DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CAN BALAGUER BELL THE CAT?

Created: 8/24/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

mandatory^*

l.bj librae CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF HATIOHALFOR RELEASE

OATL2

6

FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic: Can Balaguer Bell the Cat?

Balaguer laarticularly difficult dilemoa. He feels the need to bring his military oore under control; he would like to do thla before the departure of the Inter-American Peace Forceow scheduled for late Septenber; but to do It so quicklyiolent reaction by the military. One possible way out would be to ask the IAPF to stay longer, though this too would have ocoe political cost.

In our last estimate on the Dominicane noted the likelihood of further tension and disorder, and pointed out that the IAPF had become the primary stabilizing factor in the country. We also discussed the necessity, and at the same time the delicacy, of reshaping the Dominican military establishment, and we warned that if the new president moved clumsily in this, he might provoke the very military intervention he was trying to rule out.

The Balaguer edministratlon,rief honeymoon

period, is now faced with Increasing suspicion, opposition and

* , "Prospects for Stability in the Dominicanublished on

of violence; some on the extreme right are plotting once again. One aspect of Balaguer's response has been tbe preparationraft lav to curtail political party activity; this ispart of the moderate opposition as veil. His own Reformist Party is not so veil-organized or united that ithimeally solid base,umber of its members are dlseocbanted because Balaguer has given them less patronage and more austerity than they expected.

3- But it is Balaguor's reUtiooahip to the military* that poses the most serious short-run problem. Be has appointed aa his own military aide an ambitious officer who is generallyrujillolat and is regarded with suspicion by the defense minister and the service chiefs, who have made their views known to Balaguer. Bainguar has replaced the chief of policerustedan who seems heavier handed and lighter headed than his predecessor. Be has orderedthough not yet Implementedthe transfer of two key military units to what seem to be mora reliable cccxaands.

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Thisig establlshmantmall country. Total number of military personnel is In addition, there is the National Police with. Though not the throw-back, gorilla outfit It was In TruJUlo's time, the Dominican military Is stillonservative force and tends to align Itself with the civilian elite.

U. Balaguer has told the US Ambassador that he lo deter-nined to proceededuction and thorough reorganization of the Dominican military. Although he realizes that this Involves some risk, he may be underestimating hov much. He has emphasized his belief that certain specific changes must be accomplished and that the broad outline of the whole plan must be established while he still has the backing of the TAPP. (IAP? strength is now down to, and the last units are scheduled to leave in the latter part of September.) He has been Giving soiae thought to the proa and cons of requesting an extension of the TAP? presence.

5. Many Dominican military figures ore probably willing to cooperate with Balaguer in his reorganization efforts. Others in tho military are bound to become restive as they see plans developed to cut bach not only their numbers, but also their privileges and prerogatives. Officers already involved inwith civilian rightists are likely to do more of it. Any upsurge in terrorism on the part of the extreme left or any improvement in the political fortunes of the moderate left, would probably cause more of the military to involve themselves in coup plotting.

6. Since Its inception, the IAPF has been an effective deterrent to insurgency from the left andoup from the right. The likelihood of these contingencies vill in any case become greater when the loot elements of the IAPF depart. And if, before the presently scheduled departure date in late September, Balaguer presses ahead to accomplish several of his military reform measuresand to advertise the restbe chancesilitary coup would be sharply increased.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

ABBOT SJCTB Acting Chairman

Original document.

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