crrnrr
'(-OIHIRUJLLliU HSSBr.
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
6
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Reliability of the USSR's
European Allies
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concur/ad in byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Ai indicated6
CQHTnOLLCP PluGGM
RELIABILITY OF THE USSR'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate lhe reliability of the Easi European governments and their aimed forces, primarily from (he Soviet point of view, in various contingencies of non-nuclear conflict in Central Europe.
SCOPE NOTE
This special estimate has heen requested byhe general objective is to explore thc factors affecting the political/military reliability of the East European Warsaw Pact nations as allies of the USSK, particularly in respect lo the Soviet assessment of those factors. In addition, as specifically requested, the estimate assesses Eastreliability under three assumed circumstances tn which the USSR might conceivably plan to engage the West in non-nuclearerlineliberate non-nuclear attack on Western Europe;onflict arising by accident.
CONCLUSIONS
A. In recent years the East European members of the Warsaw Pact, especially Rumania, have shown an increasing tendency to assert their own national interests and to resist Soviet dictation.these Communist regimes value the Pactoviet guarantee of theit survival and territorial integrity. Their object is not tothe Pact, but toreater voice in its decisions. To thc extent that they conceived their own vital interests to be threatened, tbcy would support united Pact counteraction. At thc same lime, they would seek to teslrain tho USSR from pursuing courses of action which, in theii judgment, involved undue risk ofuclear conflict
SI
is evident that the USSH can no longer dictate to itsallies, but must seek iheir consent in matters which involveparallel with this political development, however, the USSRseeking lo strengthen the military command structure ofand to improve the military effectiveness of the Eastforces. Soviet war planning relies on the availability offorces to perform important tasks in Centralif present trends toward autonomy continue, theevolveonventional military alliance and the rangeiu which the USSH can rely on effective supportEast European allies will narrow.
apart from political considerations, the Pact ismilitary structure today because of specific SovietThe East European armed forces arc heavilySoviet provision of materiel and instruction in its use; Pactis doneoviet-dominated staff in Moscow; in thewar, most East European field commands would be subordinatedSoviet echelons of command. In addition, the Sovietsbelieve that strict military discipline, Communistthe careful selection of East European officers and careerensure the reliability of the East European forces in the event We too believe that this would be the case, at least initially.
any Berlin crisis deliberately planned and precipitatedUSSR, the Soviets would almost certainly plan to employand East German troops. The East Germanvery existence depends on Soviet support, wouldpromptly. Their troops would almost certainly prove toinimited confrontation
East European reactionoviet proposal to delivernon-nuclear attack in Central Europe would dependWestern action had provoked such an unlikely Sovietany case, the East European governments would almostto dissuade tbe USSH, fearing the consequences, but ifbelieved their own vital interests lo be threatened by theresistance to Soviet pressure would be less. If the Sovietsin their intention, despite East European dissuasion, theof East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia wouldfeel compelled to go along, perceiving no alternative and, in
2
this instance, their Iroops would prove reliable, at least initially. The behavior of Hungary. Rumania, and Bulgaria would be morebut Soviet planning would probably require no more of them than increased readiness to defend their own territories.
F. An accidental conflict arising, for example, from an unplanned incident on thcorder clash,ocal uprising in East Germany would initially involve only Soviet and East Cerman troops, who would almost certaiuly prove reliable. The reaction of other East European governments would depend on the extent to which they considered their own interests threatened by Uie developing situation. In general, it would probably be as described in theE.
3
sfjtet
DISCUSSION
I. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING RELIABILITY
The Growth of National Communism
There have been significant changes in the political climate of Eastern Europe since the repression of tlie East Ceiman uprisinghc Hungarian revolt and Polish unrestf there everidespread hope for Western liberation, this has receded. The continuing presence of Soviet forces in East Germany. Hungary. Poland, and thc nearby USSR inhibits revolt against East European Communistver thc past decade, important segments of thc population have become resigned to their lot, while others havetake in the existing social and economic order.
At the same lime, most ol thc Communist regimes have adopted less repressive internal policies and played up to national sentiments. The effect has been to make the regimes seem less like puppets of an alien power and thus toajor cause of popular antipathy. In several countries somewhat more liberal policies have permitted intellectual criticism to become more articulate ami open. While ihis has created new problems, more and more leading intellectuals consider themselves to he within the syslem and thc result has been to improve the regimes' stability Under present circumstanceswith the regimes now is more reformist than revolutionary.
As thc Soviet political and economic control weakens, and as the long-run Irends toward economic reforms and more permissive cultural policies continue, Ihe East European peoples will expect from their rulers policies that reflect national rather than supranational inteicsls. Greater contacts with thc West lend lo encourage hopes of change and improvement. In general, we believe that thc regimes will be able to keep the resulting pressures within bounds, svilh popular dissatisfaction being channeled into attempts to influence policies rather than in challenges lo the existence of the regime.
