India and Pakistan: Two Years After Tashkent
Special Report
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN: TWO YEARS AFTER TASHKENT
N resolution brought an end to the war ofndia andeach occupied parts ot" the other's territory, and trade, communications, andrelations had all been disrupted. Each side insisted thai the other make themove toward withdrawing from strategic positions, and the stalemate conlinuedthe restinally, under the auspices or the USSR. President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri agreed at Tashkenteries of measures designed to begin the process of restoring normal relations. In lhe two years since, there haslight and gradual improvement, delayed and complicated by the problem of Kashmir.
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"Spirit of Tashkent"
The stoat iaportanc measures agreed upon at Tashkentroop withdrawals to position* held prior to Infiltration by tho Pakistani forces; repatriation of prisoners; return of the high commissioners (ambassadors) to their posts; discouragement of propaganda; consideration of means to restore economic, trade, and cultural relations and; discussion of the return of property and assetsi and tho continuation of meetings at all levels on matters of direct concom to both countries.
Doth partlos quicklythe more immediatetroop withdrawal,ofndof correct diplomatic relations. The ban on propaganda did not last long, however, and the "Spirit of Tashkent"evere blow at the firstIndo-Pakistani ministerial meeting in6 when tho Pakistanis refused to studyIssues unless the Indians concurrently showed somein tha long-standing and emotionally charged dispute over Kashmir. Tho Indians replied that popular emotions in India at the tine prohibited anyon Kashmir, and that minor problems should beso as toore favorable climate.
in the end, all the two could agree on was that further discussion of specific matters
should be handled on thelevel by the high Although there has since been some agreement on minor points, meaningfulhas been delayedreoccupation with the dominating Kashmir issue.
The Importance of the Kashmir Dispute
India has steadfastly held to its position affirming the legality of7 accession of Jammu and Kashmir by its Hindu maharaja. ew Delhi also has maintained that it no longer considersbound to conduct ain Kashmir, despite tho UN resolutions calling forote, because the demilitarisation ofelement of thenever taken place. Moreover, tho Indians point out that four "free"have been held in Kashmir, thus providing the Kashmiris with ar.plc occasion to express their Will. Actually, strong-arm tactics and legal maneuvering governed tbe outcome of all four elections.
Buttressing these legalistic points Is tho fact that ever since9 cease-fire, India has held the lion's share of Kashmir, including the sought-after vale, and has had the military muscle to maintain Over the years, India gradually proceeded to integrate its portion of Kashnto the Indian union and also provided
the state with considerableassistance.
Some of New Delhi'son Kashmir are rooted in the Gandhian ideology that has long shaped the Congress Party's concept of tho Indian union. to this view, independent3 toecular state whose strength would be derived from the cooperative effortsast array of different religious and ethnic groups. To many, to the partitioning of tha subcontinent was an unfortunate departure from this ideal, and tourther secession from the union on the basis of religion would imperil national integrity. This argument is especially strong in north India, the region from which moot of the Congress is drown.
ndia added another argument, this one based on ita military strategy relative to China. India needs the Jaimau-Srinager-Leh road, running through the heart of the Vale of Kashmir, toivision of troop* standing guard in the Ladakh area of Kashmir, an area important for Indian defense against tha Chinese in Tibet and Sinklang.
Domestic politicallie behind all of these arguments. Nationalist sentiment in India opposes any settlement that would involve compromising on the present situation. Congress Party rulere, whose parliamentary majority was sharply reduced in last year's elections, are well
aware that too many concessions to Pakistan could bring theof their rule. This is all the more true because of thegains registered by such nationalistic parties as the Jan Sangh.
Although Indialebiscite or outrightfor Kashmir, it probably would be willing toettlement that involved some minor adjustments to9 cease-fire line, which would then become the international boundary between India and Pakistan. ettlement would hardly satisfy Pakistan, however, inasmuch as India would still hold the Vale.
Pakistan's position from the beginning has been based primarily on extending to Kashmir theof religious separation that was responsible for the original partition of India. Pakistan itself had been created in order to allow Muslims to live in their own country, free from repression andat the handsindu majority. Therefore, they argue, the people of Kashmir, who are predominately Muslim, should have the opportunity totheir land into Pakistan if they wish, an opportunity denied them by the Hindu maha-raja's accession to India
Pakistan's argument is not altogether altruistic. If souslim area as Kashmir were to remain in the
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Indian Union, tho principlethe original partition of India would be undermined. Pakistan's right to exist might become even more questionable in the minds of some Indiana. Furthermore, many Pakistanis maintain that Kashmir iaogicalof Most Pakistan. Theof many of tha rivers vital to Meat Pakistan's agriculture are in Kashmir, and tho easiest trade route from Srinagar leads
into Pakistan. Politicalare also at work. No government in Pakistan could entirelytrong stand on Kashmir and survive, any more than could the Congress Party in India.
