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LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review ,
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ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A POLITICAL TACTIC
This report, originallynited distributionifferent form, seta forth tho fight-talk tactic used by tho Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Communists I?ourse of important military conflicts, namely, the Chinese civil war, the Korean war, and the Indochina war against the French. It focuses on the factors which have impelled the Asian Communist leaders to beginand on the various tactics used duringin the effort to extract political concessions from the West. It also discusses the lessons which the North Vietnamese today profess to see in these earlierconfirming them in their conviction not to negotiate prior toublic declaration of surrender from Washington on the issue of troop withdrawal.
This report, prepared by the Research Staff, has been informally coordinated within CIA. The responsible analysts, ^Arthur A. Cohen and Helen-Louise Hunter3 wouId welcome comment, addressed to the Chief or Deputy "thief of the3
AMRGVffJ FOB
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ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF NEGOTIATIONSOLITICAL TACTIC
Summary
CCP-KMT Civilo
Korean0 to
o
for Vietnam
Discussion
CCP-KMT Civilo
Koreano
o
for Vietnam
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ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF NEGOTIATIONSOLITICAL TACTIC
This paper discusses the Asian (particularly Chinese) Communist practice of negotiating, focusing on tbe motives which, in tho past, have Impelled Asian Communists toand the signs they have given when they were prepared to talk. It includes an analysis of the fight-talk tactic used in the Chinese civil war los welletailed examination of the Korean experiencend the Vietnamese experience. Finally, therehort discussion of implications for Vietnam today.
a. General Findings
On the two occasions when the Chinese Communists have initiated negotiations during military conflicts, their forces were either
and in danger of annihilation, as In thecivil war, or
hurt in the field, as in the Koreanthey negotiated, they continued to fight. Thistactic was formulated by Mao Tse-tung0 as
a means to preserve his weak, forces from being destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior armies. Subsequently, it was used In Korea by the Chinese and North Koreans, at firstxpedient to shield their badly hurt armies and then,1olding tacticthey could extract terms enabling them to disengageostly limited war.
In Indochina, however, the decision to beginwas Imposed by the Soviet and Chinese leaders on Bo Chi Minh when tbey feared American Involvement andof the war more than he did They urged Ho to close out the war, which he was by no means losing in the field, and persuaded him to make concessions to the French after talks started and to try to seize Vietnamrocess
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of low-risk political subversion. Even after Bo had been induced to begin negotiations, his desire to use Mao's original fight-and-talk tacticrotracted period was subordinated to the larger interests of Soviet policy (to split the Western alliance ln Europe) and Chinese policy (to prevent the US from establishing alliances inhe Soviets and Chinese viewed these interests as being best servedpeace" offensive and hindered by continuation of tbe Indochina war. Ho made concessions, particularly on the matter of partition, which were later viewed by him and his lieutenantsistake not to be repeated.
b. The CCP-KMT Civil
Constantly maneuvering to preserve the badly depleted ranks of his Red Army from complete destruction by Chiang Kai-shek'ssuperior forces, Mao In7 finally induced Chiang to establish, onCP-KMT united front against Japan. But within the context of this paper alliance, Mao expanded his military and political forces in the northwest and even directed quick-decision thrusts to be made against isolated KMT units. attern of limited armed conflict and political struggle emergedao avoided major military operations which woulda major counterattack andactic of limited-fight, limited talk; "After we have repulsed the attack of the /KMT forces7 and before theyew one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fightlose. In the period that follows, we shouldruce with them.1* (Mao's statement of. In this way, Maoeries of small victories without running the riskeneral civil war, while expanding hisholdings behind the Japanese lines.
While fighting continued on tbe local level, CCP-KMT negotiations went forward on the national0 Represented in Chungking by his brillant negotiator, Chou En-lai, Mao used various lulls in the civil war to increase his regular forces, ande permitted the American Army Observer Mission to operate in Yenan because its very presenceoliticaleffect on Chiang. Recognizing thc strengthened military and political position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan inao tried to settlealf-way station-legalization of thethe road to an eventual seizure of national power. Chiang refused to facilitate thistakeover. Onhortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao dropped the talking half of his dual tactic
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and began to fight the all-out oivll wax, which hla forces decisively won In
c. The Korean
Initial Chinese Communist military successes fromthrough0 increased Mao's confidence that the UN forces could be driven from Korea If military pressure was sustained, and Cnou En-lalease-firereathing spell" for the UN. eries of manpower-killing advances by UN and ROK units In March and early1 followed by the blunting of the Communists1 big April and May offensives, which cost them anen, left Mao's best armies on tbe defensive Of thehinese Communist divisions which had Initiated the April and May offensives,ad suffered aboutercent casualties.
These disastrous defeats impelled Mao to beginbut there were no prior indications that he wasto drop his previous political conditions for a When, onoviet UN delegate Malik for the first time called for talksease-fire, he merely avoided raising the preconditions that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking should be admitted to tbe UN. Mao seized upon the military breathing-spell to Improve the badly impaired combat capabilities of his forces in the field.
Mao's strategy at the armistice negotiations1 toas toprotractedombining tactics of political attrition with limited military pressure. But this strategy did not break the determination of the US negotiators to defend the principle of voluntary repatriation of war prisoners. The death of Stalinthe developmentew Soviet attitude toward East-West tensions in general and concluding an armistice inSoviet pressure on Mao and his own recognition that further resistance was purposeless, and even harmful to his economic program, Impelled blm to retreat and accept voluntarymove which opened the way for the armistice agreement of
d.
The same considerations that led tbe Soviets and the Chinese to negotiate an end to the Korean war Inade them look with favoregotiated settlement of
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the Indochina war. At the time, however, the fortunes of the Vietnamese Communists in their eight-year fight with the French were steadily Improving and Ho Chi Minh gave nothat he would be willing to accept less in asettlement than his forces could seize on the
The first indication that the Communists might consider negotiations came from the Soviets, who began in3 to quote with approval demands in the French pressPanmunjom" in Indochina. By September, the Chinese had alsoillingness to discuss Indochina at the conference table. But Vietnamese Communist propaganda made it clear that these Soviet and Chinese initiatives were being madeime when Ho was still resisting the concept of The attitude of the Viet Ulnb leaders at this time is illustrative of the generalization that Asianhave been unwilling to begin negotiations when they have been in an advantageous position militarily, or have not been badly hurt in the field.
As the French Government was being subjected topressure from many members of the National Assembly and from the French public for an end to the costly war, Moscow and Peking acted to convince Ho that he could make major gains through negotiations. One finally took the initiative in proposing negotiations, but itedged proposal that, in effect,omplete French surrender.
Premier Laniel was able to resist the strong domestic pressure for immediate bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh by agreeing to discuss Indochina at the Genevain Although Ho clearly preferred bilaterals, (in which he would have beenuch stronger positionthe French than he was ate was againby the Soviets to agree to international negotiations.
At Geneva, Molotov and Chou En-lai moved adroitly to avoid any Impasse that could be used by the DS as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. Ho, whose delegate, Pham Van Dong, started with maximum demands after the fall of Dion Bien Phu, apparently calculated thatcould continue for some time without leading to American involvement. His tactics of protracted negotiations, which would afford him more time to solidify his military position, were similar to those of Mao in Korea. But again
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again, the Soviets and Chinese acted to undercut hismaximum demands at Geneva for French politicalin exchangeeasefire.
The Viot Mlnh certainly had not expected to have to make as many political concessions as they finally agreed to at Geneva. Ho wasosition to negotiate from strength and to do soong time, but he found himself caught in aweb and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions. It was clear at the time that tbe North Vietnamese were far from completely satisfied with the Geneva compromises. As time has gone on, they have probably become even more convinced that the political concessions they made thereistake. The clear awareness that they were impelled, primarily by Moscow and Peking, to stopalf-way station on the road to total military victory has made them all the moreto fight on in the present situation.
e. Implications for Vietnam Today
North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist officials have indicated privately that the compromises madethe Viet Minn with something lessotal takeover of Vietnam,istake. Ho's determination not to stop half-way again, even in the face of increased US airstrikes, is bolstered by Mao's special need to keep him fighting. Mao's special need, which stems largely from an image ofas "leader" of the international Communist movement, ls to prove Soviet and other doubters wrong regarding theof revolutionaries to defeat the USrotracted small war.
A. The CCP-KMT Civil
The badly depleted ranks of Mao's Red Army, whichinto the sanctuary of northwest China In5 after the punishing attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's forces during the Long March, were incapable of resisting an all-out KMT offensive. Aware of this basic fact, Mao repeatedly appealed to Chiang to end the civil war andCP-KMT united front to expel Japanese forces from north China. Chiang was unwilling to comply primarily because Mao insisted onhis military units for use in the revolution: "It
goes without saying that we shall never allow Chiang toinger on the Red Army." (Mao's statement of. But Japan's large-scale attack on China in7 provided Maoew opportunity to move Chiangnited front against Japan. Mao took the first formal step; on7 the CCP declared that its armed forces would be under the "direct control" of Chiang. Actually, three days after this paper statement, Mao made it clear that "direct control" was only an anti-Japanese political facade and that units and their weapons would remain undercontrol:
It is necessary to maintain the CCP's absolutelyleadership in what originally was the Red Army as well as in all guerrilla units. Communists are not permitted to vacillate on this principle. (CCPof
Mao used the mythical anti-Japanese united front to deter the KMT forces from attacking bis new sanctuary in theand to expand his military, territorial, and political holdings. Most of the CCP effort was directed toward extend-
ing Its assets, some was directed toward guardingMT attack, andittle was directed toward engaging Japanese armed forces. "Negotiations for the reorganization of the former "Red Army" units moved very slowly7nd clashes continued on the local level between some Nationalist and Communist forces. As friction increased, Mao began to formulate his political-military tactic. , he directed that tbe CCP's main field work should be in the relatively secure rear areas of the Japanese forces, calculating that the political-military vacuum behind the Japanese lines would shield the CCP from superior KMT forces until the foothold in the northwest could be expanded. Mao enlarged his armed forces as quickly and efficiently asbut he always stopped Just short of provoking an open break with Chiang and the retributionajor KMT.
