong irregular units. The rate of desertion, however/
rS2nIt?frably byithest'rato found SSI t category of irreg-SS: iffc raiiitiaguerrillas apparently do not de-
. ut- since they never leave home, they may 3ust refuse to fight.*- within oich category of^rregula-
Lf8 noHhow many Viet Cong deserters ' 6lth?ror through being' us *dvi!ers estimate that fromf men
otherarn Co their own orother unit. The rate of return among Viet Cong deserters
may be comparable.
Captured documents indicate that hamlet militiamen in several areas have refused to fight, or, as one report put it, "quit rank to live as civilians."
vi-15
x
forces the highest desertion rate is probably among y
So far, the southern Viet Cong have been able to live with their desertion problem, probably because tneir manpower pool has been adequate to fill the gaps. If the pool begins to dry up, or if desertion rates increase, the desertion of southerners couldrucial problem tor the Viet Cong. Among the consequencesigher de-
ould be an inc*eased reliance on fillers from North Vietnam.
b. The NVA
. . fac' NVA desertion rates have been rela-
ltVtCaPtlirGd documents, including diaries, indicate that NVA units moving southew men to desertion in North Vietnam and more along the corridor.** Once in South Vietnam, the average NVA soldier seldom deserts, probably because he has no place to go. Captured documents indicate
otebook containing strength figuresan North Vietnamese outfit shows
ere deserters and thaten were "lost." Some of
the errant may have been South Vietnamese attached.to the
unit, however. On balance, desertion is noterious
proDiem for the NVA, and seems unlikely to become one in
the foreseeable future.
3. Surrender
While desertion and defection have beenthe rate of battlefield surrender has gone down, ccording totatistics,iet Conq surrendered. The number droppednd rose
A considerable body of evidence pointsighrate among recruits. For example, in one group of
7 g sentthe deXtaraining depot in iii corps,eserted enroute. Documents captured at the depot indicate that itpecial "stragglers' and deserters' barracks."
."Jfrf.deserters in Laos go is unclear. iary of an NVA battalion commander suggests that at least some are eaten by tigers.
VI-16
ast year--an increase. Tho rise infailed to keep pace with the expansion of the Viet Cong, however, whoso numbers increased by atux ing the year. Furthermore,hile the number of Viet Cong killed has been growing substantially, the number of captives has increased only slightly.* As one might expect, Viet Cong irregulars are far more prone to surrender than Viet Cong regulars.**
Why Viet Cong surrenders have failed to keep pace with burgeoning defection and desertion rates isto determine. One explanation lies in the Viet Cong's excellent battlefield discipline. Another may lie in the increasing use of air power by the allies. Many who might otherwise surrender are struck down by bombsthey can reach allied lines.
* Ratios of estimated killed to captured:
56
(or approximately)
** In operation WHITE WING, conducted in Binh Dinhearly thisiet Cong reportedly surrendered. According to II Corps estimates, only aboutf these were regulars.
vi-17
tup-segrex
tottsegrex
ANNEX VII
MORALE AMONG THE PEOPLE IN VIET CONG AREAS
The morale and support of the populace in the aroas under Viet Cong control, (the "sea" in which the Communist "fish" must swim) are matters of prime long range importance to the Communists. Thereubstantial body of evidence that morale, and therefore, support for the Communists, isin the Viet Cong areas. The flow of refugees hasdramatically. The desire for safety, of course, is the main motive for this exodusj increasing numbers of people now realize that no Viet Cong region is immune from attach. Among other reasons given by the refugees are high Viet Cong taxes, forced labor, and conscription.
Popular support for the Viet Cong probably will continue to dwindlo as insurgent taxes rise and forced labor demands increase. Should the populace begin to think the Viet Cong are definitely losing, movement away from theif not always towards theprobably increase, and the Viet Cong will be faced with an eroding popular base.
aotuqueb
The principal evidence that the Viet Cong have lost the active support of many people in areas they control is the flow of refugees toward regions dominated by the Although there were soma refugees during andoat have fled since the beginning The rate of flow appears to have increased particularly since the summeroincidental with the build-up of US forces in Vietnam and the large-scale increase in the number of airstrikes. Statistics compiled by the South Vietnamese government* illustrate the upward trend:
TOPS&GREX.
un 65 an 66 un 66
Refugee* in Temporary Shelters
Refugees
Returning to Native Villages
Moreover, many more flee the Viet Cong than are reflected in government atatistics. The government records only those who register. Large numbers of refugees do not, many in order to circumvent local government policies which exclude them from certain areas. The largest number of such unregistered refugees ia in Saigon, whichaw on the books forbidding refugees from settling in the city. Estimates of the number of refugees in one of Saigon's nine precincts run as high0 although the government liatan the entire city.
The principal reason for fleeing given by most refugeesesire for safety,arge crcoortion add that they are weary of Viet Cong taxes, conscription, and demands for forced labor, whatever the motive, once the refugee hasa government camp active support for the Communists generally stops. Most refugees cooperate to some extant witn the South Vietnamese government.
At present, the Viet Cong do not appear tolear, overall policy on what to do about the exodus.- Their course seems to vary by timo and place. In some areas, they have merely tried to make tho refugees' lot unpleasant. Elsewhere, the Viot Cong have made direct attacks on refugee camps, for instance in Quanq Tin Province whereefugees wera killed andounded in an attackefugee center last January. The refugoo flow continues despite such tactics, indicating the inability of tho Viet Cong to stop it.
It la abundantly clear from captured documents that the Viet Cong do not want refugees to leave Communist-controlled territory. There is no documentary evidence torequently made assertion that the Viet Cong encourage the flow of refugees to overburden the South Vietnameseadministrative apparatus.
VII-2
TDTlSEGMEX
Those Who stay
For those who remain in Viet Cong territory, life iaincreasingly unpleasant. As refugees flee, theon those who remain grows more intense. Taxes are higher, demands for labor have increased, and controls are tighter. Although the Viet Cong have been losing favor in many of their areas in the last twelve months, they still maintain firm control in most of thorn and still are able to carry out their tasks adequately. By and large, the Saigon government has not been able to translate distaste for the Viot Cong into support for itself by the people in contested and VC-controlled areas, although thoro haveow dividends for the government in tho form of informationabout the Viet Cong.
1. Taxes
The Viet Cong taxin ooney andmost heavily on tho South Vietnamese peasant, and the Viet Cong effort is costly. According to theminutesOSVN-levol conferonco held the chief of tho COSVN Rear Service Department disclosed that supply requirements6 would be "three times higher" than those Tho Viet Cong frequently set goals considerably in excess of what they expect to achieve, but the COSVN supply officer's disclosure still suggests that tax pressures on tho inhabitants of Viet Cong areas will be much heavier this year than last.*
The plight of the taxpayer ln Viet Cong areasocument, captured in October in Binh Duongoutlining the Viet Cong plans for taxation in thefor the last six months The document reviewed earlier tax revenues and estimates:
Estimated Revenue for
Actual Revenue for
Estimated Revenue for
Actual Revenue for Six Months
A comparison of the estimated revenues45 makes it apparent that the Viet Cong almost doubled tax goals in Binh Duong omparison of actual revenues shows that the Viet Cong were having greater difficulties5 taxes. Documents captured later in theindicate that many Binh Duong taxpayers did "notcontribute to thond that "generally opoaking, residents in tho liboratod areasestitute and miserable life."
VII-3
totsegrex
Although complaints about Viot Cong taxes are amply documented, one must be careful to avoid reading too much into them. ax Collectionssued by COSVN's Financial and Economic Section, indicated that complaining was by no means universal in Viet Cong territory, and that in some areas taxes were collected without too much trouble. Vat Viet Cong taxes are much higher than those of the South Vietnamese government, as many refugees have pointedly High taxes probably will not by themselves cause people in Viet Cong areas to shift their allegiances. If combined with other burdons, however, the taxes may induce additional inhabitants of Viet Cong territory to flee, or, ultimately, to curtail their support of the Viet Cong.
2. Labor
The Viet Cong need large numbers of people to grow food, haul supplies, and move earth. Tho number of volunteers is Inadequate. Forced labor has become increasingly prevalent as Viet Cong operations have expanded, and as the labor pool hasbecause of the draft, and partly because of the flight of refugees. Although the Viet Cong try to persuade laborors to work willingly, the number of volunteers is inadequate and often the Viet Cong must use harsh methods.
A document, datedllustrated soma of the labor problems the Viet Cong face. The author,igh-ranking provincial labor official, stated that "the people in aroas where mobilisation is still possible are not fully aware of our policies. Therefore, they do not work enthusiastically,ense of responsibility, and waste manpower as woll as equipment. Village and hamlet cadres, instead of persuading, tend to order the people to work. Front line Supply Commands in villages and hamlets do not have sufficient personnel forhe mission is burdensome and thore are not enough laborers to move rice available from production."*
Tho shortage of laborecurrent theme in Viet Cong documents. Furthermore, recruited laborers frequently desert, one document stated thathort-terra civilian laborers needed for evacuating casualtiesattle which had takenew days earlier, onlyere gathered; these all went home after completing their first evacuation trip. The removal of wounded from the battlefield was thereafter improvised.
VII-4
It wouldistake Co exaggerate Viet Cong labor problems, or the extent to which the enemy's forced labor policy alienates the people. Viet Cong performance in moat aroaa still ahowa their ability to get thinga done; and tho South Vietnamese peasant is used to being put upon. Yot if labor shortagesseemsViet Cong will probably havo to resort to still more draconian methods to make sure that work is accomplished. An increasingly severe labor policy would probably estrange still morepeasants.
3. Wiltlnimcss of thQ Pooplo to Provide Information or. the Viet Cong'
In the past year, the amount of informationabout tho Viet Cong has increased greatly, some of the increase is due to more efficient collection techniques, higher agent pay, and the presence in the field of largeof intelligence officers. Eowever, moat Alliedandthat much of the increase has resultedreater willingness on the part of the populace to inform or. the Viet Cong.
Some of the voluntary informants became available because they thought the Allies were beginning to win, some because they harbored grudges against the Viet Cong. Some had other reasons. eport,arch, written by thedviser to tho ARVN 1st Division, stotod, for example, that "it ls bolicvod that tho local population in the 1st Division area does not feel an identity with Viot Cong Mainrobably because [Main Force units ln the rsgion] arc composed primarily of North Vietnamese draftees and some regroupoos." The people apparently were more willing to inform on northornors than on tha local boys in tho militia and guerrillas. Tho prevalence ofeaction io not known. If it is generally true throughout Vietnam, tho intelligence picture may improve still further as thsof North Vietnamese in Main Force units continues to rise.
top-segrex
ANNEX VIII
VIKTNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS OHRZLY LENGTH OF THE WAR
I. The Anticipated Timing of Victory56
During the first two years following the Genevathe Communists believed that they couldosition of dominance in South Vietnam mainly through the medium of political, rather than military action. This was clearly indicated in their secret communications. Onefor example, from the top Communist echelon in South Vietnam to the provincial Communist leaders declared in5 that "at present, the only way toof our country" is to hold the conference andcalled for under the Geneva Accords.
The Communists apparently believed that their candidates could win the elections and that it would not take long after the voting, which was scheduled under the Agreements foroommunist takeover. 4 South Vietnam's chances of political survivaliable political entity appeared so slight that the Communists had every reason to anticipate an eventualwhich would permit them to tako over even if the elections were not held. ecret Communist partyof4 said that the 'struggle" to assure that the "French imperialists and their puppets" leave the South was targeted for completion "within twond that "despite our impatience, we can accomplish this noost of tho other Communist assessments of their situation throughere also highly optimistic and implied that victory was not far away.
Fromohe Communists gradually grew more pessimistic about their chancesakeover under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, as the Diem governmentrefused to agree to an election which it realized the Communists would inovitably win. The Communists were never again so optimistic about their chances after their failure during this era. The evidence shows them inyears to have been much more cautious and vague in their references to the time necessary toakeover.
trine
II Victory Timing in tho
Captured documents reveal that the failure to hold the elections agreed on at Geneva resulted in deep anddisillusionment in Communist ranks in the South. For the next few years, party leaders in the North and the South cast aboutew strategy to accomplish their Difficulties were increased by the success of Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in repressing the low-level terrorism which had been mounted by the Communists in the hope of weakening and undercutting the Saigon government's position before and during the elections. Communist documents speak of great damage inflicted on the underground cadreby Diem's operations.
This combination of difficulties, particularly the Diem government's military pressure, led many of the southern Communists to believe thaturn from reliance primarily on political action to reliance primarily on militaryagainst the government would bringommunist victory in the South. Communist documents indicate that there were various strategies put forth by the cadres in the South for insuring the success of military action. One called for concentration on the constructionargobase in the highlands from which the lowlands and the population centers could be threatened. Those who advocated this policy, according to the documents, suggested that the Communists focus almost all their assets on the highlands and delay the solidification and enlargement of theirin the delta until the highlands effort was completed. Others arguedoncentration of effort in the delta to the exclusion of the highlands,
it can readily be seen that debates over strategy as basic as this wouldtrong influence on Communist estimates of the time needed to accomplish their goals, and that such estimates would thus be cast in only the haziest and most indefinite of torms.
Documents indicate that the Communistsountry-wide effort which theoretically would put equal emphasis on military and politicalhe documents give much of the credit for the adoption of this strategy to Le Duan, the present first secretary of the Communist Party in Hanoi. Le Duan went to the Northpparently from the top leadership position in the South. He appears to have convinced the Communist
hierarchy in tho North that an all-out military effort should be started in the South. Communist recordsdate the decision to mount an all-out struggle in the South as having been made in8 or
It was clear9 that the Communists were already organizingull-scale military effort in the South. One captured document stated that "instructions from the political department of the party in about Mayeminded the cadres in the South of the "necessity of making full use of the armednd that the cadres then started to "lay out" the "necessary policies." Since "October" the document asserted, "the armed forces have been fighting powerfully."
III. The Time Frame and Goals9
There are no specific references in any availablematerials as to what amount of time the Communists believed9 would be necessary to accomplish aof South Vietnam, or even to achieve any significant proportion of their objectives. Language on theof victory in Communist materials of this period was cast in very general terms. roadcast by theinor example, said that the "day of victory" would "depend mainly on the changing aspects of the struggle." Such statementsesire to avoid raising false hopes among the cadre or to makewhich might later prove wrong.
Analysis of Communist materials, however, does point rather firmlyommunist belief90 that it would cake at least five years of all-out military and political action to bring about Communist domination of the South. It does not appear that they expected at this time to be in power6 at the earliest. This can be inferred from indications as to what the Communists believed they had to accomplish in order to achieve They fully recognized that they were still afactor in the urban areas, and that in the rural areas
their position was still weak.* That the Communists planned to take their time and build carefully was reflectedasic order on the insurgency sent south from Hanoi According to this order, the revolutionary movement was recognized as "still weak thisut "we have the time to prepare any aspect where we are weak."
IV. The Initial Deferral of victory Anticipations
example of their appraisal of their situation was apparent in the interrogationC battalion commander captured He stated that tho Communists were at the time devoting nearly all their efforts to the rural area, lie implied that tho establishmentignificant urban apparatus to take advantage of the 'urban uprising" which the Communists expected would take several more years.
0 captive, the chairmanC district committee in Kien Giang province, indicated that thewould be satisfied if they could make significant strides 0 in the elimination of governmentin the southwestern part of South viotnam.
1 radio message, the Viet Cong leadershipthe opinion that, "depending on how the situation develops" it is "possible" that we will be able in "two or three years" to build up our units so that they "will be able to destroy part of the enemy's forces." of this would necessarily havo left them still several years away from an overpowering position throughout the rural sections of the country.
