national intelligence estiaaate
6 ko =
>blam8 of Pclfrrca! Development in
Vfetnani Over fhs Next Year or
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTttUGEMCE
Concurratf in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As ed cefloofecombar IWi.
4 NOV W5
kv
700
Iho following inltUtgamv organizations pattidpated in ths preparation ot this ostimo'ej
Coolml InteHigenco Ay*/xy ond Iho Inicliigwn*f iho Dcport-iT-.of Slo'e, Defame, ond Iho NSA.
Concurring;
Dr. R. J. Snilh, for Ih* Dapu* Director of Central In/ritQjaes
cnnay,or Tho Director of Krti^-ncc and Roisath.o' Stoto
ll. Gen- Joseph r. CorroS. Ik*mn (thlj^ocp Agency U. Gen, MsnMI S. Carter,Dwrctor, Nolkmd Security Agency
Abi/oin/ngi
Mr.onvnor.? AtwUanlonogsr. Atomic En-fgyortd Mr. WiDlam o. Crega'. for ft* AtoiMant OVrctor, Federal C'Jioou ot hwnligolion, lhe'.ng outride of their juriididton.
WAXHIUG
materielHe meoAlr.g-r iwi. Til
o*iy monnoe to oil unuvi?
oflod Siaen SKS
CONTENTS
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
II. MAJOR SOURCES OF WEAKNESS
M. MAJOR SOURCES OF STRENCTH
IV. CURRENT SITUATION
V. NONAS AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO
problems of politicalin south vietnam over the next year or so
CONCLUSIONS
the lastonths, there haveumber ofdevelopments in the South Vietnamese political scene: theregimo has successfully riddencries of crises; itan ability to fashion reasonably acceptableonstituent Assembly has been elected; theand civilian leaders have demonstrated an increasingwork together. The longer the process continues, the moreit may become to reverse itingle sudden move.US presence bas contributed significantly to stability, aud themilitary situation adds generallyetter political climate.
South Vietnam is still plagued by importantweaknesses: divisive regional animosities, religiousrivalries, and factionalism within the military.next year, crises are bound to occur, particularly as the processa constitution and movingore permanentgovernment unfolds. No assurance can be given that somenot undo the political progress made to date.
balance, we believe that the Constituent Assembly willinonstitution. If so, political maneuvering forelections may actually exacerbate the basic factors]>olitical stability. Nonetheless, we believe the chancesthan even that national elections will be conductedtlic period or this estimate.
presidential elections are held, the military woiddit easier to maintain unityilitary candidate (or aman wlw resigned in order to run). It is not clear, however.
whether the military considers it essentialilitary leader occupy the presidential seal orivilian would be acceptable. Much would depend on which civilian. The electionandidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of acoup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded,development would haveerious setback
E. Evenelatively smooth transition to an elected government can be achieved, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. The military is probaWy more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will he dependent on military support and almostunder strong military influence.
discussion
I. INTRODUCTION
When South Vietnam achieved independencewas already bvr-dened with ccttnin haste liabilities.eep sense of Vietnamese identity, there was no corresponding tonwcitniciitoncept of national government. Virtually no preparation for self government had been made during the decades of French rale. Not only wax the county partitioned atb parallel, but South Vietnam itself was also divided by ethnic, religions, regional, and oUtcr conflicts. Under the Diem regime, though some poUtical stability witsime achieved, Uttto progress was made in resolving these basicew Uireiit emerged as ft became apparent that Hanoi was dctennmcd toevolutionary war against the South. Tims, when the Diem rcgime was toppled ints various successors found no .idecuiatc base on whichtable government andapidly deteriorating nvnitary situation. One regime after another rose, quickly Boiindcrcd, and fell,
Byhe South Vietnameseby military defeats, deprived of control of large sections of the countryside, incapable of effective bureaucratic performance, and rulingopulation In varying degreesresentful, and deeplyin danger of uncuncnt coHansc. The vastly expanded US presence in South Vietnam, civilian as well as military, has retrieved this situation. In particular, tho buildup of US combat forces was viewed by South Vietnamese as evidence of US determination to see the war through and toommunist victory. Thus bolstered, the Ky regime which assumed power fn5 his had more room to maneuver and has retained control far longer than any oilier regime since tlie fall of Diem.