Hecent Developments onKashmir Problem
Despite the adamant attitudes that have hadears to harden, and which the Tashkent accords did nothing to alleviate,circumstances may dhJsc sue-:
alteration in Kashmir's status inevitable. India seams to be faced with growing unrest in the Vale. The young people there are becoming frustrated andwith the inability of their elders to acquire freedom for the Kashmiris. This new generation is not as responsive as was the previous one toto secularism and oouldeedbed for growing communal disorder. The present Sadiq government, discredited by fraudulents widely
regarded as weak and ineffective. If the unrest continues, New Delhi may have to decide between harsh repression and greater autonomy.
Kashmir developments will also be affected by the releaseanuary of Sheik Abdullah, perhaps the most Influential Kashmiri political figure, frostears of almost continual imprisonment. The ahiek will probably return to his native state, and the Gandhi government appears to bealculated risk that his presence there will not further inflame local New Delhi may hope thatelative moderate among Kashmiri nationalists, will win aupport away from moreleaders who areeparatist line. The sheikhas indicated that he will attempt to rosume his dialogues with the Indian and Pakistani heads ofby his rearrestn an effort toolution equally acceptable to "India, Pakistan, Kashmir, everybody."
Pakistan may alao beits poaition aomewnet. In the spring7 there were indicationa from Lahore that public animosity against India, which became Intense during and after5 warfare, was subsiding and that Interest in Kashmir was declining. The view from Lahore was that the economic reasons for wanting Kashmir were no longer as important as they
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been. The completion of the Mangal dam for example, had decreased the importance of Kashmir's headwaters for west Pakistan's agriculture. The Mangal dam had also demonstrated that the Indus Basin Agreementn irrigation scheme dividing the rivers from the Indus to the Sutle] watersheds between India and Pakistan, can provide West Pakistan's water needs. In retrospect, moreover, many Lahoris were disillusioned with the failure of the Kashmiris to rise up against Indianstead oflebiscite, many Pakistanis in the Lahore area began to believe last spring that partitionpecial status for the Vale would be sufficient. Although thismay be held byew west Pakistanis, Lahore is an important cultural center for west Pakistan, and it is possibleore moderate attitude may in time appear elsewhere in west Pakistan. Furthermore, the on-tire issue of Kashmir has never bean at all popular in Eastwhich contains the greater portion of the country's
President Ayub Khan has alsoess intransigent position on Kashmir that maythe changing attitudes noted in Lahore. Although Ayub said in his regular monthlyin early September that there had been norom India, and that the Kashmiris were still subjected to great atrocities, his wording waanot inflammatory. to relations with India filled only about one tenth of the speech.
Of much greater significance than this speech was Ayub's visit to Moscow at the end of September. It is certain that Ayub hoped to secure Soviet military aid,iminution of Soviet military supplies to India, andro mite of Soviet pressure on the Indians to be moreon the Kashmir question. He apparently failed on all three counts. The joint communique issued at the end of the visit did not even mention Kashmir specifically, and there was no agreed formulaolution to Indo-Pakistani disputes.
After his unsuccessful gambit in Moscow, Ayub reportedlyto close aides that it was obvious that there was no "great power" that would force India to any compromise on Kashmir, and that the Pakistanis must become more realistic. Re added that the Soviet leaders had advised Pakistan to try to settle its differences with India by direct peaceful negotiations, and that they could not count on the Soviet Union to press India.
Progress on Lesser Issues
In the few months following Ayub's visit toore conciliatory Pakistani position toward India did emerge. protest notes on communal disorders in India softened in
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tons. Increased personalbetween representatives of the two countries arein the offing. Rawalpindi is said to be reviewing theof negotiations for resump-tlon of air servicea between the two countries and of transit trade from India to Afghanistan over Pakistani surface routes.
If agreements could be made regarding air service and transit trade, they would add to the modest list of agreements raado on minor pointa since Tashkent, both in commercial and military matters.
Coscaercial airlines of each nation resumed overflights of the other's territory in Infficials from Eaat Pakistan and from India's Assam State agreed to resume demarcation of the India -East Pakistan borders. links, which had been only partially restored after Tashkent, were fullyin
Some important commercial poblems remain to be Solved, especially the restoration of trade. Although India removed its prohibition on trade with Pakistan inakistan has refused to trade directly. Pakistan still does not allow India to export by road directly to Afghanistan, although the Afghans are allowed to transit their exports--Btainly fruit--to India. India does receive Pakistani jute through third countries.
The Indua Waters Commission met few problems after5 war,ew problem haa arisen over tha waters flowing through India and East Pakiatan. India iaow dam at rarakka on the Ganges just above the East Pakistan border. The Farokkais designed to divert part of the flow of the Ganges into the Hooghlyributary flowing south past Calcutta to the Bay of Bengal. The aim is to flush out the silting Calcutta harbor and to reduce the high salinity of therims source of Calcutta's water supply.
