CENTRAL INT8LLI0BHCE KC7
LBJkajiokal istoiatbs
Mandatory
OocuiDcntI966
SPECIAL
SUarECT: Implication, cf the Latest Congo Orlali
Ih. Congo "always iatep from anarchy. President Mobutu has done little to alleviate It. chronic vow, ana hi. veskne.se.eader are dally Decerning acre apparent. El. main crutch, the Congolese national Army,eek ud lndisarray. Continued Belgian assistanceital to the functioning of the gorerrstient and economy, but Mobutulumsy vendettahe Belgian. In the name of Ccngolase economic iridependenoe, and of hi. owna. an African nationeliet.
Mobutu probably doe. not mean to expel the Belgian, from
them to withdraw their aid or reduce It drastically. In this event, Mobutu would turn urgently to the US and other sources, but would be unlikely to get enough assistance to fill tbe gap.
J^ibe *the Congo', rlcket?
political
APPROVED FOR PE1EASE DATE:0
(
A. lb* taaestic Probata
Congo in Its seveoth year of lodependence lamoat of tba same IUb which hare afflicted it from themost respects lt is mora an agglomeration of tribal,foreign Interestsation. Pew Congolesebare gained any concept of national interest cr Hardly moretart has been msdethe skilled aod trained Congolese cadres oeeded at
all levels and in all spheres of public activity. Corruption, inefficiency, aod Inertia still stymie tha efforts of the central government to extend its writ to the hinterland. The capitalew oeme, but is still beset by the seme old economic, financial, sod adainistrativa confusion.
Mobutu, who put himself in office eightlacks mooy of the political attributes and skillsthe almost impossible Job of controlling his snerehlcunsophisticated soldier, he has little grasp of economicstrati ve details, aod ls Inpatient with politicaloften acta Impulsively, without weighing alternatives or
coo sequences. Unlike his predecessor. Mo lee Tshotsbe, he lacks charismatic appeal lo any quarter, nor has ba any secure Ull BAR Jill
regional political power base of hia own. Be relies upon his ability to keep politicalff-balance and divided, and upon his coanaad of th* Congolese National Aray (AHC) and tba Surete.
3* Mobutu haa recentlyampaign to enhance Ma lsage as an African nationalist at bona and abroad. Hia objective Is to undercut oupport for Tshombe and the rebels, to acquire new politicalnd to gain plaudits from bis African colleagues, sails, ba recently paidpublic nonage to tba spirit of Patricean be once despised, end be is now courting the advice end support of latter-day Lisaasblets. By dreconlen Methods, including liberal use of the Burets and the AMC, he has gained far more control over prcrrlnclsl governaents then any of his predecessors enjoyed. let be Is doing virtually nothing to alleviate local probleas, and tbe dissatisfaction of provincial political leader* with bis performance is counting In aany keyItu, Katanga, and Kisangani (ex-Stesleyvllle).
Ibe two-year old rebellion ln tbe north end east la by no neens ended, though It is quiescent. Tba rebels areand hava withdrawn froa tbe aejor towns and lines of
APMWEIfOIIELEASf RATE:0
/ /
7
ccaarjolcstion, but rebel groups sometimes puttiff resistance vhen cornered, and have no disposition to lay down eras. Tney are held ln check mainly by mercenary elements attached to the ABC. It Is doubtful that the AHC eould or would fight the rebels, if deprived of Belgian cadres or mercenary support. Mobutu frequently talks of sending the aarcenarlea borne, and probably vould like to do so, but he ls well aware that without them the rebellion could quickly take oo new Ufa.
5. Moreover, events of tbe last few weeks give rise to grave doubts about the cohesion of the AHC and about Mobutu's ccanaod over lt. The sutlnyorce of Katsngan gendarmes against their AHC ccesaonder in Kisangani Is indicative of the tensions prevailing ln the Congolese armed forces. Indeed, thereossibilityeneral breakdown of authority aod order lo saich of the country. Change can come suddenly lo the Congo, and if Mobutu appears to be losing bis grip, younger amy officers and civilian political aspirants are welting lo tbs wings, and many of them are more radical aod nationalistic than Mobutu. Or, serious aod prolonged dlssldeoceajor province could afford sn opportunity for the self-eidled Tshombe to re-eater the arena,
Appiovfiust
BAI TIM
/
/
/
/
3. Tbe confrontation vith Belgium
6. Mobutu In recent nonthfl has turned sharply on the Belgians. omplete revereal from his earlier close assocletlon vith and reliance upon Belgian advisors, he haseries of heraaaacnts of Belgian business interests, has called for renegotiation of th* basic financial agreements vltb Belgium, and haaitriolic radio and press campaign against Belgians in general. Tba worsening of relatione with the former aetropole raises serious doubts about theof the Belgian aid, tha preservation of order and stability, and Mobutu's own political survival. The importance to the Congoleee of the continued Belgian presence can hardly be overstated, for it is largely due to Belgian military, technical, and economic aid that tha Congo Is not In even worse shape than It is.