These circumstances have given the government new strengths, although it rcmaiiis subject to most of the same stresses and weaknesses as itsike them, ft must operate within the limitsomestic political situation established as the result of Dicm's downfall. On the one hand, the mfliUry leadership assumed the reins of power while lacking the cohesiveness- that had enabled the Diem regime to establish its tightly-knir, cen-trally-controiled power structure. On the other hand. Dicm's wvrthrow also unleashed still other politicalreligious sects <principally thethe students, labor,ariety of politicians andince Dicm's overthrow, political developments have focused on two basic issues: the relative roles and power positions of tliese forces In the new body politic, and the pace and nature of tho transitionoreconifuulioikil government In varying degrees, those issues precipitated or underlay each of die political crises
H. MAJOR SOURCES OF WEAKNESS
South Vietnam has long been plagued Ixy region.ilSoutlterncrs {Coehinchincse) generally regard those of Northern (Ton-
tin escJ origin asho wield power wiiliin the government anil the military eatahUshmcnt far Out of proportion lo their numbers. In addition, those native to Central Vietnam (Armamitcs) arc viewed witli suspicion by both Noitlierncrs and Southerners. These regional antipathies hamper efforts to forgo truly national South Vietnamesen one way or another, regional biases intrude into most of South Vietnam's problems and touch all groups,die military, wlierc factionalism is olten on regional lines. In short, regionalismasic weakness of Vietnamese potitici and shows noof becoming less divisive in the near future.
religion. Political developments during the. Diem period and particularly3 have created deep suspicions between South Vietnam's badly split Buddhist majority and its active but less factionolwed Catholic minority. The Buddhists and tho Catholics mistrust each other's influence in government and each fears the emergenceovernment dominated by tho other. This rivalry is of less immediate imparlance, however, than the political role of the militant wing of the Buddhist movement led by Thich Tri Quang, an adept and wily politicallthough the militant Buddhists were weakened by their failure to topple Ky last spring and by then- unsuccessful boycott of theAssembly elections, theyikely source of trouble. They still seem lo constitute Ihe largest body Milan organized Buddhism and may In time he able to reunite the Buddhists under their control. In any event, diey stillubstantial political base in the northern provinces of Southrom which they could reenter the political arena if they wished. In the shorter run, thereossibilityew round of militant Buddhistgiven their assets among the students and the remnants of last springs "strugglo movement."
ctvllianhlih/,uy rivalry. The relationship between the military and civilian elements is fragile; neither group particularly respects the Intentions orof the other. As the ultimate arbiter of power,military is sometimes prone to ignore civilian Interests. For their part, theilicians tend to overreact to real or imagined provocations and Uierehy run live rkk of needlessly precipitating reaction by the military. Frictions between the military ami various civilian groups are unavoidable. There will almost certainly be occasional events which will threaten to burgeonerious civilian-military confrontation.
m hilary factionalism. Factionalism has been chronic among Vietnamese military leaders, and plots end counterplots, personal rivalries, and jealousies have been common. This lad: of collusiveness among the military leaders hits presented itowmililary opponents of the government templing opportunities to strike alliances with discontented commanders. The command structure itself
"Trif.o Centra] Vietnam, putkularly Around Hue. Tbc more BeilUc wing of die BudilJiist InMilote, fed hytrongest inSjIjjwi ana; omen of Itsa*eil oa BonVthttls wfginsli* from North Vietnam. In aridtton. uVicloilmg most of rime from tho southernao do not pubeiuak: In tho BuII libI InitUuCe.
a
h conducing to factionalism, since it has allowed tin- Gups Commander* to run their areas as personal satrapies.
ack of National Auxrreness.esult of the factionalisin andwhich characterizes politics in Vietnam, there Is little awareness of broad national (awes. There is nothiugational political party. Most politicians think primarh/ in terms of advancing their own or their group* Interests. Moreover, activity by the multiplicity of political groups fc generallv restricted to urlwn areas, with the rank-and-file support seldom extending beyond personal and group loyalties. The rural peasantry, which constitutes the bulk of the population, has been largely uncmiccrned and tntaffected by the political developments hi Saigon.