Calculated restraint, intended to provide Chiang with no pretext for an offensive, was designed by Mao to be atactic to gain vitally needed breathing spells prior to
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the openingevolutionary advance In the future. Mao Indicated the "positive" role of reducedactic in advancing the revolution:
Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, should always be regarded as part of therevolutionary policy, as an Indispensable link In the general revolutionary line, egment in the curvilinear movement. In short they are positive. (Mao's statement
That Is, defensive or suspended action was part of Mao's policy to expand his armies and the CCP membership behind Japanese lines with the aim of seizing more territory at the expense of the KMT. But quick-decision thrusts were never abandoned. For example, in tbe springommunist forces moved quickly into Shantung Province, and in the winter, they decimated KMT forces in Hopel These clashes were fully concordant with Mao's policy of expanding holdings by armod struggle within the context of tho CCP-KMT paper united front.
A pattern of limited armed conflict and politicalemerged in CCP-KMT relations in tbe spring Mao began to refine his fighting-and-talking tactic. Militarily, he limited the offensive operations of tbe Communist armies, which were still considerably inferior to KMT armies;he worked vigorously to Indoctrinate workers, peasants, and intellectuals. In this fashion, he groped his way, seeking out and exploiting the soft spots in Chiang's military and political armor.
Mao systematized his tactic. One set forth the unique position that there was noolitical-military struggle against Chiang whilenited front with him. The struggle half of this dialectical policy was intended to demonstrate to Chiang that Mao's forces could not bethey would fight back against any KMT offensives. The unity half was Intended to deter KMT attacks and to "avert the outbreak of largo-scale civil war." Mao depicted the partial struggle against Chiang as "tbe most Important means for strengthening KMT-CCPis calculation having been, as ho polntod out0irective to Communist field commanders operating in oast China, that clashes with the KMT forces were necessary
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so as to make tho KMT afraid to oppressnd compel them to recognize our legal status, and make themtoplit.
That is, Mao, on occasion, used military action in certain areas rather than direct political concessions to sustain the united front on paper.
He correctly estimated that small CCP military thrusts would not provoke Chiang to move beyond limitedbecause Chiang did not have the military capability0 toation-wide offensive against CCP forcos so long aa the war against Japan was being waged. Mao's estimate0 was that
The present military conflicts are local and not nation-wide. They are merely acta of strategicon the part of our opponents and are as yet not large-scale actions intended tothe Communists.
In this way, he defended the general plan for limited civil war which be had enunciated on0imited-fight, limited-talk tactic. Mao had set forth ths important tactic in considerable detail:
First, we will never /slc7 attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainlyecond, we do not fight unless we are sure ofwe must on no account fight withoutand without certainty of thehird, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hardshe KMT forces7 and before theyew one, we should atop'at the proper moment and bring that particular fightlose. In the period that follows, ve shouldruce with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies thenature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hardsew offensive should we retaliateew struggle.
This became the basic tactical principle of Mao. His practice Indicated that his forces were directed to fight, close off the particular battleefeat of KMT forces, and thenruce and be prepared to negotiate in the hope that Chiang would notocal and limited defeat as the
reasonarge-scale offensive against all Communist armies. This ls the tactical principle designed to advance Mao's protracted war waged with initially weak forces, their actions to safe proportions.
In this way, Maoeries of localreat risk of general civil war. At the same time, he seized territory by expanding the base areas behind the Japanese lines and by controlling the actions of his field commanders, whose forces sporadically chopped away at small KMT units. For example, the First Contingent of the Communist New Fourth Army commanded by General Chen YiKMT forces in northern Kiangsu in0 and, in the second halfeveral Communist victories were won In the lower Yangtze valley. Mao had directed that the New Fourth must be expandeden; by the endis generals were successful ln expanding this army tothat number of combat regulars.
While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations took place on the national level ln the second half0 as Mao implemented his fighting-and-talking tactic. Even when vastly superior KMT forces unexpectedly surrounded anden attached to the New Fourth's headquarters as they were withdrawing to the north of the Yangtze River, Mao refused to consider this setback ashis principle ofimited war. Inhe intermittent negotiations between the KMT and CCP reached another major impasse ln Chungking, Just as they had in9 and in Chiang asked Mao toonclusive reply to his demands to relinquish the independent CCP government and to Incorporate CCP forces into Nationalist armies. Chou En-lai, the brillant Communist representative ln Chungking, deflected these demands and charged the KMT with increasing their forces along the northwest border base areas. Chou attained some success in his political effort to depict Chiang as the obdurate element in the united front.
The failure of Chiang to launch large-scale attacks against Communist forces3 was attributed by Mao at the time to the political success ln arousing domestic and international opinion against Chiang's policies. (Liberat ion. Two additional factors were Japan's east China offensive against KMT forces and DS efforts to stop Chiang's attempts to suppress the Communists. That is, Mao
adroitly used political pressures to compensate for military weakness: "The Communists are not capable of much, if any, offensive action." (Report of Colonel Depass,
Expediently,3ao used the lull in the CCP-KMT protracted war to further expand his armed forces, which increasedegulars by The Wallace mission to China in4 resulted in the dispatch of the American Army Observer Mission to Yenan, which Mao favored because of "its political effect upon the KMT":
Any contact you Americans may have with us Communists is gold. Of course, we are glad to have the Observer Mission here because it will help to beat Japan. But there ls no use In pretendingto now at leastchief importance of your coming is not itseffect on the KMT. (Mao's remarks to John S. Service, interview of
That is, Mao exploited tbe DS desire to end the civil war and get on with the war against Japan, adroitly using itolitical shield against the potential offensive-power of Chiang's superior military forces. He was capable then of considerably more tactical flexibility than he has been in recent years.
By insisting on policies which made tbe KMT appearMao deflected Chiang's demand that, toegal party, the CCP should disband Its armed forces. In aworded proposal, which Mao maneuvered Ambassador Hurley to sign witb him in Tenan onao agreed only "to work for" the unification of all military forces while insisting on the formationcoalitionnited national military council." His intention was to exploit the generally held view that the CCP wasIn refusing to disband its armies before thc formationoalition government. However, in order to keep thealive, he directed Chou En-lal in Chungking to join Ambassador Hurley in pressing Chiang to accept the proposal. Chiang insisted on disbanding the Communist armies, and Mao was then able to "expose" Chiang as recalcitrant inreasonable" negotiationsa coalition. The widespread domestic and international appeal of tbe Maoist programettlement, the rapidly expanding military-political power of the CCP, and US anxiety to bring about
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unity put Chiangonsiderablo disadvantage in the talks. Mao's success with dilatoryis, hisof talks about "working for" unified armed forces in the place of action taken to disband CCPisolated Chiang in China and internationally.
All along, Mao had continued to expand bis forces, and bye claimed that theyegulars and moreilitia. Maoajor move shortly before Japan's surrender, ordering CCP troops to link up witb Soviet troops driving southward in. As CCP and KMT armies raced for control of various Japanese-vacated areas and as Chiang prepared to strike at Mao's forces, the Communist leader accepted Chiang's invitation to accompany Ambassador Hurley to Chungking, arriving on Mao was still anxious toeries of breathing spells. Two days before flying toMao drafted an inner-party policy line on negotiations, in which he indicated that the CCP should be prepared to make somesome reduction in the size of those base areas which were indefensible and in the strength of CCP armed forces.
Without such concessions, we cannot explode the KMT's civil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders in China and cannot gain in exchange legal status for our partytate of peace.
But there are limits to sucb concessions: the principle is that they must not damage theinterests of the .peopleCPof the base areas and tbe armedao's statement of
Mao in Chungking recognized the strengthened military and diplomatic position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan and the signing in Moscow of the Sino-Soviet treaty. In private talks, he dropped his demand (to which heoalition government and high command, buton retaining not less thanivisions as well as exclusive control of the base areas in north China. He wanted toalf-way station ofon the road to an eventual seizure"of national power, inasmuch as his armies were still smaller and more badly-equipped than Chiang's. "The Communist armies do not possess
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sufficient strength to directly opposo the KMT armies in positional warfare; butong period of time as an occupying force, the KMT cannot hold out even with US5 report of Colonel Yeaton from Yenan) Chiang accurately summarized Mao's position as equivalent totho CCP to carry on its political revolution without opposition or hindrance while professing to end the KMT-CCP military clashes by negotiating. Actually, while Mao was talking, CCP forces were consolidating their control over newly taken territory ln the north, and when Mao returned onfter refusing to disband his forces, he Justified in the context of protracted revolution, his willingness to negotiate.
Mao made it clear to cadres in Yenan onctober that reducing CCP forces toivisions would not mean handing over weapons. "The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be banded over." He then reminded cadres that his strategy was toongwar:
Was our party right or wrong in deciding at its 7th Congress /Inhat we were willing to negotiate with the KMT provided that they changed their policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese revolutionong one and victory can only be won step by step.
As both sides raced to seize Japanese arms and fill the territorial vacuum, Mao directed the Northeast Bureau of the CCP to expand its holdings and use theommunist troops to hold tbe rural areas remote from tho existing centers of KMT control. Between the truce of January andoth sides took territory ln During the whole period of tbe Marshall mission in5ao tried to disgrace Chiang politically byoderate program of "peace, democracy, and unity" while his armed forces expanded. He relied heavily on their ability to avoid decisive engagements, to prolong the stop-start fighting, and to counter-attack against small KMT units.
In the final series of negotiations of Mao's longwar, he gave priority to the goal ofeasefire and an extension of the Manchurian truce. He was also concerned ln6 about US aid to Chiang's forces. On the one hand, he relied on General Marshall's
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mediation to gain an immediatere, to ameliorate Chiang's demands, and to state his own settlement terms. Chou En-lai, urbane and persuasive, ably discharged his task by appearing conciliatory, moderate, and reasonable. On the other hand, Mao's press and radio in Yenan criticized DS policy with Increasing vehemency In an effort to deter Washington from giving further aid to the KMT. Byao demanded that the US stop all military assistance to Chiang and withdraw all US troops from the mainland; his concern with the modern equipment sent to the KMT forces bad been deepened. "Let them know that whatever happens, If we are faced with mechanized war, we shall fight on if necessary with our hands and feet." (Mao'e statement to Robert Payne in
Although his armies were still numerically Inferior to Chiang's, Mao issuod an inner-party directive onuly warning his forces to prepare to smash Chiang's offensive by an all-out "war ofhich required the temporary abandonment of indefensible cities and the opening of mobile warfare. Mao had no alternative but to fight against superior forces and onhortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao was Impelled to drop the talking half of his dual tactic and prepare for all-out civil war, which his forces won ln the straight forward contest ofstrength waged between6 and
In drawing an analogy between the Chinese civil war and the Vietnam war today, CCP propagandists emphasize thenature of both conflicts and the evolution of weak into strong Communist forces. But they deliberately de-emphasize, or avoid any reference to, the talking-half of Mao's tactic and the temporary half-way station he tried to obtain. Unlike the Soviet propagandists, they insist that talking should take place only after the DS withdraws Its forces from South Vietnam.