7- The Belgians, too,onsiderable stake in the Congo. Tba bulk of0 resident Belgians are there to make money for themselves or for large Brussels-based companies-Belgian investment In the Congo, which amounts to someillion, is largely controlledomplex network of holding companies and investment banks. Ocean shipping, alrllnea. Internal
APPFIOViD FOR RELEASE DATE: MARIlll
(
mining, construction, banking, and Insurance are virtual Belgian preserves. Indeed, lt Is largely because Belgian privatere so extensive that the Belgian government Is willing to provide assistance to the Congo.
6. Relations between Belgium and Ite former colony have generally been cordial ln recent years. Host Congolesehave been too preoccupied with problems of Internal order, or merely of survival, to take much stock of the Belgian economic presence. Mobutu seems to have Uscovered Belgian "exploitation" of the Congo while educating himself on his new functions as president* Since then his growing suspicions of Belgian activities In general have been nourishedroup of young Congolese intellectuals, graduatea of Lovanlum university, who replaced Belgian advisors in his entourage, and by other Africanresidentof Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia. Nyorere, ln particular,rising Mobutu tohis African Image by cutting some of theies to the former metropole, diversifying aid requests among other potential donors, and playing off interested foreign powers against each other.
APPROVED FOR PE1EASE DATE:0
/
la likely to peril et in bit effortto achieve
a greater measure of sconomio independence from Belgium. Though he claims to understand the Importance of Belgian economic, technical, and military aid, and of Belgian expertise inand public services, he ls impulsive by nature, and often acts precipitately vlthout fully weighing tbe consequences. Hence, nev Belgian-Congolese confrontations may arise at any time. Mobutu ls not inflexible and vill probably not consciouslyomplete severance of ties. The danger io that he may not recognise the limits of Belgian patience and that he mayBelgian willingness to assist the Congolese under drastically altered conditions.
the Belgians, the next few months are likely to If they are to retain the substance of theirthey vlll have to yield seme of the trappingscontrol to the Congolese and learn to conductless favorable terms than before. For manythe belated transition to pout-colonialvlllserine experience. Gome vlll blame the
OS for Instigating Congolese actions against them, end will suspect the LB of wishing to replace Belgium aa tha pre coal riant
APPROVED FOR RELEASE HATE:0
(
power In tho Congo. It Is unlikely that major Belgian private Interests vlll voluntarily vithdxav from the Congo; their investments are too large and the returns, even under less favorable arrangements, vlll still be too attractive.
U. However, if relations deteriorate rapidly, Brussels might show its disapproval by stronger diplomatic moves,perhapsull-scale break ln relations- Tb the extent that such pressures were Intended to force Mobutuore amenable position, they would almost certainly ba endorsed or even instigated by the oajor Belgian business Interests in the Congo, But if the Belgian government so hardened its position that its alms were to bring down Mobutu, business Interests would probably be divided, some advocating extreme measures, and others advising caution.
12. In any case, there would probablyonsiderable reduction of assistance to the Congo, and some disruption of services now performed byebena Airline-Iho situation would be complicated by the virtual certainty that Mobutu would urgently seek aid from the US and other countries. However, these alternative sources would almost
APPROVED FOR PE1EASE DATE:0
certainly not fill tbe gap left by the Belgian cutbacks. The result wouldurther reduction ln the effectiveness of the Mobutu regis*. Even If this regime ccllapeod, there Is no assuranceuccessor government would be more favorably diejcsed to Belgium.
ABBOT SMITH Acting Chairman
FOB THB BOARD CJ BATIOrwU, ESTIMATES:
OI IEUASE UTE: Ul IIM
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: