CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACEKCY
27 6
SUBJECT I EN: FOREIGN REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
US COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING US PORCES IN EUROPE
NOTE
This SNIE was done at the request of Mr. John J. McCloy, the President's Special Representative for the current negotiations with the United Kingdom and the Federel Republic concerning Allied strategy, force levels, and financial problems. The terns of reference were provided by hia and his staff. In view of the special character of the paper, the su.-nr.ary conclusions usually provided in NIEs ware omitted.
xcluded from automatic
downgrading and declasslfication
rHS PROBLEM
ac The a
estimate foreign reactions to variousecting American forces stationedternative courses are:
l:
Case 2:
Case >:
maintain US ground and air forces In West Germany at their presentn the basis of Strata agreement to continue to bear atubstantial portion of foreign exchange costs.
To0 men from Of! groundhinning-out process, which wouI'J el ;ninti': some subordinate units but retainra-ant number of combat divisions; in addition, to establish dual basing arrangements forercent of US aircraft and associatednow assigned to Germany, so that they would In the future be based part of the time in the continental US. These measures would reduce US dollar expenditures abroad bynnually.
To00 men from US ground forces, including withdrawal of one combat division; in addition, to arrange for dual basing ofercent of US air strength. These measures would reduce US dollar expenditures abroad by0 annually.
Present US ground forces in West Goi-ir.fcry totalen (authnriKodive coxbat divisions and Ulftao supporting elements; present Ut!ce strength consists ofircraft0 menv* squadrons plus supporting oleaents. Thef US naval personnel basedt Germany Is
insignificant.
en fror. Ui* ground f'-rcos, In
eluding withdrawal of two to three combat divisions; In addition, to arrange for dual basingercent of US air strength. These measures would reduce US dollarabroad by0 annually.
EXPLANATORY NOTE: Each of the postulated USf ground force strength given above would not necessarily be accompanied by the speciric change in air strength with which it is listed. For example, the cut (Casebove)0 men froo the US ground forces could beby dualf eitherercent,ercent,ercent of US aircraft and and associated personnel. Thus the specific cases we have chosen are intended to beof orders of magnitude and are not the only possible combinations.
THE ESTIMATE
.
FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND US RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE
General
1. For some time, many West European voices, not confined to France, have called for their countries toreater Influence over the area's policies,oncomitant reduction of US predominance.ln power and interest were bound to give rise to this attitude In time, but they have received strong stimulus from the spreading conviction that, despite the USSR's great military power, the likelihoodoviet attack against Western Europe has greatly diminished.6 developments in certain countries reflected a
further assertion of an Independent European interest: the fonal French withdrawal from NATO, domestic attacks upon the pro-US policy of the West Gernan Government,enuine uneasiness and concern over the growing US involvement in Vietnam. The issue of US troop levels in West Germany and the related financial problems will obviously affect the evolving political climate of Western Europe.
2. Case li The retention of US forces at present strength, under some financial arrangement accepted both by the US and other NATO nations concerned, would not eliminate the present malaise in the alliance. roubled phase in German-American relations is ln prospect even if th* CS decides to maintain present force levels ln West Germany. Thus, lt does not appearholly amicable settlement of the offset problem is within reach, given the history of the Issue and the likely German attitude. On the other hand, if the tripartitedid resultS decision to continue present fore* levels, relief would be felt by those who had feared an early and radical change is US policy. in Germany, there would probably be seme temporary Improvement in the climate of relations.
3. Cases Any of the three force cuts would raise some doubts about the firmness cf the US commitment to Europe's security, especially in the light of earlier pledges that force levels vould be maintained. Inndhe governments would realize that the US still had substantial military forces In place, certainly enough to commit it fully in case of Soviet attack. While the withdrawalivisional unit underould attract considerableoubt that in the end reactions would be significantly different from those under Case 2. Under all the alternatives, the concern would beless with the immediate security implications than with what the move might signify about US intentions over the long term. Nevertheless, Casewould give rise to Instant and serious alarm in many ouarters. Host governments wouldonfirmation if their fears that US policy bar shifted to give
priority to Asia over Europe. There wouldarked loss of confidence in US leadership within the alliano and the Germans would feel ineal concern for their long-term security.