B. The Korean
Military developments in Korea in the spring1lear-cut example of the Asian Communists having been impelled to switch to the talking phase after they had been hurt in the field. That is, they viewed the large losses
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of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) combat regulars as the sufficient cause for drastically reduclog the fighting phase. The military struggle was subordinatedhe intention being to wear down Western negotiators toavorable political settlement.
When, in latehe CCF entered the war in force, Worth Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) combat casualties were already very high, estimated by tbe United Nations Command (UNC)n additionrisoners. The NKPA had been virtually destroyed and never fought again above corps strength In the Korean war. The initial CCF successes against UNC forces from November through0 increased the confidence of tbe Chinese Communistthat they could drive UNC forces from Korea if CCFwas sustained. On0 and again onhou En-laiease-fire, describing iteans to gainreathing spell" for UNC forces, and demanded that prior to any halt in the fighting all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, US armed forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and Peking's representatives must be admitted to tbe United Nations. As UNC forcesfrom tbe Yalu River, however, theyeavy toll of CCF combat units. For example, betweenovember andecember,0 men of the eight divisions committed by tbe 9th Army Group, Third CCF Field Army, were estimated by the Marine Corps to have0 combatittle over half of them Inflicted by ground forces and the rest by air attack. The 9th Army Group was so damaged bythat it disappeared from the Korean battlefield for three months. ByNC forcos had stopped the CCF all along the front.
General Ridgway directed UNC forces to comply with his dictum of "Inflicting maximum casualties on tho enemy" rather than gaining ground. The dictum was put into practice in the months following the UNC offensive which started in late ebruary, OPERATION PUNCH hadatCF (body count) and when, onebruary, CCF infantry for tbe first time in Korea attacked In mass waves, UNC forces killed thousands of Chinese at Chipyong-ni. CCF mass infantry assaults resulted in further beavy Chinese casualties onh and again ont with the start of OPERATION KILLER. arch, the entire Chinese front south of the Han River had collapsed and UNC
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units moved to withiniles ofh parallel. CCFand equipment losses continued to be "heavy" after the start of OPERATION RIPPERarch, and onarch, Seoul was retaken as CCF and small NKPA forces fell back. eries of manpower-killing advances launched by UNC and BOK units in late March and early April moved the allied forces acrossh parallel. The ranks of the bestPiao's 4th Field Army and Chen Yi's 3rd Fieldtheleaders used in the first massive assault against tho UNC forces had been seriously depleted. "Now the best troops are annihilated; this forcod the CCF to send replacements from the 1st and 2nd field The CCF suffered high casualties and its faith in Victory had beenFrom interrogation report of Assistant Battalionh Army. 4th CCF Field Army).*
General Van Fleet met the first Communist spring of fensi launched onith the manpower-killing tactics of General Ridgway, and directed his corps commanders onpril
Expend stoel and fire, not ant so many artillery holesan can step from one to
the other.
Because they used massed Infantry assaults againstUS artillery, automatic-weapons, and air firepower, units of six CCF armiesotal0ndpril and were forced to end their first spring offensive. Their socond spring offensive was even more destructive to CCF men and materiel.
Onay,CF divisions, flankedotalKPA divisions, opened the second spring offensiveile front using human wave tactics against strongly fortified UNC positions. Although gains ofoiles were made along most of the front, the Communist offensive was complotoly spent byay, and UNC forces, which had recoiled only slightly, lashed backajor counter-offensive, depriving the Communists of the opportunity to place screening forces between their main armies and the
prisoner reports that are referred to in this paper are, in almost every case, the reports of prisoners captured and interrogated in March and Aprilis, after the collapse of the1 CCF offensive and before the even more costly defeats of the spring
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UNC units. UNC counterattacks quickly carried into CCF and NKPA former assembly areas, where large quantities ofwere captured as many dumps were overrun. une, the CCF and NKPA lost moreen, and of theCF divisions which had initiated the offensive, ad suffered aboutercent casualties. The following table, which is based on US Far East Command estimates, indicates the magnitude of the Communist losses:
Strength Strength Strength %June
East Central Front
(Main attack)
12th CCF Army
CCF Army
CCF Army
CCF Army
NK Corps
NK Corps
Front
10th
th
Front
64th CCF Army
CCF Army
NK Corps
NK Corps
The table indicates that ashehadoss ofercent of their totalay strength in Korea. oune, they suffered an0 casualties (not included in the table above).
Most of the CCF prisoners were taken during the last week of May in frantic efforts to escape, indicating that the political-control fabric of many CCF units bad been shattered, primarily because large numbers of political officers and non-coms had bean killed,
Tbe combined heavy losses to the first wave fieldthe CCF 3rd andthe second wavethe CCF 1st andsignificantlythe quality of the forces which the Chinese leaders could put in the field in Many of their best combat officers and political cadres had been killed or captured, partly because of the Maoist practice whichthat they take front-line positions to lead their troops. Many political officers were killed in combatthey spent much of their time with the men in the front line to lead the battle themselves" (fromreportrivate Inth Division, 4th CCF Fieldnd in some companies all officers Including the company commander had been ordered to tbe front line to raise the men's "fighting spirit" (from interrogationof the Company Political Officer inth Division, 4th CCF Field Army). "The casualties among the commanders wereecause they took the lead at the front" (from interrogation report of Battalionh Army, 1st CCF Field Army). The massed infantryfor the first time by the CCF in Korea in mid-Februarythe destruction: "We fought only with human wave tactics; great numbers of men have been sacrificed; it was indescribably miserable" (from interrogation report ofd Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The Maoist doctrine of "defeating the enemy's firepoweruperiority inilitary idea which ls no good... These views of mine were shared by most lower-level leaders and the men in the CCF, though they could not dare to make them public" (from interrogation of Assistant Battalion Politicalh Army, 4th CCF Field'Human wave' tactics are supposed to overwhelm the enemy's firepower with predominance of manpower and thus win the victory. From my first experience in this war,ound that this tactic had no sense and no In actual combat, it was nothingass loss of lives and defeat" (from interrogation report of Squad Leader and CCPh Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The quality and number of CCF cadres who were lost to the four CCF field armieswas the sufficient cause for the Chinese Communistwhose forces comprised abutercent of the Communist combat units in Korea, to switch to the talking phase.
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In the disastrous offensives ofhe CCP and NKPA sustained anasualties frompril toune. Byune, the Chinese casualties since the CCF entered the Koroan war were, including0 non-battledue torisoners. (No data arehere on NKPA total casualties since)
The war was increasingly costly for the Chinese in other ways. It forced the regime to modify its program of long-range economic development and to place the economyar footing. The war also subjected the regiue to economicimposed by tho West, increased inflationary pressures, and strained economic relations between urban and rural areas. The Chinese Communists became increasingly dependent on tho USSR, partly because the Chinese were unable to replace from their own resources the stocks of material being expended in Korea.
The first stop toward ending tho commitment in Korea was to begin nogotiationsease-fire, the calculation apparently having been that political concessions could be gained by combining protracted talks with propagandawhile the fighting was kept limited.
eries of statements made by American and United Nations' officials in late May and earlyhe UNC's willingness to end tho fighting withouta surrender of Communist forces, tho Chinese Communists and the Soviets apparently decided toreathing-spell. Prior to theune radio speech of Soviet United Nations' delegate Jacob Malik, there apparently wore no indications that the Chinose wore willing to accept these Western On the contrary, the indications continued to point to Chinese intransigence. Unexpectedly, In his radio speech, Malikhange in the Communist position when he avoided linking tho Communists' proposalease-fire to their earlier demands that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking must be admitted to the United Nations. "The Soviet peoples believe thatirst step, discussions should bo started between tbc belligerentsease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces fromh parallel."
The Chinese, too, were careful not to admit they had dropped preconditions. Onune, the Pekingaily frontpaged Malik's proposal without acceding to truce
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talks. The Chinese did not accede to truce talks publiclyuly, anduly they rationalized the change ln their basic position without acknowledging explicitly that it had changed. The Chinese later formulated their switch to the talking phasc as follows:
After the five great campaignsffensives from0 to, the"Volunteers switched over ln good time toline of "engaging in protracted warfare while conducting positiveand strictly subordinated the military struggle to the political struggle. (NCNA commentary
The Chinese used the military breathing-spell to Improve their Impaired over-all combat capabilities. By tbe time tbe armistice negotiations startedhe Chinese had improved their artillery and small-arm stores and had roplaced their manpower losses while the NKPA divisions were rebuilt. Politically, thoy had already exploited the theme of seeking peace and of opposing American "warmongering" with considerable success, gaining face internationally nnd placing tlioniKolvosavorable propaganda position as the initiators of the truce talks. They were unwilling to move the talks alongutually acceptable conclusion within any short period. On the contrary, they used Mao's tactic of wearing down UNC negotiatorsprotracted struggle" (Peking's phrasen order to extract major concessions.
UNC ground advances had ended temporarily onune after theorps had taken Chorwon and Kumhwa at tho base of the Iron Triangle at points aboutiles north ofh parallel. All of South Korea exceptmall part of the Western flank had been cleared of Communist forces enabling fortification of the UNC line in depth ln aniles north of the parallel. The Joint Chiefs of Staffctingolicy position agreed upon at meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) heldnd informed General Rldgway not to go beyond the general vicinity of the new line. In his memoirs, President Truman depicted the NSC policy objectives for Korea as follows:
Regarding Korea, we distinguished between the politicalunified, Independent, democraticthe military aim of repelling tho aggression and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the purpose would be to establish the
authority of the Republic of Korea southorthern boundary line suitable for defense and administration and not substantially belowh Parallel, to provide for the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from all of Korea, and to build up the ROK forces so as to deter orenewed North Korean aggression.