**In at least one instance. Communist cadres were told that the situation was moving as had been forecast by top Communist authorities
Until2 the Communists appear to have believed that they were making satisfactory progress in theof the insurgent movement as originallyy the springowever, the step-up in American military assistance to the Diem regime and the counterinsur-gency programs put into effect by the governmment had begun
to cause increasing difficulties for the Communists, and enemy materials indicate that their estimates of the time needed forictory were stretched out.*
It was at this point, Communist documents suggest, that the insurgents began to put more emphasis on the so-called "urbaney element in Communist guidelines for success in south Vietnam, but one that did not receive very heavy emphasis in their writings during the first few years of the insurgency. In the Communist view, victory could be anticipated as near at hand when the expansion of the Communist base among the rural populace was combinedeneral uprising of the city populace against the government. This has gradually received more stress in Communist instructions to cadre in recent years.**
Communist documents indicated that, byhe Viet Cong felt they wero successfully countering Diem's military push and the American effort. However, they alsoiet Cong expectation that the fighting in South Vietnam still would last longer than the Communists had originally thought. One of the best summaries of Communist views on the war in3 was contained in an article
by the North Vietnamese historian Minh Thuan who had often sized up the progress of the revolution since the era of the war against the French.
nat the insurgoncy had suffered oLXJh dotfnB(and raanr ^ilures.- The initiation of -hi9SS adv;sory/support effort meant that the rebels
had to face the enemy under new circumstances- and couldapid and easy victory." Thuan strcssodChe "PPearancegeneral uprising" as ,KhaSas around the corner. According to Thuan, the Communists should -keep in mind the appearancesituation- which would come about
only when the broad masses" are ready to "rise up and tight against the regime. "Decisivee declared, appears?" Cd Whe"olutionary situation
*notho? Communist document of this period indicated that
itshey could do little to hasten the
fulfillment of their objectives. In "time tot
would STiEand frora thG resC of the bloc JSt farmed forces the "capability to
SSTJ "Ut "tnat is aof time Xnnw ^usC,cannoJin a All our efforts upJust the first stops." Such statementsthat tho Communists probably believed they were still at leant five years away from victory.*
v- Tne Growth of Communist Optimism4 and5
Enemy materials discussing the war situation grew pro-
s the Communists
P?lltical disarray in Saigon and the provinces following Diom's overthrow and the success of their efforts
*rhey were also, however, still very flexible andperhaps even more so than One document, in discussing the future, said it would be nocessary "to play seesaw with the enemyertain period." If, enemy strength begins to sag significantly in the process, we will fight against the clock to overcome our wetnesses and rapidly develop our power, especially our military power, hoping to win victoriesecisive na-
to counter tho increases in US aid to the Saigonanti-insurgency programs. 4 article in the North Vietnamese party journal, for example,that the fighting, "although protracted, will not lastnd "final victory" could be achieved "in the near future."* Thereumber of Communist moves which suggested that they were trying to getosition to take maximum and rapid advantage of the governmentwhich they expected. One such move was anto speedily build up Communist main force strength in the area of the III Corps north of Saigon by levying very heavy manpower quotas on the guerrilla units in the delta.
Communist optimism appeared to reach its height in Although they still carefully refrained fromefinite timetable, they do appear to haveat the time that they were possiblyear or two of victory. This, for example, was the implication of an important article by the chairman of Hanoi'scommittees, Nguyen Van Vinh. Vinh's views have long appeared to reflect some of the inner thoughts of the top Communist leadership. Writing in the5 issue of the party journal, he argued that theof Vietnam forces had been forced to disperse widely and to use about half of their strength to protect the capital region. Tho government reserves, according to Vinh, were only about one third as great as the French reserves had boon, and thus Saigon would "soon" have to abandon large areas of the countryside to the Viet Cong.
Vinh pointed to the period3 and4 in the war against the Frenchimilarime in which the Viet Minh inflicted the most "decisive" defeats on the French. Vinh seemed to be implyingimilar development might take place in thisevelopment which couldommunist military victory5
the4 congress of the National Liberation Front, the Front's presidentnew" period of the insurgency had arrived and the "situation has never heen so bright." Inorth Vietnamese DefenseVo Nguyen Giap also saw the war asewith the Communist forces in "an offensive position."
VIT1-7
TOP-*
The insurgents, according to Vinh, wereto the fulfillment" of their mission "in the coming year."*
Among the lower-level Viet Cong leaders, it appears that the idea was being promoted at this time that the "general uprising" was near. efectoristrict Communistin Kien Hoa Province, for example, claimed thatplans called for the "general uprising and completeof the government" It does not appear that the initiation of sustained US air attacks against the DRV in5 or the landing of US Marine combat units in northern South Vietnam in March served initially to dampen Communist optimism.
VI. The Communist Reassessment in
Byhe weight of the direct US combat effort in South Vietnam had thoroughly disabused theof any hopes of an early victory. Both in public and in private, the probabilityrotracted conflict againajor theme in Communist statements. Nguyen Van Vinh, for example, who had spoken so optimistically intalked in July only of "eventual" victory. General Giap was also more sober in his assessment of the situation in5 than he had been in The entry of tho US, Giap said, hadseriousiap spoke only about "ultimate victory" over the US.
**Giap no longer focused his main attention on thefor tho Viet Cong, as ho had in hiB previousbut now stressed the necessity of defending the DRV against US "aggression." This in itself seemed an implicit admission of the major setback dealt to Communist hopes in Vietnam by the direct US involvement.
In Mayhe top leaders of the military affairs committee of tho Communist party in the South mot tothe enemy and friendly situation." eport of that conference has been captured. It indicates that the meeting was dominated by discussions of the growing Americanin the war. Analysis of the nature of the Communist military and political weaknesses set against those of the allies, as discussed at the session, suggests that the party hierarchy must have believed at the time that the Communist position was such that the war could easily last another three and possibly five more years.
Communist materials have continued toon expectation that the war will be indefinitely long and protracted. 6 editorial in the Northparty paper, for example, claimed that the Communists still had confidence in their "final" victory, but admitted that the "onemy has not budqed as yet" and his "intention" to crush the "insurgency" "had notnHV diplomat in Laos who had just returned from briefings in Hanoi said that the Communists now realized that the US war potential meant "there would be no quick and easyin South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh reaffirmed this as late as mid-July when he promised that the Vietnamesewould fight until final victory if it took "five, ten, twenty-five years, or even longer."
ANNEX IX
THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION OF LESSONS"LEARNED IN FIGHTING- THE FRENCH
THWIi'flliiWiJAL,
ANNEX IX
THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION OF|LESSONS LEARNED IN FIGHTING THE FRENCH
The attitude of the North Vietnamese leadership toward the current military situation in South Vietnam is shapedonsiderable extent both strategically and tactically by thoir experience in fighting the French. Drawingupon this experience, they have carefully plotted their actions in the current war to duplicate as far as possible their successes against the French and to avoid mistakes committed in the earlier war.
x. The Three Phased War
Their experiences in the Franco-Viet Minh warconvinced the Communists that the predictions on the course of this conflict made7 by the then PartyGeneral Truong chinh had proved valid, and could probably be applied in the planned takeover of South in essence, Truong Chinh's blueprint for victory calledrotracted struggle through three stages which would enable the small and weak forces of the Viet Minh to defeat the more numerous and better-equipped French forces.
According to Truong chinh, the first phase of the war would see the French in control of tho cities using primarily
conventional- tactics, in this period the French would be on the "offensive." The Viet Minh, on the other hand, were small, poorly armed forces and therefore had todefensive" type of war. The chief strategy for the Viet Minn during this period, argued Truong Chinh, should be to attack the enemy using guerrillambushes, sabotage, and small-scale attacks on French units of smaller size than the local Viet Minh unit. The Viet Minh during this period, he said must avoid pitched battles with the enemy and must build its strength.
Truong chinh took the position that, although the Viet Minh would be strategically on the defensive, tactically they should always be on the offensive. Since the French would be strategically on the offensive, they would over-extend themselves, thus giving the Viet Minh opportunities
for attacking isolated and small units. During this first stage of the "people'se said, the Viet Minh must also concentrate on gaining the support of the peasants. Political efforts, Chinh held, were in some respects even more important than military efforts, because without the support of the people there could be no military effort.
At some point, Truong Chinh asserted, the enemy would extend his position as far as he could. At that time, the harassing action of the guerrillas would combine with thenherent weaknesses to create an equilibrium. During this stage of the war, the enemy would concentrate on consolidating his overextended positions with particular emphasis on his lines of communications and supply. Be would continue to launch attacks on the Viet Minh in the political sphere, the enemy would concentrate on setting up "puppet" local adminstrations, infiltrating the communist zones with spies, and repressing the Viet Minh political movement.
The Viet Minh, during this period, should employ to the maximum the tactic of guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy day and night. This would be designed to force the enemy to disperse his forces, to overextend his area of operations further, and to use up his manpower and resources. Tne key tactic during this period wouldombinationarfare, with the guerrilla taking the lead at first, followed by later and stronger efforts at mobile warfare. The tactic of positional war was givenimited role at this stage, since the enemy would still be able to bring superior force to bear on static defensive positions.
During the second phase of the struggle, the Viet Minh forces would swingefensive strategy to an offensive one. This stage should soe not only military defeat of the enemy butollapse of morale on his homen metropolitan France. Economic and morale problems at home wouldecisive effect on France's will to fight. On the battle front, the French would be forced to withdraw from their advanced positions in order to defend their major bases. The Viet Minh would depend primarily on mobile warfare tactics supported by guerrilla activities. Finally, in the third phase near the end, mobilo warfare Would often be transformed into positional warfare for the decisive battles.
Truong chinh'a analysis proved an amazingly accurate prediction of the actual course of the war with the French.ssessment of the weaknesses of the French wasand his program for the development of both tactics and strategy for the Viet Minn proved effective. His viewsthe outlook of the Viet Minh leadership and particularly that of General Vo Nguyen Giap. It was largely Giap's responsibility as commander of the Viet Minh army to put into practice Truongilitary concepts. He did just that and led the Viet Minh to final victory at the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu.
The extent to which the Vietnamese Communists still rely on this basic design for victory is evidenced in the writings of their leaders. On several occasions in the last two years Giap, in his articles, haB applied Truongoncepts of military analysis to the situation in the South. In remarkably similar terms, Giap has stressed the needrolonged war, emphasized that the US would become overextended in its ability to supply its troops in the field, and predicted that popular dissatisfaction with the war in the united States would undermine the determined tion of the administration to continue the war. Giap has claimed that the tendency of both French and US strategists to fix short deadlines for accomplishing major goals is proof of their inability to outlast the Communists.
According to Truong Chinh's criteria, the Viet Cong presumably would have reached the point of equilibrium with tlie ARVN4 or5 and would have gone over to the offensive relying more and more on mobile rather than guerrilla tactics. However, the use of US forcosombat role has since then probably removed any notion from the Communists' minds that they have managed to move into an advanced part of Truong Chinh's second phase, one in which the opponent is forced to withdraw from hispositions to defend his bases. This is evidenced in their discussions of the large and successful US/ARVN offensive raids into Viet Cong base areas this year.
Apparently the Hanoi high command believes that its forces in the South, at least in the northern half of South Vietnam, are in the first part of Truong Chinh's phase two, that is to say, that the US and ARVN are now overextended and are concentrating on keeping open lines of communication to their exposed outer posts. To some
IX-3
extent, of course, this is true. What is new in thehowever, is the fact that with its improvedextreme mobility, heavy firepower, ana tremendous air-support capability, the US can also attack Viet Cong strongholds and thus by spoiling actions throw Communist tactical planning and movements off balance.
Moreover, there has nowerious challenge to what the Communists regard as one of the keys to their ultimate victory, their own rear base. In the war with
ufan?e'athis aafe rear waein China, then in the highlands of North Vietnam. In the current war, thehavo made it clear that they regard North Vietnam as the rear area for the war. sinceowever, this base for the movement of men and supplies to the Viet Cong has come under heavy aerial attack by the US. While these air strikes have as yet not prevonted North Vietnam from continuing to send men and material to the South, they have made tho process much more costly and time consuming.
Tactical Military Lessons
The lessons learned in fighting the Frenchyriad of practical steps by thein the current war. The reliance on theambush, for example, results in large measure fromdevelopment of this technique against theViet cong have frequently set up ambushes againstVietnamese and US forces on almost exactly thewhere French elements were ambushed nearly
Another lesson, learned the hard way against the French, is the need to avoid precipitous military action against superior forces, 1o Nguyen Giap launched several major attacks on French forces only to have his units shattered by superior French firepower. Giap drew back, reformed, re-equipped, and retrained his units, and from then on faithfully followed the advice of Truong Chinh who urged that such actions be undertaken only when the Communists positively enjoyed the superior position. Giap's dedication to this formula led ultimately to Dien Bien Phu, where his forces had the superior position. That thoCommunist High Command learned its lesson is evident in Communist tactics in the present war. The Viet Cong/ PAVN forces rarely venture out on an attack now unless they
IX-4
JhJ ertainhave the advantage.
The communista instead, attempt to draw friendly fords
^ ,areas wneEO terrain, transportation, andtSndnfutralize the superior firepower and mobility of the allied side.
.Ml,Jh' success of the North Vietnamese in keeping their
PZ penome meLure to oxPenence in theiet Minh war. In addi-
Kr,^appearhave drawn heavily upon Chineseofthe Korean KarT The extensive
repair is not somethingbut the Hanoi leadership has had grea?
oJKti!hS Witn Praftce' in forming and op-
9*labor unita- 0 aobilization of rudimentary
echnique learnedn
III. Political Lessons
he political sphere in thethe French are also being used by thethe present conflict. They continue to put heavy"Poiitical struggle- and to expresscannot in the long
?i in a the extent that it
ine Partlv reflectsdialectic principles that "contradictions -
efe"ing here to "contradictions"Araericans and their "puppets" as well as to
hS Jhihaas evidenced
Strbuccession of internal coups) will inevitably
tSe fartunksts ?awOT--W" Communists are mindful ofhdt in tna earlier war the lack of positiveby the majority of non-Communist Vietnamese for the
featCofWFrancrJOrto the ultimate de-
lhe Communists have in 8tf^9gle" sou?nt to apply their politicalthe war through methods which parallel those usedYieVMinh/ In addition toS-CrvietIiamese hatred forhe Communists set out to repeat
SllvTStGrror and benevolence usedL^.Che YieC Minh' Thus toey have revived thebombings in Saigon and conducted terrorist reprisals
IX-5
thagovernment at all levels throughout the countryside, while at the same time they
h"? in3ra"ate themselves with the generalby various goodwith the harvest sanitation, conducting educational progrISs?'etc.
d withthe
? ihfough simply granting ownership outside the
bSCameCongas
aders!?ip also lGar"ed in part from theWar to Proceed cautiously on the matter of negotiations, even while not rejecting the idea ofanpoint. Premier Pham Van Dong was
Communists in the series of negotiations with the French54 He
hatnamese Communists had learned
?ith tne rcench thatechnique to gain?at they canfor further fi|KC-
tSS'sw?Kattnot intend to
i fct the Orleans- Instead, they intend
f accePting the bulk of
tracted ettlement through the tactic of pro-
TttZ vieCnameBe Communists do have some reason to feel"plated agreements reached with the lltnihsed to the disadvantage of the Viet Minh.
, against He's self-proclaimed Democratic Republic of Vietnam6 despite an agreement signed with representatives of his government recognizingi?-* of the Fountainbleau conference
"ease-fire agreement was reached, showed the French moving to escalate the war. The final proof of western perfidy, in the eyes of the Vietnamesefailure of the Western powers to implement the HanoiAgreements on Indochina, agreements which
ould aseure their peaceful ta*e-
into negotiations
a Position of relative weakness, the ttSht aiso realize that the tactic of "talk,nWM in sorae reflPeots used effectively by both sides in theiet Hinh war. Thus they have been
IX-6
reluctant to close the door completely to possiblewith thealk stage in theould prove attractive to Hanoi itself at somo point toespite from allied military pressure.
robablv inwhy the North Vietnamese have ScsternI fairlV. steady flow of visitors from
and nonaligned countries with various ideas for getting talk, started between Hanoi and Washington. North
J , hSfWO aiB8 inthese
encouraaethat the Com-
rSalthough firm, in their attitude
XrtQ reaCh 8of tho war.
The second, and probably more important purpose, has been
of thef PrCflSUCethets bombingSfumber of foreign visitors have come away
r?no^ ia7in9 thaC ?eynat it tho bombings ceased, talks could begin.
IX-7
SE-GREJi
ANNEX X
THE EFFECT OP THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE ON vTETNaMi-JSE COMMUNIST PLANS ASD CAPABILITIES"
I. World Public Opinion
The evidence shows that the Vietnamese Communistspopular opposition throughout the western world to US policy in Vietnam can be an important factor inthe allied hand against the insurgents. Virtually every significant Vietnamese Communist statement on war strategy has stressed the necessity of mustering theamount of world opposition againstin the conflict.*
Also significant in the eyes of the Vietnameseare the "liberation movements" and other outbreaks of civil unrest and rebellion which occur elsewhere in the world against Western authorities. Hanoi and the Viet Cong see these, in part, as developments which hopefully willirect American military or economic reaction which will distract and weaken the US war effort in Vietnam.** Such "people's action" is also regarded as encouraging the morale
of the Communist rank and file in Vietnam by demonstrating that they are not alone in their opposition to Western "imperialism andargely for these reasons, Hanoi has frequently urged greater cooperation and unified action by the Soviet Union and China during the last two years in support of the world "liberation movements." The North Vietnamese apparently consider suchatter of great significance to Vietnamese Communist interests, since North Vietnamese usually refrain from offering advice to the rest of the bloc.
if the situation in Vietnam develops to the point where the Vietnamese Communists are forced toecision on whether to continue to support large-scale insurgency in the South, it is probable that their estimate on the extent of world popular opposition to allied policy in Vietnam and of tho strength of the various "liberation movements" wouldignificant factor in influencing their decision. It would, however, almost certainly notritical factor,
II- Domestic Opposition in the United States
A more important issue in any Vietnamese decision on continuing the war would be the extent and effect ofto American policy from within the United States. It is clear that the Vietnamese realize general Westernagainst the allies will never be particularlyunless accompanied by important opposition in the US,*
The Vietnamese Communists do not view this opposition asanifestation of moral reticence among American intellectuals and leftists over Washington's war policy, but also believe that important opposition may developesult of the economic pinch of the war on the American public and business, and that such opposition may befanned by the continuing American casualties in Viet nam. It is clear that the Vietnamese believe the DS will
*This has repeatedlyheme of Vietnamese propaganda in such assertions as "the struggle of the American people plays an important role in the common struggle of the peoples to check the acts of the US Government in Vietnam."
be forced to go on an extensive wartime footing eventually and that this will greatly increase domestic opposition.*
There have been other indications in private that the Vietnamese believe domestic opposition in the US, ifstrongly, would seriously inhibit US war options. Vietnamese Communist cadres have been told by their leaders that the "increase in anger in world opinion over USin Vietnam" could be "among the more importantn addition to "casualties and economichich would cause the "American government to desist and decide to give up and get
It is hard, however, to assess just how far theCommunist inner councils really believe domestic opposition to US war policy has developed to date. In their view of the American situation, the Vietnamese areinfluenced to some extent by their overall lack of sophistication on American politics and by their earlier successful experience in bringing significant pressure from fnench Dublic opinion to bear on French war policy. In private conversations with visitors to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese have sometimes compared the present war with their own experiences against the French.