Soviet Strengthening of the Warsaw Pact
hc Soviets have increased Iheir efforts to improvecapabilities of their East European allies and to strenglhen thcof the Warsaw Pact. Over the last five years modemizationand weapons has been stepped up, military command andhave been improved, and large-scale multinational traininghave been conducted. There is an apparent paradox in the USSR'sstrengthening ils East European allies militarily at the very time whenbecoming less compliant politically. However, wc believe that thea number ofeconomic, andpolicy.
SWRET
Politically, Ihc Soviets piobably expected these measures partly lo offset centrifugal tendencies in Eastern Europe. They probably hoped to reinforce weakening political controls by emphasizing lhe need for unity and common planning to meet tbe common danger seen in Ihe growing military power of NATO, and particularly ihc rearmament of West Cermany. From the Soviet viewpoint, thc I'.iet performs an essential political function. It provides-the basic treaty obligation binding the East European states to thc USSB. It also provides thc most convenient multilateral forum for expressions of Soviet Bloc views on outstanding international questions. For example, Moscow finds it particularly advantageous, within the context of the Sino-Soviet contest for leadership in lhe Communist world, to contrast thc Pact's unified stand on Vietnam with China's unilateral course.
On tlie economic side, problems in Ihe allocation of Soviet resources and manpower led to the large-scale force reductions instituted by Khrushchev, largely at the expense of tho Soviet general purpose forces. The Sovietssought lo offset these reductions in part by improving tbc militaryof East European armed forces.
At the same time, there hasrowing Soviet realization thatof general nuclear wai might restrict Soviet reinforcement of thcarea, thus causing tbc war to be fought mainly with the forces in place. They almosi certainly also consider that the presence of effective East European national forces reduces the needed number of Soviet forces in the area. While thc Soviets are likely to continue the current trend to improve and diversify llicii own general purpose forcei. we believe ihey will at thc same lime continue to emphasize greater integration of East European forces into Soviet wai plaits. Cuuent deployments and continued multinational training cxcidses indicate that the Soviets do in fact plan to rely nn Eisst European general purpose forces to perform important tasks in the even! of war. Moreover. East European air defense forcei will remain an important adjunct to Soviet strategic air defense cajsabibtics.
East European Responsivencsi to Soviet Direction
spilo of tbo increasing tendency of the Easi European governmentstheir national interests, their national policies still generally coincideof the USSR. They have lienefited from incmbership in theIts collective security arrangements givereater measurethan tliey could ever obtain with their own resources. Theyoviet guarantee of tbe continuance of Communist regimes andnl Cermany.
9 It seems clear that cooperation and coordination within the Warsaw Pact can no longer simply be dictated in Moscow. Many decisions must now be reached on the basisonvemus among countries no longer willing toiheir national interests to the demands of Moscow. In general, we lielieve that any of the East European governments would support tbe USSR
5
SEftET
more willingly and their forces would fight with far more determination and reliability in defense of their own territory than as partoviet offensive operation against NATO. Concern that Soviet protection carries with it the risk of involvementuclear war has become increasingly apparent since the Cuban missile crisis. and Pact members are beginning to demand moreoice in decisions which might involve their national survival. Wc believe that thc East European regimes would attempt toestraining influence on Soviet policy in any crisis threatening general war.
Over the past several years Rumania especially has beenreater degree of independence- lt has accelerated trade with the West, balked Soviet plans for the further economic integration of thc Bloc states through the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance,ose ofin thc Sino-Soviet dispute, privately expressed strong criticism of aspects of Soviet policy, and over thc past year or so. expressed its disenchantment with the concept of "military blocs" and diminished its participation in Pact activities. Most recently, it has opposed apparent Soviet plans to strengthen the Pact organization and has advanced suggestions for changes in thc Pact structureast European participation in nuclear planning, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Easternt almost eCrlainly did not anticipate Soviet acceptance of suchut probably did expect, partly through such means, to impede plans for any increase in Soviet authority within the Pact organization. In this, we believe, the Rumanians have been for the most part successful. All in all, Moscow has little reason to be pleased with thc current Rumanian attitude and considerable reason to question Rumania's reliability as an ally in the future, except where national interests coincide-
However, thc Soviets probably do not believe that tire Warsaw Pact is disintegrating and that they must consider the reliability of all their Pact allies as doubtful. On the contrary, we believe that the new Soviet leadership is succeeding in the delicate task of giving the East Europeans more stature within the Pact while lightening thc actual allianceore thoroughof East European forces into Soviet operational plans and deployments.