Impact of Cutbacks on European Military Program:
**. On strictly military grounds, If suchcould be separated from the political implications, there would be little strong opposition in NATO to either of the two smaller force reductions. Most NATO governments do not believe that the nilitary security of Western Europe depends on large conventional forces physically located there, as their own reluctance to meet NATO commitments shows. The present West German Government would argue that its nilitary security was endangered by even the smallest cut, but would do so rtainly for political reasons. It would fearrocefs of military disengagement in Central Europe was getting ur.dervay and that this meant tacit acceptance of an indefinitely divided Germany. West Germanyn fact tended tofter the rest of European opinion in downgrading the likelihood of Soviet attack. Ii view of possible changes of political leadership in Bonn, however, the views that the German Governi'.ont would uphold must be considered somewhat uncertain.
5. In the absenceisibly revived threat from the East, we do not believe that either the smaller NATO countries or Great Britain would expandn defense establishments to fill the nilitary gap caused by theuts. They would not see anyreat Britain's economic problems will almost certainly lead it to reduce its defence establishment in coming years in any case. Host of the smaller NATO countries would probably reduce their defense efforts, somewhat, ond even West Germany would almost certainly not expand its forc**t. Bonn has only reluctantly supportedflexible response which require larg'-ground forces, and wouldeterrent strategy basedow-sr nuclear threshold.
WSlTIVK REKTRIanTED DISSEM
b. If the US nade theut, other HATO countries vould probably consider that they were politically and economically unable to make up the entire difference. West Germany and France night attempt to miveommon, and perhaps eventually an enlarged, defense effort with other European nations who wished to participate, but this wouldn the outcome of highly uncertain politicaln tho countries concerned.
leal Impact of Cutbacks
NATO governments are generallythe likelihoodoviet attack hasmembers except France want NATO to continue toa political instrument of Western cooperation. also like to preserve itramework incontain the Germans, concerning whose futureIs still apprehension. Almost all memberin fact probably try harder than ever to keeppolitically involved ln Europe.
largest cutomingime
positions and Int countries, and in
of visible disarray In the alliance, would be interpreted in some quarterseliberate US move towarddisengagement from European affairs. It wouldider debate than has yet developed about the future of the alliance, and bring Into question the entire structure of political and military concepts upon which lt has been based. Some impetus would be given to the contention that Europe's best course vould be to moveeutral position between the US and the Ur-L'R. This lti turn cculd alter the foreign policy
Dees In Individual Itical and milltary
power structure of Europe. But this wouldong process, and Its outcome would depend greatly uponSpon Sovietndnd upon domeftlc politicalhich are not now foreseeable.
General de Gaulle would beln his efforts to undermine the US positionmarginally inndndajorthe OS carried out the largest reduction. Anywould bring greater receptivity for dethat the US commitment war unreliable, and
he would encourage suspicions that small cutuif such are decided uponereirst step toward larger ones. Such tactics would probably not only gain some support in other West European countries for French policies, but would also strengthen de Gaulle domestically. None of the cuts, however, would of itself bring success to French efforts to destroy NATOoliticalof US-Suropear. cooperation.
main thrust of de Gaulle's diplomacyaftermathS force reduction would probablyefforts to displace paramount US influencevith his own. Pressure would be brought to getto adopt French views on European questions. offers of Franco-German collaborationmade, perhaps including new proposals in the iplomatic campaign would probablysome success; hew much would depend onInternal German politics. De Gaulle wculd expecta new fluidity developing in Europe's powerin these circumstances, he would probably
move cautiously in developing his relations with the USSR, and he would be particularly alert to any sign ofin Soviet-German relations.