Their lack of sophistication and eagerness to seize on evidence of mounting US domestic opposition can perhaps
*we have tho word of North Vietnamese party firstLe Duan, on this. Late last year, heisiting Western Communist that he was sure the US would have toa reserve forceen in order toorceen in Vietnam. The US, he said, could not maintain that kind of war effort without being forced eventually by opinion in the US to re-examine and change its policy.
statesmen hove been told by Vietnameso Communist spokesmen that they believed the opposition to US policy shown by some congressional leaders and by well-knownjournalistsasic "lack of confidence" in the administration's policy. According to the Vietnamese, the "US is sufferingacklear objective which would unify American public opinion" behind the American poll on Vietnam.
X-3
"segrejl
best be seen in their reaction to the American studentover Vietnam policy which reached at least an initial peak in the fall There was an increasing air of optimism over the strength of the student agitation in Vietnamese Communist propaganda at that time, capped by an announcement from Hanoi onctoberunited front of the Vietnamese and American people has de facto taken shape." The propaganda strongly suggested that thewere overreading tho extent and depth of thein the US.* It is possible that the optimistic tone of the propaganda was intended in part tooost to the Vietnamese rank and file by demonstrating the sympathy which allegedly exists for their position in the enemy's own camp.
'Communist misjudgment of American opinion was alsoinhroats recently to take punitive action against US flyers, and in its public abuse of the oilots. When Hanoi realized the depth of feeling in the us'over the issue, it hastily stopped its propaganda regarding trials. Its willingness to do so is indicative of the importance it assigns to influencing US opinion.
**In private, visiting Western officials in Hanoi have been given much the same line during the past few months. One official was told that the DRV was "not counting" on US opinion to win the war. The same theme has been reflected
(continued on next page)
There has been some evidence in Vietnamese Communist materials6 of substantial realism regarding the potential for domestic opposition in the US. This could be seen, for example, in General Vo Nguyen Giap'sof the war situation in the DRV party journal Giap placed US domestic opposition last when roviewing American weaknesses in the war. He indicated that the opposition wouldestraining effect on American options in Vietnam, but implied that it would not de decisive in determining US staying power in the conflict. Giap placed more emphasis on US limitations in maintaining strong economic and military positions throughout the world whilearge-scale commitment in Vietnam. He did not, however, assess evon this latter problem as critical in determining the outcome of the conflict.**
It would appear that the Vietnamese Communistdoes not expect any important difficulties forin the near future, at least,esult of popular opposition to the war or because of economic/military stresses caused by tho conflict in the United States. Thus, in any basic decision taken on the war by the Vietnamese Communists over the next few months, the status of domestic American opposition would probably not be regarded as critical. If over the longer pull, however, the US was not forced into extensivo wartime mobilization measures and strong domestic opposition was not triggered as Hanoi appears to expect, the situation could possiblyery important factor in any basic Vietnamese Communist decision on prolonging the fighting.
Ill* Cambodian Attitudes
Phnom Penh's attitude toward the Vietnam war is of importance to Hanoi's own plans chiefly on two counts: ambodia's ties to4 Geneva agreements and,ts contiguity with Viet Cong operational bases in South Vietnam. By appealing to the nationalistic proclivities of Cambodia's loader, Prince Sihanouk, the Asian Communists have been able toubstantial amount of political support for the Vietnamese insurgents during the past several years. This has included Cambodian condemnation of the US role in South Vietnam as well as accusations that the US presence there is, as Hanoi claims, in violation of the Geneve Both of these themes are regarded by the Vietnamese as important foundation stones in their own political policy on the war.
On the physical side, Cambodia has servedourceransit channel for limited amounts of both food and other supplies for the Viet Cong. The Cambodians have alsorimarily neutral stance in permitting limited use of thoir territoryefugeecure base for the Vietnamese communist forces.
in the remarks of DRV diplomats abroad, inrench newsman was told by the DRV representative in Paris that Hanoi was greatly interested in encouraging the efforts of students and intellectuals in the US in their opposition to US policy, but realized that they representedinority.
X-5
The Communists, nevertheless, do not have an ally oronstant sideline supporter in the Cambodians. Cam-
ftaB5lva}"ntolicy has frequently been at odds with Hanoi's stand on such issues as Indo-Chinese neutrality and the exact terms for settlement of thewar. The Communists have thus had toasically cautious policy in exploiting Cambodia for their war effort. They are probably reluctant to make any really large scale ?k pachxnq Plans for the use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong, and they cannot automatically count on re-ceiving consistent and favorable political support from pnnom Penh.
On balance, the situation probably tends toestraining influence on Vietnamese Communist policy options in che sense that it forces the Vietnamese to focuson better strategic use of South Vietnamese andterritory in their efforts to cope with the growing allied military pressure on their operational bases.
rv- The Effect of Links with Western Leaders
The Vietnamese Communists also regard theand preservation of adequate links to leaders and key officials of Western countries as an important element in their war strategy. Thereumber of reasons for this apartatural inclination to enhance Vietnameseprestige at the international level. Such contacts, for one thing, offer the Vietnamese an opening to promote opposition to allied policy on Vietnam among Influentialhe free world.
This can be seen in Hanoi's treatment of the Indian Government. Although Indian proposals for settling the war have consistently been rojected by the Vietnamese as un-acceptably generous to the allies, Hanoi has been veryto avoid direct attacks on the Indian Loaders in its propaganda. It has assiduously cultivated its diplomatic relations with New Dehli and treated Indian representatives visiting North Vietnam with considerable courtesy and friendship. The Vietnamese doubtless believe the Indian outlook has an important influence on over-all Afro-Asian opinion about the war. Hanoi apparently also regards some Indian leaders as potential channels for floating Vietnamese views about the war to the allies.
eem to have given special attention to the use of western statesmen as third party channels to the allied leadership. This develoament has
noi'8 treatment of the Canadian?tlVOaSave Vl8ited or have been stationed withTne Korth Vietnamese have frankly toldLW18 Preaerve tne channel which the that Canadian visitors
be empowered to discuss more than just ICC business while in Hanoi.
n learned of third party contacts with the North Vietnamese, it does not appear that the greater Hanoi interest in talking to prominent Westerners ^ri?9 1 represents any softening as yet in Vietnamese
ZTt ?Cho war' zt Probably does mean, how-over, that the Communist leaders realize it might become
nt Coheir tactics and actively
olitical settlement of the conflict. At such
a time, third party contacts could prove especially valuable,
hey wouldhannel to the allies that did not first filter through the bloc. Atriti-
Vietnamese might not see eye to eye on strategy
with bloc
V- The Public Posture of the National Liberation Front (NFLSV)
co tne creation of the NFLSVhe Vietnamese haveontinuous effort to demonstrate that the Front enjoys broad political support and control throughout Southnd that its "growing strength" is supplemented by mounting recognition of Front claims and position incircles. The results of this have beenat best for the Communists. Front influence in South Vietnam is limited chiefly to the rural areas undercontrol; even in those areas, the Front isacade to cover the operations of the hard core Viet Cong (see ANNEX IIIiscussion of the numerical strength and influence of the Front in South Vietnam).
On the international side, although there is abody of opinion in the free world which holds that the insurgency in the South is an indigenous, patriotic and legitimate revolutionary movement, the Front's own activities have contributed relatively little to the spread of this belief.
X-7
"SEGREZ.
Tho Front is widely regarded in the West as more oroice for the Communist view on Vietnam, Efforts to achieve quasi-diplomatic status for the Front have not been very successful. Even some of the bloc countries where tho Front has opened "permanentave made it clear that the NFLSV is accredited only to local national front organizations and not to the blocitself.
The best evidence, perhaps, of the weak position of the Front lies in its failure torovisionalgovernment in South Vietnam- While both Northand Front officials have hinted on several occasions in the past year thatove was in process, it will probably not take place in tho predictable future. Such an action would pose formidable problems for the Communists and actually further expose the lack of public support for the Front. It would almost certainly alienate politicallygroups in the South, such as the Buddhists, who da not entirely support the Saigon government and have political ambitions themselves. The Front would also find ittoatisfactory seat of government in South Vietnam.*
Despite the weaknesses of the Front, however,there are compelling reasons for the Vietnamese Communists toto operate under its banner. It provides, forormal medium under which all facets of the insurgent political and military activity in South Vietnam can be organized* Although it does not yet pretend to formal governmentational scale, it does establish for theeeded organizational alternative to the Saigon regime. It is also usefullatform fox advertising the broad program of political and economic objectives which the Communists have set forth as their alleged goals in South Vietnam*
*The leadership of any provisional NFLSV government would have little attraction among politically Conscious elements of the population in South Vietnam not allied with the Movement toward the opening of negotiations on the war, should the Vietnamese Communists decide to do so, might also be complicated by the establishmentront government
X-3
i'i>o
TOr SECRET
ANNEX XI
THE PROBABLE NEAR TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE VIETNAMESE" COMMUNISTS
I. General Concepts
The near-term military strategy of the Communists will probably revolve around two major efforts: o koep intact, as far as possible, their main force units in the South,o build up this main force strength, both in quantity and quality, so as to be able to counter the allied power when US forces in Vietnam have built up to the levelxpected by the Communists at the end The North Vietnamese leaders probably hope that if they can go7 with an ability toain force strength of what we estimate to bes comparedS strength, they will be able to continue the war. Hanoi probably estimatesour-to-one nan-power advantage in favor of the US will not be enough for the US to decisively defeat the Communists. Of particular importance to the Communists is the fielding of sufficient combat units to counter the expected US strength in combat maneuver battalions. (See ANNEX IViscussion of ratios in US and Communist combat strongth)
One cf the best recent Communist assessments of the military situation was containedengthy articlein the Juno issue of the North Vietnamese army This article, as welliscussion of tacticsocument captured in Binh Dinh Province inndicate that the Communist plan for the rest of this year isontinuation ofoncept. to the article, byommunists attacks in the highlands were coordinated with those in tholear reference to what in fact was an almost simultaneous launching of operations in the Kontum-Pleiku-Phu Bonarea of the highlands together with large operations nearer the central coast in Quang Ngai Province and in the provinces around Saigon. The result was, as the articlepreading of ARVN's forces, particularly its reserves, so thin that the South Vietnamese army's ability to keep going was in question.
XI-1
The article indicated that the Communists willagain this year on opening simultaneous campaigns in the highlands and in the area northeast and northwest of oaigon. The frequency of other actions in the northern coastal provinces may accelerate toward the end of the year as the northeast monsoons begin there.- The primary aim will again be to stretch the enemy's forcesnd to inflict as many casualties as possible. This time, however,
nll^fr acl0pponcnt ?iU be US ratne* than South Vietnamese units. Although the latter continue to be struck astargets of opportunity, captured documents and recent communist propaganda identify US troops as the principal threat and dismiss the South Vietnamese "puppet army" as noorce which can deal on equal terms with us."
covered specific military concepts which appear to constitute advice from the High command on how to oattio the US in South Vietnam during the rest it suggested that the CommunistB believe they can be relatively effective in limiting the mobility of US forces. It referred,
t0 ,neof what it termed anbelt around Da Nang. This belt was not explained in
the DOSitionin9 and activity of Communist forces in the Da Nang area suggest that the Communists believe they canype of flexible cordon around Da Nang and other US base regions which can restrict many US forces largely to their general base and confine them primarily to static de-icr.se tasks.
One major tactical adjustment the Communists will have to unaertako is better concealment of the locations of their
"Tne document captured in Binh Dinh stressed that the enemy must be attacked on successive days both in theand in the lowlands. It declared, however, that our capabilities for this area are still low and far from being able to completoly annihilate an enemy unit." Thus, "it win be difficult to attack the enemynd "if the enemy roacts with great strength, with high mobility, we can hardly avoid being pushedegative situation and suffering losses." To cope with this problem, it stresses the need for superior morale and discipline to offset tho superior US firepower,ontinued build-up of forces, and for the devising of new plans to "keep up with theand mission."
XI-2
top-segret.
TOPSEQREOL
battles into atry tolarge-scale
Probable Areas of Communistthe
Sto repeat their operational patterns
The -Highlands
hi m ^ThGreinforcement this year of the central
Communists hoped this year to renow5 monsoonin the highlands.*
These Communist plans apparently have been disrupted by the series of US "spoiling- operations conducted, some in conjunction with ARVN troops, in the highlands areas since The Communists may nevertheless continue their efforts to apply "mobile warfare" principles in the highlands, although these may be preceded or accompanied by smaller action designed to disperse friendly forces and to permit the Viet Cong to regain the initiative. One document captured in the spring6 contained battle plans for an attack against the US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) base at An Khe.** Attacks on such US strong points, however, will probably be limited to mortar attacks or attempted sabotage ana he designed largely to tie down US troops andsychological impact.
11 Coastal Areas of II Corps;
Elsewhere in the II Corps area, the principalinterest continues to focus on Binh Dinh Province on the coast. There is some recent evidence, however, that at least one PAVNmoved eastward from the Cambodian border area of the highlands, possibly to fillivisional structure under the Communist Southern Front
"Reportedly singled out for attack were Special Forces camps such as those at Due Co, Plei Me, Plei Mrong, and Plei Djereng in Pleiku Province, and other targets extending as far as Toumorong district in Kontum Province to the north and into Darlac Province to the south. Coupled with road interdiction efforts, these attacks presumably would have the dual purpose of providing traps for the ambush ofunits, and of eliminating some allied outposts in strategic territory.
**The Communists could findempting target for manyfrequent fog there which limits airthe vulnerability of Routeo interdiction or ambush, and the previous Viet Minh success in trapping the French in this area. The Communists' recognition of their own vulnerability in positional warfare, however, makes it unlikely that they willajor assault on An Khe.
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headquarters in the Phu Yen-Khanh Uoa Province area on the coast. Long-term allied military operations to protect rice-harvesting activities in this ares appear to be successfully denying the Communists acceaa to their primary targets in this part of IIand manpower.
The heavy Communist troop concentrations in tho Phu Yon-Khanh Hoa area and in tho Binh Dinh-Quang Ngai area, whore another division operates on both aides of thebordor across ARVN corps boundaries, may foreshadow renewed attacks toward the coast. The latter months6 and the early months7 would appear to be the most favorable period for larger scale Communist operations in this area, although hit-and-run raids coordinated with actions In the highlands could occur here at any time.
C. orps
One of the provinces consistently suffering the groatest number of Communist-initiated actions has been Quang Ngai, in the southern partorps, Extensive operational plans for extonding the already considerable Communist control over this province hove boon captured this year, but the Com-muniat main force units have not yet proved sufficiently strong to carry out such plans in full or to threaten the province capital itself. At present the Communists in this area also appoar to be soaking to avoid sustained, large-scalein favor of rapid hit-and-run attacks and continued erosive tactics. They may, however, resume efforts to grab off isolated district towns aa weather conditions become more favorable.
There is little hard evidence available on Communist intentions in the northern Quang Ngai-Quang Tin-Quang Nam partorps. The presence of sizeable forces in this area appears primarily designed to protect their Militaryeadquarters area from US operations and to tio downUS forces in tho vicinity of the US bases at Chu Lai and Da Nang. More immediately significant may be the presence of two Communist divisional structures inorpsNorthern Front headquarters area in Thua Thien Province and the recently infiltratedB division near theZone (DMZ) in Quang Tri Province. One mission
TO
TOPrSEC&ET
of these forces probably is to draw US units into the area and spread them "thin."*
COMUSMACV has for some time anticipated an increased Communist thrust in the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area. This would not only divert attention from Communist efforts toase in the highlands and permit some respite there, but would facilitate support from or sanctuary in the"rear base" in North Vietnam. The presence ofth, which infiltrated across the DMZ, may portend increased use of this shorter, more direct route in addition to routes via the Laotian corridor. Tho Communists may also hope to exploit the inactivity and possible lowered effectiveness of South Vietnam's 1st Division in this area. The immediateplans ofth Division now appear to have been disrupted or delayed by early US detection and counteropera-tions, but increased Communist activity in this northernmost part of South Vietnam remains probable.**
D. Ill Corps
There is strong evidence from the deployment of Viet Cong forces,
"One recently captured PAVN prisoner claims that there are two other PAVNjust above the DMZ in North Vietnam and one nearpposite western Quang Tri into cooperate in just this effort. The presence of additional PAVN divisions around Quang Tri could also reflect further infiltration in process, or plans to seize territory in Quang Tri. Such plans have been reported byth Divison prisoners.
