SNIE 13-66 CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION

Created: 8/4/1966

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION

. Submitted1 by

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

l* oy Ih* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At jndkcrted6 DATE

TherganlzatJODS particlpqfcbd inioater

Concurring:

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Generalarroll, Director, Defenoe lutein-

gen co Agency'

,axrter. Director, National Sccui-ity" "

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:rown, Jr., latant Generalroy y'/ CocaiSalon, arid Mr. William;regar/for Aflsiattotf Director, "'. Bureau ofatHaepSatDlde^of

jurisdiction, . v '

material-nited" States- withinnd .the^kwtfrBT^saton or rev to anfTperson. iff prohibited.

jren-TNational Defense,fon&ge law,SC, ' 'of vhicix- in" any oahner

"SEGREZ.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUBJECT: : CURRENT CHINESE COMMJNIST INTENTIONS

IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION

CONCLUSION

The Chinese Communists have responded to recent US air actionNorth Vietnamese POL facilities and to Ho Chiulyppeal for more aid with massive propaganda demonstrations all over China. These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to reiterate the Chinese view that the war must heto final victory. At the same time, the Chinese seem likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and, for tbe first time, tbey may move some infantry troops Into North Vietnamrecautionary step against the contingency of invasion.

We do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their bacic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene If North Vietnam were invaded or If the collapse of the Communist regime seemed likely* But we continue to believe that, at present levels of US action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to the war, nor its air force to deliberate and sustained action against US forces.

DISCUSSION

1. Peking has responded to the US air strikes on POL facilities in North Vietnam and to Bo Chi Minn's Julyppeal for more aid with massive propaganda demonstrations all over China. The burden of the declarations made on these occasions ie for the most part not new; that China is no longer bound by any restrictions in aiding North Vietnam, that Chinareat "rear area" in the struggle, and that Peking and Hanoi are now ready to deal "Joint blows" against the US. In addition, the Chinese have warned against underestimating their willingness to support Hanoi and have stated that China vas prepared to make the greatest "national sacrifice" in this effort,

Chinese Foreign Minister indicated that increased bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong and an invasion of North Vietnam would bring China Into the war. Chen Yi argued that

the US vasourse which would lead to heavier boobInge, then to an invasion of North Vietnon, and finally to on attack on China*

2. It may be that Peking intended these various warnings toore direct involvement in Vietnam* In again a8 boight to take action at any time and in any place, and in adding tootal denunciation of the Geneva agreements, the Chinese could be laying the political and legal foundation for certain open military steps. It is possible, moreover, that they are unfolding new coursea of action worked out with Ho Chi Minh moreonth ago when he la thought to havo visitod Peking.

3* Cn the other hand, the Chinese clearly had toard line in response to the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings, particularly If they were not to be outdone by the Warsaw Pact declaration sponsored by the USSR. And the Horth Vietnamese mobilization order, which preceded the more significant of tbe Chinese declarations, called for "still more vigorous support" from all Caouunist countrlos.

h. Taking Chinese statementshole, we note thot Peking has been careful to hedge any conndtment to direct action and has purposely tried to portray Chinaupporting ratherirect role. It ls significant that the Chinese have reiterated the Maoist doctrine that outside aid cannot "replace" the people's struggle and that the Vietnamese people "should and can rely on themselves" to prosecute the war. It seems

likely that If China planned some direct participation in the war, lt vouldess negative position on the value of outside assistance.ratuitous reminder of the limits to outside aid may also have been intended to discourage Hanoi from accepting the Warsaw Pact offer of volunteers.

complicating factor in Judging Chinese intentions isinternal crisis. This situation has been confusing and wefrom certain ao to its meaning and Implications. It could bea period of turmoil, the Chinese leadership ia now speaking with

a new assurance andolder line on the Vietnam war. On the other hand, the "cultural revolution" must be creating considerable disarray In China, perhaps even within the armed forces, and this would seem to argueecision to go to war in Vietnam. Indeed, one theme of the campaign has been that the main enemies are Inside China. Compared to the situation six months ago, there is apparently less emphasis in domestic propaganda on preparing the population for war with tbe US, by stressing civil defense, for example.

to recent military indicators, there is no evidenceol' significant movements of ground or air forces to Southare there other indicators of the sort that might be expected,Chinese leadership intended to commit ground forces to combat atdate. Furthermore, there have been no movements indicatingto threaten military action in other areas such ooor Korea.

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7. It seems probable, therefore, that tbe current Chinese line on Vietnam is designed mainly toumber of political purposes. Peking wants toramatic reassurance to Horth Vietnam, now that Hanoi has again rejected all overtures for negotiations and reaffirmed its intention toong war. Since Chineue actions havo been cautious, Peking also probably feels that some strong words are needed to augment concern in tho US and elsewhere that China's intervention is becoming more Imminent. The hoped for effect would be totill further Increase in the scale of attack on KVN. Finally, the Chinese seem intent on destroying any lingering hopesegotiated settlement can be arranged. To this end Peking, unlike Hanoi, has emphasized that the Geneva agreements are dead and can no longer be thought ofasis for negotiations.

0. We conclude that tbe Chinese have not changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if Korth Vietnam were invaded or if the collapse of the Ccmnunist regime seemed likely. But at presont levels of US action against NVN wo continue to believe that China will not commit ita ground or air forces to sustained combat against the US. In our view, neither tbe Chinese nor tbe Horth Vietnamese regard the present situation as critical enough to Justify outside intervention with its attendant risksuch wider war, including ultimately the threat of nuclear var, which the Chlnose must now reckon they would have to face without assurance

ot Soviet support. Hanoi still has considerable freedom of actionis both Moscow and Peking, and Ho Chiolite refusal of Coanunist "volunteers" strongly suggests that North Vietnam la not moving to expand the var in this way.

This is not to say that Chinese involvement in the var vill not grow, or that the Chinese vill confine themselves to resounding phrases. Peking and Hanoi probably estimate, that the war hasew and more intense phase with the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings and the rapid commitment of NVA troops to SVN. Theyurther US buildup, and Hanoi apparently intends toeavy rate of Infiltration into SVN. They probably also estimate that US air strikes against NVN vill become more Intense and videspread.

For some time Chinese military personnel have been present in North Vietnam; current strength Is estimated0 Tbey include AAA troops, engineers, construction crews, and various other logistical support groups. More assistance of this nature is almost certain.

Hanoi and Peking may now believe tbat the time has come to move ahead with plans for greater Chinese support against the contingency of invasion. The Chinese are already apparently participating inarge base, perhaps including an airstrip, located some

* ieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Director of the National Security Agency, does not believe there is sufficient intelligence toumerical estimate of Chinese Communist troop strength in the DRV.

iles northwest of Hanoi. The ultimate purpose of this base is unknown. Beyond this, it is possible the Chinese will move some infantry troops into North Vietnam.

13. Altogether, there is Borne reason to believe that tho Chinese presence, and consequently influence in North Vietnam may grow, consonant with Hanoi's apparent resolution to continue the war for some time. We do not believe however, that recent Chinese behavior indicates that reking hasecision to enlarge the war by overt involvement of their forces against tbe US.

Original document.

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