Unlike MacArthur's demand for total victory and expulsion of the Communists from the North, this policytatus quo alongorth and South Korea for an Interim period, and an armistice agreement ensuring the status quo. In order to impel1 the Communist leaders to consider entering Into armisticeeries of public statements were made in May and June. Onay, Senator Edwin Johnsonesolution Into the Senate asking the United Nations to urge the belligerents to declare an armistice byune alongh parallel, to agree to the exchange of all war prisoners, and to withdraw all foreign troops by the end of the year. Moscow news media were quick to give extensive publicity to the resolution. Onay, Lester Poarson, President of the United Nations General Assembly, stated that total surrender of themight not be necessary, that it would be sufficient to achieve the objective of stopping the aggression. une, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that the time was right to stop the fighting, inasmuch as the UNC had forced the invaders back beyondh parallel, which could bo the approximate lino of demarcation. Alsoune, Secretary Acheson told senators at the MacArthur Hearings that the Administration's immediate aim was ending the aggression (the complete unification of Korea being the long-terme was more explicit inune, declaring thatease-fire were arranged aroundh parallel, "that would accomplish the military purposes In Korea." That is,0 policy of complete unification of Korea and expulsion of the Communists wasby the more modest and less1 policy of settlingon-Communist half in the South.
The ending of major UNC ground advances in1ove dictated by higher American political policy. Whether major UNCould have been sustained in drives toward the Yaluould have impelled theto avoid delaying tactics at tbe subsequent armistice negotiations (which beganre conjectural matters. Although badly hurt, the CCF wasighting force;uly, an estimated total of) and) divisions confrontedf the UNC under General
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Tmdisparity In numbers which providedapability toajor offensive and,onsequence,onstant source of concern for UNC strategists. The UNC would have required an additional input of at least three divisions to consider pressingin further large-scale advances into areas weresupply lines were increasingly shorter and UNC lines were Increasingly longer. It was doubtful that Van Fleet had sufficient forces to annihilate Communist forces by maneuver and encirclement. Beyond the basic militarythe majority of nations composing the UNC were reluctant again to advance toward the Yalu. General Van Fleet's strategic view in1 was:
Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the Eighth Army, therefore, was toefense line on the nearest commanding terrain /The KANSAS-WYOMING phase lines7 north ofh parallel, and from there to push forwardimited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the Eighth Army.
This Ridgway-Van Fleet strategy of maintaining militaryby means of "limited advance" was the predominant feature of tbe remainder of the Korean war.* uly, the main
even tho policy of "limited advance" was costly. For example, UNC infantry attacks on Bloody Ridge in late August and earlyhich took the ridge, cost UN and ROK forcesasualties and, according to UNC estimates, cost the Communists0 casualties. Higher losses for both sides were reported after UNC forces took Heartbreak Ridge onctober following thirty days of bloody fighting. This policy maintained the UNC military initiative, preventing the Communists fromajor drive; it provided UNC negotiators with the military pressure sufficient to impel1 Communist negotiators In October to drop their demandemarcation line south of the battlethat is, the demandine ath parallel.
Limited UNC advances in1 had inflicted on the CCF and NKPA the highest monthly total of casualties for the negotiations poriod and had galnod important terrain, but UNC casualties in the advances
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fortification of phase line KANSAS was complete and byuly, the lull in operations due to armistice negotiations permitted Van Fleet to fortify phase line WYOMING farther north, forming it Into another main line of defense.
However, the DNC made it clear from theAdmiral Joy's statement at the first armistice meetingulythe Communists would not bee facto cease-fire and that fighting would continue they agreed to reasonable armistice termsilitary armistice commission was prepared to function.
The Communist tactic of political attrition succeeded ln frustrating UNC negotiators, but It did not gain the Communists major concessions. Small-scale but sustained UNC military pressure on Communist forces in Korea in1 was reflected ln the talks. Onctober, thein effect dropped their demand that the demarcation line be moved down to correspond withh parallel.
On the other hand, theyday de factofromovember toecember, enabling them to further strengthen front-line defenses and to augment unit strength. Further, pressure on their negotiators was relaxed becauseNC concession on the matterermanent or temporary line of demarcation. In early November, thenegotiators Insisted onap line of demarcation Immediately rather than after the armistice was signed, but General Ridgway and the UNC negotiators opposed this demand, recognizingermanent line (at the line of contact) would prevent the UNC from using limited advances to pressure the Communists to get on with the task ofan armistice. But the JCS in Washingtonap line of demarcationime limit appended. The time limit permitted invalidation, by the UNC, of the line at the expirationday period. General Ridgway still objected that this in effect granted thee facto cease-fire for one month and that such awould impede the UNC strategy of sustaining militarypushing the lineprevent further stalling at the negotiations. Ridgway was overruled and onap line of demarcation was formally agreed on; byecember, the expiration ofday limit, there had been no significant change on the battlefield or in the negotiations, suggesting that the Communist calculation on the premanency of the line of demarcation was proving to be correct, providing them with exemption from UNC military pressure and further time to protract the negotiations.
Tbe Chineseolitical victory togetherilitary truce, and as the talks centered on the prisoner issue, they adamantly refused toolitical setback. The major deadlock on the matter of voluntary repatriation of prisoners prolonged the talks froa2 tonasmuch as the Chineae Insisted on the forcible return of all CCF (and NKPA) prisoners in order toajordefeat if large numbers were to opt for the West. The Communists would not recognize the ONC stand on voluntary repatriationalid principle and argued that it was in conflict with the Geneva Convention whichil-tor-all exchange. As an alternative, theythatelatively small number would resistis,0otalCF and NKPAcould tacitly agree to tbe UNCprocess.
Both tho Communists and the UNC were shocked by tbeof the screening process after about only half bad been questioned. 0 of0 prisoners screened indicated that they would resist repatriation to China and North Korea, but the UNC had given tbe Communist negotiators an estimateilling to return of therisoners. When, onpril, the Communists were Informed that0 would return without the use of force, the CCF Colonel Tsai was speechless, askedecess, and on the followingon Instructions fromsaid that the UNC's earlier estimatear cry It was "completely impossible for us to consider" and "you flagrantly repudiated what yon said Because the Communists had been stung once by the screening procedure, they indicated they would have nothing more to do with it.
Small, division-scale battles continued in the field, but the Communists were still unwilling to change the nature of the war into that of major offensive actions. The tried to deflect politically damaging charges of inhumanity on the prisoner issue byoncerted propaganda campaign, accusing thein late Februarywaging "bacteriological warfare" in North Korea and Manchuria. More importantly. Coamun1st-instigated riots in tbe POW camps were Intended to undercut tbe UNC position on voluntary repatriation by discrediting tbe entire screening process. In the POW camps, the Communist soldiers shifted theirfrom military to political goals. Close coordination was established between tbe POW camps and the
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Panmunjom truce talks. Onfter forcing aconfession of "compulsory screening" fron General Dodd, who had been held prisoner by the prisoners of the Koje-do camp, chief negotiator Nam II charged that
The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could not but confess before the whole world your inhuman treatment and murderous violence against ourpersonnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts committed by your side in screening and re-arming war prisoners by force. (empnaeTs supplied)
The Communist negotiators adroitly used the Koje-do incident to discredit the UNC figures and insisted that theyrisoners in exchange0 prisoners held by them on the principle of an all-for-all exchange and forcible repatriation. Neither side conceded, and at the recess of talks onear of negotiation had produced anords of discussion andours of formal meetings. The prisoner issue was the only remaining agenda item.
On the battlefield,ilitary stalomate continued. Mao had confronted the US with his limited-risk protracted war. He apparently believed that Washington would continue to avoid pressing for an all-out military victory because of the manpower lossesictory would require. ByCF and NKPA ground forces strength had almost doubled since the start of the talks ln. He also apparently believed that he could deter the US from Initiating airstrikes against the China mainland becauso of Washington's uncertainty regarding Stalin's reaction to such strikes.
While Stalin lived, Communist negotiators at Panmunjom refused to retreat from their demand for forcible repatriation. New Delhi's efforts to smooth the wayompromise were rejected when Foreign Minister Vishinsky on2 and Chou Sn-lai on2 attacked the Indianon repatriation as unacceptable. Mao, too, remained adamantoclaring that "however many yearsImperialism prefers to fight, we are ready to fightspeech. Stalin had raised East-West tensionsigh level, and Mao was prepared to sustain those tensions.
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On the battlefield, small-unit actions continued ln localized struggles for hill positions and, although the Communists had taken losses in2 that had cut their estimated total strengtht the end of the month, their total began to climb slowly again in November as fighting tapered off. Both sides made the same calculation, namely,ajor offensive would leadery high casualty rate butilitary
The death of Stalinermitted theof an entirely new attitude among the Soviettoward East-West tensions in general and toward concluding an armistice in particular.* Moscow now appeared to be more anxious touick end to the war than did Peking. Soviet statements ln March following Stalin's death were more conciliatory toward the West than those of the Chinese. of the Council of Ministers Halenkov stated onarch that "there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the Interested countries." For the first time since the end of World War II, Moscow Radio onarch admitted that the US and Britain hadole incommon victory" over the Axis powers. This followed Foreign Minister Molotov's unexpected agreement onarch to intercede with the North Koreanto obtain the release ofritish diplomats andinterned in North Korea since the start of the war. urther Indication of the change in the Soviet attitude was Malenkov's depiction of the Korean waxdefensive"In hisarch message to Kim Il-sung onoviet-Korean agreement. Significantly, It differedimilar message to Kimhen Stalin had described the warstruggle for liberation of the
*The death of Stalin provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to jettison Stalin's more senseless andpositions and to use methods of flexibility inariety of goodwill gesturesiminution of doctrinal hostility to Western governments. Stalin wasabout the International situation leadingeneral war, but for reasons of doctrinal obsessions and personal prestige, he refused to moderate the Soviet attitude toward the West and toward neutrals, and refused to make concessions on Important international issues dividing the West and the Communist bloc.
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n which any cease-fire would be conditioned on the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.
Three days after Chou's return from talks with the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, the Communists unexpectedly agreedoutine UNC offer for an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners which General Clark had reiterated in his letter ofebruary. In suggesting that the exchange of tbe sick and wounded might be the first step leading to the "smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world arebe Communists indicated onew and real Interest in solving the last crucial problemease-fire agreement. This was the first indication that the Chinese might be willing tooncession on repatriation.
But Maorotracted political struggle as he prepared to make his retreat on forcible repatriation as small as possible. The Chinese used ambiguous and face-saving language in an effort toeries of fallback positions, which they surrendered only after it was clear the UNC would Insist on the voluntary principle. An ambiguous proposal by Chou En-laioth sides
should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and hand over the remaining prisoners of wareutral state so as "toust solution to the question of "their repatriation (emphasis supplied)
left unclear the matter of final disposition of prisoners who wore unwilling to return to China and North Korea. The Chinese propagandists described Chou's proposal ashich it was, as the point thatwho were unwilling to be repatriated should be handed overeutral countryhinese retreat. Chou had been deliberately vague in not stating Chinese demands for forcible repatriation, but Chinese propaganda returned to the demands by insisting on the principle of totalby wayeutral state. That the Chinese hadoncession in fact while insisting on theto cover their retreat is indicated by the statement of the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat, Kas-sanlev, whoember of the Norwegian delegation onarch that Chou's declaration on prisoners was "the real thing" and that only "technicalities" remain to be worked out.
