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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligenceugu&t6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
South Africa on the Crest of the Wave Summary
Prime Minister Verwoerd's government, longfrom outside contact both by choice and by the opprobrium surrounding apartheid, appears to bea more positive approach to foreign affairs. Buttressed by confidence in South Africa's military and economicconfidence thatowerful boost when Verwoerd outfaced Britain overhas recently shown an interest In influencing events in Malawi. Kenya, and perhaps in the Congo as well. It has also made an initial probe of US attitudes, through the unlikely channel of the chief of the South African security service. This new approach to foreign relations seems to be taking place without any change In the domestic policies that have aroused widespread moral indignation and have made Southariah in international forums.
memorandum was produced solely by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA.
LI, | illUSE_0NLY
TOP SECR,
Background
rS
1 MlbalMfiYrs
was actually oracingS military attack on the mandated territory of South-West Africa. By
Lwas making an unprecedented pica for better mutual understanding between the US and South Africa. The South Africans have also made discreet attempts recently to extend their influence and make their views known in Malawi and Kenya.
vaslon scare may have been exaggerates sever less, the fear lt depicts is symptomatic of the defensive *ay in which Afrikanerhave always approached relations with other countries. In the last two years, however, the Verwoerd govornnent appears to have grown much more confident, and the recent feelers are on* result. There are several signs that lt now think* of the country as a kind of regional great power. It seems much more Interested than herutolore J
importantin making its influencefelt there.
Africa hashenomenalalmost every Important respect from tho0 Sharpeville shootings. Theforces have become more efficient and,draconlan legislation, have harried theopposition virtually out of existence.boom continues, nourished to anextent by capital from insldo thelew remaining areas Lo which South Africaeven slightly vulnerable to economicbeing whittled away. While maintainingeconomic ties with Britain, Pretoria its suppliers and markets toJapan, and West Germany, among others. has modernized and greatly enlarged establishment, turning to France and Italy
in the face of arms embargoes imposed by the US and (less fully) by Britain, and has steadily increased the domestic production of military weapons.
most important, white Southhaveenewed sense of securityachievements, as well as increased faithMinister Verwoerd. These toolings worein the massive majority thatreceived lo the elections last March. Idthe white populace seons inclined toa virtual blank check on mostissues.
South Africa's Foreign Policies
some time this growing sense ofoot particularly noticeable in South Africa'sto foreign affairs. There have alwaysbe sure, occasions on which Pretoria did act: Bfaav-j
tlons were essentially defensive, however. Inthey appear as ad hoc efforts to head off the soemlDgly powerful southward flow of black nationalism.
has always claimed thatgood relations with the emerging nationsnorth, and it has traditionally been aof Afrikaner doctrine that South Africa hasof manifest destiny to establish its the southern part of the continent. public and private foreign policy until dominated by South Africa's military buildupthe petulanco and persecution complex of theminister, Eric Louw. Louw is now gone,makes foreigo policy directly. Moreover,
in the paat two years or so, the situation abroad has changed significantly in at least two, somewhat paradoxical, respects.
many African leaders, pressedproblems closer to home, have been devoting
NO
less time to the South Africa issue. South Africa is still as muchariah to them as it ever was, and their efforts in international forums tothe West to act on the South Africa issue will be as vociferous as ever, or even more so. However, the Africans have clearlyiminishing interest in talcing on South Africa themselves, or even insignificantly to the various liberation movements.
rs
8. Second, while the Africans themselvesless interest in exerting directgenerated essentially by Africanconfronting South Africa with challengesboth concrete and close to home, and whichurgent attention. The first of theselong-drawn-out International Court oflitigation over South-west Africa, on abrought by Liberia and Ethiopia was the progress of the three formerCommissionandindependence undergovernments. The third was Rhodesia'sof independence last November and theto bring downSmith reglm-
The Rhodeslan Afialr
Decame
even greaterpril, when the UNanctionsoi-cement provisions of the UN Charter. Although the resolution waa directed only at the problem of oil tankers calling at Beira in Mozambique, Pretoria was clearly concerned that it constituted asince it was common knowledge that considerable quantities of POL were being shipped to Rhodesia via South Africa.
-4-
The ICJ Ruling on South-west Africa
On top of this series of events, which Verwoerd almost certainly viewed as confirmation of South Africa's economic strength and which he may haveonsiderable diplomatic victory as well, came the Id's ruling onuly that Liberia and Ethiopia lacked legal standing to bring their South-West Africa complaint. The legalistically minded South Africans hadoluminous and well-prepared case. They apparently had been fairly certain that they would have nothing worse to contend with than an unfavorable but imprecise judgment that would give them scope for further legal maneuver; many of themavorable ruling was not inconceivable.
The court's decision not to rule on the substance of the case deprived South Africa'sof any hope that they would soon have more leverage in their efforts to persuade the West to Impose sanctions. Moreover, some black African states are now disillusioned with the whole idea of legal recourse and are reverting to the notion of some kind of more positive action. Since they lack the power to move against South Africa directly, most of their efforts will probably be channeled through the UN General Assembly and will take the
form of further attempts to goad the West into ac- ButI neein particular will probably
resist such pressure even nore strongly now that there is no World Court decision to back it up, the chances are slim that any UN organ will be able to take effective measures. The most likely results, if the black Africans continue to push the issue, would be South Africa's withdrawal or expulsion from the UN, its continued defiance of anyand the exposure of the UN's weakness.-
The British High Commission Territories
thirdinvolving thenever particularlyit may have provided Pretoria with The territories could in theory act asfor subversives, but the Africans in allwell aware that South Africa could strangle them
luceci regimes in
all three which, although they may have somesignificance as examples of multiracialism, are unlikely to do anything to incur Pretoria's wrath. For Verwoerd and his associates, this experience may have provided evidence that it was possible to make contact more or less discreetly with African-dominated territories and do business with them.