**An entrenched Communist position inorps could provide them an alternate, although lessbase area for ultimately moving against the lowlands. The Communists appear to have been trying for some time toecure area stretching from theirtronghold in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon across the highlands to North Vietnam ath parallel. This appears to have been one aim of the coordinated drives inn the central highlands and in the Phuoc Long-Binh Duong area near Saigon.
that the Communists intended
to resume an effort to link up the southern portions of their base complex in III Corps during6 summer monsoon period. The primary targets appear to haveistrict townpecial Forces camp in Binh Long Province which separatesnd Zone D, northwest and northeast ofrespectively. Possibly related efforts to improve their position in III Corps include the presence of an understrength division or Front headquarters southeast of Saigon in coastal Phuoc Tuy province, and efforts to build up main forcereviously neglected areas east of Saigon, presaged in part by intensified guerrilla harassment throughout
US operations targeted against both the Viot Cong Central Office for South Vietnameadquartered in Zone c, and against Communist regiments in the Binh Long-Binh Uuong area appear to have thwarted or delayed Communist plans in the III Crops area.' Nevertheless, the heavy concentration of both main force units and guerrillas in much of the III Corps area gives the Communists the capability toariety of military, economic, and psychological pressures on the area around Saigon. This pressure is reinforced through road interdiction, shipping harassment, and terrorism within tho capital itself.
E. IV Corps
In the delta areas south and west of Saigon theof large-scale Viet Cong operations have been dropping for some time. This probably reflects some reduction in capability because of both heavy casualties and heavy troop levies for other areas especially III Corps. Sporadicagainst ARVN and paramilitary outposts and Special Forces camps have occurred in recent months, however, and probably will continue. The delta area is of vital importance to the Communistsource of rice and manpower, and inportions they remain solidly entrenched. Except when
oporations in this northern part of the III Corps area are being sustainedong-term basis toecure wedge betweennd D, apply increasing pressure on the Communist military and political headquarters in the area--COSVN, Militarynow known asnd Saigon/Giagradually weaken the Viet Cong hold on theirbase areas.
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ongagod in strength by ARVN operations, the Communists in xv Corps will probably continue to giva primary emphasis to maintaining thoir lines of communication between the delta and Zonestressed in capturedto retaining base areas and secure zones for training and tor the smuggling of eupplies. They will probably alsoto harass road and water communications betweenand the delta in order to put an economic squeeze on faaigon and on tho provinces served by the capital.*
HI- Prospects and Problems
Although there is as yet no hard evldonce available on vcramumst planninge anticipate nochange in preaant Communist military strategy through at least the spring The primary objective of the ^ooraunists, if they can succeed in maintaining their main force basically intact through this year, will probably be to inflict enough heavy casualties on the USparticularly in thecause the US to pull in its horns and stop its "spoiling" operations.
The Communists, however, will be under severe pressure to come up with some now ideas or modifications of their present tactics. Although they will almost certainlytheir reliance on the ambush, rocont failures in this tactic, resulting from US anticipatory moves and rapid counteraction, havo caused them setbacks. They willalso work to improve their "close-in" battle tactic which is designed to inhibit CS use of artillery and air support. The increasing emphasis noted in captureddocuments on tho needuperior human element-improved cadres and improved troop discipline and morale-points up the Communists' awareness that, under continued pressure from US troops and air bombardment, the coming year willighly aignficant one for them.
Near Term Political Strategy of the Vietnamese Communists
South Vietnam, Communist political goals for the remainder6 ond7 will have to take account
'Harassment of district towns, outposts, and US and ARVN airfields, primarily by mortar fire, will probably continue, along with small-scalo actions to disrupt and undermine theevolutionary Development (pacification) program.
XI-8
of?ntsetbacks. Captured documents indicate that the Communists will give priority to strengthening and improving their political apparatus, notably by trying to improve the quality of political cadres down to thelevel, and by continued emphasis on tho recruitment of party members and sympathizers in both rural and urban areas.
1 Particular target groups for penetration, concentration will probably continue to be on the Southarmy and civil service. Laboring class elements may attract increasing attontion, not only ln the hope ofnew wage-price spirals and further economic discontent, but because of the access of construction workers to us base facilities and of porters and other supporting workers toeupply lines. The Communists will probably eh!,lemh!lr efforts to exploit communal tensions-between the Buddhists and Catholics, between tho Chinese and ethnic Vietnamese, betweon tho Vietnamese and the ethnic tribes,tical factions. Tho failure of the Buddhists in confronting the militory in Saigon may wa'l give the Communists second thoughts about expending too many assets on trying toandle on tho Buddhist There is little question that the Communists willto focus thoir proselyting efforts on the ARVN in an attempt to encourage desertions and defections. They win also try to sow distrust and dissension among theover the US presence, role, and intentions.
The Communist policy with regard to South Vietnam's coming constitutional assembly election in September is still it toons doubtful at this time that the Communists have any significant number of followers among the candidates who have filed, though many of the candidates ore relative unknowns even to local government officials. There are scattered reports that the Communists will make seriousto disrupt the election. Similar such reports oreceded past elections, but Coomunist interference turnod out" to be relatively ineffective. Communist propaganda statements have, however, vigorously denounced the coming electionarcerick. They may thus feci impelled to try toore active position through covert campaigning against candidates, or through terrorism and other direct sabotage
XI-9
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tohe Communists are likely to continue their efforts to consolidate their hold. There
has been mental lishment of dicate that tivo bodies
evidence' over the past year of someat the local level through thl"Liberation Committees." Documentscommittees are Party-controlledpartthe liberation Front ernment endeavor may receivein concert with localt hope to challenge andimpact of elected institutions created by Saigon.
ANHSX XII
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF AS TAN COMKUSIST EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC OF NEGOTIATIONS
Summary
This Annex discusses the Asian (particularly Chinese) Communist practice of negotiating, focusing on the motives which, in the past, have impelled Asian Communists toand the signs they have given when they were prepared to talk, it includes an analysis of the fight-talk, tactic used in the Chinese civil war ins welletailed examination of the Korean experiencend the Vietnamese experience. Finally, therehort discussion of implications for Vietnam today.
a. General Findings
On the two occasions when the Chinese Communists have initiated negotiations during military conflicts, their forces were either
and in danger of annihilation, as in thecivil war, or
hurt in the field, as in the Koreanthey negotiated, they continued to fight. Thistactic was formulated by Mao Tse-tung0 as
a means to preserve his weak forces from being destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior armies. Subsequently, it was used in Korea by the Chinese and North Koreans, at firstxpedient to shield their badly hurt armiesnd then,1olding tacticthey could extract terms enabling them to disengageostly limited war.
In Indochina, however, the decision to beginwas imposed by the Soviet and Chinese leaders on Ho Chi Minh when they feared American involvement andof the war more than he did They urged Ho to close out the war, which he was by no means losing in the field, and persuaded him to make concessions to the French after talks started and to try to seize Vietnamrocess
XIi-1
of low-risk political subversion. Even after Ho had been induced to begin negotiations, his desire to use Mao's original flght-and-talk tacticrotracted period was subordinated to tha larger interests of Soviet policy (to split the Western alliance in Europe) and Chinese policy (to prevent tha US from establishing alliances inhe Soviets and Chinese viewed these interests aa being best servedpeace" offensive and hindered by continuation of tho Indochina war. Uo made concessions, particularly on the matter of partition, which were later viewed by him and his lieutenantsistake not to be repeated.
b. The CCP-KMT Civil
Constantly maneuvering to preserve the badly depleted ranks of his Red Army from complete destruction by Chiang Kai-3hok'a militarily superior forces, Hao in7 finally induced Chiang to establish, onCP-KMT united front against Japan. But within the context of this paper alliance, Mao expanded his military and political forces in the northwest and even directod quick-decision thrusts to be made against isolated KMT units. attern of limited armed conflict and political struggle emergedao avoided major military operations which woulda major counterattack andactic of limited-fight, limited talk: "After we have repulsod the attack of the (KMT forcea) and before theyew one, we should stop at tho proper moment and bring that particular fightlose. In the period that follows, we shouldruce with them." (Mao's statement of. In this way, Maoeries of small victories without running the riskeneral civil war, while expanding hisholdings behind the Japanese lines.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations went forward on the national0 Represented in Chungking by his bniiant negotiator, Chou En-lai, Mao used various lulls in the civil war to increase his regular forces, ande permitted the American Army Observer Mission to operate in Yonan because its very presenceoliticaleffect on Chiang. Recognizing the strengthened military and political position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan inao tried to settlealf-waylegalization of the CCP--on the road to an eventual seizure of national powor. Chiang refused to facilitate thistakeover. On shortly after KMT planes bombed Ycnan, Mao dropped the talking half of his dual tactic
and began to fight tho all-out civil war, which his forces decisively won in
Korean
Initial Chinese Communist military successes fromthrough0 increased Mao's confidence that the UN forces could be driven from Korea if military pressure was sustained, and Chou En-laiease-fire asreathing spell" for the UN. eries of manpower-killing advances by UN and ROK units in March and early1 followed by the blunting of the Communists' big April and May offensives, which cost them anen, left the ranks of Mao's best armies decimatedf thehinese Communist divisions which had initiated the April and May offensives,ad suffered aboutercent casualties.
These disastrous defeats impelled Mao to beginbut there were no prior indications that he wasto drop his previous political conditions for a When, onoviet UN delegate Malik for the first time called for talksease-fire, he merely avoided raising the preconditions that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking should be admitted to the UN. Mao seized upon the military breathing-spell to improve the badly impaired combat capabilities of his forces in the field.
Mao's strategy at the armistice negotiations1 toas toprotractedombining tactics of political attrition with limited military pressure. But this strategy did not break the determination of the US negotiators to defend the principle of voluntary repatriation of war prisoners. The death of Stalinthe developmentew Soviet attitude toward East-West tensions in general and concluding an armistice in Their pressure on Mao and his own recognition that further resistance was purposeless, and even harmful to his economic program,inpelled him to retreat and accept voluntarymove which opened the way for the armistice agreement of
The same considerations that led the Soviets and the Chinese to negotiate an end to the Korean war inade them look with favoregotiated settlement of
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the Indochina war. At tho time, howevor, tho fortunes of the Vietnamese Communists in their oight-yoar fight with the French were steadily improving and Ho Chi Minh gave nothat he would be willing to accept loaa in asettlement than his forces could seize on tho
The first indication that the Communists might consider negotiations came from the Soviets, who began in3 to quote with approval demands in the French pressPanmunjceV in Indochina. By September, the Chinese had alsoillingness to diBcuBs Indochina at tho conference table. But Vietnamese Communist propaganda made it clear that these Soviet and Chinese initiatives were being madeimo whon Ho was still resisting the concept of Tho attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at this time is illustrative of the generalization that Asianhave been unwilling to begin negotiations when they have been in an advantageous position militarily, or have not been badly hurt in the field.
As the French Government was being subjected topressure from many members of tho National Assembly and from the French public for an end to the costly war, Moscow and Peking acted to convince Ho that he could make major gains through negotiations. One finally took the initiative in proposing negotiations, but itedged proposal that, in effect,omplete Prench surrender.
Premier baniol was able to resist the strong domestic pressure for Immediate bilateral negotiations with tho Viet Minh by agreeing to discuss Indochina at tho Genevain Although Ho clearly preferred bilaterals, (in which he would have beenuch stronger positionthe French than he was ate was againby the Soviets to agree to international negotiations.
At Geneva, Molotov and Chou Bn-lai moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the OS as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. Ho, whoso delegate, Pham Van Dong, started with maximum demands after tho fall of Dien Bien Phu, apparently calculated thatcould continue for some timo without loading to American involvomont. His tactics of protrocted negotiations, which would afford him more time to solidify his military position, were similar to those of Mao in Koroa. But again
and again, the Soviets and Chinese acted to undercut hismaximum demands at Geneva for French politicalin exchangeeasefire.
The Viet Minh certainly had not expected to have to make as many political concessions as they finally agreed to at Geneva, llo wasosition to negotiate from strength and to do soong time, but he found himself caughtino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions. It was clear at the time that the North Vietnamese were far from completely satisfied with the Geneva compromises. As time has gone on, they have probably become even more convinced that the political concessions they made thereistake. The clear awareness that they were impelled, primarily by Moscow and Peking, to stopalf-way station on the road to total military victory has made them all the moreto fight on in the present situation.
o. implications for Vietnam Today
North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist officials have indicated privately that the compromises madethe Viet Minh with something lessotal takeover of Vietnam,istake. Ho's determination not to stop half-way again, even in the face of increased US airstrikes, is bolstered by Mao's special need to keep him fighting. Kao's special need, which stems largely from an image ofas "leader" of the international Communist movement, is to prove Soviet and other doubters wrong regarding theof revolutionaries to defeat the USrotracted small war.
Discussion
A. The CCP-KMT Civil War.
The badly depleted ranks of Mao's Red Army, whichinto the sanctuary of northwest China in5 after the punishing attacks of Chiang Kai-shek'3 forces during the Long March, were incapable of resisting an all-out KMT offensive. Aware of this basic fact, Mao repeatedly appealed to Chiang to end the civil war andCP-KMT united front to expel Japanese forces from north China. Chiang was unwilling to comply primarily because Mao insisted onhis military units for use in the revolution: "It
XII-5
TtyPSEGREX.
aintain the CCP's absolutelyw i" what originally was the Red alJ,?uerrila units. Communists are (CCP reaolu-
the"ythical anti-Japanese united front to rrom attacking his new sanctuary in theand to expand his military, territorial, and political holdings. Most of the CCP effort was directed toward extend-
imarding against alndittle was directed toward engaging
l?^tT^iations for the reorganization
7
continued on the local level between some
? Communist forces. As friction increased? Mao
B ? W! Pol?:tlcal-^Utary tactic. o-
be in tho JillJ^if0he CCP'B main fleld work ? rolatJvely socuro rear areas of the Japanoso forces
calculating that the political-military vacuum behind the '
S?netS.Uf^BhX?SJ?the CCPforces
h?oothold Jn the northwest could be expanded. Mao
pretext foJ^ ^StraJnt' intended to provide Chiang with no
arv tactfo tn J empor-
ary tactic to gain vitally needed breathing spells prior to
fOCC"? and efficiently as^.alwava "topped just short of provoking an open break with Chiang and the retributionajor FMT offend
na revolutionary advance in the future. Mao
nese lite of reducedactic in advancing the revolution:
Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, should always be regarded as part of therevolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line,egment in the curvilinear movement, hort they are positive,tatementB)
iS' defensive or suspended action was part of .expand.his aCTlies and the CCP membershiplines with the aim of seizing more territoryecision thrusts wer?never
abandoned. For example, in the springommunist
winderung Province, and in the
hov decimated KMT forces in Hopei These clashes were fully concordant with Mao'Tpolicy
ofv armed atr^le within thethe CCP-KMT paper united front.
A pattern of limited armed conflict and politicalemerged in CCP-KMT relations in the spring0 Sao
nd-talking tactic? offensive operations of the Communist armies,
Z considerably inferior to KMT armies; po-
iy' ato indoctrinate workers, peasants, and intellectuals, his fashion, he groped
!nd editing the soft spots in Chiang's military and political armor.
actic- e set forth the unique position that there was noolitical-military struggle against Chiang
of? Un!fedwith hin- ?ne struaile policy was intended to demonstrate to
COUld not bethey would fight back against any KMT offensives. The unity half
was intended to deter KMT attacks and to -avert the0 ^Picted the partial struggle
S "eans for strengthening Ihis calculation having been, as he
Xii-7
irective to Communistoperating in east China, that clashes withforces were necessary
top-secret
so as to make the KMT afraid to oppressnd compel them to recognize our legal status, and make themtoplit.
occa8ion- used military action insustain the
e3"mateo that small CCP military thrustsrovokG, Chiang to move beyond limitedtcause Cnian? dld "ot have the military capability0 toation-wide offensive against CCP forces
Japan was bein9 Mao's estimate0 was that
The present military conflicts are local and not nation-wide. They are merely acts of strategicon the part of our opponents and are
cale actions intended tothe Communists.
he aeneral plan for limitedwhich he had enunciated on0 as alimited-talk tactic. Mao had set forth thein considerable
TiESh Wfever [slc] attac* unlessattacked, we will certainly counterattack
Second, we do not fight unless we are sure ofwe must on no account fight withoutand without certainty of thehird, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hardshe KMT forces) and before theyew one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fightlose. In tho period that follows, we shouldruce with them. We must on no account Eight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies thenature of every particular struggle Only when the die-hardsew offensive should we retaliateew struggle.
tactical Principle of Mao. His practice ihf Z *d t ?LS forcesdirected to fight, close offbaJtleefeat of KMT forces, and thenruce and be prepared to negotiate in the hope that Chiang would notocal and limited defeat as the
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tupsegrmh
reasonarge-scale offensive against all Communist armies. This is the tactical principle designed to advance Mao's protracted war waged with initially weak forces,their actions to safe proportions.