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The UNC appraised this concession as Indicating no change on the substantive matter oi voluntary repatriation, and they pressed the Communists to clarify their position on where screening would take place, on its duration, and on whether the voluntary principle would be part of aagreement. After manipulating the language of their counter-proposals throughout April,ay the Communists made two more key concessions. They dropped thethat no repatriates should be sent physically to astate and reduced the explaining period from six to four months. Finally,une, the Communists* chiefNam II, using language designed to conceal thecapitulation on forcible repatriation, stated thatto the application of each Individual, those who elect to go to the neutral nations shall be assisted by theNational Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India." That is, men who refused to return to thecountries could reach non-Communist countries through tbe channeleutral-nations commission stationed ln Korea, if explanations failed to persuade them to return home. In this way, Mao accepted voluntary repatriationisguised form. His propagandists stated that ex-prisoners may go to "neutralithout making it clear that they were in fact free to go wherever they chose.
Mao was anxious to stillegree of political prostlge before the cease-fire agreement was signed. Face-saving offensives were launched in June and July by theto achieve several objectives: (a) to move the line farther south, (b) to give ROKloody-nose In order to convince Rhee that his forces could not "March North,'* and (c) to convince International opinion that the CCF and NKPA were not weaker than UNC forces and that themotive in seeking an armistice was not that of avoiding military defeat. Although suffering heavy losses between April and Julyestimated total ofwere over one million CCF and NKPA forces in Korea, well-fed adequately clothed, and effectively supported by massedby the time of the signing of the armistice onuly.
Mao's capitulation on the principle of forciblecapitulation which provided the Westajor propagandastemmed from several major considerations.
1. One was pressure from the post-Stalin leadership. The Soviet leaders were clearly anxious to consolidate their
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internal position and to relax international tension. They were alert to the harder policy taken toward the China mainland by tbe new administration of President Eisenhower. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders could be certain that the new administration would keep the war limited in the event that truce talks remained deadlocked. Chineseover the possibility of an attack, or ateries of substantial raids, from Taiwan was reflected in the resumption of recruiting in Shanghai in February and3 and in defense activity along the south China coast. Implicit warnings. officials thatwould not accept an indefinite deadlock and Secretary of State Dulles' explicit statement to Nehruiz., ruce could not be arranged,. could not be expected to continue to refrain from using atomicincreased Communist apprehensions. They were also aware that in the spring. had moved atomic missiles to Okinawa. The post-Stalin leadership desired toreater distance from the brink of involve ment in the Koroan war than Stalin had believed necessary; they were unwilling to risk an escalation on thewhich might well have provoked extensiono the China mainland.
2. Mao could perceive no further advantage inthe limited war. Ne was aware that thche war of political attrition. Intended to reduce the staying power of tho UNC on the voluntary repatriation issue had failed. Thc blackmailis, American "warmongering" and "bacteriologicalhich were components of the talkingnotNC concession. His plan of attrition, requiring policy critics in non-Communist countries to soften up theof enemy governments (while policy critics in thecountries were effectivelyid not provide him with tbe advantage he calculated would beinajor retreat. Despite bis efforts during the talking phase, the UNC prevailed on the issue of repatriation, announcing onuly0 Koreanshinese would return to Communist control,oreans0 Chinese would be non-repatriates. (Earlier, onune, Rhee had0 Korean Obviously, those figuresolitical embarrassment to his regime which tbe new Soviet leaders had to convince him to accept.
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3. Mao wanted to get on with the job of industraliza-tion. Although political and economic conditions in China and North Korea probably were not exerting compellingon the Communists to conclude an armistice inhe war was probably viewed as injurious to long-term economic development programs. Politicalhad been increased in China during tbe war and the economic strains on the Chinese were probably less severe in the spring3 than they had been0ut Mao was anxious to begin China's First Five-Year Plan of economic development, and the North Koreans were aware that they would have to start virtually from scratch to re-
build.
To sum up, Mao moved into the talking phase In Korea because his best field armies had suffered very heavy losses and were retreating under UNC military pressure. Heviewed the enormous loss of human lives withcallousness, but was forced to draw back because the military capability of bis armies had been greatly When confronted with the UNC's demand that noshould be forced to return to Communist control, he engagedprotracted struggle" in the hope ofajor concession from the Western powers by combining division-level battlefield pressure with political tactics. But he decided to end the Chinesewhen UNC persistence and Soviet pressure convinced him that further intransigence was purposeless and even harmful to the mainland's economic construction.*
casualties for the CCF and NKPA for the entirefrom0 to Julyestimated to, Including prisoners of war. In the same period, the UNC casualties, of which US lossesounded, issing or captured.
During the longest period of deadlocked negotiations on any oneof repatriation of prisoners, which extended from2 to Julyand NKPA casualties were estimated to be, while those of the UNC were.
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Q,
Near the end of the Korean war, Viet Minh prestige was steadily increasing, and its military successes andeffectiveness bolstered Ho Chi Minn's confidence that he couldecisive military victory. He was determined therefore, to prosecute the revolutionarywar more activoly and felt under no real compulsion to move toward the talkipg phase of his long-term effort against the French. On the other hand, lack of Frenchsuccess and Increasing domestic political pressure to reduce or close out the commitment in Indochina mado aof French premiers and cabinets pessimistic about everilitary decision over Ho's forces.
Even after General Navarre assumed command in Indochinahe French were unable to revise their losing strategy in the fielduch touted (but nevorplan for mobile warfare drawn on paper. The forceietnamese0 Vietnamese0 Laotians,0 Cambodians that Navarreproved unable to take over effectively the job of static defense, so Navarro was impelled to fall back on the old losing policy of tying down and dispersing French and French Union regulars toorlos of key strongpoints. Outotalegulars and0 auxiliaries, there woro only seven mobile groups and eight parachuteequivalent of threewere notto immobile, defensive duties.
In contrast, the Viet Minh was not tied down to static defense and with0 full-time regional and provincial troops,art-timeshort, the operating equivalent of ninefreely through the countryside and chose the place to attack the enemy forces. For example, strong Viet Minh guerrilla elements together with two Viet Minh divisions sufficed to containegular French Union forces in tho Tonkin Delta. The Viet Mlnh skill in guerrilla warfare and in infiltrating into areas under French control seriously reduced Navarre's ability to take the offensive.
While tho French wore cursed with the necessity ofa number of politically important but militarilypoints, Navarro was also under political restraint from Paris. Because of domestic criticism of the war In
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Indochina, the French government had directod its commander in the field to incur the fewest possible number of Fronch casualties. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, was receiving strong support, both military and political, from its allies. The arnistlce in Korea had enabled Mao to increasehis aid across the southern China border to Ho's forces, strengthening their unit firepower and overallcapability. All along, Viet Minh regular forces in northern Indochina continued their gradual evolution from lightly armed guerrilla bandsegularly organizedforce with Chinese and Soviet equipment.
For all these reasons, Ho clearlyomplete military victory and gave no Indication that he would beto attain lessegotiated settlement than bis forces could seize on the battlefield.
The post-Stalin Soviet leadership, however,ofter policy toward East-West military conflictsecessary element in their long-range effort to dissolve the Western alliance ln Europe. They tried to temporize on every major East-West difference ln order to increase pressure against the DS by its allieselaxation of trade controls, for great power negotiations, and for delays in rearmament and in European integration. The Sovietcalculated that such pressures and frictions wouldreduce the West's capability for united action, as witness Malenkov's statement of the Soviet strategy in his speech
If today, ln conditions of tension in International relations, the North Atlantic bloc ls rent bystrife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration.
This strategy formed the basis of the Soviet campaign ofthe pivotal slogan of which had been set forth by Malenkov in his statement that "there lsingle controversial or unsettled question which could not be solved by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of the Interested countries." (Speech of But Ho apparently was unwilling to end the war for SovietInterests, and Moscow was Impelled toistinction between the need to settle the Korean war and the need tothe Indochina war.
Shortly after Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders hadistinction between the Korean war, which should be settled, and the Indochlnese fight for "nationalwhich should continue- (Pravda article of They insisted that the Soviet Union cannot beto "retard the liberation movement" of colonial peoples. (Pravda editorial of But tho Soviet leaders also tried desperately to deny that their position oncut across their "peace policy" and seized upon and quoted with approval Churchill's remark that the Viet Minh offensive into Laos was notoviet-inspired move "inconsistent with the attitude of the Sovietand suggested that the chances for mutualbetween East and West would be improved if other Western leaders would recognize the real causes of themovements." (Pravda editorial ofo made it clear to the Soviet leaders, who did not have the influence with him that they had had with Kim Il-sung, that the distinction between the peace movement and the Indochina war must be maintained.
Ho was also aware of the demoralizing effect that French political disputes were having on French troops in Indochina and almost certainly viewed this development as improving Viet Minh chances in the field. The Frenchinitiative In Indochina was constantly being tempered by political considerations in Paris, andenior French official in Saigon stated privately that the confused state of French politics and the political issuesin handling the Indochina war were complicatingNavarre's task of restoring morale and confidence in the French officer corps. The Viet Minh continued to Insist inflexibly on the hard-line demand that the basic condition for negotiations was the complete withdrawal of French troops. By latehey had gained effective control over more than half of the Tonkin population and were believed to have the military capability to occupy the entire delta.
The signing of the Korean armistice in late3 provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to maneuver activelyegotiated settlement of the Indochina war. During the first two weeks after the armistice, Moscow's statements directed in large part to the French, established the line that the Korean truce demonstrated the "victory of negotiations over force" and that this hasnew stimulus" to the struggleeaceful solution to the "dirty war" ln Indochina. Whereas prior to the truce, Moscow
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had attacked suggestions for East-West negotiationsIndochina, by3 lt was quoting with approval demands in the French pressPanmunjom" in Indochina. By contrast, Viet Minn broadcasts in3 warned that the armistice must not affect the continuation of the war against the French, who will not seek an armisticehortnd that "we mustrotractedntensify our fighting so as to annihilate more enemy troops; this is the only way to compel tho enemy to accept peace in Vietnam.1*
As the Soviet leaders began to maneuver for asettlement, tbey acted to impress tbe Chinese leaders with the political benefits which would accrue to China in the event of high-level talks. They gave increasingto the big-powor status of the Peking regime andthat "serious current problems" in Asia could not be resolved without Chinese Communist participation. (Soviet note to the Western powers
The Chinese, who had been working for several years to gain wider recognition as the only legitimate government of China, welcomed this Soviet line. Indicating that the Chinese Communist position was closer to tbe Soviet position, tbeir delegate to the World Peace Council called for "step by step negotiations" on East-West issues. (Speech of3 by Kuo Mo-jo) eptember, Peking specifically cited the Indochina issue as one which could he solved "only bythe principle of negotiated settlement."