ft Inflation. Among the many economic problems, inflation presents the greatest threat to governmental security. Forear. South Vietnam has been gripped by severe inflation, caused in part by the large war-related budget deficit and In part by heavy US spending also caused Iry the war. Sincehe cost of living has increased byercent. Despite the salutary effects of the regmw's recent currency devaluation, the cost of living7 will jump by at least anotherercent, and probably by much more. Allltongb tho effects ol inflation fall most lieavity on the urban population, the rural areas also suffer difficulties which arc often compounded by disruptions hi tho supplv and distribution system. In general, inflation has increased dissatisfaction with the government and ha. provided the Viot Cong and odier cmponcuts with an exploitable popular
hiavoiicrotic Inadequacies. South Vietnam has failed to develop an effective bureaucracy and administrative apparatus. There has been aof authority from responsibility; military officers administer most programs at the province end district levels, and the ministries have little control over them. Government procedures tend to be both rigid and aunbeisomc.many trained individuals have been reluctant to work withgovernment, preferring instead to remain uninvorved. The succession of regimes and coups has resulted in frequent reorganizations, many ofinspired by politicalradter than concern with Increased efficiency, and has made many competent administrators politically unacceptable. It has also made tltemto commit themselvesegime, out of fear that its tenure and their own were likely to be of short duration. In addition, corruption is rampantthe system, and its corrosive effect not only impedes government activities but adversely affects attitudes toward tire government.
The War. These various problems would obstruct political development even In peacetime. The war, however, exacerbates every problem, magnifies every weakness, and makes even the simplest tasks of governing exceedingly difficult. Viet Cong control of large parts, of tho country, and varying degrees of insecurity elsewhere, greatly restrict the ability of the government to carry forward programs of social and economic development. Finally, the refugees who hive Bed from the countryside to the cities,> mayillion
m Saigon aluno. add to the administrative burdens of tin regime and mayan object for exploitation by its cncmn.-s. includHig of course tlie Vict Cong.
HI. MAJOR SOURCES Of STRENGTH
. on theignificant and often overlooked source of strength ir South Vietnam fa, the comisteitllyot nra< mist attitude of the country's politically active chtnents. Dcspilo concern over various CYN pohcto townrd war and pence and over the impact of tlie large US involvement In Vietnamese affairs, none has called for an end to the fightingitMrawal of US forces. The many governmental sivuVcups thattaken place have not been over basic policy concerning the continual ioo of the war or over tho CVN's steadfast refusal to deal with the Communists. Tlius the Communists have been denied tlie cipportunity of gaining power through the bocL floor la league with otlier South Vietnamese groups. Anticotmnunisin Is strongest among the Catholics and military, mauy of whom fled from comntunisin in North4
ontinuity o/ Cooerruneai. The Ky regime has now survived foroot lis. Tills remarkable longevity, reversing what appeared toersistent bend toward ever-changing short-livedas had positive psycho-logieal effects at home and abroad which hare boon reinforced by the impact of US mihtary operations. The gmemmcut baa at least bad time to beginumber of major programs which heretofore had progressed little beyond the planning stage Progress has been limited, and much of the emplmis and initiative has come from the US and US prodding. Nevertheless, Ky and bis advisors have demonstrated greater insight into the issues facing them and tuve shown greater flexibility in adopting remedial rneavturs.
II. Political ConthuHty. PoIrticalTy, the regime has also profited from its ability to maintain itsell in power, especially fioto its success in facing down both militant Buddhist opposition and military plotting. Most politically activeviewed the September elections for the Constituent Assembly as an earnest of tlie regimes willingness toarger civilian role hi tlieabout SO percent of those registered and overercent of llto total adult population of Sooth Vietnam voted, despite the opjiosinon of both the militant Buddhists and tho Viet Cong. The cabinet crish in Octoberthe persistence of regional rivalries, but the regime managed to dilute the impact of this episode, fa any event. Increasing numticrs of poh'ticiain are pmUilily coming to feel that there is political advantage in coexisting with tho Ky regime as long as they tee reasonable prospectsransition to elected gos-cniment
clifnil Development. For the first time since Dicru'i downfall, politicalanifested moro in legal channels than in demonstrations and coup ploiting. Tlus political activity, whileaft of new frictions am!is essential and healthy in terms of political devctopnient. Moreover, llie military Icnlcnhip. which will remain the final arbiter of power in any case.
is ncthy taking part in Hus political evolution, lion-owing from (he experience of (he South Korean military, the Ky' regime Is seeking lo Bod political means to insure iho military's participation In any future government With tills in-siuance. they appear to be prepared to accept an elected governmentomtitutional mandate;ovclopincnl wouldromising step toward the creationovernmentopular national base.