Pakistan long maintained that the barrage would prevent much water from reaching the lower arms of the Ganges In Eastduring the fall dry season and thus would endanger rice and jute crops. Moreover, it would be impossible for East Pakistan to develop ita reaouroes inwith plans drawn up at the request of Pakiatan by the American-based International Engineering Company. Aboutillion east Pakistanis and four million acres of Eaat Pakiatan land would be adversely affected, the Pakistania claimed
Discussions about tho dam took place before5 war, after which the issue laydormant. Recently, both aides have shown on Interest in settling the dispute and now seem willing to engage the serviceshird party to help workolution. The Harvard Center for Population Studies, which has shown an interest in the matter,
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some similar inatitutlon might well provide the catalyst needed to break the deadlock. Although the atmoaphere seems to haverecentlyettlement of the Ganges Riverrotracted period of atudy and negotiation will probably bebefore any agreement is reached. If the Pakistanisachieve what they consider an acceptable settlement, they may take the issue to the US.
The Military Situation
Aa in commercial rotations, there haa bean some progress on the military scene, although serious problems remain. In6 the commanders of the Indian and Pakistani armies met to discuss measure* toborder incidents frommajor issues. hot line" to be catablishod between their army commands, and agreed to give each other prior notification of troop movements along the border. In7 the fourth auch meeting took place between Pakistani Coramander in Chief Yahya Khan and Indian Army chief Kumaramangalam. Eachthat the talks ware pleasant and satisfactory,it seems they merelyprevious agreements. In general, the militaryof tha two countries, many of whom served together in the British Indian Army priorave found it easier to deal with each other than have their civilian counterparts.
Rapport among Westernized senior officera cannot alone solve all the military-related problems, however. One such problem is the continuing Indian claim that the Pakistanis are training and arming the rebellious Naga and Miio tribe* of eaatern India. There is no firm evidence that the Pakistanis are actually aiding the tribesman in any substantial manner at the present time, although they did help them in the. The suapicion created by the charges will probably continue to caune strains between the two countries.
A much more serious military problem is the ares race between the two nations. India continues with ita plan to modernize And strengthen its armed forces, on the grounds that it must contend not only with Pakistan but also with China. Pakistan, in turn, has bean determined to keep pace by improving the ratio ofto Indian ground forces and by increasing ita inventory of tank* and airplanes.
Although each country, at the prodding of the US, reduced its military budget for8 fiscal year, these reductions were alight. If they are to be meaningful, the reductions must be repeated in tho years to come. So far, such reductions hove not signaled an end to the arms race
on the aubcontxnant, which will probably go on--at least to some degrec--as long as the an into si -tiea between India and Pakistan continue.
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this race, it is highly unlikely that either side is actually contenplating wax with the other, although each accusos the other of nefarious intentions. Pakistan appears to haveessonnd will not be eager soon toerious India, reasonablywith the status quo, haa no reason to resume hostilities against its smaller neighbor, especially since military action would only draw tho Chinese and tho Pakistanis closer together.
Prospects
Thore hauefinite though slight improvement in relations between India andin recent months. Despite gradual progress on minor issues, however, it would be tooto hoperamatic breakthrough in the foreseeable future. Relatione between the two countries remain delicate, and seemingly minor issues can cause setbacks.
anuary, lor example, Pakistan expelled an Indianassigned to Dacca, accusing him of complicitymall group of East Pakistaniwhohad been arrested for allegedly plotting against the government. New Delhi immediately retaliated by evicting aEmbassy counselor. The bitternnns and hostile press play that ensued soon subsided, but the incident pointed up tbe sensitivity of each side to real or imagined affronts by the othor.
Nevertheless, the over-all trend toward improvement seems likely to continue. Pakistani officials appear willing to move ahead with efforts to clear away lesser problems oven though the Kashmir dispute remains On the Kashmir issue itself. President Ayub has made some public remarks recently which, although obscuro, seem to signify an encouraging moderation of his stand. In late November, he urged the settling of the Kashmir dispute in the light of UN resolutions or through any other established channels of justice. agazinein Bid-December, he said that Pakistan was willing to accept mediation from any quarter on Kashmir provided it is just,and honorable. He may nave had inody similar to the Rann of Kutch Tribunal, whose decision is expected soonerritorial dispute with India that led to armed clashes in
Mrs. Gandhi seems to be sworehange in Pakistani attitudes, in recent pressafter Abdullah'sshe stated that she had no objection to takingummit meeting with Ayuo, and thought that somo recent Pakistani statements had been more hopeful than it is therefore possible that the coming year could see renewed discussion conoerning Kashmir, along with talks on other matters. An ultimatehowever, isong way off.
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