In this way, Maoeries of localreat risk of general civil war. At the same time, he seized territory by expanding the base areas behind the Japanese lines and by controlling the actions of his field commanders, whose forces sporadically chopped away at small KMT units. Por example, the First Contingent of the Communist *Jew Fourth Army commanded by General Chen YiKMT forces in northern Kiangsu in0 and, in the second halfeveral Communist victories were won in the lower Yangtze valley. Mao had directed that the New Fourth must be expandeden; by the endis generals were successful in expanding this army tothat numbor of combat regulars.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations took place on the national level in the second half0 as Mao implemented his fighting-and-talking tactic. Even when vastly superior KMT forces unexpectedly surrounded anden attached to tho New Fourth's headquarters as they were withdrawing to the north of the Yangtze River, Mao refused to consider this setback ashis principle ofimited war. Inhe intermittent negotiations between the KMT and CCP reached another major impasse in Chungking, just as they had in9 and in Chiang asked Mao toonclusive reply to his demands to relinquish the independent CCP government and to incorporate CCP forces into Nationalist armies. Chou En-lai, the brillant Communist representative in Chungking, deflected those demands and charged tho KMT with Increasing their forces along the northwest border base areas. Chou attained some success in his political effort to depict Chiang as tho obdurate element in the united front.
The failure of Chiang to launch large-scale attacks against Communist forces3 was attributed by Mao at the time to the political success in arousing domestic and international opinion against Chiang's policies. (Liberation Daily,. Two additional factors wore Japan's east China offensive against KMT forces and OS efforts to stop Chiang's attempts to suppress the Communists. That is, Mao
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adroitly used political pressures to compensate for military weakness: "The Communists are not capable of much, ifB action." (Report of Colonel Depass,ovember
3the lull inSCP-KWr Protracted war to further expand his armed forces, which increasedegulars by The
axface mission to China in4 resulted in the dispatch of the American Army Observer Mission to Yenan, whiCh Mao tavored because of "its political effect upon the KMT":
Any contact you Americans may have with us Communists is gold. Of course, we are glad to have the Observer Mission here because it will help to beat Japan. But tnere Is no use in pretendingto now at leastchief importance of your coming is not itseffect on the KMT. (Mao's remarks to John s. service, interview of
That is, Mao exploited the OS desire to end the civil war ana get on with the war against Japan, adroitly using it 3Sr a. Political shield against the potential offensive-power
VPerlor "ilitary forces. He was capable then of considerably more tactical flexibility than he has been in recent years.
By insisting on policies which made the KMT appearMao deflected Chiang's demand that, toeqal party, the CCP should disband its armed forces, in aworded proposal, which Mao maneuvered Ambassador Hurley to sign with him in Yenan onao agreed only
to work for" the unification of all military forces while insisting on tho formationcoalitionnited national military council." His intention was to exploit the generally held view that the CCP wasin refusing to disband its armies before the formationoalition government. However, in order to keep thealive, he directed Chou En-lai in Chungking to join Ambassador Hurley in pressing Chiang to accept theiang insisted on disbanding the Communist armies, and Mao was then ablo to "expose" Chiang as recalcitrant in rejecting a reasonable" negotiationsa coalition. The widespread domestic and international appeal of the Maoist programettlement, the rapidly expanding military-political powor of the CCP, and US anxiety to bring about
unity put Chiangonsiderable disadvantage in the talks.uccess with dilatoryis, hisof talks about "working for" unified armed forces in the place of action taken to disband CCPisolated Chiang in China and internationally.
k nq' Mao nad continued to expand his forces, and bye claimed that theyegulars and moreilitia. Maoaior move shortly before Japan's surrender, ordering CCP troops
. up Wltn Soviet troops driving southward. As CCP ond KMT armies raced for controlJapanese-vacated areas and as Chiang preparedat Mao's forces, the Communist leader acceptedto accompany Ambassador Hurley toon Mao was still anxious to gainof breathing spells. Two days before flying to an innflr-party policy line onwhich he indicated that the CCP should be prepared tosome reduction in the size ofareas which were indefensible and in the strength of
Without such concessions, we cannot explode theivil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders in China and cannot gain in exchange legal status for our partytate of peace.
But there are limits to such concessions: the principle is that they must not damage theinterests of tho peopleCPof the base areas and the armedtatement of
Mao in Chungking recognized the strengthened military and diplomatic position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan anu the signing in Moscow of the Sino-Soviet treaty, in private talks, he dropped his demand (to which heoalition government and high command, buton retaining not less thanivisions as well as exclusive control of the base areas in north China. He wanted toalf-way station ofon the road to an eventual'"seizure of national power, inasmuch as his armies were still smaller and more badly-equipped than Chiang's. "The Communist armies do not possess
Xli-ll
sufficient strength to directly oppose the KMT armies in positional warfare; butong period of tine as an occupying force, the KMT cannot hold out even with OS5 report of Colonel Yeaton from Yenan) Chiang accurately summarized Mao's position aa equivalent tothe CCP to carry on its political revolution without opposition or Hindrance while professing to end the KMT-CCP military clashes by negotiating. Actually, while Mao was talking, CCP forces were consolidating their control over newly taken territory in the north, and when Mao returned onfter refusing to disband his forces, he justified in tho context of protracted revolution, his willingness to negotiate.
Mao mado it clear to cadres in Yenan onctober that reducing CCP forces toivisions would not mean handinq over weapons. "The arms of the people,gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over." He then reminded cadres that his strategy waa toongwars
Was our party right or wrong in deciding at its 7th Congress (inhat we wore willing to negotiate with the KMT provided that they changod their policy? It was abaolutely right. The Chinese revolutionong one and victory can only be won step by step.
As both sides raced to seize Japanese arms and fill the territorial vacuum, Mao directed the Northeast Bureau oftott8 holdings and use theommunist troops to hold the rural areas remote from the existing centers of KMT control. Botwoon the truco of January ondoth sides took territory in Kon-
wholeof the Marshallao tried to disgraceoderate program of "peace, domocracy, while his armed forces expanded. Ho reliedtheir ability to avoid decisive engagements, tostop-start fighting, and to counter-attackKMT
In the final series of negotiations of Mao's longwar, ho gave priority to the goal ofeasefire and an extension of the Manchurian truco. He was also concerned in6 about US aid to Chiang's forces. On tho one hand, he relied on General Marshall's
mediation to gain an immediate cease-fire, to ameliorate Chiang's demands, and to state his own settlement terms. Chou En-lai, urbane and persuasive, ably discharged his task by appearing conciliatory, moderate, and reasonable. On the other hand, Mao's press and radio in Yenan criticized US policy with increasing vehemency in an effort to deter Washington from giving further aid to the KMT. Byao demanded that the US stop all military assistance to Chiang and withdraw all US troops from the mainland; his concern with the modern equipment sent to KMT forces had been deepened. "Let them know that whatever happens, if we are faced with mechanized war, we shall fight on if necessary with our hands and feet." (Mao's statement to Robert Payne in
Although his armies were still numerically inferior to Chiang's Mao issued an inner-party directive onuly warning his forces to prepare to smash Chiang's offensive by an all-out "war ofhich required the temporary abandonment of indefensible cities and the opening of mobile warfare. Mao had no alternative but to fight against superior forces and onhortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao was impellod to drop the talking half of his dual tactic and prepare for all-out civil war, which his forces won in the straight, forward contest ofstrength waged between6 and
In drawing an analogy between the Chinese civil war and the Vietnam war today, CCP propagandists emphasize thenature of both conflicts and the evolution of weak into strong communist forces. But they deliberately de-omphasize, or avoid any reference to, the talking-half of Mao's tactic and the temporary half-way station he tried to obtain. Unlike the Soviet propagandists, they insist that talking should take place only after the US withdraws its forces from South Vietnam.
D. The Korean
Military developments in Korea in the spring1lear-cut example of the Asian Communists having been impelled to switch to the talking phase after they had been hurt in the field. That is, they viewed the large losses
3SJSBW
of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) combat regulars as the sufficient cause for drastically reducing the fighting phase. The military struggle was subordinatedhe intention being to wear down Western negotiators.
When, in latehe CCF entered the war in force. North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) combat casualties were already very high, estimated by the United Nations Command (UNCIn additionrisoners. The NKPA had been virtually destroyed and nover fought again above corps strength in the Korean war. The initial CCF successes against UNC forces from November through0 increased 'the confidence of the Chinese Communistthat they could drive UNC forces from Korea if CCFwas sustained. On0 and again onhou En-laiease-fire, describing iteans to gainreathing spell" for UNC forces, and demanded that prior to any halt in the fighting all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, US armed forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and Peking's representatives must be admitted to the United Nations. As UNC forcesfrom the Yalu River, however, theyeavy toll of CCF combat units. For example, betweenovember andecember,0 men of the eight divisions committed by the 9th Army Group, Third CCF Field Army, were estimated by the Marine Corps to have0 combatittle over half of them inflicted by ground forces and the rest by air attack. The 9th Army Group was so damaged bythat it disappeared from the Korean battlefield for three months. ByNC forces had stopped the CCF all along the front.
General Ridgway directed UNC forces to comply with his dictum of "inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy" rather than gaining ground. The dictum was put into practice in the months following the UNC offensive which started in late ebruary, OPERATION PUNCH hadatCF (body count) and when, onebruary, CCF infantry for the first time in Korea attacked in mass waves, UNC forces killed thousands of Chinese at Chipyong-ni. CCF mass infantry assaults resulted in further heavy Chinese casualties onh and again ont with the start of OPERATION KILLER. arch, the entire Chinese front south of the Han River had collapsed and UNC
XiI-14
'TOF-zSEGRJLZ
units moved to withiniles ofh parallel. CCFand equipment losses continued to be "heavy" after the etart of OPERATION RIPPERarch, and onarch, Seoul was retaken as CCP an* small NKPA forces fell back. eries of manpower-killing advances launched by UNC and ROK units ln late March and early April moved the allied forces acrossh parallel. The ranks of the bestPiao's 4th Field Army ond Chen Yi's 3rd Fieldtholeaders used in the first massive assault against the UNC forces had been seriously depleted. "Now the beat troops aro annihilatedj this forced the CCF to send replacements from the 1st and 2nd field The CCP suffered high casualties and its faith in victory had beenFrom interrogation report of Assistant Battalionh Army, 4th CCP Pield Army)*
General Van Floot mot the first Communist spring offensive, launched onith the manpower-killing tactics of General Ridgway, and directed his corps commanders onpril
Expend stool and fire, not ant so many artillory holesan can step from one to the other.
Because thoy used massed infantry assaults againstus artillery, automatic-weapons, and air firepower, units of six CCF armiesotal0ndpril and were forced to end their first spring offensive. Their second spring offensive was even more destructive to CCF men and materiel.
Onay,CF divisions, flankedotalKPA divisions, opened the second spring offensiveile front using human wave tactics against strongly fortified UNC positions. Although gains ofoiles were made along most of the front, the Communist offensive waa complotoly spent byay, and UNC forces, which had recoiled only slightly, lashed backajor counter-offensive, depriving the Communists of the opportunity to place screening forces between their main armios and the
prisoner reports that are referred to inare, in almost every case, the reports ofand interrogated in March and Aprilafter tho collapse of the1 CCPbefore the even more costly defeats of the H
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UNC units. UNC counterattacks quickly carried into CCP and NKPA former assembly areas, where large quantities ofwere captured as many dumps were overrun. une, the CCF and NKPA lost moreen, and of theCF divisions which had initiated the offensive,ad suffered aboutercent casualties. The following table, which is hased on US Far East Command estimates, indicates the magnitude of the Communist losses:
East Central Front
{Main attack)
12th CCF Armyh CCF Armyh CCFh CCF Army II NKK Corps
Strengthay
une
Strengthay
(?)
0
Front
CCF
15th CCF
20th CCF
26th CCF
60th CCF
63rd CCF
Front
CCF
65th CCF
I NK
VI NK
The table indicates that ashehadoss ofercent of their totalay strength in Korea. oune, they suTfered an0 casualties {not included in the table above).
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Most of tho CCF prisoners were taken during the last week of May in frantic efforts to escape, indicating that the political-control fabric of many CCF units had been shattered, primarily because large numbers of political officers and non-coms had been killed. UNC ground pursuit endedune after all of South Korea exceptmall part on the Western flank had been cleared of Communist forces, enabling fortification of the UNC line in depth to begin in the vicinity ofh parallel.
The combined heavy lossos to the first wave fieldtho CCF 3rd andthe second wavethe CCP 1st andsignificantlythe quality of the forces which the Chinese leaders could put in the field inI. Many of their best combat officers and political cadres had been killed or captured, partly because of the Maoist practice whichthat they take front-line positions to lead their troops. Many political officers were killed in combatthey spent much of their time with the men in the front line to lead the battle themselves" {fromreportrivate inth Division, 4th CCF Fieldnd in some companies all officers including the company commander had been ordered to the front line to raise the men's "fighting spirit" (from interrogationof the Company Political Officer inth Division, 4th CCF Field Army). "The casualties among the commanders wereecause they took the lead at the front" (from interrogation report of Battalionh Army, 1st CCF Field Army) . The massed infantryfor the first time by the CCF in Korea in mid-Februarythe destruction: "We fought only with human wave tacticsj great numbers of men have been sacrificed; it was indescribably miserable" (from interrogation report ofd Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The Maoist doctrine of "defeating the enemy's firepoweruperiority inilitary idea which is no These views of mine were shared by most lower-level leaders and the men in the CCF, though they could not dare to make them public" (from interrogation of Assistant Battalion Politicalh Army, 4th CCF Fielduman wave1 tactics are supposed to overwhelm the enemy's firepower with predominance of manpower and thus win the victory. From my first experience in thisound that this tactic had no sense and no In actual combat, it was nothingass loss of lives and defeat"
(from interrogation report of Squad Loader and CCPh Amy, 4th CCF Field Army). The quality and number of CCF cadres who were lost to the four CCF field armieswas the sufficient cause for the Chinese communistwhose forces comprised aboutercent of the Communist combat units in Korea, to switch to tho talking phase. Heavy losses of NKPA officers of the I, II, and III Corps were also indicated by intercepted messages in
in the disastrous offensivos ofhe CCP and NKPA sustained anasualties frompril toune. Byuno, tho Chinese casualties since tho CCF entered tho Koroun war woro, including0 non-battledue torisoners. (NKPA casualties as early as0 hod already been vory high, estimatedn additionrisoners. No data ishere on NKPA total casualties since)
The war was increasingly costly for the Chinese in other ways. It forced the regime to modify its program of long-range economic development and to ploce tho economyar footing. The war also subjected the regime to economicimposed by the West, increased inflationary pressures, and strained economic relations between urban and rural areas. Tho Chinese Communists became increasingly dependent on the USSR, partly because tho Chinese were unable to replace from their own resources the stocks of material being expended in Korea.
The first step toward ending the commitment in Korea was to begin negotiationsease-fire, the calculation apparently having been that political concessions could be gained by combining protracted talks with propagandawhile the fighting was kept limited.
eries of statements made by American and United Nations' officials in late May and earlyhe UNC's willingness to end tho fighting withouta surrender of Communist forcos, the Chinese Communists and the Soviets apparently decided toreathing-spell. Prior to theune radio speech of Soviet United Nations' delegate Jacob Malik, there apparently were nc indications that the Chinese were willing to accept these Western On the contrary, the indications continued to point to Chinese intransigence. (For example, early in
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Vice Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu had beenalk with Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peking and insisted that the war must be settled onlyilitary way.") Unexpectedly, in his radio speech, Malikhange in the Communist position when he avoided linking the Communists' proposalease-fire to their earlier demands that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking must be admitted to the United Nations. "The Soviet peoples believe thatirst step, discussions should be started between the belligerentsease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces fromh parallel."
The Chinese, too, were careful not to admit they had dropped preconditions. Onune, the Peking People's Daily frontpaged Malik's proposal without acceding to truce talks. The Chinese did not accede to truce talks publiclyuly, anduly they rationalized the change in their basic position without acknowledging explicitly that it had changed. That the Chinese were anxious to deny that they were operatingosition of weakness is suggested by their statements to Burmese embassy officials in Peking shortly after Malik's speech. They insisted that "China and the USSR are confident of their joint strength, as none is equal to them." The Chinese also indicated to the Burmese that they had moved into the war's political phase in order tois, "to brand" the US and its allies asand to create dissension in the Western camp, their strategy having been toow-risk, high-volumewar in order to gain concessions at the truce talks. The Chinese later formulated their switch to the talkinq phase as follows:
After the five great campaignsffensives from0 to, the Volunteers switched over in good time to the strategic line of "engaging in protracted warfare while conducting positiveand strictly subordinated the military struggle to the political struggle. (NCNA commentary
The Chinese used the military breathing-3pell to improve their impaired over-all combat capabilities. By the time the armistice negotiations startedhe Chinese had improved their artillery and small-arm stores and had replaced their manpower losses while the NKPA divisions were rebuilt. Politically, they had already exploited the theme of seeking peace and of opposing American "warmongering" with considerable
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success, gaining face internationally and placing themselvesavorable propaganda position as tho initiators of the truce talks. They were unwilling to move the talks alongutually acceptable conclusion within any short period. On the contrary, they used Mao's tactic of wearing down UNC negotiatorsprotracted struggle" (Peking's phrasen order to extract major concessions.