S Support. Ormously crucial fa die military and economic fields, the greally incrcused US presence Itosew clement of major importance into the South Vietnamese bodj' politic- Tho US role carries great weight among the Vietnamese, so much so in fact that even Enaction by the USorm of involvement or, at die very least, has the same impact by being seen as such. For example, several previous regimes became- vulnerable when their opponents suspected that US support was weakening. Ky's regime is strenglliened by the fact tint most Vietnamese consider the US to be solidly behind it TlieUS presence has obviously irxTcased the disruptive effect of the war on the Vietnamese economy, and there are some latent anti-American sentiments. These negative factors arc likely to be aggravated by tlie infusion of larger numbers of VS troops into the more heavily populated areas of the country. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the US presence has thus far been-to contribute significantly to stability.
IV. CURRENT SITUATION
IT. The Directorate. During lhe past year, tlie Directorate strengthened its position within tlie military establishment, enhanced its standing in the countrv, andonsiderable degree of cohcsiveiiess. The successful removal ot two deeply entrenched Corps Commanders. Generals Tlii and Qunng. ndded to the stature of both Ky and Tlncu. The precise rclalionship between these two leaders is not dear, but Ky certainly has llie leading public role. He also draw, sbength from the anra of US support, from tho air force which he still coinmands, androup of younger officers called the Baby Turks. This latter group includes Genera) Loan, Director of Police and Chief of Military Secwityose confidant of Ky's, and Central Klumg. Commander of III Corps and the Capital Military Zone. This combination has provided physical security for too Ky regime.
IS. There are persistent rumors of friction between Thieu and Ky, though we sec no evidence that such friction is now of serious proportions. But the future colicsivencss of the Directorate dependsreat extent on theor at least continuing mutual tolerance, of these two officers.
he CowtHucHt Assembly. Except for the Buddhist Institute, all the traditional politicol, regional, and religious groups are reflected incmber Constituent Assembly. The Assembly includes professional politicians,of Iho Dai Vict and VNQDD parlies {badly splite-gfonalists (such as die militant Movement for the Renaissance of theuge number of young and inexperienced delegates. Four political "blocs"
were formed for ihe election of Assembly officers and committees, but eachonglomcrotc of differing hitcrcsts, and their membership and Ihe lines between Uiem continue to shift
For the next few montla at least, tlie Assembly will be the source of die issues on which the civilian politicians and the regime will confront one another. The Directorate !ms net yet shown its hand, butilary members would almost certainly resist any move which would deprive themunstitiitional roleesv government, The precise goals of the civilians arc not clear. In general, liowevcr, tl>cy distrust the Dircctoralo aud appear to believe that the lime is ripe for the creationonstitutional governmentuch larger role for die clvfliaii elements. The September etectiora whetted their political appetites, and since the military gave tip some political power then, the civilians are pressing for more. Their motives range from parochial self-interest to genuine concernegitimate government. Tho many divisions and rivalries wilhin die Assembly will impair Us ability toolid front against the Directorate.
Thereumber of potential problems that could lead to an open break. eWier by design or by accident, between tlie Assembly and tlieThe Assembly will continue to interpret its mandate for constitution-drafting broadly, while the Directorate will be suspicious of incursions biro its domain of power. There is considerable resentment in the Assembly over the power of the Directorate to change items in the draft constitution, reversible onlyvo-tlurds vote of the Assembly. The regime, for its part, fa reluctant to relinquish this power until itairly good idea of what will be in the constitution. The desire of some Assembly members to retain the Assembly in being until the convocation of an elected legislature may also cause friction with the Directorate.
There are. however, factors that could lead toward compromise. The majority of the Assembly members probably are not interested inollision course with the government, to large part because, they realize that if the Assembly fails, they arc unlikely for some time to have another chance of diaring power. Moreover, time may bo many who will advocate caution to the expectation thatjhc very'establishmentonsiittrtiond system, even if it Is not fully to accord with their desires, will provide new opportiuritjej for change. Tlie Directorate also has reason to try tohowdown. It probablythat the real test is not so much the questiononstitution but Unit of power afterwards, and it fa aware of the US concern that there be aWithin limits, the regime will probably try to be forthcoming on this matter. On balance, we believe that an open break betweenirectorate and ths Assembly will be avoided andonstitution will be produced.