Within this general pattern, however, there are important variations. The chief distinction is between East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on tbe one hand, and Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria on the other. East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakiaearmed Westhreat to their national security. Their common apprehension has ledpecial relationship among these three countries and thc USSR which has conferred privileged status on this "Grst strategic echelon* of the Pact, as Moscow has termed it. As regards Central Europe, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria must balance the general .security offered by the Pact against possible involvement in German issues which they do not regard as direclly affecting their national interests.
responsiveness of East European governments to Sovietthe reliability of their forces in warimic would vary according to thc cause
6
SFjRET
and nature of the conflict ami tin* role assigned to each. For example, Poles and Czech* would likely have parallel inleresls wiih the Soviets in certain situations by virtue of Iheir concern over tlie "Cermanhe East Cerman Government, whose veiy existence depends on Soviet support, would probably respond promptly. In the event of war, we therefore estimate that the northern tier forces (East Cerman, Polish, Czech) would take part, at least initially, in military operations with lhe Sovietsthey could not avoid mvolvcmcnt. Thc Rumanianperhaps the Hungarian and Bulgarian asprobably seek to avoid involvement as long asunless their borders were llueatened.
Reliability of Mililory Personnel
trict discipline, party mdortrtnation. careful screening of officers and career NCCK and the very nature of military organization are factors which make for initial reliability in the East European divisions that would be called upon to fight along with Soviel forces. The degree of reliability, of course, would vary from country to country, and its durability would be affected by thc extent to which national interests were involved, llie degree of Soviet support, and the course of tbe battle. Tlve reliability of East European forces would almost certainly deteriorate rapidly in lhe face ol serious reverses or drastic curtailment of Soviet logistic support, and in opportune circumstances some troops might even seek to change sides.
lthough there is no doubt ol lhc subservience of the East Cerman regime tn Soviet direction, tltetepecial problem with respeel to the reliability of the East German armed forces in combat with Wesl Cerman forces. We believe, however, that lhe Soviel command would expect their politicaland military discipline to prevail over any compunction they might feel as Germans. We too believe th.it Ihis would be the case, at least initially. However, if West Cerman troops were intervening in an East German uprising, thc reliability of East Ceiman troops would be much less certain.
Means of Soviet leverage
he substance of Soviet command and staff control of Warsaw Pact forces is dill jealously maUitainrd Some eflort has been made in recent years toacade of coequal command authority by such devices as placing East European military leaders in charge of some combined exercises, but tbc Pact's supreme commander and rhrf-of-staff arc Soviet officers, and control of at least one major operational clrmenl (air defense) remains in Soviet hands.pecial branch of the Soviet General Staff serves as the planning and coordinating center for the Pact forces. Soviel reservations about any dual wartime eontiol of forces were reflected in Marshal Sokolovskiys "Miliiaryhich indicated lhal combined command in major theaters ofsvould rest with Soviet officers, although allied uruls In less important areas might remain under national command.
SEfjTET
SEjSET
The very high degree of standardization ia equipment, organization, and tactical doctrine facilitates Soviet control. East European forces are heavily dependent upon the USSR for spare parts, replacement items, and other forms of logistic support in both peace and wartime conditions. Lacking suchthey would quickly lose their military effectiveness. We have seen such loss of effectiveness, even In peacetime, in both Yugoslavia and Albania, at thc time when Soviet support was cut off.
In peacetime there is close coordination between thc East European and Soviet defense ministries. Therelnificd command headquarters in Moscow for general military planning and overall direction. In the event of war, most East European combat forces would come directly under high level SovietThus, Soviet control would be virtually complete at the national and higher tactical levels. The Soviets would even control thc extent of Eastmobilization in large measure because of thc logistic support that would be required if an extensive effort were to be made. It would be difficult for any sizable East European military unit to operate except in accordance with overall Soviet plans and under orders of Soviet higher commanders.
II. PROBABLE RELIABILITY IN THREE CONTINGENCIES
requested, we assess below East European forces' reliability inthree possible instances of non-nuclear conflict, bui in so doingto emphasizehc latest pertinent natlunal estimate (NIETrends in Soviel Militarytates ourthe Soviets will continue to pursue their aims by means short ofwith Ihe West.
Berlin Crisis
In the easeimited confrontation or conflict related to Berlinplanned and piceipilaled by the USSH, Soviet planning and Pact response would probably be confined to thc commiiment of thc Soviet and East Cerman forces in lhc area We think ihis would be true even if thc Berlin crisis aroseoviel response to US actions outside Europe.all Pact nations would take measures to increase readiness of their forces.