This tactic of political attrition succeded inUNC negotiators, but it did not gain the Communists major concessions. Small-scale but sustained UNC military pressure on Communist forces in Korea in1 was reflected in the talks. Onctober, the Communists in effect dropped their demand that tho demarcation line be moved down to correspond with the 3Bth parallel. On the other hand, theyday de facto cease-fireoecember, enabling them to further strengthen front-line defenses and to augment unit strongth.
The Chineseolitical victory togetherilitary truce, and as the talks centerod on the prisoner issue, they adamantly refused toolitical setback. The major deadlock on the matter of voluntary repatriation of prisoners prolonged the talks from2 toas the Chinese insisted on the forcible return of all CCP (and NKPA) prisoners in order toajor propaganda defeat if large numbers were to opt for the West. Thewould not recognize the UNC stand onalid principle and argued that it was in conflict with the Geneva Convention whichompulsory, all-for-all exchange. As an alternative, they calculated thatelatively small number would resistthat is, 0otalCF and NKPAcould tacitly agree to the UNC screening process.
Doth the Communists and the UNC were shocked by theof the screening process after about only half had been questioned. 0 of0 prisoners screened indicated that they would resist repatriation to China and North Korea, but the UNC had given the Communist negotiators an estimateilling to return of therisoners. When, onpril, the Communists were informed that0 would return without the use of force, the CCF Colonel Tsai was speechless, askedecess, and on the followingon instructions from
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said that tho unc's earlier estimatear cry It was "completely impossible for us to consider" and "you flagrantly repudiated what you said Because the Communists had been stung once by the screening procedure, they indicated they would have nothing more to do with it.
Small, division-scale battles continued in the field, but the CommuniBta were still unwilling to change the nature of the war into that of major offensive actions. They tried to deflect politically damaging charges of inhumanity on the prisoner issue byoncerted propaganda campaign, accusing thoin late Februarywaging "bacteriological warfare" in North Korea and Manchuria. Moro importantly, Communist-instigated riots in tho POW camps wore Intended to undercut the UNC position on voluntary repatriation by discrediting the entire scrooning process. In tho POW camps, the Communist soldiers shifted theirfrom military to political goals. Close coordination was established between the POW camps and the Panmunjon truce talks. Onfter forcing aconfession of "compulsory screening" from Genoral Dodd, who hod boon held prisoner by tho prisoners of the Koje-do camp, chief negotiator Nam II charged thot
The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could not but confess before tho wholo world your inhuman treatmont ond murderous violence against ourpersonnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts committed by your side in screening and re-arming war prisoners by force, (emphasis suppliod)
The Communist negotiators adroitly used tho Kojo-do incident to discredit the UNC figures and insisted that theyrisoners in exchange0 prisoners held by thorn on the principle of an all-for-all exchange and forcible repatriation. Neither side conceded, and at the recess of talks onear of negotiation had produoed anords of discussion andours of formal meetings. Tho prisoner issue was the only remaining agenda item.
On theilitary stalemate continued. Mao had confronted the US with his limited-risk protracted war. no apparently believed that Washington would continue
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to avoid pressing for an all-out military victorythe potential manpower lossesictory would ByCF and NKPA ground forcesalmost doubled since the start of the talks in. He also apparently believedcould deter the US from initiating airstrtkesChina mainland because of Washington's uncertaintyStalin's reaction to such strikes. As part ofeffort, Chou En-lai and the Soviet ambassadortold Indian Ambassador Panikkar that the USSRwith air attacks against Japan if Manchuriabv tha US.
While Stalin lived. Communist negotiators at Panmunjom refused to rotreat from their demand for forcible repatriation. New Dohli's efforts to smooth the wayon-promise were rejected when Foreign Minister Vlshinsky on2 and Chou En-lai on2 attacked the Indianon repatriation as unacceptable. As late asn an interview with Indian Ambassador Krishna Menon, Stalin avoided advancing new proposals on Korea and showed no real interest in the Indian compromise effort. Mao, too, remainod adamanteclaring that "however many years American imperialism prefers to fight, wo are ready to fight (speech. Stalin had raised East-West tensionsigh level, and Mao was pro-pared to sustain those tensions.
On the battlofiold, smell-unit actions continued in localized struggles for hill positions and, although tho Communists had taken losses in2 that had cut their estimated total strengtht tho ond of the month, their total began to climb slowly again in November as fighting tapered off. Both sides made tho same calculation, namely,ajor offensive would leadery high casualty rate butilitary.
2
top^ecrez.
*1
Tho death of Stalinermitted theof an entirely new attitude among the 8oviettoward East-West tensions in general and toward concluding an armistice in particular.* Moscow now appeared to be more anxious touick end to the war than did Peking. Soviet statements in March following Stalin's death were more conciliatory toward the West than those of the Chinose. of tho Council of Ministers Malenkov stated onarch that "there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries." For the first time since the end of World War IX, Moscow Radio onarch admitted that the US and Britain hadole incommon victory" over the Axis powers. This followed Foreign Minister Molotov's unexpected agreemont onarch to intercede with the North Koreanto obtain the release ofritish diplomats andinterned in North Korea since tho start of the war. urther indication of tho change in tho Soviet attitude was Malenkov'h depiction of the Korean wardefensive"in hisarch aiessago to Kim Il-sung onoviet-Korean agreement. Significantly, it differedimilar message to Kimhen Stalin had described tho warstruggle for liberation of then which any cease-fire would be conditioned on the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.
Three days after Chou'a return from talks with the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, the Communists unexpectedly agreedoutine UNC offer for an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners which General Clark had reiterated in his letter ofebruary. In suggesting that the exchange of the sick and wounded might be the first step leading to the "smooth sottlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing," the Communists indicated
death of Stalin provided the Soviet leaders with tho opportunity to jettison Stalin's more sonseless andpositions and to use methods of flexibility inariety of goodwill gesturesiminution of doctrinal hostility to Western governments. Stalin wasabout the international situation leadingeneral war, but for reasons of doctrinal obsossions and personal prestige, he refused to moderate the Soviet attitude toward the West and toward neutrals, and refused to make concessions on important international issues dividing the West and the Communist bloc.
XII-23
onew and real interest in solving the last crucial probleuease-fire agreement. This was the first indication that the Chinese might be willing tooncession on repatriation.
But Maorotracted political struggle as he prepared to make his retreat on forcible repatriation as small as possible. The Chinese used ambiguous and face-saving language in an effort toeries of fallback positions, which they surrendered only after it was clear the UNC would insist on the voluntary principle. An ambiguous proposal by Chou En-laioth sides
should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insiot upon repatriation and hand over the remaining prisoners of wareutral state so as toust solution to the question* of their repatriation (omphasis
left unclear the matter of final disposition of prisoners who were unwilling to return to China and North Korea. The Chinese propagandists described Chou'a proposal ashich it was, as tho point thatwho were unwilling to be repatriated should be handod overeutral countryhinese retreat. Chou had been deliberately vague In not stating Chinese demands for forcible repatriation, but Chineao propaganda returned to the demands by insisting on the principle of totalby wayeutral state. That the Chinese hadoncession in fact while insisting on theto cover their retreat Is indicated by the statement of the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat, Fas-saniev, whoember of the Norwegian delegation onarch thot Chou's declaration on prisoners was "the real thing" and that onlyremain to be worked out.
The UNC appraised this concession as indicating no change on the substantive mattor of voluntary repatriation, and they pressed the Communists to clarify their position on where screening would tako place, on its duration, and on whethor the voluntary principle would be part of aagreement. After manipulating the language of their counter-proposals throughout April,ay the Communists
xn-24
TOr-SEGREX.
made two mora key concessions. They dropped thethat no repatriates should be sent physically to astate and reduced the explaining period from six to four months. Finally,une, the Communists' chiefNam II, using language dosigned to conceal thecapitulation on forcible repatriation, stated that "so-cording to the application of each individual, those who elect to go to the neutral nations shall be assisted by theNations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India." That is, men who refused to return to thecountries could reach non-Communist countries through the channeleutral-nations commission stationed in Korea, if explanations failed to porsuade them to return horre. In this way, Mao accepted voluntary repatriationisguised form. His propagandists stated that ex-prisoners may go to "neutralithout making it clear that they were in fact free to go wherever they chose.
Mao was anxious to stillegree of political prestige before the cease-fire agreement was signed. Faco-saving offensives were launched in June and July by theto achieve several objectives: (a) to move the line farther south, (b) to give ROKloody-nose in order to convince Rhee that his forces could not "Marchnd (c) to convince international opinion that the CCF and NKPA were not weaker than UNC forces and that themotive in seeking an armistice was not that of avoiding military defeat. Although suffering heavy losses between April and Julyestimated total ofwere over one million CCF and NKPA forces in Korea, well-fed adequately clothed, and effectively supported by massedby tho time of the signing of the armistice onuly.
Mao's capitulation on the principle of forciblecapitulation which provided the Westajor propagandastemmed from several major considerations.
1. One was pressure from tho post-Stalin leadership. The Soviet loaders were clearly anxious to consolidate their internal position and to relax international tension. They wcro alert to the hardor policy taken toward tho China mainland by the new administration of President Eisenhower. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders could be certain that the new administration would keep the war limited In tho event that truce talks remained deadlocked. Chinese ap-prohonsion over the possibility of an attack, or ateries of substantial raids, from Taiwan was reflected in
XII-25
the resumption of recruiting in Shanghai in February and3 and in defense activity along the south China coast. Implicit warnings. officials that Washing-con would not accept an indefinite deadlock and Secretary of State Dulles' explicit statement to Nehru onruce could not be arranged,. could not be expected to continue to refrain from using atomicincreased Communist apprehensions. They were also awaro that in the spring. had moved atomic missiles to Okinawa. The post-Stalin leadership desired toroater distance from the brink ofin the Korean war than Stalin had believed necessary; they wore unwilling to risk an escalation on thewhich might well have provoked extension. air-strikos to the China mainland.
could perceive no further advantage intho limited war. He was aware that the talkingthe war of political attrition, intended to reducepower of the UNC on the voluntary repatriationfailed. The blackmailis,and "bacteriologicalhichof the talkingnot forced a His plan of attrition, requiringin non-Communist countries to soften up theof enemy governments (while policy critics in thecountries were effectivelyidhim with the advantage he calculated would beInajor retreat. Despite histhe talking phase, the UNC prevailed on tho issueannouncing onuly0 Koreans
hinese would return to Communist control,oreans0 Chinese would be non-repatriates. (Earlier, onune, Rhea had0 Koroan Obviously, those figuresolitical embarrassment to his regime which the now Soviet loaders had to convince him to accept.
wanted to get on with the job of Although political and economic conditions inNorth Korea probably were not exerting compellingon tho Communists to conclude an armistice inhe war was probably viewed as injuriouseconomic dovelopment programs. Politicalhad been increased in China during tho war and the
XII-26
economic strains on the Chinese were probably loss severe in the spring3 than they had been0ut Hao was anxious to begin China's First Five-Year Plan of economic development, and tho North Koreans were aware that they would have to start virtually from scratch to
To aura up, Hao moved Into the talking phase in Korea because his best field armies had suffered very heavy losses and were retreating under UNC military pressure. Hoviewed the enormous loss of human lives withcallousness, but was forced to draw back because the military capability of his armies had been greatly When confronted with the UNC's demand that noshould be forced to return to Communist control, he engagedprotracted struggle" in the hope ofajor concession from the Western powers by combining division-lovol battlefield pressure with politicaltactics. But he decided to end the Chinesewhen UNC presistence and Soviet pressure convinced him that further intransigence was purposeless and even harmful to the mainland's economic construction.
C.
Near the end of the Xorean war, Viet Minh prestige was steadily increasing, and its military succosses andeffectiveness bolstered Ho Chi Minn's confidence that he couldecisive military victory. He was determined therefore, to prosecute the revolutionarywar more actively and felt under no real compulsion to movo toward the talking phase of his long-term effort against the French. On tho other hand, lack of Frenchsuccess and increasing domestic political pressure to reduce or close out the commitment in Indochina mado aof Prench premiers and cabinets pessimistic about everilitary decision over Bo's forces.
Even after General Navarre assumed command in Indochinahe French were unable to revise tholr losing strategy in the fielduch touted (but neverplan for mobile warfare drawn on paper. The forceietnamese0 Vietnamese0 Laotians,0 Cambodians that Navarreproved unable to take over effectively the job of static defense, so Navarro was impelled to fall bock on the
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old losing policy of tying down and dispersing French and French Union regular* toeries of key strongpoints. Outotalegulars and0 auxiliaries, there were only seven sxjbile groups and eight parachuteequivalent of threewere notto ismobile, defensive duties.
In contrast, tho Viet Minh was not tied down to static defense and with0 full-time regional and provincial troops,art-timeshort, the operating oquivalont of ninefreely through the countryside ond choso the place to attack the enemy forces. For example, strong Viet Minh guerrilla elements together with two Viet Minh divisions sufficed to containegular French Union forces in the Tonkin Delta. The Viet Minh skill in guerrilla warfare and in infiltrating into areas under French control seriously reduced Navarre's ability to toko the offensive.
While the French were cursed with the necessity ofa number of politically important but militarilypoints, Navarre was also under political restraint from Paris. Because of domestic criticism of the war in Indochina, the French government had directed its commander in the field to incur the fewest possible number of French casualties. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, was receiving strong support, both military and political, from its allies. Tho armistice in Korea had enabled Mao to increasehis aid across the southern China border to Ho's forces, strengthening their unit firepower and overallcapability. All along, Viot Minh regular forcos ln northern Indochina continued their gradual evolution from lightly armed guerrilla bandsegularly organizedforco with Chinese and Soviet equipment.
For all these reasons. Ho clearlyomplete military victory and gave no indication that he would beto attain lessegotiated settlement than his forces could seizo on the battlefield.
The post-Stalin Soviet leadership, however,ofter policy toward East-West military conflictsecessary element in their long-range effort to dissolve the Wostem alliance in Europe. They tried to temporise on evory major East-West difference in order to increase
pressure against the us by its allieselaxation of trado controls, for great power negotiations, and for delays in rearmament and in European integration. The Sovietcalculated that such pressures and frictions wouldreduce the West's capability for united action, as witness Malenkov's statement of the Soviet strategy in his speech
If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent bystrife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration.
This strategy formed the basis of the Soviet campaign of the pivotal slogan of which had been set forth by Malenkov in his statement that "there isingle controversial or unsettled question which could not be solved by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of the interested countries." (Speech of But Ho apparently was unwilling to end the war for Sovietinterests, and Moscow was impelled toistinction between the need to settle the Korean war and the need tothe Indochina war.
Shortly after Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders hadistinction between the Korean war, which should be settled, and the Indochinese fight for "nationalwhich should continue. (Pravda article of They insisted that the Soviet Union cannot beto "retard the Liberation movement" of colonial peoples. (Pravda editorial of But the Soviet leaders also tried desperately to deny that their position oncut across their "peace policy and seized upon and quoted with approval Churchill's remark that the Viet Minh offensive into Laos was notoviet-inspired move "inconsistent" with the attitude of the Sovietand suggested that the chances for mutualbetween East and west would be improved if other Wcstorn leaders would recognize the real causes of themovements." (Pravda editorial ofo made it clear to the Soviet leaders, who did not have the influence with him that they had had with Kim Il-sung, that the distinction between the peace movement and the Indochina waro maintained. iet Minh message ofunethrough Peking to the Viet Minh ambassador in Moscow informed the latter that the war in Laos should not be treated
Yd
as contributing to the defense of "worldut ashe message clearly indicated that Ho refused to have his effort subordinated to the needs of Moscow's European policy, particularlyime when.aid deliveries were averaging as muchonth and Viet Minh forces were moving closer to theobjectiveomplete military victory.
Ho was also aware of the demoralizing effect that French political disputes were having on French troops in Indochina and almost certainly viewed this development as improving Viet Minh chances in the field. The Frenchinitiative in Indochina was constantly being tempered by political considerations in Paris, andenior French official in Soigon stated privately that the confused state of French politics and the political issuesin handling the Indochina war were complicatingNavarre's task of restoring morale and confidence in the French officer corps. The Viet Minh continued to insist inflexibly on their hard-line demand that the basic condition for negotiations was the complete withdrawal of French troops. By latehey had gained effective control over more than half of the Tonkin population and were believed to have the military capability of occupying the entire delta.
The signing of tho Korean armistice in late3 provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to maneuver activelyegotiated settlement of the Indochina war. During tho first two weeks after the armistice, Moscow's statements directed in large part to the French, established the line that the Korean truce demonstrated the "victory of negotiations over force" and that this hasnew stimulus" to the struggleeaceful solution to the "dirty war" in Indochina. Whereas prior to the truce,had attacked suggestions faregotiations concerning Indochina, by3 it was quoting with approval demands in the French pressPanmunjom" in Indochina. By contrast, Viet Minh broadcasts in3 warned that the armistice must not affect the continuation of the war against the French, who will not seek an armisticehortnd that "we mustrotractedntensify our fighting so as to annihilate more enemy troops; this is the only way to compel the enemy to accept peace in Vietnam."