By late summer, the Soviets had begun to contactFrench officials privately. These Soviet initiatives wore madeime when Ho was still resisting the concept of negotiations: thend American propagandawnTch"Has the "semblance ofs advanced In the "vain hope of weakening the will of our people, who ask only toowever painful and long." (Ho Chi Minh speech Ho continued to insistprotractednasmuch as his forces had not been hurt in the field. On the contrary, in the falliet Minh military capabilities wereew high pointesult of the marked increase in Chinese aid, thelight casualties suffered during the previousseason, and the excellent state of its intelligenceFrench troop dispositions and tactical plans.
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Tba attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at the time is further confirmation of the generalization that the Asian Communists have been unwilling to begin the talking-phase of their dual tacticsime when they are militarily in an advantageous position and have not suffered highin the field.
French operations to counter expanded Viet Minhwarfare in the southern Tonkin Delta area had met with very limited success in3 and at the cost of heavy casualties. After an area was "cleared" by the French, the Viet Minh reappeared quickly and Navarre's men, like those of Salan, his defensive-mlndod predecessor, were tied down and dispersedtatic defense of provincial crossroads waiting for the Viet Minh to come at them again in the night. As the French waited for the Viet Minh fall offensive, reliable reports Indicated that they had only four battalions in their mobile reserves ln Tonkin and that their military position was "grave." The Viet Minh was awaro of this French weaknessiot Minh source which was believed by American officials to have penetrated the French high command.
As cortain French cabinet officials and many members of the National Assembly increased their demands thatLanlel and Foreign Minister Bidault move to end the costly war by negotiations. Ho apparently was broughtincreasing pressure from Moscow and Peking to agree to enter the talking-phase of the Viet Minh effort ln Indochina. Quoting Izvestlya ln Its Vietnamese-language broadcast ofeptember, Moscow Radio declared that there exists no international misunderstanding which could not be settled peaceably.
French government was convinced that France could not win the war ln Indochina any more than the DS could win the Korean war.
i poxesman who indicated to rican officials that the only way France saw of ending the war lay through asettlement with the Viet Minh.]
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lai accepted tho US proposalseeting to discuss the time and place for tho Korean political conference, and Peking's propaganda continued to point to the need tointernational problems through peaceful means^
Ho was clearly reluctant to switch to the talking-phase, but because of Soviet and Chinese pressure as well as domestic pressure on the French government to agree to bilaterals, he apparently believed thatedged offer to talk would Improve his international prestige without hindering Viet Mlnh military initiatives. In their note ofovember to the Western powers, the Soviet leaders bad indicated tbeir desire to prepare the wayive-power East-West foreign ministers' conference at which Communist China would be present, and they apparently insisted that Ho should at loast appear to be less adamantly against talks with the French than he had been. (Politburo member Truong Chinh had declared on1 tbat peacewould be "illusory" and that the French would have to be expelledecessary condition of peace, and Hostated3 that "We know that only resistance, however painful and long it may be, can give us victory and restore peace to us.")
When, in lateo began to bring hisa step closer to that of Peking and Moscow, he accepted the principle of negotiations but insisted on the practice of continuing military methods toettlement satis-factory to the Viet Minh. He conceded through his spokesmen that "every international problem can be settledctober) and that "to stop the Vietnam war through negotiations ls completely necessary and alsoovember). But in his reply to questions posed by thepaper, Expressen, Ho onovember in effectomplete French surrender. He asked the French to begin bilateral negotiations byeaceHo was only prepared tostop fighting, to recognize the Viet Minh regime, and, by implication, to withdraw from Vietnam. Ho implied that, in return, he might not continue his war until the Viet Minhomplete military
victory.* Actually, he continued to fight, and despite somo displays of French aggressiveness, the military initiative was with the Viet Minh, whose forces in late3 Included divisions so disposed as to permit attacks against northwest Tonkin, against the northwest corner of tht delta or against Laos.
Ho's hedged proposal ofovemberhree-pronged exercise of considerable political skill. dvanced the Soviet and Chinese "peaceurtherthe Laniel government from the National Assembly and the French press,evived and deepend Vietnamese distrust of the French, who were viewed as being at the brinkpacifist trap" and who might decidereater military effort in the field. At the same time, Ho had his own paramount interest to protect,omplete military victory, and in the first Viet Minh comment on his proposal, it was made clear to Moscow and Poking that peace could be attained only throughmilitary struggle and that the Viet Minh had no illusion that peace could be easily won. (Viet Minh news agency broadcast
In France, Premier Laniel, supported by Foreign Minister Bidault, rejected Immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh in the illusory hope that future negotiations could beon more favorable terms after military successes in the field.
Ho's generals continued their highly successful strategy of dispersing French forces in static defense positions while moving Into areas of their own choosing. When, lneneral Navarre made the recently captured Dieo Dientrongpoint to prevent moves into northern Laos, some Viet Minh forces began to move artillery into thearea and, ln late December, other Viet Minh forces swept southward into central Laos.
This Invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh was treatedby Moscow and Peking, who muted reports of the new development in their commentaries and stressed the demand for
stated that "if the French government wishes to have an armistice and settle the question through negotiations, we will be ready to meet the French proposal."
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an end to tbe war. The Soviet leaders, who were searching desperately for "proof" that Ho really intended to negotiate, centered their commentaries on this proposal ofovember. "The recent statement by President Ho Chi Minh on historench proposal on an armistice, shouldroposal be made, constituted striking proof of the peaceful intentions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." (Moscow Radio commentary ofhile initiating little Independent comment, Pekingto rebroadcast foreign statements alleging that only OS pressure prevented Paris from seeking an end to tbewar.
By contrast, the Viet Minh generally avoided the matteregotiated settlemont and reminded its forces that real peace could be won "only by pushing forward the armed struggle and by dealing deadly blows at the enemy until be is compelled to demand negotiations." (Viet Mlnh radio broadcast of Byhen at least six battalions of Viet Minh were maintainingon French forces In central Laos and moreere blocking all avenues of exit from Dlen Blen Phu and bringing in artillery for the siege, the divergence between Ho, on the one hand, and the Soviet and Chinese leaders, on the other, romained clear-cut and reflected his reluctance to enter tho talking-phase when his forces were consolidating portions of northwest Tonkin. By insisting that Parisormal proposal for talks to the Viet Minh, Ho had placed the onus for avoiding negotiations on the French government, which continued to equivocate on the Issue.
His forces held the initiative throughout Indochina as the result of widespread simultaneous offensive actions by the time the four-power Berlin conference convened on The drive into northern Laos of an0 Viet Mlnh troops, continued encirclement of Dion Blen Phu, the capture of small French poets in southern andLaos, and extensive harassing operations in the Tonkin Deltaurther overall dispersal of French regular forces. ebruary, the American army attache in Saigon reported that staff thinking and procedures at Frenchwere of9 vintage" and that Navarre's strategy was identical to that of the defense-minded Salan. Navarre tied upattalions of regular troops at Dlen Blen Phu, only to be by-passed by the Viet Minh, who had moved into portions of Laos but had not been engaged even where the
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Frenchhree-to-one advantage. French patrolling from strongpolnts was "the exception rather than the rule,"apparent Instructions front Paris to Navarre that he nustBinlBuun-casualty holding action"iew to eventual big-power negotiations.
As domestic pressure to ond the war increased on the French government ln the absence of victories in the field, two alternatives to bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh were considered"! CO an internationalinternationalization" of the war through , well before the fall of Dien Blen Phu, French government officials and army staff officers regarded an international negotiated peace as the Inevitable solution to the war. In3 they prepared for negotiations at Geneva. , almost all French spokesmen vigorously bad opposed internationalization of the conflict and, largely for fear ofretext for Chinese intervention, they continued to rebuff firmly any suggestion that American troops would be necessary.
The Communists hit hard at the possibility ofinvolvement in responding to speculation in thepress, reflecting their own calculation that theViet Minh initiatives in the field might impel "direct intervention" by Washington. One of Molotov's chief alms at tho Berlin meeting in agreeing to the Geneva conference was to block any possible increase in American military assistance to thc French. Thc Chinese Communists, satisfied with tho Berlin agreementirst step in gaining general acceptance by the international community, warned that increased American involvement ln Indochina was making the issue of Geneva moro complicated. Bo Chi Minh expressed his concern when,arch, he accused the US of "another step" toward direct Intervention in "allowing the American air force to participate" in the Indochina war.
Soviet plans to end the waregotiatedat Genevaove to convince Ho thatInternational prestige could be derived froathe talking-phase of his military effort ln Indochina. Pravdaarch attacked Foreign Minister Bldault's public statement that it was not necessary to Invite Ho'sto Geneva and insisted that "it ls impossible to solve the Indochina problem without considering the lawful right of her people." As Soviet propaganda continued to
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press for Viet Minh participation at Geneva, Ho waslear insight into his prospective political gains: international prestige, intensification of French-Vietnamese frictions, demoralization of French forces in the field, and reduction of the risk of direct Americanin the war. Nevertheless, he clearly preferred bilaterals with the French (in order to prevent US pressure on Laniol to remain intransigent) and considered attendance at aconference would reduce his position of strength. He finally agreed, however, to multilateral.
Moscow and Paris began to set forth their positions before the Geneva conference wasoviet embassy official in London told American officials that if the US and France object to an amalgamation of the Vietnam and Viet Mlnh administrations, "they can agreeivision alongh parallel." This first Soviet comment on Geneva suggested thaf] Moscow was the most active advocate of partition which would deprive the French of the heavily populated, strategic Tonkin Delta and open the way for Viet Minh control of the whole country. Premier Laniel set forth the French position publiclyarch by calling for the complete withdrawal of all rebel troops from Laos and Cambodia, establishmenteutral zone around the Red River delta, and withdrawal of all Viet Minh troops from that area. He was aware that these terms would beto Ho, as was later conceded by the Foreign Ministry official who formulated them in order to forestall any Viet Minh offers for bilateral negotiations before Geneva. Rumors in Paris of direct French-Viet Minh contacts wore not andarch, the Geneva alternative enabled Laniel to resist pressure for immediate bilateral talks with the Viet Minb.
