DEN WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATIONOTTOM
intelligence agenct OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
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Director/ComptroJ ler
REPLT
m?m. reply
jonn raranguyitv
FROM: ISIS MO.
In regard to our meeting with Mr, Helms'clock onecember, wc have prepared two options relatingetter the DCI may wish to send to the President concerning the OXCART/atter. These first draft copies are being sent to the Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology, the General Counsel and the Acting Director of Reconnaissance, CIA. for review and comment. We purposely took two approaches to the problem to enable recipients to consider alternative approaches
FOLD HCMB TO RETURN TO SENDER
Dec
APPROVED FOP ,
DATE:7 .
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IDEA LIST/OX CART
central intelligence agency
. C,
OfFICt Of THE DIRECTOR
A
6 Copy j
The President The White House Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
I am deeply concernedesulteeting inecently
participated with Mr. Cyrus Vance of the Department of Defense,
Mr. Charles L. Schultze, Director of the Budget, and Dr. Donald F. "
Hornig of your staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and
conclude upon recommendations with regard to the future of the OXCART
ovort photographic reconnaissance program.
During the course of theseoll of the participants
revealedajority of the group was in favor of phasing out the
OXCART program. Inast Lhe lone dissenting vote. It is my
understandingecommundation that the OXCART program be phased
out will bu forwarded to you by the Director of the Budget in the near
future. m prepared, as always, to accept and expeditiously*
implement any decision youarnestly solicit your consideration
of the factors uponase my dissent to this course of action.
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I was, admittedly, somewhat surprised at this consensusm acutely aware of the almost universal conviction within the intelligence community that the manned reconnaissance collection capability represented by OXCART is essential to the future fulfillment of high priority intelligence requirements of national interest.
Although there is some persuasive argumentation that there'are alternative capabilities which are adequate substitutes form firmly convinced that failure to maintain this demonstrated asset, which has been nurturedtate of operational readiness (evaluated and declared operationally ready ineriod of eight years and at considerable financial cost, wouldignificant gap in the national photo reconnaissance inventory. The projected savings which might result from termination of the program may prove to be more illusory than tangible. The extensive investment which has already been made in the development of the aircraft and. support facilities, both in this country and overseas, must be balanced against the relatively small savings that could be realized by abandoning the project at this time.
The basic issue, simply stated, is. civilian agency manned covert aerial reconnaissance capability is essential for the future fulfillment of high priority national intelligence requirements. ubmit,
imWfWS^CZpXCA RT
derived fromrogram. It is assumed that the political philosophy which guided the evolutionperational concepts, as well as program management, has not altered significantly with the passage of time and is as equally valid for OXCART today.
rested,verflights of the USSR were first undertakenas our ability to offer to the President the means whereby this vital
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might be collected without placing the United States in a
posture wherein the USSR or others could accuse the United^States of an act of pure military aggression. ery fundamental ingredient in achieving this capability was the irrefutable fact that the pilotivilian.employee of an Agency whose business was espionage. This policy also applied to countries other than the USSR which were subjected to covert
*
overflight. The policy has been reaffirmed on several occasions in the intervening years by your predecessors as well as the Chairmen of the House Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, the ranking minority members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the CIA Congressional subcommittee. m not aware, Mr. President, that you have ever expressed any views to the contrary.
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In essence, the logical conclusion depends mainly on the question of covert versus overt operations, and the political ramifications that pertain to each type of operation. We are of the opinion that once you inject the military element, e. g. an Air Force crew, the operation is noruly covert collection effort butilitary activity which should properly be conducted by the appropriate military service. It is further believed that CIA civilian sponsorship clearly identifies the mission as non-aggressive and permits plausible description of its nature as defensive rather than offensive. In addition, unlike the military, CIA controls no nuclear weapons, which rules out any propaganda suggestion that an irrational act by some subordinate commander mightuclear war.
ery practical sense, wc have learned from experience that CIA sponsorship in the caserotestuccessful overflight permits the U. S. military commander in the area to truthfully state, after investigation,
the flight without fear of subsequent exposure.
The rationale which dictates the useivilian CIA pilot forof denied areas leads directly to the question of program management. There appears to be no practical means of severing operational control of such programs from the management and developmental aspects of the activity. ill nol dwell on the detailed security measures which have been evolved by this Agency to protect these operations from public exposure. It is most unlikely that the Air Force could duplicate these procedures which arc uniquely associated with Agency operations. Suffice to note that these rather complex, but essential, procedures contribute
materially to increased protection of the mission itself,reater
facility in denying overflights even/'iough they have in fact occurred.
