Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
special report
THE CREEK POLITICAL SCF.XE ON EVE OF PAllLlAMENTA'RY SESSION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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Thi* Special Reportupplcn-ni! ro the currt-n!his datev Offiw o:. Special Report* aie puhlishrd *ep.iratviv in ordereet more comprehensive treatment tlianin thr rviliHxu-lion. Special Report are producecffice of Research and Ren-nttrot' Dtfeewcti eland Technology.
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This Special Report was produced by CIA. Aside fromnormal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this paper has not been coordinated outside OA. It wis prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports
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the greek political scene on eve of parliamentary session
The uneasy calm that has characterized the Greek political scene since early last summer probably will soon end. Parliament is scheduled to opennd the atmosphere has been heated by thepublication of the so-called ASPIDA report whichumber of nilitary officers and politicians of political activity in the army, intelligence, and security forces.
The present "palace" government of Premier Stephenotley assortment of former Center Union (EK| followers of ex-premier George Papandreou, is supported by the National Radical Union andparties. Its precarious balance is preserved mainlyunity of fear" of the Papandreouwith the electorate. With the*backing of the crypto-Communist United Democratic Left, Papandreou continues to demand new elections, while hisson Andreas continues to exploit the Papandreous' differences with the royal family in his own efforts to take over the EK.
The King prefers to delay elections as long as possible, althoughay be forced to agree to them some time The Stephanopoulos factionwill not emerge from an electionorkable parliamentary base.
Following the ravages of World War II and the guerrilla war against the Communists, Greece experiencedecade of unusual political and governmental stability. 2 the Greekconsolidationultitude of conservativepower. 6 the rally was reorganized into the present National Radical Union (ERE) party and in the election of that year Constantine Karaican-lis was swept to power. In the
aramanlis1 popular image was tarnished by EK charges that he was using police tactics.uarrel with theled to Karamanlis' resignation in the summernd to the assumption of power by George In the new elections in4 Papandreou's EK party receivedercent of the popular vote, the first clear electoral majority in postwar Greece.
The EK emergediable if somewhat loosely organized
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alternative to the conservative ERE. itssoon began to spreadthe leadership of the popular Papandreou, an articulate andfigure whose politicalhistorically had swung between the left-of-center and the right.
In5 Papandreouto encounter seriouswith his policies. King Constantine, year-old monarch brought to the throne by his father's death the previous spring, was becoming increasingly concerned with Premier Papan-dreou's attempts to "democratize" the normally tradition-bound and conservative army, intelligence, and security forces by placing EK supporters in key positions. He was especially irate over the premier's intentions tothc defense ministrycharging that Papandreou was doing so to cover up the shenanigans of his son. Andreas Papandreou had beenin ASPIDA,ecret, pro-EK, and antipalace organization of military.
A confrontation between the King and Papandreou in5 led to the premier's resignation and the ensuing governnent crisis. Today, it is doubtfuleaceful reconciliation between the adversaries is possible. the EK may split beyond repair, with the forces of left and right exploiting their republican and promon-archy sentiments regardless of the harm to their country.
The "Meddling" Monarchists
The confrontation between the King and Papandreou has raised the issue of the role of the monarchy in the country's political affairs. This same theme is likely to be the mostissue in the next Historically, thehas had its share ofhaving been banished three times in this century alone. King Constantine risked the same fate by maneuvering Papandreou out. His action led to charges from the Papandreou faction, and the crypto-Communist United Democratic Left (EDA), thatacted unconstitutionally by trying to rule rather than reign.
The King appears sincerely to believe that the Papandreous, particularly Andreas,hreat to the country'sorientation and to his own future. He has so far beento compromise with the former premier, and may even be willing to risk the consequencesictatorship if thepower is not curbed.
outh lends credibility to charges ofimmaturity, but there are signs that he hasreat deal from the confrontation. Much of the blame for hisharsh action can be laid to the bad advice he received from members of his royal household, none of whom can be said torepublican or pro-Papandreou sympathies and who favororegovernment.
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the chief support for the monarchy has come from the army and the conservative social and political croup-;. roup of large entrepreneurs sometimes called the "economic oligarchy" is also identified with the palace. The monarchy's role in the fight againsthelped to enhance its However, the passage of time has blurred the image of the guerrilla struggle and instances of political meddling from the palace have resulted in someabout the monarchy even within conservative circles.
On balance, the King isnot as incompetent as his enemies claim, his politicalhas probably matured, and most important, he possesses the courage to cling to his beliefs. Although he will probably allow the politicians every opportunity to arrive at some accommodation he is unlikely to give upight, and may even succumb to the advice from some factions within ERE and the army who favor an "extraparliamentary" solution. It is clear that his fearapandreou victory will dictate his holding out on elections as long as possible, perhaps until8 when they arerequired.
The "Apostate" Government
The Stephanopoulositself typifies the murky state of Greek politics. Hade up of "defectors" from the EK and kept in power by the reluctant support of ERE and the Progressive
Party, the government has been no moreolding operation from its outset last fall. With only lim majority init has been unable to pass any major legislation which might help strengthen its foothold. Many members of the government are obscurewith no recognizedability, theirbased solely on their willingness to desert theirleader and make themselves available for high office. Some have engaged in corrupt practices in dealing with the financial and patronage connected with their office. Stephanopoulos himself has described many of them as"sick or psychopaths."
The group hasarty cell, the Liberal Democratic Center hich they saythe "trueut some of the ministers have yet to join. Lacking the necessary popular following and the solid support of any of the politically potent newspapers, the FDKwill be hard pressed toa new election unless they manage to runew ticket.
The governmentumber of periods of tension during its year of tenure, chiefly because no one of the opposition factions iswell organized to push for early elections. Its monetary control measuresold crisis last winter broughtresults. However, this may be due chiefly to the basic soundness of the economy which
allows it to survive temporary political maladjustments.
The old bugaboo Cyprus ishorn in the side of the Stephanopouloshile the government must be credited with the courage tothe dialogue with Turkey over the peculiar and perennial problems with the Island, itsweakness is one of the biggest difficulties inyprus solution acceptable to the Turks, as the necessarycould prove unpopular with the Greek electorate.
In spite of its precarious existence, ths government does amble on. Howsvsr, with all the opposition factions beginning to make at least preliminaryfor the eventual election, the government members realize their days may be numbered. The publication of the ASPIDA report at least superficially touched che government itself and,the report will probably not change the average person's views in regard to his vote in any election, it will surelyto increased political tension in the coning months.
The National Radical Union
The nominally oppositionRadical Unionost uncomfortable and politically embarrassing Combined with the eight Progressive deputias under Spyros Markezinis, the ERE deputiesthe basic support infor tho "apostate" Thus, although they
are reluctant to be identified with the government, they are faced with the inglorious task of supporting it, sharing in its faults and failures, but not sharing in the dispensation of political favors and patronage to help preserve their own.
The dominant element in EREariety of rightist factions which generally view the monarchyymbol of solidarity and source of prestige for the state. ERE has the support of the army which has historically chosen its officer corps from chemore conservative families. Like its counterparts in many other countries, ERE receives the majority of its popularfrom the more conservative rural areas.
ERE has been withoutleadership since Karamanlis' voluntary "exile" to Paris after the elections in Its present leader, Panagiotis Kanel-lopoulos, has been forced tofrom many of his espoused positions for lack of support within the party organization. Kanellopoulos has been bothered by the specter of Karamanlis, and much of his effort has been based on his desire to improve his personal image rather than to promote the party's program. Although many deputies areincreasingly restless, his periodic threats to withdraw ERE support from the government have failed to materialize, chiefly because of the fear that the ERE popular image has not recovered from its low state
which allowed the EK whelmingly
A question mark for ERE is the present image of ex-premier Karamanlis, both within the party and among the voters. Toward the end of his term as premier, Karamanlis was under somefor his allegedpolicies which led towith the people and the politicians, as well as thebreak with the palace. There are doubts whether his return would bring about theof thc party necessary toromising ERE showing in an election. In addition, his relationship with the palace is not much improved and he also is reported to have someabout the need for the Personally, he regards himself as the only real answer to thedo many others in the conservative circles. However, he will probably return only under circumstances which he believes most beneficial to himself and reportedly wouldto return as the result of popular acclaim,
selects the tenor campaign.
Pa;jundreou's Center Union
The course the EK will largely determine of the coming election
The EK, formedrought together many diverse elements of the political center. Its main electoral strength has come from the lower middle class, the intellectuals,ignificant portion of the youth of the country. It
also has the supporttrong, high-circulation portion of the press. Its strength within the peasant class also increased in the last two elections. Its many republican elements traditionally have fought for limitations on the monarchy and have generally outdone the ERE in pressing for economic and social reforms. EK's principal intraparty problem has been the maintenance of party unity,
A key factor in the EK is, of course, the position of George Papandreou himself. He still remains the most popular and charismatic figure in Greekbut his nearlyears and apparently failing health presumably rule him outeader much longer. It iswhether he is physically able toong, hardcampaign.
Most interesting is theof the elderwith his sonormer US citizen and an able economist, who is politicallyand has been attacked by conservatives both in andhis party for left-wing sympathies. Papandreou has long been grooming his son to take over tho EK. However, therearked dissimilarity in their public utterances, especially in regard to Andreas' attacks on the King. Some observersthat the father is not in sympathy with his son'sbitter attacks on thebut at the same time he does not have the influence to turn his son away from hiscourse.