All the while, Viet Minh tactical capabilities were continuing to improve, particularly with respect toartillery and heavier infantry weapons acquired from China. Each succeeding campaigning season left the French occupying fewer outposts and the Viet Minh spread over larger areas of the intervening countryside.
Before entering thc talking-phaso of the IndochinaHo apparently decided to demonstrate Viet Minh strength In the field. Hoajor military move for political reasons; onarch, Viet Minh battalions hit strongpolnts at Dlen Bien Phu. He was willing to acceptilled and wounded outotal0 troops byarch. He was also willing to depart
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Viet Minh military tactics byajor strong-point without the element of surprise. Though the size and timing of tbe attack vere anticipated, however, the Communist assault did incorporate one major factor for which the French vere not prepared; tbe massive and extensive use of artillery. Communist possession and employment of artillery in itselfajor olement of surprise and rendered invalid the French tactical assumption, on which planning for the defense of Dien Blen Phu had been basod.
In early April during the siege, Ho Indicated to the pro-Communist nowsnan Wilfred Burchett that the Frenchat Dien Blen Phu was hopeless. Hoelmetdownable, and compared the helmet's rim to the hills around Dien Blen Phu, saying: "They shoot up and we shoot ln." He apparently calculated that loss of Dion Blen Phu would reduce Vietnamese army morale, already lowered by talk of an imminent truce; seriously discredit the "new" strategy of Navarre; give the Viet Minh aboost in prestige Immediately prior to tho Geneva conference, thus Increasing the Incentive for defection by Vietnamese nationalists; and Increase French domesticfor direct negotiations with his representatives.
As Laniel and Bidault parried domestic demandsiet Minh negotiations, they wore alsoto increasing Soviet pressure before the Geneva con-ference
and Peking were anxious to disparage American foot-dragging and used Secretary Dulles' speech onarch, in which he suggested that the West should take "unitedtoommunist seizure of Indochina, to spur Paris into bilaterals. They were particularly fearful that tbe American preference for the French to fight would stiffen Bidault further at Geneva and make French concessions more difficult to extract from him there, flanked by Secretary Dulles. They were also concerned about American statements regarding eventual If not Immediate involvement: Pravda onpril claimed that the real target of US threats was China, and the Peking Puople's Daily declared onpril
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that "faced with armed aggression, the Chinese people will certainly not refrain from doing somothing about it." Onpril, Chou En-lai made another noncommittal deterrent statement: the Chinese "most emphatically will not tolerate aggression against us by any country" and tho US ls lookingnew world war."
The series of assaults on Dlen Blen Phu throughout April Indicated that Ho intended to take tho strongpolnt evenery high cost. Despite murderous losses, which in late April and early May were variously estimated at about two divisions0o's forcesto attack in intermittent phases. Their estimated strength was0 infantry plustroops, as compared with less0 French Union Troops. Thererench and Vietnamese regulars in the Tonkin Dolta, but the greater port of this number was still tied down in static defense, leaving thefew mobile units to counter the lncreasod Viet Minh activity.
By the start of the Geneva conference onhe overall military situation in Indochina and theserious situation at Dion Blen Phu had provided Ho, and his Soviet and Chinese partners,osition of considerable strength to use to offset Amorlean warnings about possible Internationalization of the war. Sovietprivately made various suggestionsettlementas partition, nation-wide elections, and an immediate cease-fire. Calculating that the French would be moreto some sort of partition thanoalitionSoviet diplomats on the opening day of the conference privately suggostod to American officials that tho idea of partition would meet China's requirement that its southern border should be bufferedommunist regime.
The Soviet-Chinese effort to soften up the French on the issue of partition was made in the face of theof Ho, who like Bao Dai, claimed sovereignty over all Vietnam.
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At the Geneva conference, the Viet Minh delegate, Phaat Van Dong, tried to use military developments in Indochinaackdrop in demanding major French concessions. Dien Bien Phu fellay, with Viet Minh losses estimated atf which about one-half were killed, and French Union losses of0 men. Onay, Pham Van Dong set forth maximum conditions in the form of an eight-point resolution, the main points of which were political which were linked with military provisionsease-fire: French recognition of the independence of the three Indochlnese Communist-sponsored states, withdrawal of "foreignlections in each state,otal cease-fire involving occupation by each side of unspecified areas, no reinforcements,ixed controlartition was not mentioned. By tying the French-desired cease-fire to political concessions, the Viet Minh putin the position of using the military weapon toa French political retreat.
onference deadlock was threatened by French determination to deal with military matters first. toease-fire) and Viet Minh insistence thatand military questions be dealt with together, Chou En-lai and Molotov, playing major negotiating roles, moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the US as an excuse for Intervention in the fighting, fin his major speech ofay, Molotov had explicitly rejected the French terms for an armistice because Bidault's formula did not deal with political questions. However, at the secret session onh, he conceded that military questions could be discussed first. Chou En-lai also retreated; rivate conversation with Eden onay, he stated that theand political aspects of any Indochina settlement must be dealt with separately, with priorityease-fire. These concessions strongly suggested that neither Moscow nor Peking desired protracted talks; they undercut Viet Minh intransigence and policy to prolong the talks^
Ho calculated that negotiations could continue together with the fighting for some time without leading to American involvement. iet Minh commentary of mid-May seemed to be directed at reminding the Chinese and Soviets that there was no pressing need to end the war:
We still remember the Korean lesson which taught us that one could negotiate and fight at tho samefor two years.
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Ho was clearly determined to protract the talking-phase to gain as much territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the French were willing to concede. As the Viet Mlnh augmented its forces in the Tonkin Delta with units from the Dlen Blen Phu operation, helping to compress French-controlled areas there, Ho's delegate at Geneva apparently was instructed to insist again on political concessions in exchangeease-fire. Be hardened the Communist position, which Molotov and Chou En-lai had been making increasingly more flexible.
Pham Van Dong onay insisted on French political concessions before agreeing to end tbo fighting. He linked any cease-firo prospect with arrangements for "Khmer Is-serak and Pathethe Communist-contrived regimes in Cambodia and Laos, and in effect denlod that military and political questions could be separated. Dong alsoard line on the Soviet-Chinese concept of partition,the "readjusting of areas under control of eachaking into account tbe actual areas controlled, including population, and strategic Interests." Inasmuch as Chinese Communist maps showed the Viet Mlnh as holding most of Vietnam, about half of Laos, and parts of Cambodia, the Viet Minh proposalemand for considerablethan its units held on the ground.
Onay, however, an agreement was reached to have representatives of both commands meet at Geneva to study the disposition of forces priorease-fire. Molotov and Chou apparently were the prime movers on tbe Communist side in making this concession. Moscow and Peking, whose policy was centered on splitting the Americans from the French andystem of alliances from forming in Asia, were apprehensive regarding the demands of French military leaders and some Laniel cabinet members that the US enter the war. Accordingly, Molotov and Chou worked hard to attain some kind of agreement at Geneva and toan abortive conference from leading to lnternationaliza tion of the war. Militarily, Ho was keeping up theaptured Viet Mlnh document of late4 directed Viet Minh commanders in the Tonkin Delta area to continue tbeir harassing and guerrilla activities for an unspecified period "pending commitment of tbe battle corps.n
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jtold Ambassador Heath in Geneva that he favored partitionolution at abouthat about the line suggested by the Soviets earlier.
The negotiationsew turn as the Lanieltried to survive the National Assembly debate onwhich beganune. On the preceding day, theindicated that they would use the weakenedposition to gain their maximum demands;ard line, similar to that of Pham Van Dong as set forth onay. Molotov demanded independence for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, free elections in these states, and withdrawal of all foreign troops. He seemed to believe that the Laniel government would either move toward the maximum Communist position or be replacedovernment pledged to negotiate an immediate end to the war, andoviet Pravda writer told an American Journalist in Geneva that no progress on Indochina was possible until after the French government crisis was resolved.
2 June, thc Laniel
government fell, losing the vote of confidence in theAssembly after the debate on the war; onune, Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier, and ho promised to close out the fighting byulyJ
In the military conversations between the French and the Viet Minh in Geneva, the latter asked for direct control of about three-fourths of Vietnam, half of Laos, and much of Cambodia. In the field, General Ely stated privately onune that the military situation in the Tonkin Delta was precarious and that French and Vietnamese troops were "very, very tired." The Viet Minhapabilityull-scale attack on the delta.
The ever-present prospect of American involvement again impelled Molotov and Chou to keep the conference alive with small concessions. Onune, Molotov tried to break the deadlock over the composition of thc international truce supervisory commission, and on thc same day, Chouettlement proposal which implied withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. Under pressure, Pham Van Dong also suggested postponementolitical settlement for those two states. Thus by the time the Genevaterminated its Korea phase and temporarily adjourned,
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the Soviets and Chlneso seemed to have moved back ln effectositionartition of Vietnam and aLaos and Cambodia. When Pierre Mcndes-France took over as the new Promior pledged to seek an end to the war beforeuly, the road was openedinal settlement.
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egarding Laos and Cambodia, Chou said that
oreign forces, Including the Viet Hinh, should beand that thoro must be no American bases in either state. When the new Fronch Premier complained that thestaff talks botweon the French and Viet Minh at Geneva had been stalled for soveral days because of Viet MinhChou agrood to Intervene to speed the talks. During the conference recess, Chou, in discussions with Nehru in late June in Now Delhi, apparently setartition plan.
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Chou then moved to apply pressure on Ho to dropfor retaining troops in Laos and Cambodia andpartition line as far south ash parallel. HeHo at Nanning on tho China-Vietnam border inon his return from India and Burma, to discuss m tnc teriasinal settlement. lear signli Chou nad insisted that Ho givo some ground in thoViet Minh position oppoared inth^reinarknmdcbydeputy foreign ministeron
8 July: Chou hadvery good meeting" with Ho, theof which "would bo helpful to the French." When tho Viet Minh tried again at the reconvened conference to gain permission to retain their troops in Laos and Cambodia and to settle onh parallel, Mendes-Franco complained to Chou that this was unacceptable and out of accord with Chou's position. Chou replied that both sides must makewith the Viet Minh making tbe larger. Onuly, following Chou's statement to tbe French Premier, Pham Van Dong changed his position and told Mendes-Franco that be was prepared to compromise onh parallel. Thc French stillino betwoonhh parallels, and rejected Viet Minh damands for control of socio part of Laos and elections in all three Associated States.]