In addition, thereumber of special procedures which have been
developed by CIA to further the objectives and effectiveness of the covert
overflight program. For example, the Agency has over the years developed
a highly sophisticated analysis and personal evaluation program for
i
election ox psychologically adapted individuals to perform overflights. It has also conceived andound program for indoctrination and psychological preparation of-the Individual in the event of capture under
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these very unique circumstances. CIA also takes stringent measures to compartment and limit knowledge of the individuals as soon as they joint the project. It is doubtful that the Air Force could duplicate those program* and proceduree.
From the operational standpoint, in ten years of CIA management and controlverflights In all parts of the5 overflights of approximatelyenied countries) there has been only one incident which resulted in genuine embarrassment to the United States Government, this being the lossver the Soviet Union in May This rather remarkable record was not established by happenstance; rather it is the product of the entire concept of the CIA operation, including meticulous security, judicious mission planning and timing, specialized maintenance by expert contractor personnel on long-terra assignment, careful development of plausible cover stories and detailed contingency planning (includingcoordination and authentic documentation) to eliminate or minimize the harmful effects of an incident or mishap.
The picture is not complete without some reference to accomplishments in the field of aircraft and systems improvement and development. Over the years there have been many innovations to improve the performance, versatility and defensive capabilities of bothndmong
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them the introduction of higher thrust engines, in-flight refueling, advanced electronic countermeasures systems, new camera systems, carrier capability, personal equipment, etc. With few exceptions, these innovations and improvements were initiated and developed by CIA. In several cases, particularly in the electronics field, these new equipments have subsequently been adopted by the Air Force and the Navy and are being widely utilized in combat aircraft today.
If the OXCART program is terminated, it is virtually certain that the motivation and inspiration which led to these past accomplishments will be severely diminished for the future.
Another factor which cannot bc ignored and which has diroctthe prospects for future covert overflight operations, is theof third countries to provide support, e. g. staging bases,operation is military in nature. Traditionally, they have beento approve and cooperate in these activities when they are
ossible compromise arrangement, it has been proposed that if the OXCART program is terminated we might maintain within the SACrganization one or more CIA civilian pilots who could, if the equirement arose, be employed for covert overflight in an unmarkedhis proposal assumes that in the event of mishap CIA would accept
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responsibility for the flight. o not consider this hybrid expediency to be workable or realistic fromecurityanagement standpoint,ould be reluctant to engage in such an arrangement because of the potential embarrassment which could result to the United States Government.
In conclusion, Mr.ecommend that the OXCART program be continued in its present form, at least until such time as theasapability to perform covert overflights. Unlike the OXCARTheoes not haveapability today and it docs not appear likely to reach that stage of development for many months to come. The operational readiness date for theas been postulated on the assumption of rapid solution to current technical problems and we are not really certain when this will be achieved. Only when theavorable comparability to2eexamination of2 phase-out in terms of potential monetary savings to the government. In such anould still envisionthe sharing by the Air Force ofssets with this organization soovert capability under the management and control of the Central Intelligence Agency could be maintained.
Faithfully yours,
(Richard Helms}
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: The CIA High Performanceircraft
You will beaper from the Director, Bureau of the Budget, recommending discontinuance ofircraft program now managed and operated by the CIA. Before you make yourant to bring to your attention the events leading up to this recommendation and the reasons for my firm dissent.
For your information, the following background preceded the development ofn order to satisfy the national need for collection of photographic intelligence of the Soviet Union, the Central Intelligence Agency had, innitiated development arid operation of
ircraft after having received Presidential approval. This developmentoint program under Agency direction, but with the*- ull support and participation of the Air Force. The Bureau of the
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agreed to Agency contracting and management of the program, after the
Air Force acknowledged that the CIA could almost certainly achieve a
greater degree of security in procurement and operation than could the Air Force. Overflight of the Soviet Union commenced infter thirty successful missions (providing. with its only extensive photographic coverage of the Soviet Union up to thathe Soviet
overflight activity was terminated with the loss of Powers' aircraft in Anticipating the improvement in Soviet defenses, tho CIA, again with Presidential approval, had already embarked on the development
and postulated Soviet defenses by high speed, high altitude and low radar dc tec lability. esign competition between General Dynamics and Lockheedontract was awarded to Lockheed inor the design, development, production, and test of2 single place,ircraft for covert peacetime reconnaissance. Based on2 development, the Air Force later procured thirty-cwo, two-placo follow-on post strike reconnaissance aircraftor SAC, and three advanced interceptorsith similar performance goals.