Germany. The question of USin E'jrppe and the associated financialtheir greatest impact on Germany, where theyhelped to sharpen policy conflicts and The administration of Chancellor Erhard and
hir Foreign and Defensechroeder and vonl, which has in the past strongly suppurtedith the US. has for various reasons come under *envyA principal feature of the current political infightingendency on the part of Erhard': oth within and outridearty, to accuse him of having
placed too much trust in US wlllir.gneris tu uphold German interest.
opposition Social Democratichas recently been engaged In efforts toinitiative on East European andissues in ways andace union thedoes not favor. Although thesenot contrary to US policy (the SPD Is fondits activities to tho concepts ofand Presidenthey reflect ir. fact
a growing inclination to pursue German interests more independently of US guidance.
of the German public stillconfidence in US policy, and probably neithertwo smaller troop cuts vould seriously erode There would, of course, be less orif the German oolltical leadership defendedaction. In the present political Infighting,most German political leaders and opinioneither be unwilling or unable to do this.
1W. Either of the smaller force reductions would strengthen the arguments of German Gaul lists in the CDU/CSU and would further weaken the Erhard government. Either would also add to existingth from Gaullists advocating priority for Franco-German coop-peration and from the advocates of flexibility toward the East,eexamination of West German attitudes toward the US, France, and NATO integration. Nevertheless, despite considerable political commotion, ve believe that the basic course of present West German policy would survive this event. There would be some deterioration in the climate of German-American relations, however, especially since other factors are independentlyln this direction.
seems cloarajor reduction in
orces would convinco many Germanspport for German interests and Gorman standing In the alllenco were on the want, and that thiI In turn couldeeply OABattling factor in German politics. The cuts would almost certainly mean either tho end of the Erhard government orhift in itsthat it would In ci'fentow government.
In either care, broader representation would almost, certainly be afforded to those Germans who advocate greater Independence from American policy guidancee degree of incroased cooperation with the Trench.
force reductions, comingimeand crisis in internal German politics and
of growing uncertainty about whether the allies support merman interests, would of course stimulate German tendencies to consider alternatives tc Bonn's present foreign policies. The Germans have been movingecognition that their Western partners are either unwilling or unable to do anything about Germany's national problem. But they realize, too, thatof their own toward the USSR have no foreseeable prospect of success, exceptrice and withhey arc unwilling to contemplate. olitical leadership might finally appear in Bonn which wouldolicy of rapprochement vith Bast, Germany. If this did not bring movement toward unification, the West Germans would have no choice but to reconcile themselves to their situation for an indefinite perio*i. We cannot foresee what this might do to the stability of German politics, or to the value of Westn ally.
Britain. Basically, Britainalternative at present to the political rtatuscentral Europe, and believes it cai besome reduction of present forces as long asUS guarantee of European security remainsbelievable. The British Government wouldequanimity either of the smaller force cutscontinue with it? own plans to remove part offrom West Germany. Britain'r reactionuld probablj be for th* mort partpredominant feeling would probablyoncernlong-torn stability <if the Continent and Potof present arrangement? p Uw Cinlaina-mL
eraviny.
Effectiveness or Various US Explanations
Europe, the impactould perhaps be marginally softenedexacerbated by our public handling of We doubt that emphasis on USand US inability to vork out full offsetwould receive much sympathy; the turns to bewould not seem large enough to providefor the cuts. It would probablyUS policy to.-ard NATO for the US toand officially the common West Europeanthe Soviet threat to Europe had diminished. not be helpful to referroop cut in theofS policy of detente. articularly adverse effect Inwhere the government argues that forceshould be made only in return for specificon the Gorman question.
line of argument would bethat significant US forces remained inthat advances In weaponry and logistics now makefor the US to meet its commitment toof Europe with fewer forces on hand on This line of argument would not becogent ln Germany, tut It would reassurethat the cuts did not represent ain US policy.
Regardless of how the cuts were explained, however, most European governments and the bulk of sophisticated opinion would conclude that the real roaroriPwore UShe manpower noodr. of Vietnam war. Thero would buconcern thnt Uv preoccupation vith Viutnam vould in time lead to still further withdrawaln, ond finny would feelutback tied to Vietr.imign thatUS night be overextended in Its cianl tm>nt: .
TIVE
II. COMMUNIST REACTIONIS
s has been implied above, there wouldarge measure of interaction between attitudes in Western and Eastern Europe in the wakehange in the vs posture. Most West European opinion newfrom the assumption that the policy cf the USSR and its allies has changed and is directed towardThe implication cf this attitude is that there is no longer much reason toenewal ofpressures from the East. If Soviet behavior in the wake of force cuts should disappoint theseobviously the reactions attributed to Western Europe in the foregoing discussion would be quite different. But the attitudes and behavior of the USSR and its allies would in turn dependreat extent on the movement of opinion and' policy in Western Europe.
rinciple Soviet objective Tor some years past has been to obtain from the West an acceptance of the status quo in central Europe, including the division ofe crolonged crisis over, the Soviets pursued theirby threat and pressure. Subsequently, the Soviets used the tactics of "detente" with the US. More recently, their propaganda and diplomacy have stressed the neededuction of tensions in central Europe and for all-European security arrangements which would be built on the existence of two German states. They presumably calculate that acceptance of this thesis by the West, including the US, would isolate the Federal Republic, introduce strains into its relations with its allies, and ultimately set inhift of political forces within the Federal Republic more favorable to Soviet long-term purposes. The reduction of US military strength in Europe would be seen as favorable to these aims and tactics, and probably also as r, sign that KATO's further disintegration war in prospect.
bliCHE
i'iv
We believe that, initially at least, the Soviets vould consider it to their advantage toonciliatory lint toward Western Europe, except of crurse toward Bonn. They would probably say that the US had been "compelled"by the pressures of European opinion and by the strains of the Vietnam waro retreat from its "domination" of the West Europeanne Soviets would not wish to do anything to arrest this process, and they therefore would probably not revert to tactics of pressure ond threat In Germany. They would recognize, moreover, that the drawdown of US forces did not mean an abandonment of US commitments in Europe andenewed challenge there would stillajor crisis,onsequent reversal of European attitudesenewed buildup of the American military presence.
2U. The initial Soviet reaction, therefore, would probably be toiplomatic andnnoe which would encourage West European opinion Lo believe that no ne- risks threatened because ol't vould be emphasizedurope in which US influence was diminished and the independence ol' European states was reasserted could easily arrive at bread and lasting security arrangements. tline of such an all-European settlement is contained in the Bucharest Declaration adopted by the Warsaw Pact states Innd this would no doubt be the centerpiece of the Soviet diplomatic effort. Its main features include acceptance of existing frontiers, that Is,ecognition of two Germannd tht-ir permanent exclusion from any sort ofto nuclear weapons. The declaration also advocatesEuropean security conference to adoptcami-ei ami olhor undertakings which vould insurend inability in Europe iVr the Indefinite future. ProbablyioMi politicalould bo the main 1rm'.praiSa from the East to the now situation createdraw, downorces.
2*i. Trie flovletr woula probably also believe that NATO itself war becoming more vulnerable to diplomatic and propaganda pressure by thex. They would
TliJgt!eiJ Ul:.yKV
"pig
presumably intensify efforts they have made in the past to get Norway and Denmark to loosen their tics to NATO or even to exchange this link for entry into asecuritypecial security arrangement for southeastern Europe Bight be devised to attract Greece and Turkey away from NATO. And the Soviets vouldhat they could to give more substtnee to their rapprochementFranco. They would expect that any new discords they might be able to foster in the Western Alliance would help to accelerate the departure of US power, and bring them nearer to their ultimate goal cf aEurope In which their own power was clearly
The Soviets would of course consider whether, to promote an advantageous climate of detente, they should reciprocate US force withdrawals withof their own. We believe that they would not wish to negotiate an agreement to do this, mainly for two reason*. It is their current line to emphasize dealings among Europeans on Europeannd to minimize dealings with the US. Perhaps more important at present is their policy to avoid any acts which would suggest that they were facilitating US military reinforcement in Southeast Asia.