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The final settlement onuly indicated that the Viet llinb bad retreated on three points. They accepted theof Vietnam (they had insisted on "unity" of Vietnam) and with the line ath parallel (they had wantedhey agreed to withdraw from areas south of that line in Vietnam and from all of Laos and Cambodia; and they accepted6 as the dale for nationaltwo-yearcontrasting with their demand forix-month delay.
Pham Van Dong had come to Geneva with the apparentthat the Viet Minn's increasingly strong military position in the field would enable bim to extractconcessions from the French to open tho way forforces to further penetrate Laos and Cambodia andeverything aboveh parallel In Vietnam. But Soviet and Chinese pressures, stemming from largor policy considerations and fear of American intervention, frustrated this hope for maximum French concessions. Although Bocertain advantages in ending the militaryis, his forces could take territory by political subversion and, thereforo, his effort would be less costly in terms of manpowor and safer in terms of non-Involvement by thehe had not expected to bavo to mako so many political Theso concessions were later viewed by him and his lieutenantsajor mistake. His forces bad not been badly hurt in field, as the Chinese armies had been in Korea in the spring1 when Mao moved to the talking-phase of tho Korean war. He probably was concerned about tbe prospect of US intervention, but Hoscow and Peking wore clearly more concerned about the consequencos to their policy of internationalization of the war. Be wss In ato negotiate from strength and to do soongyears" as his radio declared In mid-Maybe found himself caughtino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions.
military and intelligence officials agreed that Viet Minh forces in the delta following the fall of Dlen Blen Phu were capable ofamaging full-scale offensive, but it never took place. In mid-July, oneJournalist stated that he assumed Chou bad pressed Ho to keep tho fightingow boil when the Genevawas in its last phase. The Chinese indicated their national Interest in settling the fighting-phase when, onuly, ono of their Journalists at Geneva declared "We have won the first campaign for theof all Southeasthe implication being that only"]
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Thailandrobable area for the establishment of an 'American base. Chou in late July, after the Geneva agroe-ments vere concluded, stated on two occasions that Asian states must work out their "own" security arrangements, and Pravda onuly emphasized that tho area will not be permitted to Join any "aggressive groupings."JJ
(fey contrast, the North Vietnamese leaders wore far less categorical in praising tho Geneva conforenceJ Pham Van Dong declared at the closing session on
July that the problem of Vietnamese unification remained: "We shall achieve this unity, and wo shall achieve lt Just as we have won the war." This contradicted the Pravda statement onuly that Vietnamese independence badon." On
July, Ho renewed bis exhortationslong and arduous struggle" and declared that tbe division of Vietnam wasemporary and transitional arrangement: "Contral, South and North Vietnam are all our land, and our countrywill be unified, tbe compatriots throughout our country will certainly be liberated." frbc Viet Minh ambassador in Peking, Hoang Van Roan acknowledged to Indian correspondents onuly that despite the strong military position of the Viet Mlnh, it had to compromise on several vital points, notably the timing of elections (put off for two years),
the question of French troop withdrawal, and the location of the temporary demarcation line ath parallel, in order to secure peace in Vietnam^ The leaders of theGovernment Khmer and Patbetepeated Ho's view that the agreements arefirst step" and calledong, hard struggle.
Neither Moscow nor Peking revived propaganda support for these resistance phantom-governments. Moscow made little effort to describe the agreement on Vietnam as "temporary" or to stross that portion of tho conference declarationany intent to permanently partition Viotnam; that is, tho Soviet loaders wero satisfied with partition. Peking strossod its own new international prestige and tbe boost to tho cause of "collective peace in Asia" provided by tbe agreements, whichanifestation of Chou's five principles as declared jointly withu, and Ho.
To sum up, the Soviet and Chinese leaders induced Ho to enter the talking-phase of tbe Indochina war because:
1. Itajor problem which stimulated Western defense efforts and threatened toockery of the
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offensive" designed to lrapode these efforts. Soviet policy In Europe, devised to produce schisms and paralysis in France and to split Britain from the US, required that an end be brought to this ear. Just as the Korean war bad been removedefense-stimulating conflict.
2. Peking as well as Moscow feared that any further military advances in Indochina by the Vict Minh might have led to tbe formationtrong anti-Communist alliance in-iluding some of the previously uncommitted Asian states,
With tho example of Korea before them, the Chinese and Soviet leaders could not Ignore the possibilityontinued offensive in Indochina would greatly increase the risk of Amor1dan interventionlobal war. Theyar lower level of risk, namely, politicalcarried out by the Viet Minh. They "paid off" Ho by continuing (in violation of the Geneva agreements) tomilitary equipment to make hisodernizedforce.
The developments34 have influenced the attitude of Ho and his lieutenants toward the current war. The clear awareness that they had been Impelled, primarily by Moscow and Peking, to stopalf-way station on the road to total military victory in Vietnam, apparently has made them very reluctant to stop half way again.
D. Implications for Vietnam Today
It is impossible to exaggerate tbe importance of this historical lesson for Ho. It sustains his hostility toward any suggestion that he again stopalf-way station on the road to control of all Vietnam.
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Only through full and unconditional indepen-
^oleTicT^oan we achieveWo are determined to continue to fight until we achieve total victory, that is, military and political, and the Americans leave and accept our four points, (emphasis supplied)
The Chinese leaders, too, apparently believe that they hadistake in pressuring Ho to stop Chou En-laiisiting youth delegation6 that
China will continue her absolute support of Vietnam. To tell the truth, ersonally signed the Geneva agreementegret that my having done so istrouble for our comrades in Vietnam. m not going to be deceived by the American peace campaign this time.
Actually, it was the Soviet-Chinese (not theeace offensive that required an end to the war, and Molo-tov was Chou's partner in persuading Ho to make concessions! to the French.
Ho is nowtronger position to reject any Soviet suggestions that he should closo out thc fighting, andInfluence on him is as strong or as weak as Moscow's positive support for the war. That ls, when Moscow avoided involvementhen Khrushchev decided to stand clear of providing important political and military aid tooviet influence was at an all-time low. On the other hand, when Moscowegree of commitmenthen the post-Khrushchev leadership decided to supply Hanoi withaid and political support against the US), SovietIncreased. However, it will never be as great as it had been
The Chinese leaders have helped to make this In contrasthey are now the opponents, not the partners, of the Soviets. Ho'b militancy ls bolstered by Mao's support, which itself stems from special personal requirements. That ls, Mao is personally far morethanwitness the current Irrationalities of the Mao cult inwith increasing neuroticism Insists that his unique doctrine of "people'should legitimatize his claim to be the successor of Lenin and Stalin as the "leader of the international Communist movement." Unlike Ho, whose sights are centered on his own national war, Mao
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arger anti-Soviet doctrinal point to sake: snail wars are effective in all under-developed areas and must be the main strategy againstTbe OS.
Maoonsiderable personal stake In proving to the Soviets, the Eastneutrals, and even men in his own party andhis principle of protracted smallwork against the superior American military Vietnam is the main proving ground forEn-lalanu-
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6 that if the VletnaAesecomaujnists continue their, military operations
they will make the Americans admit their defeat and drive themhe most importantis to prove this by actual deed. Unless we defeat the enemy, we will not be believed. supplied)^ ' '
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Any sign, therefore, from Hanoi that Ho ls willing even to consider the matter ofease-fire or aof DS air strikes against the Northotal withdrawal of American troops occurs is criticized by Peking. For example, ouble-edged statement, Intended for neutrals and for the North Vietnamese, Chou En-lalarned that: "As long as the OS does notits troops, it can carry on endless talks with you ao that it may hang on there indefinitely." (emphasis supplied) [Tiiat thislear warning to Hanoi is suggested by the fact that Chou made the statement ^SJJJjSWsmsmj^BB^BjjjjjjBj at the North Vietnamese embassy in Peking^
Despite the constant concern of the Chinese leaders that Ho might agree to negotiations before OS troops are withdrawn from the South, Ho continues toigh priority to prolonging his reactivated war. He and his lieutenants have absorbed Mao's own view on protracted civil war. When, inao said that "to wage awar for ten years, as we have done, might bein othore waa rejecting modern Western and Soviet military doctrine onar. Ho mado his point emphatic Inoting that tho Spanish civil war was "fought for three years, but we have fought for twenty years." Ho declared on6 that
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The war may still0 years, or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated.
Ho apparently believes that be can continue tho war primarily because, despite losses in the North and South, be is still able to put forces into the South and to supply them for operations. On the otber band, the Maoist doctrine he has absorbedtrong Ingredient of opportunism. That is, there ls no fixed principle that determines when and in what situation negotiationsease-fire should be accepted. The deciding factorery practicalinability to keep fighting. In the evont that US air strikes were to continue to increase bis problems, his willingness toessation of the strikes would not be blocked by any doctrinal consideration. The Chinese leadersare aware of the ever-present prospect that Ho might view negotiationsoans toreathing-spell from US pressure and are attacking not only the matter of talksotal American withdrawal but also the matter of talks touspension of air strikes against the North.
Despite the constant concern of the Chinese, theof bombing in5 and In6 failed to budge the North Vietnamese from tbeir adamantto negotiations because. had not yielded to their basic demand: that Washingtonnilateral publictowithdraw from the South and alsoheme introduced inrovide some proof that it would do so. An important political consideration in Hanoi's advancement of this line was the need foris, the need to commit Washingtoneclaration of surrender while pretending that the demand foreclaration was reasonable. Euphemistic language was used to conceal tbe fact that the demand was simply for surrender. The North Vietnamese did not,surrender" expressly, but rather called on
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Washington to "recognize" or "accept" the four points (as set forth. Following American military inputs inanoi became even more unreasonable, and even more frequently demanded that. "carry out" or show by "actual deeds" that it recognized these points and would abide by them. Further, toward the end of the second suspension of bombing, Ho went beyond the demand for proof. acceptance of the four points to the demand that Washington negotiate with the Liberation Front and stop bombing forever and "unconditionally." In this way, Ho tried to deflect the appeals of Western and neutral leaders for the commencement of negotiations, and to neutralize the effects of the important American political weapon (tho cessation of bombing) which had revealed Hanoi as the real recalcitrant opposed to negotiations. In short, Hanoi's position since6 has been more adamantly opposed to negotiations than it had seemed to be previously.
Original document.
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