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of the ever-present need for reduction ofBureau of the Budget, CIA, and the Department of Defense undertook
a joint study of the2 and Air Forcerograms In This study group presented three options for consideration: I. Maintain the status quo for both the2 and the militaryleets, as currently programmed and budgeted at aboutillion dollars through
II. Mothball the ten aircraft2 fleet and share the thirty aircraftleet between separate CIA and Air Force contingents, at an estimated savings ofillion dollars throughontinueIA and Air Force operational capability but with theilitary aircraft and at such time as theemonstrates operational readiness.
III. Mothball the2 fleet in8 and assign all missions, both peacetime and wartime to the Air Force,avings ofillion dollars through.
et with Dr.yrus Vance of the Department of Defense, and Mr.of the Budget, to discuss the proposed options.issented
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from the conclusion reached by them, which recommended Option III: termination of the2 program by8 and assignment of all missions, both peacetime and wartime to the Air Force.
5. My dissent is based on my firm belief that you should have the option now and at any future time to callemonstrated bivilian (CIA) reconnaissance capability to perform peacetime overflight missions. My rationale is as follows:
a. The2 aircraftroven capability. This fleet which now includes eight operational aircraft was declared operationally ready in5 after an exhaustive flight demonstration and reliability program. It has been maintainedeady status since then. This program has accumulatedlight hours at speeds ofnd above. Deployment and operation in the Far East can be accomplished within fifteen days of your direction.ecision at this time to terminate2 fleet, even though programmed to occur after the expected operational readiness of theould be disastrous to the continued opcrability of2 during the interim period.
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ircraft are currently restrictedecause of technical problems associated withtemperatures involved. The effect of theseaggravated by design differences peculiar to tho
The Air Force estimates Chat this follow-on, larger, andaircrafc will approach2 in performance and,
be operationally ready in This performance and readiness, however, are postulated on the assumption of rapid solution to current technical problems. Therefore, we do not
really know when theill be operationally ready, or ever
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compare favorably with the performance of thei
CIA flown, operated, managed, and directed aircraft
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operation continues to be preferable over denied areas. While the civilian would be charged with espionage in the event ofilitary pilot in similar circumstances would probably provoke tho charge that tha United States had committod an act of war.
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civilian Agency operated aircraft and programcivilian pilots, provides the only basis for friendlynations tono comment" posture orcovertly to support our intelligence collection effortsmanifestly military operation in the event of an incident.
ia difficult, if not impossible, to forecast ailwhich you, as President, must evaluatearticular crisis; the lack of an option to utilize a
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bona fide civilian capability would seriously restrict the latitude
of your choice, particularly in peacetime or an escalating situation.
As amply illustrated byowers incident, the verifiable
naturo of civilian Agency directed operations is of great importance
in calming fears of military agrosslon. The civilian nature of the
undertaking must be verifiable at all levels, as the truth of the
matter rapidly comes to the surface even with the bqst contrived
cover stories; in other words, the so-called "sheep
where military pilots are merely taken out of uniform and made
to look like civilians is inadequate, particularly in the event of a
poacetime international incident. To ask the CIA to assume
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public responsibility in this situation would invito the embarrassment which would result on exposure of the truth, wild iho iiinvlLAble impact on public opinion both at homo and among friendly and neutral nations.
Rivers, Vinson and Mahon, as well asof congressional committees, have flatly statedthat only the CIA could conductevelopmentmaintain its secrecy, and have indicated they did notother agency could securely conduct an operationalsensitive peacetime overflights of hostile territory. 2 capability as an asset for nationalthey do not believe should be controlled by the military.
cognizant congressional subcommittees havebriefed on the civilian status of the pilots in theand, of course, were also briefed on the civilianthe pilots in therogram. There seems to beacceptance and recognition of necessity for ain such circumstances asember of thethe event of capture over denied territory. The distinction
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between the military overflights of Cuba and Viet Nam as opposed to civilian overflights of other areas of the world was
clearly accepted.
h. The view of tlie Congresshole, as well as the CIA subcommittees, on the question of the effect of an overflight and shoot-down of an airplaneilitary pilot versus civilian should be taken into account. eel certain that the general view remains that the civilian would be the least dangerous and cause loss. public and world reaction. 6. Inecommend that the OXCART program be continued in its present form, at least until such time as theasapability to perform covert overflights. Unlike the OXCARTheoes not haveapability today and it does not appoar likely to reach that stage of development for many months to come. The operational readiness date for theas been postulated on the assumption of rapid solution to current technical problems and we are not really certain when this will be achieved. Only when theavorable comparability to2eexamination of thephase-out in terms of potential monetary
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savings to the government. In such anould still envision tho sharing by the Air Force ofssets with this organization soovert capability under the management and control of the Central Intelligence Agency could_be _maintained.
Richard Helms
LIST/OXCART
Original document.
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