Although we consider it unlikely that the Ky regime will be ovcrtluown during the near future, its downfall could seriously endanger the promulgationonstitution as well as the political progress made to dale. Much would depend on how Ky was overtlirowii and what sort of regime succeeded hint.
would noth* wholly lost; for example, if Ky were over-lluowii by an internal pakii. coupinimum of violence and disruption, or If lhe new regime were no lew disposed to work toward constitutional gov-ernmcnl. Sliould the coup lie violent. however, or should thereeries of coup* and eountereonps. lhe whole oUucture crealed by past political develop, menf Would almost certainly dhintcgratc.
V. PROBifcMS AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO
Judgment* cementing the course of political development in South Yictuain must be highly tentathe. The country is in the throe* of iiolitical eolation, thef which will be disputed evendopted.ery real sense, political development in South Vietnam willay-to-day. monlh-lo month phenomenon for some time to come, and periodic optieavah and crises will threaten the entireIndeed, as the pace of political events quickens, tltc factors that workhility may actually be exacerbated. Begioualban Inkery lo hepolitically volatile factor. The Southern clemenU are resentful of the Nwthcrn/Central coloration of Ky's regime and fear that Ky andre conniving to perpetuate it at Southern expense. No assurance can be given that some crisis might not prove to be the ultimate undoing of the government.
A falling out among tliedcrs could have seriousi political activity increases, lhe possOxility of frictions brlween Ky and Thieu also Increases. Ky ha* thus far been skillful and fortunate In his efforts to eon-tain the political power of Individual Corps Commanders;uture occasion, ho might be less successful The question of how much political power is to be shared with lhe civilian elements mightause of contention within the military, particularly since the Baby Turks appear to be less inclined to com' promise with the civilians than is the Directorate.
The prospect of negotiations could introduce unsettling influences into the political situation over the next year or so. At present, no sigiuncantgroup publicly ndSocatei negotiations and DM military leaders are quite opposed lo them except on terms that amount lo Communist capitulation. Hence, any government that, fn tlio near term, agreed to negotiations would increase its vulnerability lo attack by Its political enemies. On tlie other hand, tlie large US presence may encourage the Vietnamese lo believe that the US will agree to no settlement that doc* not effectively insure the survivalon-Communist SVN. The degree to which this confidence wo-.Id remainotmtrravrgnt lo disruptive effects would depend heavily on the cncurnstancci In which negotiations seemed an imminent possfonty.
cvcrtlielfss. there are development, which lend lo make u* cautiously optimUtic about the prospectsore stabk- political situation. Tliesethe continuity of tlie Ky regime, its succea* in ridingeries of crises and potei'.tial crises, and its ability lo fashion reasonably acceptable compromKc without resorting to outright repression. In addition, the election of a
ititucftt Assembly, and the willingness of both tho military kadcrslnp and civiliano attemptork rogellicr nugur well for continued political progrcss-Tltc longer the process continues and is reflected in tlie envelopment of new institutions and working rclaltous. tlie more difficult it may become to reverso ft by some single sudden move. Finally, tlie improved military situationgenerallyetter political climate.
During the next year or so, the successful holding of national elections would lie an important indication of growing political stability. Actually, events are moving in thisonstitution will almost certamly call for prcsl-denlial elections, and probably legislative ones as welt. Political inaocuvcring among die various civilian clemenls is already underway in anticipation of clec-lions and will grow more intense. New political alliances will eventually emerge, although it is too carry to detcrmino what they are likely to be. Thefinal decision concerning elections will depend on its assessment of the situation at the time; If the military felt Hiat elections seriously threatened their basic interests, they might move to postpcm them. But we believe the chances are belter than even that national elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate.
If presidential elections arc held, there will probablyilitary roan who has resigned in order toerhaps Ky or Thieu, as wellivilian candidates. It is not clear whether the military considers it essentialilitary leader occupy the presidential seat orivilian would be acceptable. Much of course would depend on the civilian. Tlie military would probably find it easier to maintain unityilitarylv. Tlie electionandidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chaucesilitary coop attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded, political development would haveerious setback.
Evenelatively smooth transition to an elected government, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without militaiy unity and support. There is little evidence of any significant growthense of national commitment that would submerge special interests.y and other rivalries wiB persist and will manifest themselves in recurring conflicts over the distribution of power within the government. Any government,ivilian one, will almost certainly be subject to debilitating bickering andfor influence, and vulnerable to plots from within and without As long as the military leadership remains relatively united, it will have the upper band over others.robably more cohesive and certainly commands greaterthan any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almostunder strong military influence.
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