Soviet confidence in tlve reliability oi the East German forces to perform in such contingencies is evidenced by the greater responsibilities that havebe.en assigned to Cerman fortes in East Germany. We believe that lhe East Cerman forces wosild probably operate reliably as long as thc situation remained confined in scale and nature and there were no escalation or setback su severe as lo undermine their confidence in the outcome. The Soviets would not plan for active military support Irom other East European Warsaw Paci members, although expressions of political support svould likely lie expected in tlse second ease cited above.
8
Deliberate Non-Nuclear Attack on Western Europe
he East European reactionoviet proposal toeliberate non-nuclear attack in Central Europe would depend on what Western action had provoked such an unlikely Soviet decision In any case, the Eastgovernments would almost certainly seek to dissuade the USSR, fearing the conseq-.icncrt. buthey realty believed their own vital interests to be threatened by the West their resistance to Soviet pressure would be less. If thc Sovieu persisted in their intention, despite East European dissuasion, (fie governments of East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia would probably feel compelled to go along, perceiving no alternative and. in this instance, their troops would prove reliable, at least initially, llie behavior of Hungary,and Bulgaria would lie more iinofrtuiii. but Soviet planning wouldrequire no mote of them than increased readiness to defend their osvn territories.
Accidental Conflict
A conflict arising by accident is defined as ooe not deliberately planned by either side.onflict might arise, for example, from an autobahnorder dash, or an East German uprising Inonflict, if Pact members saw their national biteiestl threatened, they would almostsupport Soviet objectives in limited actions.
In the unlikely cucumstanccs of an uprising in East Cermanv, quick suppression by East German forces, or by Soviet forces if necessary, is almost certain But in cormdering this contingency, the Soviets might foresee the possibility of unilateral West Ceiman intervention In this case. East Cerman reliability would be much less certain In addition, the SovieU would beabout the possibility of NATO intervention, and thc Pact states would probably lake steps to prepare lor largo-scale conflict.
conflict arising from Ml autobahn incidentorderin out view, have tlie same results at in the caseerlinEast German support for Soviet actions al the outset, confinement ofto Cermany, and no Soviet demand for other East Europeanmore than measures lo imicase readiness of their fortes.
III. FUTURE TRENDS
Effects of Possible Changes in NATO
disruption of NATO has longrime Soviet poliiicalThe disruptive effect of lhe French svithdrawal from militaryin NATO must be gratifying to the USSR, but as yet it has had noeffect on Soviet military policy. The Soviets are apparentlythe weakening of NATO loosen constraints on the revival ofpower, and arc thereby disposed towardubstantia]the role of West Germany in NATOubstantial increase in Cerman
SEjfET
nationalism would strengthen Ihr special relationship among East Cermany, Poland. Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. The Soviets have implied lhat any form of nuclear sharing with West Cermany would impel them lo respond, perhapsarsaw Pact nuclear command. In this event, however, the Soviets would almost certainly reserve to themselves alone the final decision on use of nuclear weapons.
Prospects for the Wor saw Poet
oviet iulrrest in the alliance and Soviet power in Eastern Europe will probably of llvcmselvw lie sufficient to'secure the continuance of the Warsaw Pact. Except for. Rumania, the areas of agreement still overshadow the areas of disagreementarge margin Despite the growing independence within the Pact which will make it difficult to obtain agreement on specific courses of action, we believe tbat the rulmg regimes in Eastern Europe will remaintlsat their ultimate security rests on lhe protection provided by Soviet military power and influenceresent trends toward autonomy continue, lite Pact will evolveonventional military alliance and the range of contingencies in sshich the USSR con rely on effective support from its East Euiopcan allies will narrow.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
I. Ihit document wot dkiominoted by the Centralgency. Thb copy it (or the Information and ut* of the recipient ond of persons under hit jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may ba authorized by the following official! within their respective departments:
of Intelligence ond Research, for lhe Department of State
Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office af the Secretary of
Defense ond the organization of the Joint Chief* of Stoff e. Assiilont Chief of Staff far Inielligence, Department of tha Army, for iho Department of tha Army
Chief of Naval Operationsor lhe Department of lhe
Navy
Chief oi Staff, intelligence, USAF, fot the Oeportmenl of the Air
Force
of Intelligence, AEC, for tha Atomic Energy Commlsilon
Direcior, FBI, for the Federal Bureau ef Inveitigation
of NSA, for the Nalional Security Agency
I. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Deportment or Agency
hit document may ba retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable securityr returned lo ihe Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with Ihe Office of Central Reference, OA.
ihisisseminated overseas, lhe overseas recipientsileriod not in excess of one yeor. At lhe end of thlt period,ihould either be destroyed, relumed lo the forwarding agency, orshould be requested of the forwarding ogency lo retain it In
title of thii document when used separately from the text should ba clas-
lifted: raif^friffiii irmmY
DISTRIBUTION:
White Home
Nalional Security Council
Department of Stale
Oeportmenl of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Inveitigation
SECRET
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: