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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Problems of Politicalouth Vietnam Over the Next Year o
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE .BOARD
* indicated overleaf 6
The following intelligence organizations participated in Ihe
Tho Control Intelligence Agency ond the Intelligence organization* of theof Stale, Defense, ond. '
Dr. R. J. Smith, for Ihe Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
George C. Denney,or Ihe Director of Intelligence ond Research, Depart-
moot of ;'^
9 'uaraw.
mm
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, tho Director, Defense Intelligence Agency It, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Charles A. Som/ner, for tho Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energyand Mr. William O, Cregor, for the Assistant.Director, Federal Bureau,
of Investigation, the subject being outside of thoir |urisdiction>
contents
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CONCLUSIONS1
DISCUSSION 3
SOURCKS OF WEAKNESS
MAJOR SOURCES OF STRENGTH
CURRENT SITUATION
V. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OVER HIE NEXTOR
PROBLEMS OF POLITICALIN SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO
CONCLUSIONS
A. Over (he lastonths, there haveumber ntdevelopments in Uie South Vietnamese political scene: the Ky-Tbieu regime has successfully riddeneries of crises; it has shown an ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises of troublesomeonstituent Assembly has been elected; theand civilian leaders liave demonstrated an increasing willingness to work together. The longer the process continues, the moreil may become to reverse ilingle sudden move. Finally, the US presence has contributed significantly to stability, and themililary situation adds generallyetter political climate.
Ii. Nevertheless. South Vietnam is still plagued by importantweaknesses: divisive regional animosities, religious enmitirs, civilian-military rivalries, and faelionalisin within the military. Over the next year, crises are bound to occur, particularly as the process ofonstitution and movingore permanent form of government unfolds. No assurance can be given that some crisis might not undo the political progress made to date.
C. On balance, we believe that llie Constituent Assembly willinonstitution, If so, political maneuvering lor new national elections may actually exacerbate the basic factors which threaten political stability. Nonetheless, we believe the chances are better than even that national elections will be conducted successfully during tlie period of this estimate.
i presidential elections are held, lhe military would probably find it easier to maintain unityilitary candidate (or aman who resigned in order to run). It is not clear, however.
whether Ihe military considers it essentialililary leader occupy lhe presidential seal orivilian would be acceptable. Much would depend on which civilian. The electionandidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of acoup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded,development would haveerious setback.
K. Evenelatively smooth transition to an elected government can be achieved, continuing political stabilityaintained without military unity and support- The military is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in Soulh Vietnam will be dependent on mililary support ami almosiunder strong military influence.
DISCUSSION
When Soulh Vietnam achieved independence, i( was alreadywith certain basic liabilities.eep sense of Vietnamese idcnlity, there was no corresponding commitmentoncept of national government. Virtually no preparation for self government liud been made during llie decades of French rule. Not only was the country partitioned ath parallel, hut Smith Vietnam itself was also divided by ethnic, religions, regional, and other conflicts. Under tlie Diem regime, though some political stability wasime achieved, little progress was made in resolving these basicew threat emerged as il became apparent lhat Hanoi was determined toevolutionary war agaiast the South. Thus, when tbe Diem regime was toppled ints various successors found no adequate base on which totable government andapidly deteriorating military situation. One regime after another rose, quickly floundered, and fell.
Hyhe South Vietnameseby military defeats, deprived of control of large sections of the countryside, incapable of cIToctive bureaucratic jierfurmance, and rulingopulation in varying degreesresentful, and deeplyin danger of imminent collapse. Hie vastly expanded US presence iu South Vietnam, civilian as well as mililary, bas retrieved this situation. In particular, the buildup of US combat forces was viewed by South Vielnamesc as cvideucc of US determination to see the war Ihrough and toommunist victory. Thus bolstered, the Ky regime; which assumed power in5 has had more; room to maneuver and lias retained control far longer than any other regime since the fall of Diem.
hese circumstances have given the government new strengths, although it remains subject to mosl of the same stresses and weaknesses as its predecessors. Like them, il must operate within the limitsomestic political situation established as the result of Diem's downfall On the one liand, the military leadership assumed the nuns of power while lacking the cohesiveness and single-iniiidcdncss that had enabled the Diem regime to establish its tightly-knll, ccn-trally-cnn trolled power structure. On the other hand. Diem's overthrow also unleashed still other politicalreligious sects (principally tliethe students, labor,ariety of politicians and intellectuals. Since Diem's overthrow, political developments have focused on two basic issues: lhe relative roles and power positions of these forces in the new body politic, and the pace and nature of tbe transitionore broadly-based constitutional government. In varying degrees, these issues precipitated or underlay each of the political crises
sources of weakness
trgiVnMiiMm. South Vietnam lias long been plagued by regional animosities. Native Southerners (Cochmchinesc) generally regard those of Northern
rigin usho wield power wilhin the government and the military establishment far out of proportion to their numbers. In addition, those nativi; to Central Vietnam (Atmamites) are viewed with suspicion bv both Northerners and Southerners. These regional antipathies lumper efforts to forgo truly national South Vietnamesen one way or another, regional biases intrude into most of South Vietnam's problems and touch all groups, in* eluding the military, where factionalism is often on regional lines. In short, regionalismasic weakness of Vietnamese politics and shows noof becoming less divisive in the near future.
eligion. Political developments during the Diem period and particularly3 have created deep suspicions between South Vietnam's badly split Buddhist majority and its active but less factionahzed Catholic minority. Hie Buddhists and the Catholics mistrust each other's influence in government and each fears tho emergenceovernment dominated by the other. This rivalry is of Icsa immediate importance, however, than the political role of the militant wingfhe Buddhist movement led by Thich Tri Quang, an adejit and wily politicallthough the militant Buddhists were weakened by their failure to topple Ky last spring and by their unsuccessful boycott of theAssembly elections, theyikely source of trouble. Ihey still seem to constitute the largest body within organized Buddhism and may in time be able to reunite the Buddhists under their control. In any event, they stillulistanlial political base in lhe northern provinces of South Vietnam, from which they could reenter the political arena if they wished- In the shorter run, thereossibilityew round of militant Buddhistgiven their assets among the students and the remnants of last spring's "struggle movement.1*
ilary Rivalry. The relationship between the military and civilian elements is fragile; neither group particularly respects the intentions orof the other. As the ultimate arbiter of power, tlie military is sometimes prone to ignore civilian interests. For their part, the civilian politicians tend to overreact to real nr imagined provocations and thereby run the risk of needlessly precipitating reaction hy the military. Frictions between the military and various civilian groups are unavoidable. There will almost certainly be occasional events which will thrciitcn to burgeonerious civilian-military confrontation.
Mililary Factionalism. Factionalism has been chronic among Vietnamese military leaders, and plots and counterplots, personal rivalries, and iealousies have been common. This lack of cohesiveness among the military leaders has presented nonmilitary opponents of the government tempting opportunities to strike alliances with discontented commanders. The command structure itself
'lit 'ghumg's base of iwwrr ii in Central Vietnam, portiudarly around Hue. The more uVtible wiii^ of tlie Buddhist Institute, led hy Thich Tarn Chau, In strongest In the Saigonuch of ilsaied on Buddhists OitgiliaUy from North Vietnam. In addition, then' me many Buddhists, Including most of those from lhe sonthcro provinces, who dotiiipjte iu Ihc Buddhist IuiUttitc.
is conducivec it lias allowed tlir Corps Commanders lo run llii'iras personal satrapltt.
H. Ijuk of Sational Auweneu.esult ol lhe factionalism and paio-chialmn whicholitics in Vietnam, there is little awareness of Idational issues. There is nothingna national nollltctd party. Mosl politicians think phmarly in teims of advancing their own or tlicir group's interests, Moreover, activity hy the multiplicity of political groups is generally restricted to urban areas, witb llie rank-and-file support seldom extending lieyond persona) und group loyalties. Tbe rural peasantry, which constitutes tlie bulk of the population, lias been largely unconcerned ami unaffected by the political developments in Saigon.
nflation. Among the many economic problems, inflation present* (Im-grcutesl threat to governmental security. Forear, South Vietnam has been gripped by severe inflation, caused in part by the large war-related budget deficit aiid in part by heavy US spending also caused hy the war. Sincev cost of living has increased bytcrcent. Despite lhe salutary effects of the regime's recent currency devaluation, tlie cost of living7 will jump by at least another 2t> percent, and probably by much mote. Altliough llie (fleets of inflation fall moil heavily on llie urban population, the rural arras also sutler difficulties which are often compouudtd bv disruption* in thelv and distribution system. In general, inflation lias increased dissatisfaction wiih tin* govcrnnicnt and has provided the Viet Cong and other opponents with an exploitable popular issue.
outh Vietnam has failed to developbureaucracy and administrative apparatus. There has lieen aof authority from respondedity, military officer, administer mosttlie province and divtrkt levels, and tlie ministries have little controlGovernment procediirr* tend to be both rigid and cumbersome.many trained individuals have been reluctant lo work with theinstead to remain nuinvolved. Tlie succession of regimes midresulted In frequent reorganizations, many of tliem inspired by politicalrather than concern with increased efficiency, ami has madeadministrators politically unacceptable. It has also made themto commit themservrsegime, out of fear that its tenure ami tlicirlikely to be of short duration, in addition, corruption is rampantthe system, and its corrmive effect not only impedes governmentadversely affects attitudes toward the government.
Wor. These various problems would obstruct politicalin peacetime. Tlie war. liowcver. cxacerlwtcs every problem,weakness, and makes even the simplest tasks of governingViet Cong control of large parts of tlie country, and varyinginsecurity elsewhere, greatly restrict the ability of lhe government toprograms of social and economic development. Finally, thehave fled from llie countryside lo the cities, ami who mayillion
indd to llie administrative burdens of the regime and mayan object for exploitation by its enemies, including of course the Vict Cong.
AJOR SOURCES OF STRENGTH
Consensus on lheignificant and often overlooked source of strength in South Vietnam is tlie consistently anti-Communist attitude of the country's jHil.tieally oclivo elements. Despite concern over various CVN policies toward war and peace and over the impact of the large US involvement in Vietnamese affairs, none has called for an end to the fightingithdrawal of US forces, 'llie many governmental shakeups llial have taken place have not been over basic policy concerning the continuation of the war or over the CVN's stcudfast refusal to deal with the Communists. Thus tbe Communists have been denied the opportunity of gaining power through the hack door in league: with oilier South Vietnamese groups. Anticommunism is strongest among the Catholics and military, many of whom fled from communism in North Vietnam
Continuity of Government. The Ky regime has now survived forionn. This remarkable longevity, reversing what appeared toersistent trend lowaid ever-changing, short-lived governments, has had positiveeffects at home and abroad vvliich have been reinforced by the impactilitary operations, "lhe government has at least had time to beginumber of major programs which heretofore liad progressed little Ik'VoikI the planning stage. Progress has been limited, and much of the emphasis and initiative has come from the US and US prodding. Nevertheless, Ky and his advisors liave demonstrated greater insight into the issues facing them and have shown greater flexibility in adopting remedial measures.
Political Continuity. Politically, the regime has also profited from its ability to maintain itself in power, especially from its success in facing down both militant Buddhist opposition and military plotting. Most politically activeviewed the September elections for the Constituent Assembly as an earnest of the regime's willingness toarger civilian role in theidwutercent of tfiose registered and overercent of the total adult population of Smith Vietnam voted, despite the opposition of both the militant Buddhists and the Viet Cong. The cabinet crisis in Octoberthe persistence of regional rivalries, hut the regime managed to dilute the impact of this episode. In any event, increasing numbers of politicians are probably coming to feel lhat there is political advantage in coexisting with the Ky regime as long as they sec reasonable prospectsransition to elected government.
Political Development. For the first lime since Diem's downfall, political activity is manifested more in legal channels than in demonstrations and coup plotting. This political activity, whileaft of new frictions andis essential and healthy in terms of political development. Moreover, the military leadership, which will remain the final arbiter of power iu any case.
is actively taking pait in this political evolution. Borrowing from the experience uf the South Korean military, the Ky regime is .seeking to find politicalo insure the military's participation in any future government With thisthey appear to lx* prepared to accept an elected governmentonst it ut iunal mandate,evelopment wouldromising step toward the creationovernmentopular national base.
Support. Obviously crucial in the military and economic fields,increased US presence hasew element of majorthe South Vietnamese body politic. The US role carries great weightVietnamese, so much so in fact that even inaction by the USormor, at the very least, lias the same impact by being sc-en asexample, several previous regimes became vulnerable when theirthat US support was weakening. Ky's regime is strengthened bythat most Vietnamese consider the US to he solidly behind it. TheUS presence has obviously increased the disruptive effect of the war oneconomy, and there are some latent anti-American sentiments.factors are likely to be aggravated by the infusion of larger numberstroops into the more heavily populated areas of the country.overall elTecl of the US presence has thus far been to contributestability.
IV. CURRENT SITUATION
Directorate. During the past year, the Directorate strengthenedwithin the military establishment, enhanced its standing inonsiderable degree of cohesiveness. Tlie successfultwo deeply entrenched Corps Commanders, Generals Thi and Quang.the stature of both Ky and Thieu. The precise relationship lietwocnleaders is not clear, but Ky certainly has the leading public role. Hestrength from the aura of US support, from the air force which heandroup of younger officers called tbe Baby Turks.group includesan, Director of Police and Chieflose confidant of Ky's, and General Khang. Commander ofand the Capital Military Zone. This combination has providedfor the Ky regime.
IS. There are persistent rumors of friction between Thieu and Ky, though we see no evidence tbat such friction is now of serious proportions. But the future cohesiveness of the Directorate dependsreat extent on theor at least continuing mutual tolerance, of these two officers.
he Constituent Assembly. Except for the Buddhist Institute, all the traditional political, regional, and religious groups are reflected inembcr Constituent Assembly- Tlie Assembly includes professional politicians,of the Dai Viet and VNQDD parties (badly splite-gionalists (such as the militant Movement for the Renaissance of thearge number of young and inexperienced delegates. Four political "blocs"
ei,
were formed for llie election of Assembly officers and committees, but eachonglomerate of differing interests, and their membership and the lines between them continue lo shift,
For the next few months at least, the Assembly will be the source of the issues on which thr civilian politicians and the regime will confront one another. The Directorate has not yet shown its band, but its military members would almost certainly resist any move which would deprive themonstitutional roleew government. Tlie precise goals of the civilians are not clear. In general, however, they distrust tbe Directorate and appear to believe that the time is ripe for the creationonstilnlional governmentuch larger role for the civilian elements. The September elections whetted their political appetites, anil since the military gave up some political power then, the civilians are pressing for more. Their motives range from parochial self-interest to genuine concernegitimate government. Tbe many divisions and rivalries within tlie Assembly will impair its ability toolid front against the Directorate.
Thereumber of potential problems that could lead to an open break, either by design or by accident, between the Assembly and theThe Assembly will continue to interpret its mandate for constitution-drafting broadly, while the Directorate will be suspicious of incursions into Its domain of power. There is considerable resentment in the Assembly over the power of the Directorate to change items In the draft constitution, reversible onlywo-thirds vote of the Assembly, The regime, for its part, is reluctant to relinquish this power until itairly good idea of what will be in the constitution. The desire of some Assembly members to retain the Assembly in being until tlie convocation of an elected legislature may also cause friction with the Directorate.
There are, however, factors that could lead toward compromise. The majority of the Assembly members probably are not interested inollision course with tbe government, in large part because they realize that if the Assembly fails, tliey are unlikely for some time to have another chance of sharing power. Moreover, there may be many who will advocate caution in tlie expectation that the very establishmentonstitutional system, even if it is not fully in accord wiih their desires, will provide new opportunities for change. Tlie Directorate also lias reason to try tohowdown. It probably lie-lievcs that the real test is not so much tlie questiononstitution but that of power afterwards, and it is aware of tlie US concern that there be aWiihin limits, the regime will probably try to he forthcoming on this matter. On Italance. we believe that an open break between the Directorate and the Assembly will be avoided andonstitution will be produced.
Although we consider it unlikely that the Ky regime will be overthrown during the near future, its downfall could seriously endanger the promulgationonstitution as well as the political progress made to date. Much would depend on how Ky was overthrown and what sort of regime succeeded him.
Progress would nol necessarily lie wholly lost, for example, if Ky wereby an internal palate coupinimum of violence and disruption, or if the new regime wen1 no less disposed to work toward constitutionalShould the coup be violent, however, or should therecries ofnd countercoupn, the whole structure created by past politicalwould almost certainly disintegrate.
V. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO
uing tlie course of political development in South Vietnam must he highly tentative. The country is in the throes of political evolution, the course of which will U-enonstitution is adopted,ery-real sense, political development in South Vietnam willay-to-day, month-to-rnonth plieiHimenon for some time lo come, and periodic upheavals and crises will threaten the entire ptocess. Indeed, as the pace of political events quickens, the factors thai work against stability may actually be exacerbated. Regionalism hi particular Is likely toolitically volatile factor. The Southern elements are resentful of the Northern/Central coloration of Ky's regime and fear that Ky and Loan are conniving lo perpetuate it at Southern expense, No assurance can lie given thai somemight not prove to be the ultimate undoing of the government.
A falling out among tin- mililary leaden could have serious consequences. As political activity increases, the possibility of frictions Ix-twcrn Kv and Thieu also increases Ky lias thm far lieen skillful and fortunate in his efforts to eon-tain the political power of individual Corps Commanders,uture occasion, be might Im- less successful. The question of how much political power is to Itc shared with llie civilian elements mightause of contention within the military, particularly since the Baby Turks appear to be less inclined towith Ihe civilians than is the Directorate.
Tlie prospect of negotiations could introduce uiiscttling influences into the political situation over lhe next year or so. At present, no significantgroup publicly advocates negotiations and the military lenders are quite opposed to then except on termsamount to Communist capitulation. Hence, any government that, in the near term, agreed to negotiations would increase its vulnerability to attack lry its politicalhe other hand, the large US presence may encourage the Vietnamese- to believe tliat the US will agree to no settlement that does not effectively insure tlie wrvivalon-Communkt SVN. the degree to which this confidence would remainounterweight to disruptive effects would depend heavily on the circumstarKes in which negotiations scented an imminent possibility.
Nevertheless, there arc developments which tend to make us cautiously optimistic about Ihe prospectsore stable political situation. Thesethe continuity of the Ky regime, its success in ridingeries of crises and potential crises, and ils ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises without resorting to outright repression. In addition, the electionon-
stituoiit Assembly, and the willingness ol both tlieeadership and civilian elements to attempt to work together augur well for continued political progress. The longer tin: process continues and is reflected in the development of new institutions and working relations, the more difficult it may become to reverse it by some single sudden move. Finally, the improved military situationgenerallyetter political climate.
2H. During tbe nest year or so, the successful holding of national elections would he an important indication of growing political stability. Actually, events are moving in thisonstitution will almost certainly call forelections, and probably legislative ones as well. Political maneuvering among the various civilian elements is already underway in anticipation ofand will grow more intense. New political alliances will eventually emerge, although it Ls too early to determine what they are likely to be. lire Dircc-loiiite's final decision concerning elections will depend on its assessment of the situation at the time^ if tbe military felt that elections seriously threatened their basic interests, they might move to postpone them. But we believe the cluinces are lietler than even that national electionsonducted successfully during (be period of this estimate.
If presidential elections are held, there will probablyilitary man who has resigned in order toerhaps Ky or Thieu, as well as civilian candidates. It ls not clear whether the military considers it essentialilitary leader Occupy the presidential seat orivilian would lie acceptable. Much of course would depend on the civilian. Tho military would probably find it easier to maintain unityilitaryTbe election> was opposed hy tlie military leadership would raise the chancesilitary coup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded, political development would haveerious setback.
Evenelatively smooth transition to an elected government, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. Ilicre is little evidence of any significant growthense of national commitment that would submerge special interests. Civil ian-mlUtarv and other rivalries will persist and will manifest themselves in recurring conflicts over tbe distribution of power within the government. Any government, particularly fl civilian one, will almost certainly be subject to debilitating bickering andfor influence, and vulnerable to plots from within and without. As long as tjie military leadership remains relatively united, il will have Ihe upper hand over others. It is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greaterthan any other group in the country. Tims for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almostunder strong military influence.
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