SNIE 13-66 - CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION

Created: 8/4/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CIJRRENT- CHINESE COMMUNIS

INTENTIONS IN THE 'VIETNAM SITU/

director of central intelligence united states inteuigence board

.Tne/ffollowingintelligence oreonigatiorio" participatedthis/ .

' e ^offcS De>ertiS^

'fir TSooas L. Hughes, *Use Director of Intelligence anaDepartmenty'

..Lieutenant General Joscpr> F. Carroll, Director, Defenseenqe

General Marct.Uil S. Carter^

oral Defense cif the

.atice of vl.ich in any manner

Howard C,Assistant Geoeral Manager, Atomic Energy ComciSslcaS- arid .Mr.regar for 'Assistant Director,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

k6

SUBJECT: : CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST IKTENTICN3

IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION

CONCLUSION

The Chinese Communists have responded to recent us air actionNorth Vietnamese POL facilities and to Ho Chi Minn'sor more aid with massive propaganda demonstrations all over China. These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to reiterate tbe Chine oe view theft tbe war must beto final victory. At the same time, the Chinese seem Likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and, for the first time, they may move some infantry troops into North Vietnamrecautionary step against the contingency of invasion.

Ue do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam-were invaded or if the collapse of the Ccemiunist regime seemed likely* But we continue to believe that, at present levels of IB action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to tbe war, nor its air force to deliberate and sustained action against US forces.

DISCUSSION

1. Peking has responded to the US air strikes on POL facilities in North Vietnam and to Ho Chi Mtnh's Julyppeal for more aid with massive propaganda demonstrations all over China. The burden of the declarations made on these occasions is for the most part not newi that China is no longer bound by any restrictions in aiding North Vietnam, that Chinareat "rear area" in the struggle, and that Peking and Hanoi are now ready to deal "Joint blows" against the US. In addition, the Chinese have warned against underestimating their willingness to support Hanoi and have stated that China was prepared to make the greatest "national sacrifice" in this effort.

the Chinese Foreign Minister

indicated that increased bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong and an invasion of North Vietnam would bring China into the war. Chen Yi argued that

theasourse which would lead to heavier bombings, then to an invasion of north Vietnam, and finally to an attack on China.

2. It nay be that Peking Intended these various warnings toore direct Involvement in Vietnam, In againight to take action at any time and in any place, and in adding tootal denunciation of the Geneva agreements, the Chinese could be laying the political and legal foundation for certain open military steps. It la possible, moreover, that they are unfolding new courses of action worked out with Ho Chi Mnh moreooth ago when be is thought to have visited Peking.

3* Co the other hand, the Chinese clearly had toard line in response to the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings, particularly if they ware not to be outdone by the Warsaw Pact declaration sponsored by the USSR. And the North Vietnamese mobilization order, which preceded tbe more significant of the Chinese declarations, called for "still more vigorous eupport" from all Communist countries.

h. Taking Chinese statementshole, we note that Felting has been careful to hedge any commitment to direct action and ha* purposely

significant that the Chinese have reiterated the Maoist doctrine that outside aid cannot "replace" the people's struggle and that the Vietnamese people "should and can rely on themselves" to prosecute the war. It seems

some direct participation in the war, it

ess negative position on the value of outside assistance.ratuitous reminder of tho limits to outside aid may also have been Intended to discourage Hanoi from accepting the Warsaw Pact offer of volunteers.

complicating factor in JudglDg Chinese intentions isinternal crisis. This situation has been confusing and vefrom certain as to its meaning and Implications. It could bea period of turmoil, the Chinese leadership ia now speaking with

a new assurance andolder line on the Vietnam war. On the other hand, the "cultural revolution" must be creating considerable disarray in China, perhaps even within the armed forces, and this would seem to argueecision to go to war in Vietnam. Indeed, one themo of the campaign has been that tho main enemioB are inside China. Compared to the situation six months ago, there is apparently less emphasis in domestic propaganda on preparing the population for war with the US, by stressing civil defense, for example.

to recent military indicators, there is no evidenceof significant movements of ground or air forces to Southare there other indicators of tbe sort that might be expected,Chinese leadership intended to commit ground forces to combat atdate. Furthermore, there have been no movements indicatingto threaten military action in other areas such asor Korea.

7> it seems probable, therefore, that the current chinesevietnam is designed mainly toumber of politicalwants toramatic reassurance to north vietnam,hanoi has again rejected all overtures for negotiations and reaffirmedtoong war. since chinese actions have beenalso probably feels that some strong words are needed toin the us and elsewhere that china's intervention isimminent. tbe hoped for effect would be totillin the scale of attack on nvn. finally, the chineseon destroying any lingering hopesegotiated settlementarranged. to this end peking, unlike hanoi, has emphasised thatagreements are dead and can no longer be thought of .

8. we conclude that the chinese hove not changed their basic polioy because of tbe recent air strikes. we have estimated that peking would almost certainly intervene if north vietnam were invaded or if the collapse of tbe communist regime seemed likely. but at present levels of os action against nvn we continue to believe that china will not commit its ground or air forces to sustained combat against the os, in our view, neither tbe chinese nor tbe north vietnamese regard the present situation as critical enough to justify outside intervention with its attendant risksuch wider war, including ultimately the threat of nuclear war, which the chincee must now reckon they would have to face without assurance

of Soriet support. Hanoi still has considerable freedom of actionis both Moscow and Peking, and Ho Chi Mich's polite refusal of Ccoramst "volunteers" strongly suggests that north Vietnam Is not moving to expand tbe war in this way.

'-). This is not to oay that Chinese Involvement in tbe war will not grow, or that the Chinese will confine themselves to resounding phrases. Peking and Hanoi probably estimate that the war hasew and more Intense phase with the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings and the rapid commitment of KVA troops to SVB. Theyurther US buildup, and Hanoi apparently intends toeavy rate of infiltration into SVT). They probably also estimate that US air strikes against NVH will become more Intense and widespread.

For some time Chinese military personnel have been present in North Vietnam; current strength is estimated0G." They include AAA troops, engineers, construction crews, and various other logistical support groups. More assistance of this nature is almost certain.

Hanoi and Peking may now believe that the time has come to move ahead with plans for greater Chinese support against tbe contingency of invasion. Tbe Chinese are already apparently participating inarge base, perhaps including an airstrip, located some

' 'Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Director of the national Security Agency, does not believe there Is sufficient Intelligence toumerical estimate of Chinese Coramuniet troop strength in the DRV.

iles northwest of Hanoi, The ultimate purpose of this base is unknown. Beyond this, it is possible the Chinese will move some infantry troops into North Vietnam.

12. Altogether, there is some reason to believe that the Chinese presence, and consequently Influence in North Vietnam may grow, consonant with Hanoi's apparent resolution to continue the war for some time. We do not believe however, that recent Chinese behavior indicates that Peking hasecision to enlarge the war by overt involvement of their forces against the US.

Original document.

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