Lessons Learned
in each of these threeterritories, Rhodesia, andthreat of pressure on South Africaat the moment. In each case, Verwoerdto believe that efforts by his government
helped avert the danger. Moreover, Rhodesiars him the limitsan
suggested that, with the possible exception of the US, South Africa was the only reasonably powerful country that might be willing and able to commit much of its power in southern Africa. At the same timo, the relationship with the High Commission territories gave Pretoria experience in making its Influence felt in territories governed by Africans.
is some persuasive evidence that,new experiences and buttressed by itsof strength. South Africa may be taking ato the whole problem of the "blackmore than speculation is difficult onof this problem but there are signs thatis trying to use its considerable financialto gain an economic foothold in countries to
CKIIYrs
the north,
iipting to iniiucnee people and events-. Its aim, if this reading of the signs is correct, is nothing so unsubtle as the installation of African stooges all over the southern part of the continent. Indeed, this would patently be far beyond South Africa's capability. The purpose might rather
be to bolster relatively moderate regimen, to monitor any changes that occur, and to minimize the harmful implications for South Africa.
Economic Aspects
frequently overlooked fact la thewhich the Rhodesian crisis has made Rhodesiaan economic client of South Africa. he Rhodesian economy was orientedprincipally to Britain and Zambia. TradeAfrica was restricted in order to protect Rho-
S"*MIMIYri
esult, South Africa >ecome Rhodesia's maof credit, one of its principal suppliers of essentialnd an important channel for exports as well. With Zambia embarked on a long-term campaign to end its economic dependence on southern Africa, it seems likely that Rhodesia's southward orientation will be confirmed. If Rhodesia should come under Africanthis is one of the legacies with which angovernmentve to cope.
has also been sizing up thein Afrlcan-domlDated states to the nortb. Banda, who alreadyeputation am amaverick in black Africa, recently entertained
Souih African mission that investigatedbauxite duposits (aluminum is one of the few minerals that South Africa has to Import). The mission also left word that aid on the orderillion pounds might be available from private South African sources for Banda's pet project, the constructionew capital inMalawi. outh African commitment for at least part of this sum may in fact have been made.
IS. But Banda's economic dependence on whiteAfrica is well known, as is his willingness tothe whites. Perhaps more significant aa anof Pretoria's new approach is thetour South Africa that the VerwoerdAfrican editor from Kenya in June. Kenyaof the few countries, even in Africa, which laparticipating in the sanctions campaign against
South Africa, although lt has recently seemedmoderate on related Issues such as Rhodesia. The editor was sent away favorably impressed with South Africa's economic and military strength, with the condition of the country's Africans, and with the benefits to be derived from renewed trade.
South Africa's Relations with Congo (Kinshasa)
to opportunities to advance itsnorth, and very possibly using its powersophistication. Marring its
Pretoria has
a healthy respec^io^Tr&^powerand for the depth of US opposition to South African internal policies. Much of this shortcoming is due to the defensiveof the Afrikaners themselves. Almost all of those with any Influence have studiously keptisolated from US officials. The onlyexception Is Van Den Bergh, who is one of the "twelve apostles" who direct the powerful Afrikaner Broederbond. It was Van Den Bergh who recently made theat his own initiative, but almost certainly with the knowledge and approval ofgreaterouth Africanand more frequent contact between US officials and important Afrikaners. It seems almost certain that this probe, like those into black Africa, was made with the idea, at most, of smoothingouth African relations and, at least, of improvingunderstanding of US intentions.
StcWIYrs
It should be made clear what the changesby this analysis do not involve. First, the apparent new attitude depicted here has to do solely with South Africa's foreign policy. There is nothat either apartheid or the battery oflegislation will be weakened; Indeed, there
Outlook
are some signs that Verwoerd intends to push ahead even more vigorously with apartheid. There was no hint of apology when Bantustans and securitywere discussed with the Kenyan editor. Verwoerd will be operating at home with an Afrikanerdom whichhole is almost as provincial as ever, and most South Africans are likely to be just as prone as ever to react negatively to outside advice.
side of those forces usually labeled "moderate" by the US m All this could occur without the slightest modification in the internal policies that have made South Africa an international outcast.
Further, these changes do notudden improvement in South Africa's relations with black Africa. For Instance, when the Kenyan editor returnedigh Kenyan official claimed that President Kenyatta had earlier been adamant in his refusal to alter Kenya's policy in the slightest. This assertion may have been meant partly for outside consumption, however, and Kenyatta himself has not been heard from since the editor's trip. In any case, the South Africans can hope that at the very minimum theiron an Africa that remains disunited and shows signs of becoming moreoccasionally moderate the visceral African reaction to South Africa. Even this would further diminish the already negligible Impact that African nationalism has on their control and would thus postpone the time when they mustredible external threat from the north. And evenegative accomplishment might also pave the way for the northward extension of positive South African influence.
With all these limitations, the change in attitude suggested by this analysis nevertheless seems significant. Up to now, however bull-headed and aggressive the South Africans have been about their domestic policies, their foreign policy has been almost entirely reactive. Now thereros-pect that South Africa will be assertive beyond its u
Original document.
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