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certainly Andreas is the leading candidate to take over at Least the EX left wing, although possibly under abanner. The long-awaited publication of the ASPIDAreport, whichhim of being among the leadership of the conspiracy, has so far linked him with the organization by implication only and has largely resulted only in the usual stir in the widely read and highly partisan Greek press. ourt examination fails to unearth new evidence which points to Andreas' direct involvement in the plot, he will probably exploit the case asexample of the way the "darkmong which he includes the US, are working to the detriment of democracy in Greece.
Andreas charges that the King acted in JulyS -oGreeceonstitutional to an absolute monarchy and that whole sections of public life, national defense, public order, foreign relations, and education have become extensions of the palace. The younger Papandreou denies he is raising the regime issue, but insists he merely questions the functioning of the monarchy--whether the King or the people shouldndreas also denies he is inwith the Communist-front EDA, which supports and profits from his confrontation with the King. However, some of the EDA leadership may be apprehensive about the effect heavy popular support for Andreas could have in any election in which he heads an EK ticket that did notwith EDA.
Moderate elements within the EK violently oppose Andreas' taking over the party and deplore his scathing attacks on the King. So far, however, they have found no device to thwart his drive for power. They are unwilling to declare an open break in the party, realizing that their own best chance for re-election to parliament lies in running under the banner of an EK headed at least symbolically by the ex-premier. Nevertheless, if the ASPIDA affair should upsetapplecart, some EKmay pull out and setew party to offset the pro-Papandreou faction.
The Extreme Left
The United Democratic Left (EDA) swiftly seized upon the5 "coup" to establish the appearancenited front with the EK in its opposition to the King's "meddling" politics. EDA leaders organizedand supported pro-Papan-dreou rallies in their drive for unity at the "street" level.
The elder Papandreou has consistently denied that hethe support of EDA. for purposes of hisimage, he probably welcomed it on some occasions. His son Andreas' contacts with aCommunist friend have led to charges of EDA-EK
The precise electoral strength of EDA is difficult to measure. Declared membership of the party is probably less than ten percent of the populace,rotest
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fay disgruntled nationalists8ercent of the vote to nearlyercent. EDA support ischiefly from theand port workers in theareas of Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki. The party also has an active youth movement. It has servedront for theCommunist Party of Greece but its ability to exploit the unequal distribution of income, along with the ebbing memory of the guerrilla war, has given the party an increased air of respectability. Itsis somewhat marred by organizational problems, much of which revolve around the Sino-Soviet dispute.
EDA will continue tothe Papandreous in theirfor new elections. Further, the possible repolarization of the Greek political structure cannot but help the fortunes of the party. What is nothowever, is whether open EDA-EK cooperation will reap benefits for the Communist front. If Andreas becomes the principal political figure and proves tooil for ths EDA, thepopular support could rise higher than it didshould he isolate EDA, the effect could be disastrous for the party, as he would probably draw auch of the marginal EDA vote.
Considering theseEDA will probably bide its time and continue to profit from the infighting within theparties. It may also
gain more respectability from its support for the increasing popular, though nonethelessAndreas Papandreou. It will also hope that George Papandreou's early departure from the scene will increase the opportunitiesopular front.
Dark-horse Candidates
There are other potential personalities who would like to benefit from the renewedactivity. One such player is Spyros Harkezinis, the highly egotistical leader of the small, right-of-cencer Progressive Party, who has remarked to the US ambassador that his deep knowledge of his country givessuperiority complex" in parliamentary debates. However, he has never been able toopular image and his main hope would appear to be in the King's turning to him in
Within the EK and the there are at least three others who may emerge among the new leadership. George Marvros,ormer cabinet member forwho resigned over awith Andreas, has re-entered center politicsossible counterweight to Andreas. he has no particularstanding and will find difficulty in drumming upsupport. Kikitas Venize-los, the grandson and nephew of two of modern Greece's mostliberal politicians, may be interested in reviving the now defunct Liberal Party.
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Mitsotakis, cheof coordination forand the holder of the same post under Papandreou, would also like to lead many of the maverick FDK deputies andek defectorsew center group which they would herald as the "trueowever, he does not have apolitical standing innor does hearticularly popular imageof his home constituency in Crete. He has also beenin the ASPIDA scandal.
Conclusions
Irrespective of how theforces line up, the next few months shoulderiod of intense political activity. The King will probably delay elections as long as he can, but
he may be forced to agree to them sometime next year. Andreas Papandreou will probably continue to be the most controversialon the political scene and he could assume actualof the EK, especially if his aging father should pass from the scene. Andreas'of the EK could result in complete disarray in the party. Should the King decide toaomplete polarization of the political spectrum could endanger thestructure of the government. In addition, the failure to comeolitical compromise in its domestic affairs complicates the country's relations with its neighbor Turkey and increases the improbability of asolution to the Cyprus (CONFIDENTIAL)
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