We do, however, believe tho chance.'; are good that the Soviets would, after they had taken some time to appraise the political-military effects of the US withdrawals, carry out some withdrawals of theirhey have advanced proposals for mutual withdrawals in the past, and they would probably like,ariety of reasons, to reduce their forces ln East Germany.
aj^ Gen. Chester L. Johnson, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department or the Army, believes that,ossibility exists, -if Soviet withdrawals, available evidence is insulTicJent toudgment that "there good thai. zhe Sovietsarry outwithdrawals of their own."
a^?itive RESTftyTED DISSEM
ISITIVE-?ED_-
How deep the cuts might, go seems to us beyondat present. The extent or suchuld be determined mainly by the USSR's appraisal of the condition of NATO and of the political and policy tendencies developing ln Western Europe, ln particular in West Germany, and whether these could be more advantageously influenced by intimidation or by inducement.
28. In general, the reactions of the USSR's Warsaw. Pact allies to the moves discussed in this estimate would be much the same as those of the USSR. The ideaeveloping detente on terms vhich the East has advocated would be congenial to them. They would welcome the opportunity to develop their trade vith Western Europe, and would hope that military burdens could be eased. Some of them might want to move faster in developing relations with West Germany than East Germany, Poland, and the USSR would want. The USSR night think it had reason to be concerned about the degree of independence that vould develop in time from the assertion of these Interests. But unless there vere fundamental changes in the political and military stucture of Europe, the basic alignment of these countries vith the USSR would not be affected.
29- The Soviets would be less interested ingiven for the US moves than in what thefor power relations in central Europe and forof developing and exploiting abetween the US and its allies. Ifshould Judge these factors to be favrable,might eventually depart from the cautionswe believe would nark their early rateLionIto policies of pressure. In
general struggle with American power, in which thoyas inevitablyeir ain remains to Induce as many Europeanossible toeutral position. They have shown in th'*hat they consider both pressure and parMiitabl" tactics to this end, and would presumably employ both; their judgment of circumstances eight dictate.
S ec REjfrpgTS ITIVE RESTJmWTEfJ DISS3M
The Asian Communlsis. HanoiPoking would believe, on the one hand, that us resourcesbeing strained and that the US hadurther setback infforts, to gain European suopnrt for itr: Asian policy. On the other hand, they would oxpaot thai *JS po-'er was about to be concentratedtill grc-ater scale in the Asian theater. However they struck the balance, we doubt that their will to persist In pursuit of their own declared objectives in Southeast Asia would be affected.
III. POSSIBLE BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Interpretationsnd no doubt overinter-pretatlonsof the meaningK move to change its posture in the vital European theater would be made by political leaders all over the world. Many would probably believe that this developmentelcome further stage ln the dismantling of the cold war, at least In Europe. Some might think it provided proof that American power and resources were overextor.ded and reverberations from American domestic debate might help to sustain this view. On the whole, we do not believe there would be any substantial political costs ln other areas in consequence of US withdrawals from Europe.
Our judgment that no serious problems for US policy in other areas are likely to result from trocp reductions in Europe applies only to thenear term. The alignment of forces which has obtained in Europe forecades hasthe central feature of the world's power structure. If, ln consequence of US moves and reactions to them, it came to be believed that this alignment was changing, perceptions of what power relations are and where interest and security lie might alter, both in Europe and elsewhere. We do not suggest that the particular measures to reduce US forces in Europe which are discussed in this estimate would predictably have such far-reaching effects. We do, believe, however, that they might set inmportant changes in power
Ii
IEJEM
REETRmPBT) DISSEM
relations and political alignments, the full scope of which cannot be foreseen. Some unknown degree of risk inevitably attaches to deliberate moves to alter long established political-military,relationship*.
33. It Is also true that timingey rector affecting the consequence of such mover-. Initiative: which at one moment and ir. one set of circumstances might have entirely tolerable or even advantageous effects, might at another assent sot Inrain of wholly adverse repercussions. At present, confidence in the wisdom of American policy has suffered in many areas because of Vietnam. In NATO Itself there is disarray and uncortainty owing to the French challenge to the foundations of the alliance. Partly because of the developments, Soviet prestige and Influence appear to have gained lnth US standing. Altogether, there seems to us to be considerable risk that withdrawals from Europe, especially if they ara large, would at this juncture convey an impression of Anerican weakness in many quarters. This would probably notasting setback to American policy, but again, hww others may reacthange in their perception of the relations of peer is largely unpredictable.
Original document.
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