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As the Soviet leaders began to maneuver for asettlement/ they acted to impress the Chinese leaders with the political benefits which would accrue to China in the event of high-level talks. They gave increasingto the big-power status of the Peking regime andthat "serious current problems" in Asia could not be resolved without Chinese Communist participation. (Soviet note to the Western powers
The Chinese, who had been working for several years to gain wider recognition as the only legitimate government of China, welcomed this Soviet line. Indicating that Chinese Communist position was closer to the Soviet position, their delegate to the World Peace Council called for "step by step negotiations" of East-West issues. (Speech of3 by Kuo Mo-jo) eptember, Peking specifically cited the Indochina issue as one which could be solved "only bytho principle of negotiatednd Chou En-lai in mid-September privately informed the Swedish ambassador in Pekingig-power conference on Korea could alsosignificant change in Chou's previousthat Indochina could not be discussed at such a
By late summer, the Soviets had begun to contactFrench officials privately; in early August, Ambassador Vinogradov indicated to Foreign Minister Bidault Moscow's desire to begin "general discussions" and openly hinted that the Indochina issue could be included. By early September, the Soviet leaders had indicated to the French ambassador in Moscowoviet mission was to go to Viet Minh"to study conditions under which the Viet Minh can undertake peace negotiations." These Soviet initiatives were madeime when Ho was still resisting the concept of negotiations: thond American propagandawhich has the "semblance ofs advanced in the "vain hope of weakening the will of our people, who ask only toowever painful and long." (Ho Chi Minh speech Ho continued to insistprotractednasmuch as his forces had not been hurt in the field. On the contrary, in the falliot Minh military capabilities wereew high pointesult of the marked increase in Chinese aid, thelight casualties suffered during the previousseason, and the excellent state of its intelligenceFrench troops dispositions and tactical plans.
XII-31
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The attitude of the Viot Hinh loaders at the time is further confirmation of tho generalization that the Asian Communists have been unwilling to begin the talking-phase of their dual tacticsime whon they are militarily in an advantageous position and have not suffered highin tho fiold.
French operations to counter expanded Viet Kinhwarfare in the southern Tonkin Delta area had met with very limited success in3 and at the cost of heavy casualties. After an area was "cleared- by the French, the Viot Hinh reappeared quickly and Navarre's men, like those of Stalin, his defensive-minded predecessor, ware tied down and dispersedtatic defense of provincial crossroads waiting for the Viet Hinh to come at them again in tho night. As the French waited for the Viet Minh fall offensive, reliable reports indicated that they had only four battalions in their mobilo reserves in Tonkin and that their military position was "grave." The Viet Minh was aware of this Prench weaknessiet Minh source which was believed by American officials to have penetrated the French high command) Viet Hinh messagesknowledge of the complete order of battle of the Vietnamese national army, detailed reports of Frenchand information on the deployment and plans of tho Prench-Vietnamese forces.
As certain French cabinet officials and many members of the National Assembly increased their demands thatLaniol and Foreign Minister Bidault move to end the costly war by negotiations, Ho apparently was broughtincreasing pressure from Moscow and Peking to agroe to enter tho talking-phase of tho Viet Hinh effort in Indochina. Quoting Izyestiya in itsse-language broadcast ofeptember, Moscow Radio declared that there exists no international miaundorstanding which could not be settled peaceably.
Inenior French official had indicated to American State and Defense Department officers that tho French were fighting in Indochina toosition of strength from which they could negotiate on "honorable" aettlcmont and that the French government was convinced that France could not win tho war in Indochina any mora than tho US could win the Korean war. in earlyhis theme was taken up againrench Foreign Ministry spokesman who indicated to American officials that
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the only way France saw of ending the war lay through asettlement with the Viet Minh.
Accordingeliable sourcectober, French cabinet ministers agreed to ask Foreign Minister Bidault to suggest to Washingtonive-power meeting,Communist China, should take up the matter on how to end the war as soon as possible. Onctober, Chou En-lai accepted the US proposalseeting to discuss the time and place for the Korean political conference, and Peking's propaganda continued to point to the need tointernational problems through peaceful means.
Ho was clearly reluctant to switch to the talking-phase, but because of Soviet and Chinese pressure as well as domestic pressure on ths French government to agree to bilaterals, he apparently believed thatedged offer to talk would improve his international prestige without hindering Viet Minh military initiatives. In their note ofovember to the Western powers, the Soviet leaders had indicated their desire to prepare the wayive-power East-West foreign ministers' conference at which Communist China would be present, and they apparently insisted that Ho should at least appear to be loss adamantly against talks with the French than he had been. (Politburo member Truong Chinh had declared on1 that peacewould be "illusory" and that the French would have to be expelledecessary condition of peace, and Hostated3 that "We know that only the resistance, however painful and long it may be, can give us victory and restore peace to us.")
When, in lateo began to bring hisa step closer to that of Peking and Moscow, he accepted the principle of negotiations but insisted on the practice of continuing military methods toettlement satis-factory to the Viet Minh. He conceded through his spokesmen that "every international problem can be settledctober) and that "to stop the Vietnam war through negotiations is completely necessary and alsoovember). But in his reply to questions posed by thepaper, Exprcssen, Ho onovember in effectomplete French surrender. He asked the French to begin bilateral negotiations byeaceHo was only prepared tostop fighting, to recognize
XII-33
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tupseg&ej:
the Viot Minh regime, and, by implication, to withdraw from Vietnam. Ho implied that, in return, he might not continue his war until the Viet Minhomplete military Actually, he continued to fight, and despite eona displays of French aggressiveness, the military initiative was with the Viet Minh, whose forces in late3 included divisions in Tonkin so disposed as to permitagainst northwest Tonkin, against tho northwest corner of the dolta, or against Laos.
Ho's hedged proposal ofovemberhree-pronged exorcise of considerable political skill. dvanced tho Soviet and Chinese "peace offensivo,urtherthe Laniel government from the National Assembly and the French press,evived and deepened Vietnamese distrust of the French, who were viewed as being at the brinkpacifist trap" and who might decidereater military effort in the field. At the same time, Ho had his own paramount interest to protect,omplete military victory, and in tho first viot Minh commont on his proposal, it was mado cloar to Moscow and Poking that peace could be attained only throughmilitary struggle and that the Viet Minh had no illusion that peace could be easily won. (Viet Minh news agency broadcast
In France, Premier Laniel, supported by Foreign Minister Bidault, rejected immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh in tho illusory hope that future negotiations could beon more favorable terms after military successes In the field.
Ho's generals continued their highly successful strategy of dispersing French forces in static defonse positions while moving into areas of their own choosing. Khen, ineneral Navarre made the recently captured Dion hientrongpoint to prevent moves into northern Laos, some Viet Minh forces began to move artillery into the sur-roundinq area and, in late December, other Viet Minh forces swept southward into central Laos.
*Uo stated tnat "if the French government wishes to; have an armistice and settle the question through negotiations, we will be ready to meet the French proposal."
xil-34
This invasion of Laos by the Viet Kinh was treatedby Moscow and Peking, who muted reports of the new development in their commentaries and stressed the demand for an end to the war. The Soviet leaders, who were searching desperately for "proof" that Ho really intended to negotiate, centered their commentaries on this proposal ofovember. "The recent statement by President Ho Chi Minh on historench proposal on an armistice, shouldroposal be made, constituted striking proof of the peaceful intentions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." (Moscow Radio commentary ofhile initiating little independent comment, Pekingto rebroadcast foreign statements alleging that only US pressure prevented Paris from seeking an end to thewar.
By contrast, the Viet Minh generally avoided the matteregotiated settlement and reminded its forces that real peace could be won "only by pushing forward the armed struggle and by dealing deadly blows at the enemy until he is compelled to demand negotiations." (Viet Minh radio broadcast of Byhen at least six battalions of Viet Minh were maintainingon French forces in central Laos and moreere blocking all avenues of exit from Dien Bien Phu and bringing in artillery for the siege, the divergence between Ho, on the one hand, and the Soviet and Chinese leaders, on the other, remained clear-cut and reflected his reluctance to enter the talking-phase when his forces were consolidating portions of northwest Tonkin. By insisting that Parisormal proposal for talks to the Viet Minh, Ho had placed the onus for avoiding negotiations on tho Prench government, which continued to equivocate on the issue.
His forces held the initiative throughout Indochina as the result of widespread simultaneous offensive actions by the time the four-power Berlin conference convened on The drive into northern Laos of an0 Viet Minh troops, continued encirclement of Dien Bien Phu, the capture of small French posts in southern andLaos, and extensive harassing operations in the Tonkin deltaurther overall dispersal of French regular forces. ebruary, the American army attache in Saigon
XII-35
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reported that staff thinking and procedures at Frenchwere of9 vintage" and that Navarre's strategy was identical to that of the defense-minded Salan, Navarre tied upattalions of regular troops at Dien Bien Phu, only to be by-passed by the Viet Minh, who had moved into portions of Laos but had not been engaged even where the Frenchhree-to-one advantage. French patrolling from strongpoints was "the exception rather than the rule,"apparent instructions from Paris to Navarre that he mustminimum-casualty holding action"iew to eventual big-power negotiations.
As domestic pressure to end the war increased on the French government in the absence of victories in the field, two alternatives to bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh were considered!Ill an internationalinternationalization" of the war through
Araerican--involvement(
oreign Minister Bidault reported from the Berlin conference onanuary his intention to work for 'joint discussion of the Indochina question by those principallynd suggested an approach toMinister Molotov to try to end the war. Bidaultthe hope that he had convinced Secretary Dulles earlier that the reasoning behind American acceptance of an armistice in Korea was even more valid for Indochina. Military prospects were dismal. officer inresponsible for estimates of the over-all situation in Indochina/ told the American military attacheeb^ ruary that the situation in the Tonkin delta wasrench military victory there was impossible, and that the population was turning increasingly to the Viet Minh. According to Ambassador Heath, who spoke withNavarre on the same day. the General's main concern was the effect any losses he might incur would havo in Paris, and when the visiting French air force chief of staff said that Prance could take its officer losses for only one year more, Navarre replied that if that was the spirit in France, it had better pull out now. General Le Blanc, chief of staff of the French army, also stated in Saigon that France should use its officers and troops for NATO and appeared to catalogue the reasons why the war could never be won.
XII-36
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In short, well before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Prench government officials and army staff officers regarded apeace as the inevitable solution to the war. essage to Saigon onebruary, Bidault indicated that at the forthcoming Geneva conference
The time and the conditions of the negotiation, or, negotiations, which are likely to be necessary to to end the Indochina war are left in large measure to our initiative. The Americans have committed themselves to sit by our side at the time of theof the problem in Geneva with the Chinese, out it will be our responsibility to say how we desire to orient the continuation of the talks.
Despite Bidault'sebruary promise to Secretary Dulles at Berlin to pushtrong military offensive tothe Viet Minh drive, it was clearly impossible for the dispersed French forces to concentrate in the springaximum effort.
' almost all French spokesmen hadopposed internationalization of the conflict, speaking for himself, Pierre de Cnevigne, Frenchof state for the army, told the American consul in uanoi onebruary that he would not be averse to He said that American equipment
??Uldituation, implicitly rejected the build-up of the Vietnamese armyubstitute for American participation, and said that nothing was to be gained byolitical arrangement with the Viet Minh. His opinion, however, was atypical.. By contrast, French officials in Paris, largely for fear ofretext for Chinese intervention, continued to rebuff firmly any suggestion that American troops would be necessary-
Tho Communists hit hard at the possibility ofinvolvement in responding to speculation in thepress, reflecting their own calculation that theViet Minh initiatives in the field might impel direct intervention- by Washington. One of MolotoWs
Xii-37
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chief aims at the Berlin meeting in agreeing to the Geneva conference was to block any possible increase in American military assistance to the French. The Chinese Communists, satisfied with the Berlin agreementirst step in gaining general acceptance by the international community, warned that increased American involvement in Indochina was making the issue of Geneva more complicated. Ho Chi Minn expressed his concern when,arch, he accused the US of "another step" toward direct intervention inthe American air force to participate" in the Indochina war.
Soviet plans to end the waregotiatedat Gonovaove to convince Ho thatinternational prestige could be derived fromthe talking-phase of his military effort in Indochina. According to an intercepted French message, Molotov was quoted as saying at the Berlin meeting that "all parties concerned" should participate in the Geneva conference on Indochina, just as both Koreas should take part inon Korea. Praydaarch attacked Foreign Minister Didault's public statement that it was notto invite Ho's representative to Geneva and insisted that "it is impossible to solve the Indochina problemconsidering the lawful right of her people." As Soviet propaganda continued to press for Viet Minh participation at Geneva, Ho waslear insight into his prospective political gains: unprecedented international prestige,of French-Vietnamese frictions, demoralization of French forces in the field, and reduction of the risk of direct American involvement in the war. Nevertheless, he clearly preferred bilaterals with the French (in order to prevent US pressure on Laniel to remain intransigent) and considered the attendanceultilateral conference would reduce his position of strength. He finally agroed, however, to multilaterals.
Moscow and Paris began to 3et forth their positions before the Geneva conference was convened. oviet embassy official in London told American officials that if the US and France object to an amalgamation of the Vietnam and Viet Minh administrations, "they can agreeivision alongh parallel." This first Soviet comment on Geneva suggested that Moscow was the most active advocate of partition which would deprive the French of the heavily populated, strategic Tonkin Delta and open the way
XII-38
top^egrex.
Hivma^naiii^^HiinHiBBjmmvniimpn
for Viet Minh control of the whole country. Premier Laniel set forth tho French position publiclyarch by calling
"OTple-ce- withdrawal of all rebel troops from Laos and Cambodia, establishmenteutral zone around the Red River delta, and withdrawal of all Viet Minh troops from tnat area, lie was awaro that these terms would be unaccept-
*ifas was later conceded by the Foreign Ministry official who formulated them in order to forestall any Viet Minh offers for bilateral negotiations before Geneva. Rumors in Paris of direct French-viet Minh contacts were notandarch, the Geneva alternative enabled Lanie^
S?J Dressure for immediate bilateral talks with the viet Minh.
All the while, Viet Minh tactical capabilities were continuing to improve, particularly with respect toartillery and heavier infantry weapons acquired fromach succeeding campaigning season left the French occupying fewer outposts and the Viet Minh spread over larger areas of the intervening countryside.
frt HQf0re entGrin9 tha talking-phase of the IndochinaHo apparently decided to demonstrate Viet Minh strenqth in the field. Heajor military move for political reasons; onarch, Viet Minh battalions hit strongpoints at Dien Bien Phu. He was willing to acceptilJed and wounded outotal0 troops byarch. He was also willing to depart from Viet Minh military tactics byajor stronq-point without the olement of surpriserench message of ii March from Hanoi to Saigon revealed that the French were aware of the time the attack was to occur, the units involved, and the logistic build-up in the area.) Though the size and timing of the attack wore anticipated, however, tnc Communist assault did incorporate one major factor for which the French were not prepared; the massive and exten-
Communist possession and employment
of itselfajor element of surprise and rendered invalid the French tactical assumption, on which planning for the defense of Dien Bien Phu had been based.
In early April during the siege. Ho indicated tonewsman Wilfred Burchett that the French situation at Dien Bien Phu was hopeless. Hoelmet upside downable, and compared the helmet's rim to the
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Pi."1
prcs-
hills around Dien Bien Phu, saying: "They shoot up and we shoote apparently calculated that loss of Dien Bien Phu would reduce Vietnamese army morale, already lowered by talk of on imminent truce; seriously discredit thetrategy of Navarre; give the Viet Minh aboost in prestige immediately prior to the Geneva conference, thus increasing the incentive for defection by Vietnamese nationalists; and increase French domestic aure for direct negotiations with hia representatives,
As Laniel and Bidault parried domestic demandsiet Minh negotiations, they were alsoto increasing Soviet pressure before the Genevabegan. Soviet officials in Washington insisted to French officials onarch that direct talks between French and Viet Minh representatives should be held "in order toease-fire prior to Geneva." Thereturned to the matter of bilaterals even after the conference began, anday, Molotov told ForeignEden that the French and "Indochinese" should work out an armistice "themselves,"
Moscow and Peking were anxious to disparage American foot-dragging and used Secretary Dulles1 speech onarch, in which he suggested that the West should take "unitedtoommunist seizure of Indochina, to spur ^arls into bilaterals. They were particularly fearful that the American preference for the French to fight would stiffen Bidault further at Geneva and make French concessions more difficult to extract from him there, flanked by Secretary Du21es. They were also concerned about American statements regarding eventual if not immediate involvement; Pravda onpril claimed that the real target of US threats was China, and the Peking People's Daily declared onpril that "faced with armed aggression, the Chinese people will certainly not refrain from doing something about it." On
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pril, Chou En-lai made another noncommittal deterrent statement: the Chinese "most emphatically will not tolerate aggression against us by any country" and the US is lookingnew world war." At the same time, the Chinese stepped up their already large military and medical aid shipments to the Viet Minh for the Dien Bien Phu siege.
The series of assaults on Dien Bien Phu throughout April indicated that Ilo intended to take the strongpoint evenery high cost. Despite murderous losses, which in late April and early May were variously estimated at about two divisions0o's forcesto attack in intermittent phases. Their estimated strength was0 infantry plustroops, as compared with less0 French Union Troops. Thererench and Vietnamese regulars in the Tonkin Delta, but the greater part of this number was still tied down in static defense, leaving thefew raohile units to counter the increased Viet Minh activity.
By the start of the Geneva conference onhe overall military situation in Indochina and theserious situation at Dien Bien Phu had provided Ho, and his Soviet and Chinese partners,osition of considerable strength to use to offset American warnings auout possible internationalization of the war. Sovietprivately made various suggestionsettlement such as partition, nation-wide elections, and an immediate cease-fire. Calculating that the French would be moreto some sort of partition thanoalitionSoviet diplomats on the opening day of the conference privately suggested to American officials that the idea of partition would meet China's requirement that its southern border should be bufferedommunist regime.
The Soviet-Chinese effort to soften up tho French on trie issue of partition was made in the face of theof ho, who like Bao Dai, claimed sovereignty over all Vietnam, as earlyoviet officialsuggested privately to American officials that partition alongth parallel" would be agreeable to Moscow.
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At the Geneva conference, the Viet Minh delegate, Pham Van Dong, tried to use military developments in Indochinaackdrop in demanding major French concessions. Dien nien Phu fellay, with Viet Minh losses estimated atf which about one-half were killed and French Union losses of0 men. Onay, Pham Van Dong set for maximum conditions in the form of an eight-point resolution, the main points of which were political which were linked with military provisionsease-fire: French recognition of the independence of the three Indochinese Communist-sponsored states, withdrawal of foreignlections in each 3tate,otal cease-firo involving occupation by each side of unspecified areas, no reinforcements,ixed control commission. Partition was not mentioned. By tying the French-desired coase-fire to political concessions, the Viet Minh putin tho position of using the military weapon toa French political retreat.
onference deadlock was threatened by French determination to deal with military matters first. toease-firo) and Viet Minh insistence thatand military questions be dealt with together, Chou Bn-lai and Molotov, playing major negotiating roles, moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the OS as an excuse for Intervention in the fighting. In his major speech ofay, Molotov had explicitly rejected the French terms for an armistice because Bidault's formula did not deal with political questions. However, at the secret session onh, he conceded that military questions could be discussed first. Chou En-lai also retreated)rivate conversation with Eden onay, he stated that theand political aspects of any Indochina settlement must be dealt with separately, with priorityoase-fire. These concessions strongly suggested that neither Moscow nor Peking desired protracted talks; they undercut Viet Minh intransigence and policy to prolong the talks.
Ho calculated that negotiations could continue together with the fighting for some time without leading to American
XII-42
involvement. iet Minh conroentary of mid-May seemed to be directed at reminding the Chinese and Soviets that there was no pressing need to end the wart
We still remember the Korean lesson which taught us that one could negotiate and fight at the samefor two years.
Ho was clearly determined to protract the talking-phase to gain as much territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the French were willing to concede. As the Viet Minh augmunted its forces in the Tonkin Delta with units from the Dien Bien Phu operations, helping to compress French-controlled areas there, Ho's delegate at Geneva apparently was instructed to insist again on political concessions in exchangeease-fire. He hardened the Communist position, which Molotov and Chou Bn-lai had been making increasingly more flexible*
Phaia Van Dong onay insisted on French political concessions before agreeing to end the fighting. He linked any cease-firo prospect with arrangements for "Khmer Is-serak and Pathethe Communist-contrived regimes in Cambodia and Laos, and in effect dsnied that military and political questions could be separated. Dong alsoard line on the Soviet-Chinese concept of partition,the "readjusting of areas under control of eachaking into account the actual areas controlled, including population, and strategio interests.** Inasmuch as Chinese Communist maps showed the Viet Minh as holding most of Vietnam, about half of Laos, and parts of Cambodia, the Viet Minh proposalemand for considerablethan its units held on the ground.
Onay, however, an agreement was reached to have representatives of both commands moot at Geneva to study the disposition of forces priorease-fire- Molotov and Chou apparently were the prime movers on the Communist side in making this concession. Moscow and Peking, whose policy was centered on splitting the Americans from the French andystem of alliances from forming in Asia, were apprehensive regarding tho demands of most French military leaders and some Laniel cabinet members that the US enter the war. Accordingly, Molotov and Chou worked hard to attain soae kind of agreement at Geneva and toan abortive conference from leading to interaatlonaliza tion of the war. Militarily, Ho was keeping up the pressure
xii-43
a captured Viet Minh document of late4 directed Viet Minh commanders in the Tonkin Delta area to continue their harassing and guerrilla activities for an unspecified period "pending commitment of the battle corps."
Opposition of the French to the idea of partitionto weaken as they pressedease-fire with controls, andune, the French minister for the Associated States told Ambassador Heath in Geneva that he favored partitionolution at abouthat about the line suggested by the Soviets earlier.
The negotiationsew turn as the Lanieltried to survive the National Assembly debate onwhich beganune. On the preceding day. theindicated that they would use the weakenedposition to gain their maximum demands;ard line, similar to that of Pham van Dong as set forth onay. Molotov demanded independence for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, free elections in these states, and withdrawal of all foreign troops. He seemed to believe that the Laniel government would either move toward the maximum Communist position or bo replacedovernment pledged to negotiate an immediate end to the war, andoviet Pravda writer told an American journalist in Geneva that no progress on Indochina was possible until after the French government crisis was resolved. Onrench official in Saigon told the American charge there that all members of the endangered Laniel cabinetthe Premier, Bidault, and Schumann had "written off the war" and were anxious to end it. Onune, the Laniel government fell, losing the voto of confidence in theAssembly after the debate on the war; onune, Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier, and he promised to close out the fighting byuly.
In the military conversations between the French and the Viet Minh in Geneva, the latter asked for direct control of about three-fourths of Vietnam, half of Laos, and much of Cambodia. In the field. General Ely stated privately onune that the military situation in the Tonkin Delta was precarious and that French and Vietnamese troops were "very, very tired." The Viet Minhapabilityull-scale attack on the delta.
XII-44
to
The ever-present prospect of American involvement again impelled Molotov and Chou to keep the conference alive with small concessions. Onune, Molotov tried to break the deadlock over the composition of the international truce supervisory commission, and on the same day, Chouettlement proposal which implied withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia, Under pressure, Pham Van Dong also suggested postponementolitical settlement for those two states. Thus by the time the Genevaterminated its Korea phase and temporarily adjourned, the Soviets and Chinese seemed to have moved back in effectositionartition of Vietnam and aLaos and Cambodia. When Pierre Mendes-Prance took over as the now Premier pledged to seek an end to theuly, the road was openedinal settlement.
onversation at Bern onune, Chou told Mendes-France that an armistice should be reached in Vietnam as soon as possible, andinal political settlement should be reached thereafter. This broke the linkby the Viet Minhilitary truce andsolution. Regarding Laos and Cambodia, Chou said that all foreign forces, including the Viet Minh, should beand that there must be no American bases in either state. When the new French Premier complained that thestaff talks between the French and Viet Minh at Geneva had been stalled for several days because of Viet MinhChou agroed to intervene to speed the talks. During the conference recess, Chou, in discussions with Nehru in late June in New Delhi, apparently set forth aplan.
Chou then moved to apply pressure on Ho to drop his demands for retaining troops in Laos and Cambodia andartition line as far south ash parallel. He met with Ho at Nanning on the China-Vietnam border in early July, on his return from India and Burma, to discuss with him the tonusinal settlement. lear sign that Chou had insisted that Ho give some ground in theViet Minh position appeared in the remark made by the Chinese deputy foreign minister to the French delegateulyi Chou hadvery good meeting" with Ho, theof which "would bo helpful to the French." When the Viet Minh tried again at the reconvened conference to gain permission to retain their troops in Laos and Cambodia and to settle onh parallel, Mendes-France complained to
XTI-45
YO^SEGREXl
Chou that this was unacceptable and out of accord with chou's position. Chou replied that both sides must makewith the Viet Hinh making the larger. Onuly, following Chou's statement to the French Premier, Pham Van Dong changed his position and told Mendes-France that he was prepared to compromise onh parallel. The Prench stilline betweenhh parallels, and rejected Viet Minh demands for control of some part of Laos and elections in all three Associated States.
The final settlement onuly indicated that the Viet Minh had retreated on three points. They accepted theof Vietnam (they had insisted on "unity" of Vietnam) and with the line ath parallel (they had wantedhey agreed to withdraw from areas south of that line in Vietnam and from all of Laos and Cambodia; and they accepted6 as the date for nationaltwo-yearcontrasting with their demand forix-month delay.
Pham Van Dong had come to Geneva with the apparentthat the Viet Minh's increasingly strong military position in the field would enable him to extractconcessions from the French to open the way forforces to further penetrate Laos and Cambodia andeverything aboveh parallel in Vietnam. But Soviet and Chinese pressures, stemming from larger policy considerations and fear of American intervention, frustrated this hope for maximum French concessions. Although Hocertain advantages in ending the militaryis, his forces could take territory by political subversion and, therefore, his effort would be less costly in terms of manpower and safer in terms of non-involvement by thehe had not expected to have to make so many political These concessions were later viewed by him and his lieutenantsajor mistake. His forces had not been decimated in the field, as the Chinese armies had been in Korea in the spring1 when Mao moved to the talking-phase of the Korean war. He probably was concerned about the prospect of US intervention, but Moscow and Peking were clearly more concerned about the consequences to their policy of internationalization of the war. He was in ato negotiate from strength and to do soong
1
Prench military and intelligence officials agreed that Viet Minh forces in the delta following the fall of Dien Bien Phu were capable ofamaging full-scale offensive, but it never took place. In mid-July, onejournalist stated that he assumed chou had pressed Ho to keep the fightingow boil when the Genevawas in its last phase. The Chinese indicated their national interest in settling the fighting-phase when, onuly, one of their journalists at Geneva declared "we have won the first campaign for theof all Southeasthe implication being that only Thailandrobable area for the establishment of an American base. Chou in late July, after the Genevawere concluded, stated on two occasions that Asian states must work out their "own" security arrangements, and Pravda onuly emphasized that the area will not be permitted to join any "aggressive groupings."
By contrast, the North Vietnamese leaders were far less categorical in priasing the Geneva conference Pham Van Dong declared at the closing session on
July that the problem of Vietnamese unification remained: "We shall achieve this unity, and we shall achieve it just as we have won the war." This contradicted the Pravda statement ofuly that Viotnameso independence had been "won." On
July, Ho renewed his exhortationslong and arduous struggle* and declared that the division of Vietnam wasemporary and transitional arrangement: "Central, South and North Vietnam are all our land, and our countrywill be unified, the compatriots throughout our country will certainly be liberated." The Viet Minh ambassador in Peking, Hoang Van Hoan acknowledged to Indian correspondents onuly that despite the strong military position of the Viet Minh, it had to compromise on several vital points, notably the timing of elections (put off for twohe question of French troop withdrawal, and the location
of the temporary demarcation line ath parallel, in order to secure peace in Vietnam. The leaders of theGovernment Khmer and Pathetepeated Ho's view that the agreements arefirst step" and calledong, hard struggle.
f.,rnor Pe*in9 revived propaganda support^^tance phantom-governments. Moscow nado little effort to describe the agreement on Vietnam os "temporary" or to stress that portion of the conference declaration dis-
S;9c^artition Vietnam, that is, the Soviet leaders wore satisfiod with partition.
^SSed itB neY international prestige and tho colle<^tive peace in Asia" provided by tho ugreements, whichanifestation of Chou's five principles as declared jointly withu, and Ho.
to sum up' tho Soviet and Chinese leaders induced Ho to enter the talking-phase of tho Indochina war because:
d.fftn.i'offilem which stimulated Western^ threatened toockery of the peace offensive" designed to impede these efforts. Soviet policy in Europe, devised to produce schisms and paralysis an ZTZ aintho us, required til t
ar' ^the KorSan war had oeen removedefense-stimulating conflict.
Jif,kin9s Jtoficovthat anyin Indochina by tho Viot Minh night have
led to the formationtrong anti-Communist alliancereviously uncommitted Asian states?
Pakistani, Indonesian,leaders in his talks with them that theirbe guaranteed by his "five principles." AtSking lnaUtod that the Genevastates from any military al-
,3" "ith tho example of Korea before them, the Chinese and
tinnedCO"ld,notthe possibility that aoffensive in Indochina would groatly increase tho
lobal war. Theya far lower level of risk, namely, politicalearned out by the Viet Minh. They "paid of"(in violation of the Geneva agreements)to Eakemodernized fight-
4 nave influenced the altitude of Ho and his lieutenants toward the current war The clear awareness that they had boon impelled, primarily
xri-4a
iLTllTtJTialf-way atation on the road to total military victory in Vietnam, apparently has made them very reluctant to atop half way again.
Implications for Vietnam Today
iKipossible to exaggerate the importance of this historical lesson for Ho. It sustains hishostility
suggestion that ho again stopalf-wayiiki k to control of all Vietnam. eftiBt Soumalist on
Wc thought we had achieved something with the French by compromisingnd it turned out to be shaky. Only through full and unconditionalcan we achievee are determined to continue to fight until we achieve total victory, that is, military and political, andleavo and accept our four points, (emphasis supplied)
oo<believe that they hadietaxe in pressuring Ho to stopalf-way sta-
d-^tioo
China will continue her absolute support of Vietnam. To toll thoersonally signed the Geneva agreementegret that my having done so iatrouble for our comrades in Vietnam. m not
th^time deceivod bvAmerican peace campaign
e(not theeace offensive that required an end to the war, and Moio-
tner into make concessions
iB nowtronger position to reject any Soviet
he.fih?uldout the fighting, ind So-
viet influence on him is as strong or as weak as Moscow's
henavoided involvementhen Khruahchev decided to stand clear
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of providing Important political and military aid tooviet influence waa at an all-time low. On the other hand, when Moscowegree of commitmenthen the pout-Khrushchev leadership decided to supply Hanoi withaid and political support against theovietincreased. However, it will never be as great as it had been
The Chinese leaders have helped to make this In contrasthey are now the opponents, not the partners, of tho Soviets. Ho's militancy is bolstered by Mao's support, which itself stems from special personal requirements. That is, Mao is personally far morethanwitness the current irrationalities of ths Mao cult inwith increasing neuroticism insists that his unique doctrine of "people's war" should legitimatize his claim to be tho successor of Lenin and Stalin as the "leader of the international Communist movement." Unlike Ho, whose sights are centered on his own national war, Maoarger anti-Soviet doctrinal point to mako: small wars are effective in all under-developed areas and must be tho main strategy against the US.
Maoonsiderable personal stake in proving tothe Soviets, the East Europeans, the neutrals, and oven mon in his own party and militaryhis principle of protracted small war will work against the superior American military capability anywhero. Vietnam ls the main proving ground for this thesis. Chou En-lai told Japanese Diet membershat if the Vietnamese Communists continue their military operations
they will mako the Americans admit their defeat and drive thenhe most importantia to prove this by actual deed. Unless we defeat the enemy, we will not be believed, suppliod)
Any sign, thoreforo, from Hanoi that Ho is willing even to consider the matter ofoase-fire or aof US air strikes against the Northotal withdrawal of American troops occurs is criticized by Peking. For example,ouble-edgod statement, intended for neutrals and for the North Vietnamese, Chou En-loiarned that: "As long as the US does notits troops, it can carry on endless talks with you so
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ltTY hanghore ino-'initely.- (emphasissi!rnin9 to Hanoi is suggested bytheto the DRV ambassador at
the North Vietnamese embassy in Peking.
he constant concern of the Chinese leaders that llo might agree to negotiations before DS troops aro
^ga high priority to prolonging his reactivated war. He and his
w,r ?aV^ abBorbod view on protracted civil war. When, inao said that "toov-
oare'* haveeur-
re was rejecting modern Western and Soviet military doctrine onh-tic inoting that the Spanish civil war was "fought for three years, but we nave fought for twenty years.- Ho declared on6
war may still0 years, or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and enterprises may be aestroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated.
bjat*,wnjVietnamese determination to rnt occities in the
"ss hY aofficial in Havana "The imperialists may well do soomb
Hanoi andut we are ready to accept thisas we have accepted the others and it will not change our position or determination one iota."
believes that he can continue thedespite losses in the North andis still able to put forcos into the South and tofor operations. On the other hand, the Maoist of opportunism. iff* flXGd PrinciPle that determines whoneaso-fire should bo accepted.
C factorpracticalinability to keep fighting. In the event that US air strides were to continue to increase his problems, his willingness toessation of the strikes would not be blocked by any doctrinal consideration. The Chinese leaderswYnaonv^MethGprospect that Ho might s 's"ooan" toreathing-spell from
nlV*alk.
pjfpf*withdrawal but also the matter of
no-th uspension of air strikes against the
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Original document.
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